COURT FILE NO.: F1266-18-02
DATE: November 23, 2020
Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Family Court (London)
Applicant: Jennifer Rafeiro (formerly Bolhuis)
Respondent: Matthew Bolhuis
THIS REQUEST FOR COSTS HAVING BEEN HEARD IN WRITING, PURSUANT TO THE COURT’S ENDORSEMENT DATED OCTOBER 9, 2020.
DATE: November 23, 2020
APPEARANCES:
Stephanie Ouellette, for the Applicant
Salim Khot, for the Respondent
ENDORSEMENT - COSTS
Introduction
This endorsement deals with cost issues relating to a motion brought by the Applicant and a cross-motion brought by the Respondent, both of which were heard by a video court session on October 6, 2020.
At the conclusion of that hearing, I formally reserved my decision for a short time, prior to my completion and release of a typed endorsement on October 9, 2020.
Background
The circumstances leading to the two motions, and the relief sought by each party, are described in detail in my earlier endorsement, and I will not repeat that information in similar detail here.
For present purposes, suffice it to say that this cost endorsement should be read together with my earlier substantive endorsement, which included the setting of a timetable for the delivery of written cost submissions, if the parties were unable to reach an agreement in that regard.
Pursuant to that timetable, the parties delivered the following material:
a. written cost submissions filed by the Applicant on or about October 22, 2020, including an attached Offer to Settle and a Bill of Costs;
b. written responding cost submissions filed by the Respondent on or about October 28, 2020; and
c. written reply cost submissions filed by the Applicant on or about November 2, 2020.
I now have had an opportunity to review and consider those written cost submissions, and the material included with the Applicant’s cost submissions.
Party positions
The Applicant seeks an order requiring the Respondent to pay her costs, fixed in the amount of $5,029.63, (inclusive of disbursements and applicable HST), as well as an order directing that costs payable to the Applicant by the Respondent be set off against the child support payable by the Applicant to the Respondent. In that regard, the Applicant relies on considerations that include the following:
a. She submits that she clearly was the successful party, having regard to the relief requested and the substantive outcome of the motions.
b. She says her success in that regard is confirmed by reference to her settlement offer, dated October 5, 2020.[^1] In particular, the Applicant submits that all the substantive relief proposed therein by the Applicant, (except the Applicant’s request for a second two-week extended access visit with the girls over the Christmas and New Year holidays, which was severed and adjourned on consent), essentially was granted.
c. She says the Respondent acted unreasonably by:
i. withholding access between March of 2020 and the hearing of the motion; ii. failing to respond to the Applicant’s access proposals prior to the bringing of her motion; iii. failing to agree between March of 2020 and the hearing on weekly weekend access arrangements for the period during which the Applicant would be in Ontario, before indicating at the return of the motions that there was no dispute such access should be granted; and iv. failing to acknowledge receipt of the Applicant’s settlement offer; and not making a settlement offer of his own.d. Anticipating the Respondent’s reliance on suggested impecuniosity to resist the imposition of any adverse cost award, the Applicant relies on authorities indicating that a party’s limited financial means should be given less weight in cost determinations than overall success, especially where a party has acted unreasonably, and that costs are an important means of encouraging a sensible approach to such disputes. The Applicant also notes that the court has authority to direct that cost award entitlements be set off against child support payment obligations.
The Respondent asks the court to exercise its residual discretion to award no costs in relation to the motions I decided; i.e., to order that each party bear his or her own costs in relation to the two motions. In the alternative, the Respondent submits that any cost award in the Applicant’s favour should be nominal, something the Respondent should be permitted to address by instalment payments, or put over to the trial judge for determination. In that regard, the Respondent relies on considerations that include the following:
a. While acknowledging that my decision was more favourable to the Applicant, the Respondent argues that success actually was somewhat divided, insofar as I imposed terms and conditions addressing various concerns raised in part by the Respondent; e.g., regarding the timing of access visit cancellations, as well as transportation, accommodation and other arrangements relating to access visits between the Applicant and the children.
b. The Respondent denies responsibility for any lack of access between the Applicant and the children prior to the motions being heard, submitting that the week-end access I ordered was consistent with court-ordered access already in place before the matter came before me, that the Applicant was the one who effectively frustrated access by failing to agree to the Respondent’s proposals regarding a set schedule for weekend access, and that he provided the Applicant with regular and ample video access with the children.
c. The Respondent denies the suggestion that he adopted an unresponsive or unreasonable approach to resolution of the parties’ disagreements regarding access; e.g., noting that correspondence was exchanged between counsel prior to the Applicant bringing her motion, and that the Applicant’s settlement offer was served at the eleventh hour, effectively denying the Respondent any meaningful opportunity to consult with counsel and respond. He submits that his positions were consistent with good faith and a desired adherence to existing court-ordered access arrangements, (e.g., without deviations to permit travel of the children to Nova Scotia not contemplated by the court’s previous order), and with reasonable parental concern about the children travelling during the pandemic and their scheduled attendance at school.
d. The Respondent emphasizes his limited financial means and inability to pay a substantial cost order, submitting that the impact of such an order would be devasting; e.g., having regard to his unemployment since 2015, his reliance on Ontario Works and child support as his sole sources of income, his expenditure obligations, (including those related to his primary care of the children), and his lack of other assets. In that regard, he suggests that the Applicant currently is paying less child support than she should, insofar as her income increased in 2019 without any corresponding adjustment in child support, and suggests that the Applicant to date has failed to comply with her court ordered obligation to provide annual financial disclosure.
Legal principles
Before assessing the parties’ competing positions and arriving at an appropriate cost determination, I note certain provisions and principles which govern such matters.
Pursuant to section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.C.43, as amended, and subject to the provisions of an Act or rules of court, “the costs of and incidental to a proceeding or a step in a proceeding are in the discretion of the court, and the court may determine by whom and to what extent the costs shall be paid”. [Emphasis added.]
Costs of matrimonial/family litigation such as this proceeding are governed primarily by Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, O.Reg. 114/99, which reads in part as follows:
- (1) SUCCESSFUL PARTY PRESUMED ENTITLED TO COSTS – There is a presumption that a successful party is entitled to the costs of a motion … . …
(4) SUCCESSFUL PARTY WHO HAS BEHAVED UNREASONABLY – Despite subrule (1), a successful party who has behaved unreasonably during a case may be deprived of all or part of the party’s own costs or ordered to pay all or part of the unsuccessful party’s costs.
(5) DECISION ON REASONABLENESS – In deciding whether a party has behaved reasonably or unreasonably, the court shall examine,
(a) the party’s behaviour in relation to the issues from the time they arose, including whether the party made an offer to settle;
(b) the reasonableness of any offer the party made; and
(c) any offer the party withdrew or failed to accept.
(6) DIVIDED SUCCESS – If success in a step is divided, the court may apportion costs as appropriate. …
(8) BAD FAITH – If a party has acted in bad faith, the court shall decide costs on a full recovery basis and shall order the party to pay them immediately. …
(10) DECIDING COSTS – Promptly after each step in the case, the court shall, in a summary manner,
(a) determine who, if anyone, is entitled to costs in relation to that step and set the amount of any costs; or
(b) expressly reserve the decision on costs for determination at a later stage in the case. …
(12) SETTING COSTS AMOUNTS – In setting the amount of costs, the court shall consider,
(a) the reasonableness and proportionality of each of the following factors as it relates to the importance and complexity of the issues:
(i) each party’s behaviour,
(ii) the time spent by each party,
(iii) any written offers to settle, including offers that do not meet the requirements of rule 18, [which includes, amongst other things, presumptive cost consequences when a party achieves a more successful outcome than certain extended settlement offers not accepted by another party],
(iv) any legal fees, including the number of lawyers and their rates; …
(vi) any other expenses properly paid or payable; and
(b) any other relevant matter.
General principles relating to the application of Rule 24, reflected in reported decisions, include the following:
a. Although Rule 24 has circumscribed the court’s otherwise broad discretion in relation to cost matters, otherwise conferred or confirmed by s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act, supra, that discretion has not been completely removed. In particular, numerous factors, considered collectively, may rebut the presumption set forth in the rule, and otherwise move the court to exercise its residual discretion.[^2]
b. Rule 24 demands flexibility in examining the list of factors set out therein, without any assumptions about categories of costs. In that regard:
i. Judges are not constrained by the normal scales of costs contemplated by the Rules of Civil Procedure, and the traditional scales of partial indemnity and substantial indemnity costs are no longer the way to quantify costs in relation to proceedings governed by the [Family Law Rules](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/regu/o-reg-114-99/latest/o-reg-114-99.html), supra; ii. It nevertheless also is not true to say that costs in family law proceedings should generally approach full recovery, particularly insofar as a judge clearly has discretion to increase or decrease cost awards having regard to matters such as party conduct, the presence or absence of settlement offers, and the “touchstone” considerations of proportionality and reasonableness; iii. A judge assessing costs under Rule 24 therefore effectively is permitted to consider a broad range of possible cost awards, from no costs or nominal costs to full recovery; and iv. At the end of the day, cost awards in family law proceedings should reflect what the court views as a fair and reasonable amount that should be paid by the unsuccessful party.[^3]c. In relation to determinations of success or relative success:
i. There generally must be some unusual circumstance, gap or other good reason to warrant departure from the Rule 24 presumption that a successful party is entitled to his or her costs of the proceeding. The rule otherwise will come to have little meaning, and the exception will become the rule.[^4] ii. However, while “success” is the starting point in cost determinations made pursuant to Rule 24, the Rule clearly contemplates and demands the consideration of other factors in arriving at a final just and appropriate cost award.[^5] iii. “Divided success” does not necessarily mean “equal success”, and “some success” may not be enough to have an impact on cost determinations. Rule 24 requires a contextual analysis, which takes into account that most family law cases involve multiple issues, not all of which will be equally important, time-consuming or expensive to determine.[^6] iv. Determinations of success are not governed by party positions set forth in pleadings, but by positions adopted and advocated at the time disputes are heard, if different from those set forth in pleadings.[^7] v. Offers to settle are another useful “yardstick” by which to measure “success”.[^8]d. In relation to determinations of reasonable and unreasonable behaviour:
i. A court’s view of reasonable litigation conduct is gauged over the totality of a proceeding, from the time a dispute arose to the time of hearing, and includes consideration of efforts throughout the dispute to find compromise and resolution.[^9] The court should not consider the reasonableness of conduct lying outside the time when the issues for which costs are being determined first arose.[^10] ii. In looking at reasonableness, it accordingly is necessary to review and consider any offers to settle either party has or has not made. It is unreasonable behaviour for a party not to make an offer to settle.[^11]e. In relation to determinations of “bad faith”:
i. The essence of bad faith is a representation that one’s actions are directed towards a particular goal while one’s secret goal is something else; something that is harmful to other persons affected or at least something they would not willingly support or tolerate if the truth had been known. However, not all bad faith involves an intent to deceive; for example, it may be demonstrated by failure to abide by agreements or court orders.[^12] ii. However, conduct that is merely unreasonable, negligent or reflecting bad judgment must not be equated with bad faith conduct. Bad faith implies the conscious doing of something wrong because of some dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.[^13] iii. The bad faith must have occurred in relation to the issues in respect of which costs are being decided, from the time those issues arose, or be the direct and immediate cause of those issues.[^14]f. In relation to reliance on professed inability to pay an adverse cost award:
i. The financial situation of parties may be taken into account, (e.g., as another “relevant matter” to be considered), when making cost determinations pursuant to [Rule 24](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/regu/o-reg-114-99/latest/o-reg-114-99.html#sec24_smooth) of the [Family Law Rules](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/regu/o-reg-114-99/latest/o-reg-114-99.html).[^15] To some degree, courts making cost determinations also should take into consideration the indirect impact on children of a court making any sizeable order of costs against their parent.[^16] ii. However, our courts also repeatedly have emphasized that a litigant’s meagre financial resources must never be regarded as conferring immunity from adverse cost awards. Such approach would greatly undermine the objectives underlying cost awards; i.e., the indemnification of successful litigants for the cost of litigation, encouraging settlement, and discouraging/sanctioning inappropriate behaviour by litigants. Indeed, those who can least afford litigation should have the greatest incentive to pursue resolution through reasonable negotiation. At most, impecuniosity therefore should be considered in relation to the appropriate quantum of a cost award, instead of being regarded as a complete shield against an obligation to pay adverse cost awards. The court must dispel any mindset that a party, because of his or her limited financial resources, is entitled to litigate with impunity.[^17] iii. In circumstances demanding a meaningful adverse cost award, where the payor lacks the immediate ability to pay such an award but has an ongoing entitlement to child support payments, one permissible solution is an award of costs to be paid by setting off the entitlement to a cost award against the entitled party’s obligation to pay child support.[^18]With the above legislation, rule provisions and general principles in mind, I turn to determination of an appropriate cost award in this particular case, in relation to these particular motions.
Assessment
In my view, the Applicant was the successful party in relation to the two motions and is presumptively entitled to costs. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:
a. I approach the question of relative success by reference to the issues which were left with me for substantive determination. In particular, I think the issues which were severed and adjourned for argument on December 9, 2020, (i.e., issues relating to the Applicant’s request for a second extended access visit during the “winter break” period covering Christmas and New Year’s Day), have no bearing on the degree to which each party was successful in relation to the issues I addressed substantively. Costs associated with those issues can and no doubt will be the subject of further discussion and/or court determination after those further issues have been substantively addressed and decided.
b. I agree with the Applicant’s position, (acknowledged to some extent in the Respondent’s cost submissions), that she should be regarded as the primarily successful party in relation to the motions. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:
i. I agree that, apart from the issues that were severed and adjourned for separate later argument, the Applicant effectively succeeded in obtaining all the substantive relief sought in her motion. ii. While I imposed terms and conditions in relation to some of that relief obtained by the Applicant, they reflected additional refinements to the exercise of access the Applicant proactively indicated she was willing to undertake if it would facilitate more time with her children, (e.g., such as arrangements to ensure minimal disruption to the children’s education), and/or Respondent suggestions the Applicant accepted without hesitation or resistance, (e.g., such as arrangements to protect the children’s health and safety), and in my view such matters accordingly were not as important, time-consuming or expense generating as the primarily disputed issues I was required to address and resolve. iii. In other respects, I imposed terms and conditions going beyond the substantive relief formally requested by the Applicant, (e.g., terms and conditions regulating the manner in which either parent would enjoy video contact with the children when not in that parent’s care), to address concerns raised in the Applicant’s evidence about the problematic nature of video access she was attempting to have with the children. In that respect, the Applicant’s success arguably was greater than that which she formally sought in her notice of motion. iv. Although the Respondent agreed to some of the relief sought by the Applicant during the course of the hearing, the reality is that the Applicant was required to formally pursue such relief up until the time of the hearing, necessarily incurring costs in that regard.On balance, I do not think the conduct of the Respondent in relation to this matter should be characterized as “bad faith”, in the sense described by the authorities noted above. However, I do think the timing and unilateral nature of the Respondent’s decision to enroll the children in a school program requiring “in person” classroom attendance raised understandable Applicant concerns in that regard; i.e., insofar as the children previously had been home-schooled, the registration coincided with the Applicant’s requests to have the girls visit her in Nova Scotia, and the Respondent professed concerns about exposure of the girls to COVID-19 through travel to Nova Scotia seemed inconsistent with his sudden willingness to have his asthmatic daughters personally attend an elementary school program where masking was not required.
In any event, I think there are clear indications that the Respondent did not approach the disputed issues in a reasonable manner. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:
a. Although the Respondent suggests that week-end access obtained by the Applicant through these proceedings was consistent with that already in place, in my view the history of the matter makes it clear that the Respondent refused to recognize and concede, up until the time of the hearing before me, that restrictions imposed on the Applicant by her Canadian Armed Forces obligations made it practically impossible for her to enjoy anything more than limited Saturday to Sunday access with the girls while the Applicant remained in Ontario, (i.e., such that the Respondent’s suggestion of Friday to Sunday access on alternating week-ends was a practical impossibility), and that a reasonable accommodation accordingly was required whereby the girls would be able to see their mother from Saturday to Sunday each week-end rather than every other week-end. Time, expense and conflict could have been avoided if the Respondent had acknowledged altered realities, and the need for such reasonable modification of existing arrangements, much sooner than he did.
b. As noted in my substantive decision, the Respondent similarly failed to acknowledge that changed circumstances, and the Applicant’s membership in the Canadian Armed Forces in particular, reasonably had addressed and alleviated any earlier concerns about alleged instability and possible substance abuse by the Applicant – which the Applicant denied in any event.
c. As noted in my substantive decision, in addition to insistence on existing access arrangements without regard to changed circumstances, the Respondent’s approach to access arrangements unfortunately seemed clouded by inappropriate focus on responsibility for the breakdown in the parties’ relationship, the Applicant’s decision to leave the matrimonial home, and/or the Applicant’s decision to volunteer for service in the Canadian Armed Forces. In short, it seemed to me that the Respondent was not approaching the question of current access arrangements through the lens of what would be in the best interests of the children, having regard to current realities.
d. As already noted, it also seemed to me that there was something fundamentally inconsistent and unreasonable about the Respondent’s refusal to consider a proposed visit of the girls to see their mother in Nova Scotia, based on alleged concerns related to potential COVID-19 exposure, while simultaneously committing the girls to unprecedented “in person” attendance at an elementary school where masking was not required.
e. While the Respondent raises legitimate points about the timing of the Applicant’s settlement offer, I am mindful of the reality that the Respondent made no settlement offer whatsoever.
There was no suggestion that the time devoted to the matter by Applicant counsel and/or her law clerk, or the hourly rates they charged, should be regarded as excessive, unreasonable, or beyond what the Respondent might reasonably have expected.
Moreover, I note that I have been provided with no indication of the time and expense devoted to the matter by Respondent counsel, which might have supported any such assertion.[^19]
In any event, I independently think the time devoted to the matter by Applicant counsel and her law clerk was appropriate, having regard to the issues in dispute and the understandable importance of those issues from the Applicant’s perspective. As noted in my substantive reasons, it was apparent to me that the Applicant’s inability to reach negotiated solutions with the Respondent had made the relationship between the Applicant and the children increasingly strained, challenging and tenuous in the absence of meaningful in-person access.
I nevertheless think some allowance and discount reasonably should be made for the fact that certain aspects of the material prepared by Applicant counsel, and Applicant counsel preparation, relate to the Applicant’s request for a further extended access visit during the children’s “winter break” from school, covering the Christmas and New Year’s Day holidays. Again, that issue – and therefore costs associated with that issue – have been severed and adjourned for later court consideration.
As for the Respondent’s reliance on his limited financial means, in support of his position that the court award no costs, award only nominal costs, or reserve determination of costs associated with the motions to the trial judge:
a. I think the limited financial means of the Respondent have relevance, and merit some alleviation in the amount of costs he might otherwise be ordered to pay, and/or modification of the manner in which such costs should be paid, particularly insofar as the Respondent retains primary responsibility for caring for the children.
b. I nevertheless think it would be entirely inappropriate and counter-productive to award the Applicant no costs, or only nominal costs, in relation to the motions. Again, the Applicant was the successful party, and the Respondent’s approach to the disputed issues was unreasonable, for the reasons outlined above. An award of no costs, or nominal costs, would leave the Respondent with the impression that he effectively is immune or largely immune from having to pay any adverse cost awards to the Applicant. That in turn would not encourage reasonable behavior and appropriate compromise/settlement in relation to further disputes.
c. In my view, deferring determination of an appropriate cost award to the trial judge would have similar unfortunate implications. Moreover, the trial judge obviously will not have the familiarity I have with the underlying motion material and dynamics.
d. As noted above, the Respondent buttressed his reliance on impecuniosity by submissions that the Applicant’s payment of child support was lower than it should be, owing to the Applicant’s suggested failure to abide by financial disclosure obligations, and her increased income. In that regard:
i. The Applicant notes in her reply submissions that the relevant court order made by Justice Tobin on May 28, 2019, required both parties to exchange their complete income tax returns, (along with all slips and attachments), within 30 days of the order’s anniversary date, and that both parties delayed their compliance with those provisions until October of 2020; i.e., with the Applicant disclosing her complete income tax return for 2019 on October 27, 2020, approximately six days after the Respondent disclosed his. ii. Whether the Applicant’s child support payments should be increased, and if so to what extent, are yet to be determined. However, if the Applicant’s income has increased, and the Respondent will be enjoying a corresponding increase in the amount of child support he will be receiving from the Applicant, that suggests he will have an increased ability to address a cost award made in the Applicant’s favour; i.e., if the Respondent has been able to address his existing financial obligations through his present level of income, including the Applicant’s current level of child support.e. In my view, the financial impact of an adverse cost award on the Respondent and his ability to care for the children will be alleviated if it is not imposed in a sudden and crushing manner, but is instead made subject to terms allowing for its payment over time through a court authorized/directed off-set to be applied to the Applicant’s otherwise payable child support obligation.
Conclusion and order
It has been emphasized many times and in many ways that cost determinations are more art than science.
Having regard to all the circumstances, including the above considerations, I think justice will be done in this particular case if the Respondent is ordered to pay the Applicant costs of the motions fixed in the all-inclusive amount of $2,400.00.
However, having regard to the Respondent’s financial situation, I also order that the aforesaid cost award, if not otherwise paid by the Respondent, may be satisfied by twelve payments of $200.00 per month, which the Applicant shall be permitted to recover by way of set-off against the monthly child support payments the Applicant is otherwise required to pay to the Respondent.
An order shall go accordingly.
Ian F. Leach
Justice I.F. Leach
[^1]: In that regard, the Applicant concedes that the settlement offer was not physically signed by the Applicant herself – as required by Rule 18(4) of the Family Law Rules. However, the Applicant relies on Rule 24(12)(iii) – which permits the court to have regard to “any written offers to settle, including offers that do not meet the requirements of rule 18” – as well as Applicant counsel’s express indication to Respondent counsel that the offer would be relied upon in relation to cost submissions.
[^2]: See M.(A.C.) v. M.(D.), 2003 CanLII 18880 (ON CA), [2003] O.J. No. 3707 (C.A.).
[^3]: See Osmar v. Osmar, 2000 CanLII 20380 (ON SC), [2000] O.J. No. 2504 (S.C.J.); Serra v. Serra, 2009 ONCA 395, [2009] O.J. No. 1905 (C.A.); and Beaver v. Hill, 2018 ONCA 840, [2018] O.J. No. 5412 (C.A.).
[^4]: See Feng v. Philips, 2006 CanLII 13769 (ON SC), [2006] O.J. No. 1708 (S.C.J.).
[^5]: See Reimer v. Appa, [2001] O.J. No. 1793 (S.C.J.).
[^6]: See Scipione v. Del Sordo, 2015 ONSC 5982, [2015] O.J. No. 5130 (S.C.J.).
[^7]: See F.I. v. S.P.P., [2012] O.J. No. 450 (S.C.J.); and Johnstone v. Locke, [2012] O.J. No. 1154 (S.C.J.).
[^8]: See Osmar v. Osmar, supra.
[^9]: See Y.(J.) v. F.(L.), [2017] O.J. No. 5228 (S.C.J.).
[^10]: See Caldwell v. Caldwell, [2007] O.J. No. 1057 (S.C.J.)
[^11]: See Fisher v. Fisher, [2015] O.J. No. 1532 (S.C.J.); and Palod v. MacDonald, [2018] O.J. No. 4180 (Prov.Ct.).
[^12]: See Ontario (Director Family Responsibility Office) v. Grant, 2003 CanLII 64323 (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No. 1931 (S.C.J.); Leonardo v. Meloche, 2003 CanLII 74500 (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No. 1969 (S.C.J.); S.(C.) v. S.(M.), 2007 CanLII 20279 (ON SC), [2007] O.J. No. 2164 (S.C.J.), affirmed 2010 ONCA 196, [2010] O.J. No. 1064 (C.A.); J.S. v. M.M., [2016] O.J. No. 2404 (S.C.J.).
[^13]: See Hendry v. Martins, [2001] O.J. No. 1098 (S.C.J.); Nairn v. Lukowski, [2002] O.J. No. 5111 (S.C.J.); and Husein v. Chatoor, 2005 ONCJ 487, [2005] O.J. No. 5715 (S.C.J.).
[^14]: See Caldwell v. Caldwell, supra.
[^15]: See J.F. v. V.C., 2002 CanLII 46717 (ON SC), [2002] O.J. NO. 608 (S.C.J.); and M.(A.C.) v. M.(D.), 2003 CanLII 18880 (ON CA), [2003] O.J. No. 3707 (C.A.).
[^16]: See, for example, Parsons v. Parsons, 2002 CanLII 45521 (ON SC), [2002] O.J. No. 3034 (S.C.J.).
[^17]: See Parsons v. Parsons, supra; M.(L.C.) v. V.(C.A.), 2003 CanLII 1994 (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No. 4843 (S.C.J.); LeVan v. LeVan, 2006 CanLII 63733 (ON SC), [2006] O.J. No. 4599 (S.C.J.); Brown v. Philips, [2015] O.J. No. 2264 (O.C.J.); and Y.(J.), v. F.(L.), [2017] O.J. No. 5228 (S.C.J.).
[^18]: See Richardson v. Lafrance, 2005 ONCJ 299, [2005] O.J. No. 5186 (S.C.J.).
[^19]: Allegations that a party has spent a disproportionate or unreasonable amount of time on a matter generally lack credibility and substance when the party making such assertions fails to provide any information or details about the time that party devoted to the matter; e.g., to illustrate and support their supposed contrasting reasonable expectation of what adverse cost award may have reasonable in the circumstances. As emphasized by Justice Winkler (as he then was) in Risorto v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2003 CanLII 43566 (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No. 990 (S.C.J.), allegations of excess in relation to the quantum of costs sought by a litigation adversary are nothing but an “attack in the air” when the party alleging excess provides no dockets of his or her own as a basis for comparison.