Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: F719/16 DATE: September 30, 2016 SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO FAMILY COURT

RE: Jefferson Andrew Thompson, Heather Anne Thompson and Jared Warren Thompson, applicants AND: Alysha Marie Thompson, respondent

BEFORE: MITROW J.

COUNSEL: William R. Clayton for the applicants Salim J. Khot for the respondent

HEARD: August 3, 2016

Endorsement

Introduction

[1] The issue on the motions before the court is interim custody and interim access relating to two children: Landon, age 4, and Dean, age 3 (“the children”).

[2] The affidavit material filed on the motions was unnecessarily voluminous in the extreme; many affidavits contained evidence that was repetitive and a regurgitation of previous affidavits filed by the same deponents; a number of the affidavits filed from witnesses wandered outside of the facts personally observed by the witnesses and drifted into inadmissible comment, conjecture and opinion; in totality, a not insignificant portion of the affidavit evidence was of little or no assistance to the court. Further, the parties ignored the court’s directive in its endorsement dated June 30, 2016 that further material should be brief and relevant. The parties are put on notice that the failure to comply with this directive will be a factor in relation to costs.

[3] There are three applicants: Jefferson Andrew Thompson (“father”); he is the father of the children and the son of Heather Anne Thompson (“grandmother”) and Jared Warren Thompson (“grandfather”), who are the children’s paternal grandparents and are sometimes collectively referred to as “the grandparents.”

[4] The respondent, Alysha Marie Thompson, is the children’s mother (referred to in these reasons as the “mother”). The mother and father were married to each other in 2015.

[5] This is a divorce action. On June 15, 2016, the applicants brought an emergency ex parte motion before me; on that date, an order was made, inter alia, awarding to the applicants on a without prejudice basis interim primary care and control of the children with access to the mother as agreed to by the parties or as ordered by the court; the motion was adjourned to June 29, 2016; an order was made for service of all material and a three month (now expired) police assistance order was made.

[6] The basis of the ex parte order was that the mother wrongfully had changed the status quo and had absconded with the children from London to Woodstock; the mother had quickly commenced an application in the Ontario Court of Justice in Woodstock seeking custody of the children; at the hearing of the ex parte motion, the applicants’ counsel provided the court with a copy of the application issued by the mother in the Ontario Court of Justice.

[7] Procedurally, the present application, being under the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) c.3 [as am. by S.C. 1997, c.1], has the effect of staying the application commenced by the mother: s. 27 Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12; the evidence is that the Woodstock application has not proceeded any further; also, leave has been granted to the grandparents, permitting them to make an application for custody and/or access and adding them as parties pursuant to s. 16(3) of the Divorce Act.

[8] All interlocutory orders made to date have been pursuant to the Divorce Act.

[9] The children were apprehended from the mother’s custody in Woodstock by the police and were returned to the applicants in accordance with the police assistance order.

[10] On the return of the motion on June 29, 2016, some procedural orders were made that included adjourning the motions to August 3, 2016 for a special appointment; the following day, on June 30, 2016, an order was made that included a regular interim access schedule in favour of the mother every weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Monday at 6:00 p.m. This access was conditional on the following: the mother had to continue to reside in Woodstock at the residence of her aunt, Christine Elizabeth Munday (“the aunt”), and her uncle, Sean Edward Munday (“the uncle”), and the mother’s aunt or uncle was required to be present at all times during access. The mother’s access was ordered suspended until such time as the mother delivered the children’s passports to her counsel, Mr. Khot, and Mr. Khot confirmed same in writing. The evidence is that this happened promptly after the order was made.

[11] The above orders were to remain in effect, after the special appointment on August 3, 2016 was argued, pending further order of the court. Also, it was ordered on August 3, 2016, on consent, that the mother’s access may be supervised by another adult person who was approved as a foster parent, or as a relief foster parent, by the Children's Aid Society of Oxford County. This order was made to permit the aunt and uncle to go on a planned vacation in August 2016.

Discussion

[12] There is significant conflict in the affidavit material and it is unnecessary to delve, in any extensive way, into the conflicting accounts of the facts; that task will fall to the trial judge.

[13] The children’s parents are young; based on their respective form 35.1 affidavits, the father is currently age 25 and the mother is currently age 23; to add some context, when the eldest child, Landon, was born, the mother was age 19 and the father had just turned age 21.

[14] The mother is from Woodstock and that is where her support network is.

[15] There is no dispute as to the following basic essential facts: a) in 2011, the parents, while living in Woodstock, began dating each other; b) shortly thereafter, the parents began living together in the father’s Woodstock apartment; c) in that same year, the parents moved to London into an apartment on Cheapside Street; d) Landon was born while the parents lived in that apartment; e) later, when the mother was expecting her second child, the parents moved into a larger apartment in the same building; f) Dean was born on July 30, 2013 and, on the next day, the father “broke up with” the mother; g) as a result of the breakup, the mother and both children went to live with the grandparents in their apartment on King Street in London; h) in December 2013, the parents reconciled; during their separation, the father had only sporadic minimal contact with the children – five times, according to the mother, and “somewhere closer to ten times” according to the father; the reality, I find, is that during this period of separation, the father effectively abandoned his two children, seeming to be more interested in pursuing a relationship with his new girlfriend; the father’s excuse that the mother was preventing his access is quite lame; one problem, as noted by the mother, was that the father insisted on bringing his girlfriend to meet the children, which not surprisingly aggravated the mother, especially considering the fact that the father himself had no relationship with his newborn son, Dean, as of yet, as the father exited Dean’s life when Dean was one day old; later, it turned out, as deposed to by the father, that his girlfriend took it upon herself to burn the parents’ family photos; the mother’s resistance in having the father’s girlfriend attend at access visits appeared to be child-focussed and in the children’s best interests; i) when the parents reconciled, the mother and the children moved back to the apartment with the father; j) a plan was then devised, agreed to by all parties at the time, that the grandparents would purchase a suitable building where everyone could live; as a result, the grandparents purchased a triplex on Cathcart Street in London; renovations were done to this residence, with the result that the parents and children would live in the lower apartment, the grandparents would live in the main floor unit and the upper unit would be rented out to a tenant to bring in some income; the parents and children occupied the apartment allocated to them in or about April 2014; k) in June 2015, the parents were married to each other despite having what appeared to be a somewhat ongoing unstable relationship; and l) in or about April 2016, the parents separated on a final basis; the mother and both children continued to live in the parents’ apartment in the triplex while the father moved out, staying with his parents, and later found a rental residence (applicants’ factum, paragraph 116).

[16] As at June 13, 2016, which was the day that the mother took the children to her aunt’s residence in Woodstock, the status quo was that the children were ordinarily resident in London, Ontario and residing in the triplex.

[17] On the evidentiary record, it is quite apparent that these young parents at times lacked the necessary maturity required to effectively parent their children. This, too, was quite apparent to the grandparents.

[18] As a result, and there can be no real dispute about this, the grandparents became an integral and inseparable part of the children’s lives. They assisted extensively in caring for the children. They provided significant financial assistance to the parents for the benefit of the children, including rent; although the grandmother worked fulltime, the grandfather worked part-time in Woodstock and was pursuing studies, which he abandoned, to assist in child care.

[19] I have little doubt that the grandparents’ financial contributions are accurately set out in the grandmother’s affidavit and that they exceeded $32,000 since 2011. The mother, as did the father, acknowledged the grandparents’ financial assistance. The grandparents stepped in financially as the parents both were unable to maintain or secure employment for any length of time.

[20] The father dropped out of his first Fanshawe College program after the parents moved to London. He then worked at a company called Stream briefly – it was the father’s evidence that he worked there approximately eight months, then later in the same affidavit he deposes he worked there for approximately one year (affidavit sworn July 11, 2016). Thereafter, the father went to Medix College and finished that program but was unable to find employment related to his field of study.

[21] Since coming to London, the mother has had little, if any, gainful employment. At various times, the parents, either or both of them, were in receipt of Ontario Works.

[22] The father deposes that he is now employed fulltime.

[23] At the heart of the factual dispute is the different characterizations put forth by the opposing parties as to the history and current situation.

[24] The applicants band together to tell the same story and to make the same complaints about the mother. These complaints include the following: that the mother is unfit to parent; that she has unresolved mental health issues that affect her ability to parent; that historically the mother has ignored the children, has failed to meet their needs and has failed to properly supervise the children; that the children are at risk of harm in her care unless supervised; that the mother has acted aggressively towards one or both of the children; that the mother often was disinterested in child care; that the mother was a poor homemaker, unable to maintain a reasonable standard of cleanliness in the home; and that the father and the grandparents intervened to provide stable and effective parenting for the children.

[25] The grandparents maintain that they were the de facto primary caregivers; further, all the applicants depose that discussions involving all parties were held after the final separation, and that a consensus was reached that the grandparents would, for now, assume custody of the children, and that the mother would continue to reside in the triplex, but that the children would live in the grandparents’ apartment.

[26] It was the applicants’ evidence that the parties discussed a separation agreement being signed, giving custody of the children to the grandparents; the applicants further deposed that they encouraged the mother to get independent legal advice, which she declined according to the applicants, although she did agree with the plan.

[27] The mother has a different story to tell. She deposes as follows: that at all material times, she was the children’s primary caregiver; that although the grandparents were very helpful and assisted not only with child care but also household duties, which the mother stated she appreciated, that she still remained the primary caregiver; that the father was at various times disinterested in child care; when the parties were together, the father was absent at times during the evenings pursuing his martial arts activities; that many of the allegations levied against the mother were false; and that the father was a poor housekeeper and was of little help around the house.

[28] Although the mother acknowledged occasions when she was not as attentive to the children as she should have been, or may have treated one or more of the children inappropriately, the mother generally characterized these as isolated occurrences. The mother explained that this conduct was related to her feeling depressed and alone, which caused her difficulty in coping with all aspects of child care.

[29] As to the state of the house, the mother deposed that during both pregnancies she often felt quite ill, including nausea, and that she had little, if any, understanding or support from the applicants, in particular the father, as to the extent that her health affected her ability to do things around the house. The mother also deposed that during her second pregnancy, her ongoing illness as a result of the pregnancy also compromised her ability to care for the eldest child.

[30] The mother is quite vocal in denying any agreement to give custody of the children to the grandparents; in fact, she deposed that the father threatened court action if the mother failed to agree to this custody proposal and, further, the mother deposed that the father told her that the court would be told that she was unfit to care for the children because of her mental health issues.

[31] Near the end of May 2016, the mother reached out to the grandmother, wanting to go to the hospital because of her mental health. The text messages exchanged between the mother and grandmother indicate that the mother agreed that she was feeling suicidal and that she wanted to go to emergency. The grandmother accompanied the mother to the hospital and was present, with the mother’s consent, when the mother met with the doctors. There is no dispute that the mother stated during the meeting that she had tried to commit suicide approximately two weeks or so earlier by swallowing pills. The children were not with the mother at that time according to the mother’s evidence. The mother was not admitted to hospital.

[32] It is noteworthy that in an exchange of text messages the day prior to going to the hospital that the mother told the grandmother “I need a mom right now. You’re the only one I have that I trust.” On the day after the visit to the hospital, the mother forwarded a text message to the grandmother thanking her for going to the hospital with her. She added “I really appreciate it. It means a lot.”

[33] In relation to mental health issues, the gist of the applicants’ evidence is that the mother has suffered from depression or other mental health issues for a number of years. According to the applicants, this would result in the mother not being able to function, including not getting out of bed, not attending to the children and spending time either watching television or playing videogames.

[34] The mother characterizes her recent suicide attempt, and her depression, as situational. She asserts that she felt depressed and anxious as a result of her recent final separation, the pressure being exerted on her to give custody to the grandparents and the fact that the grandparents had, in her view, transitioned from being supportive to now being controlling. The mother deposes that she felt anxious, with nowhere to go. All her supports were in Woodstock.

[35] From the mother’s perspective, the precipitating event occurred when the mother had been away for a short while and returned to find that the grandparents had moved the children’s beds into their apartment and, in her view, had thereby wrongly assumed custody of the children.

[36] The mother’s aunt and uncle are foster parents with the Children’s Aid Society of Oxford County. It was the aunt’s evidence that she had been actively involved in the mother’s life since birth, and that in 2005 the mother was placed in the aunt’s temporary care and custody and eventually the aunt obtained full custody of the mother and her sister.

[37] The grandparents had arranged, and paid, for the children to attend a private preschool, Woodstock Trinity School, which is actually located in Innerkip, a small community close to Woodstock. The children began to attend at Trinity in September of 2015; the grandfather would drive the children there daily and pick them up at the end of the day. This proved convenient for those days when the grandfather was working in Woodstock.

[38] The evidence, I find, supports a conclusion that although the mother was at home, that she had no issue with the children attending this private preschool, which also has classes for school-age children. The grandparents paid the fees. Accordingly, the children attending preschool daily during the school year was part of the status quo.

[39] On June 13, 2016, the mother arrived at the school to take custody of the children; school officials contacted the grandfather and refused to release the children. Police were called and eventually the mother was permitted to take the children to her aunt’s residence. This prompted the applicants’ ex parte motion two days later.

[40] The mother deposes that she has never been diagnosed with depression or any other psychiatric disorder. She does not dispute that, in 2015, she asked the grandmother to accompany her to a walk-in clinic because she was feeling depressed and anxious. The grandmother deposes that she sat in on the appointment with the doctor, at the mother’s request, and that the doctor told her that based on her symptoms, she may be depressed. The mother was prescribed co-sertraline. It was also the grandmother’s evidence that the mother was referred to Dr. Gangdev, a psychiatrist; however, the mother does not appear to respond to the allegation regarding a referral to a psychiatrist.

[41] The mother does attach to her material a CMHA Oxford crisis assessment report, dated June 6, 2016, where the mother was seen on self-referral by a professional (although not a doctor). The report is generally positive and assesses a risk of suicide as zero on a scale of zero to ten, where ten is high.

[42] It is noteworthy that both parents have accused each other of being in effect addicted to video games. Each parent admits to a history of video gaming, but portrays the other as the worst offender. The only sensible conclusion is that the evidence relating to video gaming is but another example of each parent’s immaturity in relation to parenting, and misplaced priorities.

Decision

[43] While the mother professes to feel much better, given her current living circumstances and her supports, she needs to consider whether to provide clinical notes and records from her recent hospital admission and the walk-in appointment. She also needs to disclose whether she was referred to a psychiatrist and, if so, she should consider whether to provide a report and/or clinical notes and records from that psychiatrist.

[44] It is also important for the mother to obtain an up-to-date report from her treating family physician, summarizing her health status and in particular her mental health and any medications that she is taking.

[45] The case conference which has been set for October 27, 2016 at 11:30 a.m. shall be before me and the trial coordinator has made necessary changes to the court schedule to accommodate that.

[46] I will leave it for now for the parties to agree through counsel for medical record disclosure by the mother. If there is an issue, then that can be addressed at the case conference.

[47] The following are the guiding statutory provisions set out in s. 16 of the Divorce Act:

Joint custody or access (4) The court may make an order under this section granting custody of, or access to, any or all children of the marriage to any one or more persons.

Access (5) Unless the court orders otherwise, a spouse who is granted access to a child of the marriage has the right to make inquiries, and to be given information, as to the health, education and welfare of the child.

Terms and conditions (6) The court may make an order under this section for a definite or indefinite period or until the happening of a specified event and may impose such other terms, conditions or restrictions in connection therewith as it thinks fit and just.

Factors (8) In making an order under this section, the court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child of the marriage as determined by reference to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child.

Past conduct (9) In making an order under this section, the court shall not take into consideration the past conduct of any person unless the conduct is relevant to the ability of that person to act as a parent of a child.

Maximum contact (10) In making an order under this section, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child of the marriage should have as much contact with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child and, for that purpose, shall take into consideration the willingness of the person for whom custody is sought to facilitate such contact.

[48] Although there is conflicting evidence, as noted earlier, I am less than persuaded by the mother’s criticism of the grandparents alleging that they have overstepped their role and are now attempting to control the mother. The evidentiary record suggests, more likely than not, that the grandparents at all times were motivated by the best interests of both children, with their involvement being welcomed, and accepted, by both parties; that the grandparents were concerned about the ability of both parents to parent and felt that they needed to step in. Consequently, the grandparents became involved in all aspects of the children’s lives, including arranging and taking them to extracurricular activities, to medical appointments, paying for dental costs, caring for the children, assisting the parents with housecleaning, being there to look after the children when the parents were unavailable to look after the children, arranging for and taking the children to preschool and assisting the parents financially. Last, but not least, they purchased a residence suitable for themselves, the parents and the children, and made necessary renovations to accommodate the parents.

[49] However, I do find that the grandparents were overly generous in their criticism of the mother, while at the same time, unreasonably, being very frugal with any criticism of their son (the children’s father).

[50] In relation to interim custody and interim access, I deal first with the father. While it is clear that he has participated in some caregiving for the children, he also is agreeable to handing over custodial responsibility to his parents. The material suggests that the father either cannot, or does not want to, be a primary caregiver for the children. The real custody issue is between the mother and the grandparents. This is quite evident by the fact that the grandparents are parties in this case, with the agreement of the father; further, the father moved and left the children behind in the care of others.

[51] While much criticism has been levied at the mother, and accepting that there was reason for genuine concern, the situation is best analyzed that the mother can be assisted in parenting the children with appropriate supports for the time being. That would be in the children’s best interests. The evidence is clear and compelling that the mother does have appropriate supports, including her aunt and uncle with whom she resides. Both the aunt and uncle have agreed to carry out their duties of supervision for as long as necessary and this would also include the mother continuing to reside with her aunt and uncle while caring for the children.

[52] While I agree that the mother’s conduct in absconding with the children was inappropriate and not in the children’s best interests, the reality is that that issue was dealt with by the children being returned to the applicants. The children cannot be forever punished for the mother’s misdeed if an order can otherwise be crafted that is in the children’s best interests.

[53] The status quo as to who had primary care of the children, as between the grandparents and the mother, cannot be definitively established on the conflicting evidence. The mother submits that the children have always been with her and that she has never lived apart from the children. There is some merit to that submission.

[54] It is not possible to make a finding whether or not the mother agreed that the grandparents would have custody. The best that can be extracted from the conflicting evidence is that the grandparents and the mother were the three main people who were all inextricably involved in the care of the children. Accordingly, any order for interim custody should proceed on that basis. That was the status quo, and the jurisprudence is clear as to the importance of status quo, as a factor to consider, on a motion for interim custody.

[55] The mother relies on Foster v. Allison, [2003] O.J. No. 3681 (S.C.J.), a decision of Aston J. Not unlike the present case, Aston J. was dealing with motions for interim custody where the real contest was between the mother and the paternal grandparents. At para. 1, Aston J. stated in part:

1. … If the legal issue was confined to preservation of a status quo or to a factual determination of who has spent more time looking after the child in the past, the grandparents would prevail, but the issue is more complex, even at this interim stage.

[56] In awarding interim custody to the mother, with generous access to the father and grandparents, Aston J. found that the mother had never relinquished or abandoned her custodial rights pursuant to s. 20(4) of the Children's Law Reform Act; that although the mother had delegated responsibility for the child’s day-to-day care to the grandparents, extensively and over a protracted period of time, she did so on a temporary basis to better her employment situation and personal life (paras. 3-4). At para. 6, Aston J. states:

6 The child has thrived in the past arrangements but a continuation of the stable status quo does not inevitably trump the mother's prima facie right to custody. Continuation of a stable status quo in which the child has thrived is a factor of great importance, but not the only factor.

[57] Aston J. further noted at para. 7 that, considering the mother’s new circumstances, that she now is ready to assume full responsibility for the child once again.

[58] Setting aside that the present case is being decided under the Divorce Act, rather than the Children's Law Reform Act as was the situation before Aston J., it is apparent, and with some justification, that the mother compares herself to the mother in the case before Aston J.

[59] Cases, of course, turn on their facts; in the present case, the mother still has to address issues as discussed in these reasons.

[60] However, to be clear, and to assist these parties, hopefully, in working towards a final resolution, one of the objectives of the order being made, and in the children’s best interests, is to preserve the mother’s relationship with the children and to create a situation where the mother is not overpowered by the three applicants and where her role in the lives of the children is not minimized.

[61] The ability of the mother to take the necessary steps to address any issues that may relate to her ability to parent will be an important consideration moving forward. All parties are encouraged to reflect on the sage comments of Aston J. in para. 6 of his reasons, quoted above.

[62] I find that it is in the children’s best interests that the grandparents and the mother share time with the children as set out in the order below and, further, that the mother and grandparents shall have interim joint custody.

[63] All three applicants signed a form 35.1 affidavit confirming that the children will be attending Woodstock Trinity School starting September 2016. Accordingly, the order below takes that into account.

[64] Although the mother resides in Woodstock and the grandparents reside in London, the sharing of time with the children between the mother and the grandparents can be accomplished considering that London and Woodstock are in reasonably close proximity to each other and also considering that the grandfather works at least part-time in Woodstock and that the children are to attend Woodstock Trinity School.

[65] Given that the motion was argued in the summer and school has now started, in the event that the children are not attending at Woodstock Trinity School, then that should be explained in brief affidavit evidence as contemplated in the order below. If the applicants have unilaterally deviated from their plan and enrolled the children in school or daycare elsewhere, then that may result in a change in the order at the case conference.

[66] There is conflicting evidence regarding the children’s allergies, if any. The applicants shall obtain and serve and file a report from the allergist prior to the case conference.

[67] The order below also deals with extracurricular activities.

[68] A provision is made in the order for the father to have interim access during times when the children are with the grandparents.

[69] There are currently some conditions that place restrictions on how the mother spends her time with the children. Any eventual complete lifting of those conditions will depend in part on updated medical evidence from the mother. The order below continues the conditions, although on a relaxed basis. The mother will have an opportunity, as set out in the order below, to argue for further relaxing of the conditions and/or removal of conditions. Assuming medical evidence that is positive, the mother will be in a much better position to present a plan of care where she is able to obtain her own residence, suitable for herself and the children.

[70] Prior to the case conference, the parties should reflect on whether the Children’s Lawyer should be involved, so that the issue can be addressed at the case conference. If the parties all agree, a draft standard form order should be prepared.

Order

[71] For reasons set out above, the following order is made:

1. The mother and the grandparents shall have interim joint custody of the children.

2. During the school year, the children shall be in the care of the mother and grandparents in accordance with a two-week rotating schedule as follows: (a) in week one, the children shall be with the mother from 6:00 p.m. Saturday to 6:00 p.m. Tuesday; (b) in week two, the children shall be with the mother from 6:00 p.m. Friday to 6:00 p.m. Tuesday; (c) the children shall be with the grandparents at all other times; (d) while the children are attending Woodstock Trinity School, the mother’s parenting time on a Friday shall start when school is finished and the mother is responsible for picking up the children from school.

3. The mother’s parenting time with the children is subject to the following conditions: (a) the mother shall reside in Woodstock at the residence of her aunt and uncle subject to subpara. (c); (b) the mother’s aunt or uncle shall be present at all times while the children are in the care of the mother, except between 10:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m.; (c) if the aunt and uncle are not available to be present as required in subpara. (b), then another adult person may be present if that person is approved either as a foster parent, or as a relief for foster parent by the Children's Aid Society of Oxford County; a letter from the Society or an affidavit from the person who is doing the supervising, confirming the above credentials, is sufficient; this information shall be forwarded by the mother to the grandparents prior to other persons supervising the mother’s time with the children; (d) this order is without prejudice to the mother’s right to vary this interim order to remove the conditions requiring her to reside with her aunt and uncle, and to have her parenting time supervised; prior to any such interim variation, the mother shall ensure that she has included satisfactory medical evidence as part of her revised plan of care.

4. During summer holidays when school is out, the children shall be in the care of the mother and grandparents on alternating weeks with the switch over to be Friday at 6:00 p.m. During each week, the children shall have mid-week parenting time with the other custodial party (or parties) from 6:00 p.m. Tuesday to 6:00 p.m. Wednesday.

5. During the Christmas break from school, the children shall spend equal time with the mother, and the grandparents, as agreed between those parties.

6. The father shall have reasonable interim access to the children while the children are in the care of the grandparents, as agreed between the father and the grandparents.

7. The children’s place of residence on an interim basis shall remain in London and Woodstock, and shall not be changed unless agreed to in writing by all parties, or by court order.

8. The children shall continue to attend Woodstock Trinity School during the current academic year, unless all parties agree otherwise. If the children are no longer attending Woodstock Trinity School on the date of this order, then that matter and any changes to the parenting schedule, if necessary, shall be addressed at the case conference.

9. The mother and the grandparents shall make best efforts to agree on the children’s extracurricular activities, and efforts shall be made to ensure that extracurricular activities take place both in Woodstock and in London.

10. The grandparents shall obtain, and serve and file prior to the case conference, a brief medical report from the children’s allergist summarizing any dietary restrictions.

11. The applicants and the respondent are equally entitled, on presenting a copy of this order, to receive any records, or information, regarding the children, including from the child’s dentist, doctor, counsellor, any other health care professional, teacher, school principal, or from any hospital where the child has received treatment.

12. The grandparents and the mother shall cooperate to ensure that the children are taken to all medical, dental or other health-related appointments.

13. The children shall not be removed from the Province of Ontario, unless agreed to in writing by all parties, or order of the court.

14. The issue of where the children shall attend school starting 2017 remains to be dealt with and, if the parties cannot agree, a motion may be brought.

15. I am seized with all motions relating to interim custody or interim access, or any incidents of custody or access.

16. If the parties cannot agree on who retains possession of the children’s passports, birth certificates or health cards, then that may be spoken to at the case conference.

17. The case conference, currently scheduled for October 27, 2016 at 11:30 a.m., shall be heard by me. Each case conference brief shall include an affidavit, not to exceed five typed and double-spaced pages, restricted to advising the court as to the children’s current school and/or daycare arrangements, and any new and relevant information subsequent to August 3, 2016.

18. The mother is responsible to pick up the children from the grandparents’ residence (or where applicable, the school) at the beginning of her parenting time; and the grandparents are responsible for picking up the children from the mother’s residence at the beginning of their parenting time.

19. The parties are at liberty to make changes, on consent, to the parenting schedule to accommodate any special occasions, or vacation time.

20. All parties and the mother’s aunt and uncle are prohibited from discussing any aspect of this court case with the children, and each party, while having care of the children, shall ensure that no other person discusses any aspect of this court case with the children.

21. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of my interim order dated June 30, 2016 are vacated; paragraph 5 of my interim order dated June 15, 2016 is vacated.

22. This order is made pursuant to the Divorce Act.

23. The parties may make costs submissions in writing, to the trial coordinator, by October 28, 2016, limited to three typed pages (plus any offers, time dockets, bill of costs and authorities); any reply submissions are limited to two typed pages; counsel shall agree on the sequence of the costs submissions.

“Justice Victor Mitrow” Justice Victor Mitrow Date: September 30, 2016