Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex v. S.A.W., 2026 ONSC 352

CITATION: Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex v. S.A.W., 2026 ONSC 352

COURT FILE NO.: C807/10-06 and C807/10-07 (London)

DATE: 2026-02-12

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

London court file no. C807-10-06

BETWEEN:

THE CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY OF LONDON AND MIDDLESEX

Applicant

– and –

S.A.W.

Respondent

– and –

G.K.M.

Respondent

Christine McLeod, for the Applicant

Salim J. Khot and S.A. Doidge-Feder, for the Respondent Ms W.

Alla Kikinova, for the Respondent Mr M.

Paul A. Van Meppelen, for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer

HEARD: April 7-9, 11, and 14-17, 2025

London court file no. C807/10-07

AND BETWEEN:

THE CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY OF LONDON AND MIDDLESEX

Applicant

– and –

S.A.W.

Respondent

– and –

Z.G.

Respondent

Christine McLeod, for the Applicant

Salim J. Khot and S.A. Doidge-Feder, for the Respondent Ms W.

Not participating

HEARD: April 7-9, 11, and 14-17, 2025

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

jUSTICE I.F. LEACH

1This judgment relates to a simultaneous trial before me, on the dates noted above, of a child protection status review application and a child protection application, both brought pursuant to the Child Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c.14, Schedule 1; i.e., “the CYFSA”.

The Parties, Non-party Participation and Evidence

2The parties herein, and the children who are the subject of these companion proceedings, (which all concerned expressly agreed should be tried simultaneously), are identified in the most recent iteration of the relevant two Form 8B applications filed prior to trial, namely:

a. the Amended Amended Application dated September 26, 2024, filed in London court file number C807/10-06, following up on the original status review application issued on December 11, 2019; and

b. the Amended Application dated July 14, 2023, filed in London court file number C807/10-7, following up on the original child protection and status review application issued on August 13, 2020.

3However, by way of introduction, and an overview of how those involved stand in relation to each other and the children:

a. The applicant in both proceedings is the Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex; i.e., “the Society”. Over the course of events giving rise to these proceedings, the Society was actively involved primarily through three successive child protection workers; i.e., Kayla Horenberg, Zoe Gardiner and Alicia Studerus, all of whom provided testimony at trial, supplementing the evidence provided via their respective extended affidavits.

b. The respondent to both proceedings formally identified therein as S.A.W. or simply S.W., (but self-identifying as S.H. at the time of trial, and therefore hereinafter referred to as Ms H.), actively participated in both proceedings, provided testimony at trial, and is the biological mother of all six children who are the subject of these proceedings, namely:

i. D.I.N.M., (i.e., “D1”), born on [a specified date], 2009, and 16 years old at the time of trial;

ii. A.A.K.M., (i.e., “A1”), born on [a specified date], 2010, and 15 years old at the time of trial;

iii. K.A.M.M., (i.e., “K”), born on [a specified date], 2012, and 13 years old at the time of trial;

iv. D.E.K.M., (i.e., “D2”), born [on a specified date], 2013, and 11 years old at the time of trial;

v. A.A.L.M., (i.e., “A2”), born [on a specified date], 2017, and seven years old at the time of trial; and

vi. S.M.B.G., (i.e, “S”), born [on a specified date], 2020, and four years old at the time of trial.

c. The respondent G.K.M., (identified as a respondent in court file number C807/10-06), is the biological father of the five older children. He too actively participated in this litigation, albeit formally only in relation to court file number C807/10-06. Both he and his current partner, S.P., (who apparently has remained Mr M.’s sole partner since June of 2017), also testified at trial.

d. The respondent Z.G., (identified as a respondent in court file number C807/10-07), is the biological father of the youngest child, S. The amended application relating to S includes information indicating that, as of October 2023, (if not before), Mr G. had relocated to Iraq, where he had married and started a new family. The Society’s worker Ms Gardiner thereafter received a communication directly from Mr G. indicating that he wanted nothing further to do with S. Subsequent information provided to the Society by the London Police Service suggests that Mr G. may have returned to Canada. However, he generally did not participate in these proceedings, and specifically did not attend at trial.

4Although not formally parties to the litigation, there were other participants in the trial, and I note the following in particular in that regard:

a. In court file number C807/10-06, the five older children had formal legal representation through the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, pursuant to s.78 of the CYFSA and implemented by way of Mr Van Meppelen, who provided information of the views and preferences of those children, and advocated on their behalf. All concerned were mindful that the scope of Mr Van Meppelen’s representation did not extend to the youngest child, S., in relation to court file C807/10-7. However, all concerned also accepted that, insofar as one of the proposals put forth by the respondent Ms H. contemplated separation of S. from her siblings K., D2 and A2, with all concerned in apparent agreement that such a separation would be very much against the children’s wishes, Mr Van Meppelen understandably voiced the views of the children he was representing in that regard as well.

b. C.A. is the mother of Mr M., and therefore the paternal grandmother of the five older children. Although having no biological relationship with the youngest child, S., all concerned acknowledged that Ms A. has played a very supportive role in relation to all six children, (including but not limited to her facilitation of regular access visits between the six siblings), and that all six children, including S., share a strong and positive bond with Ms A..¹ All concerned also agreed from the outset that, whatever the outcome of the proceedings, court ordered arrangements should ensure ongoing independent access between the children and Ms A., and Ms A. has confirmed her willingness to be bound by such an order.² Although not a formal party to the proceedings, Ms A. accordingly has been provided with notice throughout the litigation. Ms A. also provided testimony at trial, during which she expressly confirmed that she would like the children to have independent rights of access to her and vice versa, (i.e., rights of access not dependent on parent or sibling access), confirmed by a court order, and that she was content to have such access occur once a month; i.e., consistent with the frequency with which she was seeing all six of the children at the time of trial.

c. Following apprehension of the children, D1 and A1 were placed in foster care with a foster parent who will be identified herein only by her first name; i.e., M-A. As discussed in further detail below, D1’s placement there with A1 proved problematic, and D1 accordingly was the subject of further placement relocations. However, up until the time of trial, A1 remained with M-A, who participated in the proceeding pursuant to s.79(3) of the CYFSA, and provided testimony at trial.

d. Following apprehension of the children, the four younger children, (K., D2, A2 and S.), were placed in foster care with foster parents who will be identified herein only by their first names PE and SC. As discussed in further detail below, the four younger children remained in the care of PE and SC up until the time of trial, with PE and SC participating in the proceeding pursuant to s.79(3) of the CYSA, and PE providing testimony at trial.

e. Additional testimony at trial was provided by L.C., the mother of Ms H., and therefore the children’s maternal grandmother. As discussed in further detail below, the alternative proposals put forth at trial by Ms H., (and supported by her mother), included formal placement of the child S. with Ms C. under a supervision order. Ms C. also testified at trial.

5Additional material and evidence presented for my consideration included, in addition to previous orders and decisions made by the court in relation to the children, and draft orders submitted for my consideration:

a. the responding pleadings delivered by Ms H. and Mr M.;

b. the plans of care respectively filed by the parties;

c. Minutes of Settlement dated December 19, 2019;

d. a Letter of Expectations provided by the Society to Ms H. on September 5, 2023; and

e. documents tendered in evidence during the course of testimony from Mr M., including his probation order, a “final report” of his participation in the “Caring Dads” program, and a letter confirming D1’s formal school enrolment.

6While I have considered all of the material and evidence presented for my consideration, (including the testimony and exhibits described above), I will not attempt to address all of that evidence in completely exhaustive detail here; e.g., bearing in mind the extensive nature of the plans of care, affidavits and other exhibits, and the reality that the trial itself occupied eight full days.

7I instead will attempt to summarize what I consider the more salient aspects of that evidence in order to explain why I have made my decisions outlined herein.

Issues

8While the issues to be addressed are defined by the pleadings noted above, they essentially reduced to the following in this case:

a. in relation to the youngest child, S., and the application relating to her in court file number C807/10-07, formal determinations required by s.89(2) of the CYFSA, (i.e., described in the vernacular as the “statutory findings” mandated by that subsection), relating to the child’s name, age, aboriginal heritage or lack thereof, and place from which the child was removed and brought to a place of safety;

b. in relation to the two applications and corresponding court files, whether any or all of the children remain in need of protection, and/or are in need of protection, on any of the possible grounds set forth in s.74(2) of the CYFSA;

c. in relation to the two applications and corresponding court files, if any or all of the children are found to remain in need of protection and/or be in need of protection, and the court also finds that intervention through a court order is necessary to protect the child in the future, determination of the appropriate disposition orders to be made pursuant to s.101 of the CYFSA; and

d. in relation to the two applications and corresponding court files, if any such orders are made pursuant to s.101 of the CYFSA, determination of the appropriate access orders to be made, if any, pursuant to s.105 of the CYFSA.

9As noted below, however, a number of those required determinations were not contentious, and indeed were either the subject of consensus, agreement or non-opposition; e.g., in relation to certain access orders that may be appropriate, in the event the court found that certain dispositions were appropriate.

Party Positions

10As noted and described in further detail below, the parties to court file number C807/10-07 were agreed on the “statutory findings” that should be made in relation to S.

11All concerned also were agreed that each of the six children remained in need of protection and/or should be found to be in need of protection, on the stated grounds relied upon by the Society.

12The primary area of dispute centered on the appropriate disposition orders to be made pursuant to s.101(1) of the CYFSA, with the parties generally agreeing, (for the most part), on appropriate access orders that should follow depending on the disposition orders the court found to be appropriate; i.e., with some of the parties having certain lingering disagreements regarding the appropriate frequency and duration of the access visits to be offered.

13By way of a further detailed outline of the parties’ respective positions at trial:

a. I have reviewed and considered, in their entirety, the original and amended versions of the applications and plans of care filed by the Society in relation to each court file, the Answer and Plan of Care filed by Ms H. in relation to each court file, and the original and amended versions of the Answer and Plan of Care filed by Mr M. in relation to court file number C807/10-06. The necessarily abbreviated summary of the parties’ respective positions which follows regarding appropriate disposition orders to be made in relation to each of the children, (including the extent to which those positions were modified in the course of submissions at trial), should not suggest otherwise.

b. As the Society, the five oldest children represented by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer and Mr M. generally agreed on the appropriate disposition orders to be made in this case, with Ms H. submitting divergent views and proposals in that regard, the respective positions regarding disposition put forward for my consideration will be outlined in that order; i.e., in a manner similar to the order of presentation and questioning adopted during the trial.

c. With the above caveats, the position of the Society at trial generally may be summarized as follows:

i. It was emphasized that, in relation to the five oldest children, the Society’s status review application has been before the court since January of 2020, following a child protection trial in June of 2019, and a corresponding trial decision rendered by Justice McArthur on July 11, 2019; a decision which found (on consent) that the five oldest children were in need of protection, and ordered that the children were to remain in the care of Ms H. subject to the Society’s supervision for six months, with access to the father and other terms. The youngest child, S., was born in July of 2020, and a protection application in relation to her has been ongoing since then.

ii. Throughout the course of this litigation, and the Society’s successive pleadings, (i.e., as amended and further amended), the Society has maintained a position that the five oldest children remain in need of protection, and that the youngest of the six children is in need of protection. That continued to be the Society’s position at trial, based on particular grounds specified by the Society and discussed in further detail below. However, the Society’s position in relation to appropriate disposition orders has changed, reflecting underlying practical and legal realities, (acknowledged and emphasized by our Court of Appeal), that child protection proceedings are not a static process, but a dynamic one of changing circumstances requiring court consideration and weighing of numerous factors, “past, present and future”.³

iii. In relation to the five oldest children, addressed by court file number C807/10-06:

1. Earlier iterations of the Society’s pleadings and corresponding plans of care, filed over the course of this litigation, formally:

a. requested placement of the five oldest children with their mother Ms H. subject to an additional six-month supervision order, including terms and conditions whereby Mr M. would have reasonable access to the children, subject to supervision at the discretion at the Society; and

b. following initial pleading amendments, requested an order placing the children in the interim care of the Society for a period of six months, with terms and conditions whereby Ms H. and Mr M. each would have reasonable interim access to the children, subject to supervision at the discretion of the Society.

2. The Society’s formal pleadings were then further amended to request an order placing all five of the oldest children in extended society care, with additional provisions whereby, inter alia:

a. the five children would have a right of access to Ms H., (with the children and their mother being designated as access holders in that regard for purposes of section 105 of the CYFSA), with such access to be offered a minimum of six times each year for two hours, (while allowing for the possibility of further and longer visits by agreement), and with such access to be subject to supervision at the discretion of the Society;

b. the five children would have a right of access to Mr M., (with the children and their father being designated as access holders in that regard for purposes of section 105 of the CYFSA), with such access to be offered a minimum of six times each year for two hours, (while allowing for the possibility of further and longer visits by agreement), and with such access to be subject to supervision at the discretion of the Society; and

c. the five children, as well as their younger sister S., would have a right of access to each other, (with all six being designated as access holders in that regard for purposes of section 105 of the CYFSA), with such access to occur a minimum of six times each year for two hours with all siblings together, while allowing for the possibility of additional visits upon agreement of the children’s caregivers, taking into account the needs, ages and wishes of the children.

3. By the time of trial, however, the Society’s position nevertheless had been modified further. In particular:

a. In relation to the oldest child, D1, (who had been placed in the care of his father Mr M., supervised by the Society, on an interim basis, pursuant to an order made by Justice Tobin on January 24, 2025, and remained so at the time of trial), the Society sought an order placing D1 in the care and custody of his father, Mr M. – i.e., a supervision order made pursuant to s.101(1).1 of the CYFSA -- for a period of six months, subject to the supervision of the Society on terms and conditions specified in the revised draft final order presented and filed at trial.⁴ Those proposed terms and conditions would include provisions that, beyond addressing ongoing protection concerns in relation to D1, would ensure:

i. reasonable access of Ms H. to D1;

ii. reasonable access of D1 to his five siblings; and

iii. reasonable access of D1 to his paternal grandmother, Ms A.

b. In relation to the second through fifth oldest child, namely A1, K., D2 and A2, (who at the time of trial all remained in interim society care, in foster care arrangements whereby A1 was in the care of foster parent M-A and K., D2 and A2 were, along with their younger sister S., in the care of foster parents PE and SC), the Society continued to seek an order, in respect of each child, that he or she be placed in extended society care – i.e., an extended society care order made pursuant to s.101(1)3 of the CYFSA – on terms and conditions specified in the revised draft final orders, (essentially the same apart from appropriate variations in identification of the child in respect of whom the order would be made), presented and filed at trial.⁵ Those revised draft final orders generally speak for themselves, but proposed terms and conditions therein would include provisions that would ensure:

i. each child’s right of access to Ms H. according to the child’s wishes, (with both being designated as access holders in that regard for purposes of section 105 of the CYFSA), with such access to be offered a minimum of six times each year for two hours, while allowing for the possibility of further and longer visits by agreement;

ii. each child’s right of access to Mr M. according to the child’s wishes, (with both being designated as access holders in that regard for purposes of section 105 of the CYFSA), with such access to be offered a minimum of six times each year for two hours, while allowing for the possibility of further and longer visits by agreement, and with such visits to be supervised by the child’s paternal grandmother Ms A. or by another person approved by the Society;⁶

iii. each child’s right of access to his or her five siblings, (with all six being designated as access holders in that regard for purposes of section 105 of the CYFSA), with such access to occur a minimum of 12 times each year for two hours with all siblings together, while allowing for the possibility of additional visits upon agreement of the child’s caregivers, taking into account the needs, ages and wishes of the children; and

iv. each child’s right of access to his or her paternal grandmother, Ms A., according to the child’s wishes, (with both being designated as access holders in that regard for purposes of section 105 of the CYFSA), with such access to be offered a minimum of 12 times each year for two hours, while allowing for the possibility of further and longer visits by agreement.⁷

iv. In relation to the youngest of the six children, (i.e., S.), addressed by court file number C807/10-07:

1. Earlier iterations of the Society’s pleadings and corresponding plans of care, filed over the course of this litigation, formally:

a. requested placement of S. with her mother Ms H. for a period of six months, subject to a six-month supervision order, with terms and conditions providing Mr G. with reasonable interim access, subject to supervision at the discretion of the Society; and

b. following pleading amendments, requested an order placing S. in the interim care of the Society for a period of six months, with terms and conditions whereby Ms H. and Mr G. each would have reasonable interim access to the children, subject to supervision at the discretion of the Society.

2. The Society’s formal pleadings were then further amended to request an order placing S. in extended society care, with additional provisions whereby, inter alia:

a. S. would have a right of access to Ms H., (with S. and her mother both being designated as access holders in that regard for purposes of section 105 of the CYFSA), with such access to be offered a minimum of six times each year for two hours, (while allowing for the possibility of further and longer visits by agreement), and with such access to be subject to supervision at the discretion of the Society; and

b. S. would have a right of access to her five siblings, (with all six being designated as access holders in that regard for purposes of section 105 of the CYFSA), with such access to occur a minimum of six times each year for two hours with all siblings together, while allowing for the possibility of additional visits upon agreement of the children’s caregivers, taking into account the needs, ages and wishes of the children.

3. By the time of trial, however, the Society’s position in relation to S., (who at the time of trial remained in interim society care, in foster care arrangements whereby S. and her siblings K., D2 and A2 were in the care of foster parents PE and SC), nevertheless had been modified further. In particular, the Society continued to seek an order that S. be placed in extended society care – i.e., an extended society care order made pursuant to s.101(1)3 of the CYFSA – on terms and conditions specified in the revised draft final order relating to S. presented and filed at trial.⁸ Those proposed terms and conditions would include provisions that would ensure:

a. S.’s right of access to Ms H. according to S.’s wishes, (with both being designated as access holders in that regard for purposes of section 105 of the CYFSA), with such access to be offered a minimum of six times each year for two hours, while allowing for the possibility of further and longer visits by agreement;

b. S.’s right of access to her five siblings and her paternal grandmother Ms A., (with all seven being designated as access holders in that regard for purposes of section 105 of the CYFSA), with such access to occur a minimum of 12 times each year for two hours with all siblings together, while allowing for the possibility of additional visits upon agreement of the child’s caregivers, taking into account the needs, ages and wishes of the children.

v. By way of very broad summary, the Society contends that its proposed disposition orders are appropriate and in the best interests of the children, particularly insofar as the proposed dispositions all accord with the children’s views and wishes, the situation relating to Mr M. has improved to an extent that remaining protection concerns in relation to D1 continuing to live with his father can be adequately addressed via the proposed supervision order, all of the remaining children are now settled and stable in their current placements, (which have been maintained since July of 2023), and Ms H. has not adequately addressed the protection concerns that existed when the children were removed from her care, nor those which existed at the time of the earlier trial in 2019, which resulted in Justice McArthur’s decision. It was also emphasized that, despite overtures and invitations making it clear that the children wanted to see their mother and were worried about her, and ongoing virtual contact between the children and their mother, (e.g., via social media), Ms H. had not seen any of the children in person since August 31, 2024; i.e., more than seven months prior to the trial before me. Moreover, in relation to S., it was noted that her memories of time with Ms H. were inherently limited by her very young age at the time she was in Ms H.’s care, and the reality that S. thereafter had remained in settled and stable society care, with her three immediately older siblings, for a period of time approaching half of her life.

d. Subject to the same caveats noted above, the position at trial of the five oldest children, represented by Mr Van Meppelen, may be summarized broadly as follows:

i. They generally supported the making of the disposition orders being proposed by the Society, albeit with a request that the minimum frequency of access visits between the children and Ms H. be increased from six times each year to once a month.

ii. It was emphasized that all of the children love and miss their mother, and want to see and maintain a relationship with her – although that would require Ms H. to re-engage with the Society. At the same time, the children firmly desire certainty, safety and stability. In that regard, all of the children were quite clear that none of them wish any return to the care of their mother, and the corresponding risk of once again being exposed to the conditions they endured and survived prior to their being removed from their mother’s care; e.g., conditions of chronic instability, (involving constant housing insecurity, frequent moves and corresponding school changes and educational impairment), exposure to unsafe people and abusive men, direct exposure to violence and corresponding police involvement, chronic hygiene concerns, medical neglect, breaches of family and criminal court orders, and horrific living conditions at the time of their removal, all with corresponding embarrassment and detrimental impact on their health and development. In that regard, it was emphasized that Ms H., while sometimes accepting help from the Society and Ms A., repeatedly exhibited poor, impetuous and risky decision making, while frequently demonstrating a pattern of being overly defensive, resistant to offers of assistance, difficult to deal with and uncooperative vis-à-vis the Society, while avoiding issues and responsibility and/or focusing on blaming others.

iii. While the oldest child D1 had struggled for a time after removal, (e.g., with an unsuccessful placement in foster care with his brother A1 at the home of M-A, followed by an unsuccessful placement on his own in a group home in Hamilton), he has been doing fairly well since his interim supervised placement with his father in January of 2025, (consistent with D1’s repeatedly expressed desire in that regard), and D1 wished to continue living with his father. While there were acknowledged serious concerns meriting ongoing supervision by the society, the situation in Mr M.’s home had improved significantly since the time of the children’s earlier problematic placement there, and Mr M. himself appeared to be gaining insight and making progress, such that the ongoing and evolving situation could be adequately addressed by a supervision order.

iv. A1, K., D2 and A2 all have expressed a clear desire to remain in extended society care, where they are content and thriving in safe and stable environments where their basic needs are being met. In addition to further contact with their mother, they were open to renewed contact with their father, in accordance with their wishes.

v. All five of the five oldest children also made it clear that they wished to continue seeing each other, and their paternal grandmother Ms A., with a willingness to have those visits combined; e.g., in a manner consistent with Ms A. to date having facilitated visits between all six siblings.

e. The position of Mr M. at trial generally may be summarized as follows:

i. He acknowledged that there continued to be significant protection concerns in relation to his children, (i.e., the five oldest children), and generally supported the making of the disposition orders being proposed by the Society in that regard. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

1. While Mr M. would have preferred a final order simply placing D1 in his care, he is agreeable to the Society’s request for a six-month supervision order, in contemplation of using that period to demonstrate further progress, including the making of arrangements to provide additional services to D1; e.g., to address D1’s ongoing medical and educational challenges, having regard to his age.

2. Mr M. was content with the proposed orders directing extended society care for his four younger children, subject to further minor revisions being made to the proposed draft final orders put forward by the Society, which the Society was content to make; e.g., to address certain particulars of his contemplated supervised access, and his concerns about disparaging remarks being made or permitted by either parent.

ii. Mr M. confirmed his commitment to continued co-operation with the Society, and efforts to gradually restore his relationship with the younger four children through access, according to their wishes, supervised by his mother or someone else approved by the Society; e.g., building on supervised visits to date between A1 and his father, and other incremental virtual contact that had been occurring prior to trial in relation to K., D2 and A2.

iii. While Mr M. generally was supportive of access between the children and Ms H., ongoing concerns were expressed about the need to address and prevent Ms H.’s perceived tendency, while in the presence of the children, to disparage Mr M., make the children feel guilty about spending time with Mr M., or otherwise undermine his relationship with the children.⁹ To that end, Mr M. sought the inclusion of terms and conditions in the draft final orders put forward by the Society, (which the Society was willing to include by further revisions to the initial draft final orders), requiring both parents to refrain from permitting or engaging in disparaging comments about the children’s family, whether made directly to the children or made in their presence.

f. The position of Ms H. at trial generally may be summarized as follows:

i. She agreed there should be a finding that the five oldest children remained in need of protection, and a finding that the youngest child, S, also was in need of protection.

ii. Ms H. nevertheless was not content with the disposition orders proposed by the Society. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

1. In relation to court file C807/10-06, and the five oldest children:

a. Ms H.’s primary request was for a six-month supervision order, placing all of the children in her care subject to ongoing supervision by the Society, with terms and conditions that hopefully would suffice to address the ongoing protection concerns.

b. Consistent with but in addition to that primary request, Ms H. expressed opposition to any continued placement of the oldest child, D1, with Mr M.; e.g., citing perceived resistance by M. in the past to cooperate with the Society and engage in programming recommended by the Society, as well as past incidents of the children being exposed to and/or the subject of conflict, verbal abuse and physical violence while in the care of Mr M. and his partner Ms P..

2. In relation to court file C807/10-06, and the youngest child, S.:

a. Ms H.’s primary request was for a six-month supervision order also returning S. to her mother’s care, subject to terms and conditions addressing the protection concerns.

b. In the alternative, however, Ms H. proposed a six-month supervision order, on terms and conditions to address the protection concerns, placing S. in the care and custody of her maternal grandmother; i.e., Ms H.’s mother, L.C.

3. In relation to both court files, and in the further alternative if the court determined that it was appropriate to make an order placing any of the children in extended society care, Ms H. asked that the provisions regarding her access with such children be augmented beyond that proposed by the Society; i.e., to instead ensure that such access would be offered at least once a month, for a minimum of four hours.

iii. Generally, it was the position of Ms H. that she and her six children had been the victim of unfortunate circumstances beyond the control of Ms H. and for which she should not be faulted, with the primary concern being housing instability; a situation which she attributed, in large measure, to lack of adequate support from the Society. It was submitted that she had made best efforts to resolve problems and made decisions in the best interests of the children despite such difficult circumstances, drawing on community and family supports as necessary, in a manner that actually had enabled her to address the children’s needs; e.g., in terms of housing, education, hygiene and medical care. It also was emphasized that, when access visits between Ms H. and the children were occurring, such visits were both safe and positive, with the children benefitting from an ongoing strong relationship with their mother.

Statutory Findings

14Pursuant to s.89(2) of the CYFSA, a court is required to determine, as soon as practicable, and in any event before determining whether a child is in need of protection:

a. the child’s name and age;

b. whether the child is a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child and, if so, the child’s bands and First Nations, Inuit or Métis communities; and

c. where the child was brought to a place of safety before the hearing, the location of the place from which the child was removed.

15In this case, as far as the five oldest children are concerned, (i.e., in relation to the children whose child protection status is being reviewed in the formal context of court file number C807/10-06), such findings were made previously by the court, form part of the court’s continuing record, and are reflected in this court’s earlier child protection trial decision rendered by Justice McArthur on July 11, 2019, finding the five oldest children to be in need of protection. However, for ease of reference and the sake of clarity, I confirm that:

a. the names and ages of the five oldest children are as set out in sub-paragraphs 3(b)(i) through 3(b)(v) of these reasons;

b. none of the five oldest children has First Nations, Inuk or Métis heritage, or is a member of such communities; and

c. prior to being brought to a place of safety, the five oldest children were removed from specified locations here in the city of London, in the County of Middlesex.

16As for the youngest child, S., (in respect of whom the court is being asked to make a formal finding, for the first time, in the context of court file number c807/10-07, that the child is in need of protection), the formal determinations required by s.89(2) have not yet been made. However, the parties expressly indicated that the following findings should be made in that regard, on consent, as admitted facts:

a. that the child’s name is S.M.B.G., and that the child was four years old at the time of the hearing before me, having been born on [a specified date in July], 2020;

b. that the child has no First Nations, Inuk or Métis heritage, and is not a member of any of those communities; and

c. that prior to being brought to a place of safety, the child was removed from a specified location here in the city of London, in the County of Middlesex.

17The evidence provided at trial for my review and consideration supports such findings, and they are hereby made accordingly.

18Before providing an overview of the history of this matter and my findings in that regard, I note my views regarding the various witnesses who presented affidavit and/or viva voce testimony at trial for my consideration. In that regard:

a. I found the testimony of the Society’s three child protection workers to be consistent, credible and reliable. In my view all three gave their evidence in a candid and straightforward manner that was professional, but which also demonstrated considerable care and empathy for the parties, and the welfare of the children in particular. My overall impression was that of witnesses doing their best to provide a fair and balanced account; i.e., describing concerns relating to what they had witnessed and experienced, while also noting when and how the children’s parents had acted in a commendable way and/or made genuine efforts to recognize and address concerns and shortcomings. The workers’ memories were not perfect, (e.g., insofar as they were sometimes obliged to refresh those memories by reference to their notes or “contact logs” and affidavits), but I generally was left without any doubt as to their ability to make and recall observations with accuracy. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, but by way of more particular comments in that regard:

i. Ms Horenberg was the child protection worker assigned to the matter from October of 2018 to June of 2023, and remained involved during July of 2023 as the matter was transferred to Ms Gardiner. Like Justice McArthur, I found the testimony of Ms Horenberg to be balanced, compelling and helpful. Her extended involvement with the matter, (including regular and direct contact with the parents, children, extended family and partners, as well as frequent visits and direct interviews with the children), clearly allowed her to establish considerable rapport with the parties involved, and obvious insight into the underlying dynamics and concerns. She was careful to note intermittent progress of the parents, as well as their concerning failings. During the course of her testimony, there also were times when Ms Horenberg expressly acknowledged that she did not have certain information, and/or declined to speculate about things she simply did not know. Such things reinforced my impression that she was doing her best to be truthful and accurate about the matters she did observe and remember.

ii. Ms Gardiner is an extremely experienced child protection worker who, at the time of trial, had worked with the Society for 28 years in a variety of roles, including residential care, child protection, kinship assessments and kinship support. She was formally assigned responsibility for these matters from late June of 2023 to mid-August of 2024, (working with other Society colleagues to ensure overlapping and smooth transitions in that regard), and supplemented her affidavit evidence with testimony that was consistent, clear and replete with vivid remembered detail. Where she could not remember certain specifics or had not been provided with certain information, she candidly acknowledged the limits of her memory and awareness, instilling confidence in the accuracy of what she was definitely able to recall. Although Ms H. apparently felt at times that Ms Gardiner was unhelpful or overly critical, that was not my impression. To the contrary, while Ms Gardiner sometimes felt constrained by the Society’s limitations and policies, (e.g., in relation to funding capable of being provided by the Society, in relation to repeated demands by Ms H. for assistance with cab fare or housing, and in my view understandably declining to provide written confirmation requested by Ms H. that all of the children definitely would be returned to their mother’s care to assist with housing applications, prior to Ms H. adequately addressing other concerns and expectations of the Society that the Society had emphasized in writing and verbally), in my view the evidence made clear that Ms Gardiner repeatedly and proactively had assisted with suggestions and efforts to help both parents, including Ms H., see the children and make progress with their individual parenting issues. Ms Gardiner noted and acknowledged progress where it was made, (i.e., by Ms H. and Mr M.), while remaining concerned about delayed progress and/or lack of progress in relation to other ongoing issues. In my view, her evidence was credible, reliable, balanced and fair; i.e., with her voice being one of caring and empathy tempered by experience and practical realism.

iii. Ms Studerus was relatively new to the Society at the time of trial; i.e., having commenced work with the Society in January of 2023, after obtaining an advanced college diploma in child and youth work, and a university degree in social work, with training that included a focus on high conflict families, crisis management, and infants living in high-risk situations. She was the child protection worker with primary assigned responsibility for this matter from August of 2024 until the time of trial. She occasionally seemed somewhat nervous while testifying, (e.g., speaking very rapidly at times), and wanted to refer to her affidavit and contact notes from time to time to confirm specific dates and similar details before confirming them during the course of her testimony. She also proactively noted that she had made a small number of incidental errors in her affidavit, (explaining that she had been called upon to deal with other urgent matters when the affidavit was being finalized), and wanted to ensure those errors would be corrected. On the whole, however, while Ms Studerus struck me as someone who was somewhat new to the experience of testifying in court as a Society child protection worker, she also came across as someone who was competent, professional, caring, forthright and fair; e.g., with her testimony generally pouring forth in a manner that seemed entirely honest and candid, (albeit accompanied by an effort to make sure that the court was provided with detailed and precise information), and she balanced her testimony by recounting progress and positive developments with concerns that some steps had been delayed or difficult to achieve.

b. M-A, (who has been acting as a foster parent in relation to A1, after an initial period serving as a foster parent for D1 as well), has been a licenced foster parent since May of 2023, (i.e., approximately two years before the trial of this matter), and has fostered approximately 5-10 children. She impressed me as a remarkably calm, mature and precise witness, whose testimony not only focused on an accurate presentation of facts and observations, but also repeatedly indicated considerable reflection, empathy and insight. She took care to acknowledge the limits of what she knew and did not know, noting in particular things that A1 and others had and had not shared with her, while providing a remarkably candid account of events she had experienced, (whether concerning, rewarding, sad or amusing), during her interactions with D1, A1 and other members of their extended family. Her demeanor clearly reflected evident fondness and concern for A1; e.g., ranging from restrained laughter and joy to tearful moments as she vividly and evocatively recalled their interactions. I had no doubt as to her general credibility and reliability as a witness.

c. PE and her husband SC, (who have been acting as foster parents in relation to the four youngest children), formally registered as foster parents approximately two years before trial, with an agency used by the Society in that regard, after their completion of an appropriate training course. K., D2, A2 and S are the first children PE and SC have fostered, (doing so since the children were placed in their care in July of 2023), and PE noted in her testimony that the experience admittedly has been a “lot to process”, particularly given the number of children involved. In assessing PE’s testimony, I also have been mindful of her indication that she and her husband have been open about their willingness to have the children remain in their home, and their desire to adopt the four children if that becomes an option; i.e., something which arguably might influence such a foster parent’s testimony to further such an outcome. However, my overall impression of PE was that she was a credible and reliable witness, who was doing her best to be honest, fair and accurate. Although slightly nervous when she began her testimony, (e.g., such that she had difficulty recalling specific dates that were not in issue), her otherwise generally detailed and evocative testimony regarding what she and her husband had experienced since the four younger children came into their lives flowed easily and naturally, with obvious candour and without hesitation, and left me with an impression of someone sincerely recalling accurate memories. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, she repeatedly indicated the limits of her memory and knowledge, when necessary and appropriate, and also was quite willing to offer positive comments about the children’s parents and Ms H. in particular; e.g., emphasizing how much the children love their mother and how much Ms H. appeared to love the children, based on PE’s observations of their interactions. It also was abundantly clear that PE herself obviously cares deeply about the children and their welfare.

d. As noted above, Mr M. is the father of the five oldest children. Over the course of his testimony, he spoke candidly about past misconduct and parental failings on his part, and an apparent sense of resignation in some respects; i.e., accepting that there was little that could be done about the past apart, from acknowledging responsibility for past failings and hopefully learning from that experience, while also accepting with sadness that the future of his children and his relationship with them was now shaped in large measure by what had gone before. It seemed clear that he had thought a great deal about his past conduct, how to avoid past mistakes, what he realistically now could hope for in terms of current and future interaction with his children, and what might be best for his children from an overall perspective. In the result, I was left with a definite impression of a witness that was speaking frankly, without any attempt to “gild the lily”. Moreover, while it was clear that Mr M. has a lingering sense of bitterness about certain perceived actions on the part of Ms H., (i.e., in terms of denying him access to the children at times, and/or perceptions that Ms H. encouraged the children to misbehave while they were in his care in order to promote their return to their mother), Mr M. also testified with notable restraint in that regard, emphasizing his view that it was nevertheless important, whatever had happened in the past, for the children to have a relationship with their mother and for the children to see their mother as much as possible. On the whole, I therefore found Mr M.’s testimony to be sincere and credible. In terms of reliability, Mr M. appeared to have genuine difficulty recalling specific details and timing of events more distant in time, particularly from the period when he and Ms P. admittedly were overwhelmed, struggling and not doing well with so many children in their care. However, Mr M.’s testimony regarding more recent events was much more detailed, particularly in relation to matters relating to D1 and efforts to address D1’s needs, and Mr M.’s more recent and ongoing efforts to interact with his other children. In relation to those matters, it seemed to me that Mr M.’s testimony was also reliable.

e. As noted above, Ms P. is Mr M.’s current partner. They apparently have known each other since they were 14, and she has known all of Mr M.’s children since their birth. Although not legally married, Ms P. and Mr M. generally have been cohabiting partners, (apart from some limited periods of separation mandated by conditions related to criminal proceedings), for approximately eight years. As a witness, Ms P. at times seemed somewhat nervous, (e.g., speaking rapidly and interrupting questions to provide answers), although not in a manner unusual to many lay witnesses. However, she appeared to exhibit a different type of discomfort in relation to certain lines of questioning while testifying, and I formed an impression that she was being somewhat less than candid in relation to certain aspects of the past; e.g., when it came to acknowledging some aspects of past domestic violence wherein she had been on the receiving end of one or more blows from Mr M., while minimizing and/or providing implausible explanations for some injuries observed at the time. Having said that, Ms P. was strikingly candid about other past conduct inherently casting Mr M. and/or her in a negative light; e.g., about Mr M. admittedly striking her on one occasion, (because she had yelled at A2), about Ms P. admittedly striking or “smacking” D1 on one occasion, (because D1 had punched Ms P.’s similarly aged but much smaller daughter very hard in the face), and about Ms P.’s past substance abuse -- in respect of which she nevertheless adamantly denied any current issues and emphasized that she now has been absolutely “clean” for at least two years or more at the time of trial. She provided testimony about such acknowledged misconduct with humility but without hesitation, indicating by way of explanation, (rather than excuse), that she and Mr M. had felt completely overwhelmed and “burnt out” at the time when they had eight children in their care in one residence, (i.e., his five children and her three children), while she simultaneously was also working and pursuing post-secondary education and training, all without sleeping properly. In particular, Ms P. emphasized that she and Mr M. found that was all simply too much for them to handle without adequate supports, giving rise to conflict between them owing to feelings that each was asking too much of the other. She also emphasized that she and Mr M. have been doing much better since putting that overwhelming situation behind them, and having moved on to a much more controllable situation living alone with D1;¹⁰ an explanation for significantly altered behaviour that seemed, in my view, entirely sensible and understandable. On the whole, apart from her aforesaid minimization of past domestic conflict between herself and Mr M., (consistent with feelings of embarrassment and/or shame often demonstrated by other victims of past abuse in our court proceedings), I generally regarded Ms P. as a credible and reliable witness.

f. As noted above, Ms A. is the mother of Mr M. and therefore the paternal grandmother of the five older children, but also shares a supportive and close bond with her grandchildren’s younger sibling S.¹¹ I am mindful that, given natural loyalties that might exist between a mother and son, Ms A. generally might be regarded as someone with a bias inclining her to provide evidence more favourable to Mr M. and the Society, (insofar as the Society’s position coincides with that of Mr M.), than to Ms H.. However, that frankly was not my impression of Ms A. during the course of her testimony. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, it was not disputed that Ms A. previously provided Ms H. with considerable and extended support while the children were in Ms H.’s care, regardless of whether Mr M. was absent while in custody, regardless of the separation of Mr M. and Ms H. and conflict between them, and regardless of Ms H.’s notable dislike of Mr M. thereafter. Moreover, Ms A.’s candid assessment of parenting ability included both positive and negative comments about the abilities of Mr M. and Ms P., and adopted a similar balanced approach in relation to her comments regarding Ms H. and her parenting abilities, while consistently emphasizing her view that it was extremely important for children to have a relationship with both their parents. Ms A. also spoke with notable candour in providing requested assessments of each of the six children, (i.e., in terms of describing their respective strengths and weaknesses), although it was also clear that she loves each of them dearly. For such reasons, it was abundantly clear to me that Ms A. has done her best to remain “neutral” as between her son Mr M. and Ms H., and that Ms A.’s primary concern was and remains the best interests of all six children; children whom she has done her best to support and remain bonded with regardless of whose care they were in. Ms A.’s memories of her extended interactions with the children and their parents over the course of many years also generally were very clear, (albeit with some minor acknowledged inability to recall certain precise details), and consistent with much of the other evidence I received. In short, I regarded Ms A. as an entirely credible and reliable witness.

g. Ms C. is the mother of Ms H., and therefore the maternal grandmother to all six of the children. As in relation to Ms A., I therefore have been mindful that, given natural loyalties that might exist between a mother and daughter, and that Ms C. therefore generally might be regarded as someone with a bias inclining her to provide evidence more favourable to Ms H. and the outcomes desired by Ms H.; i.e., as opposed to evidence more favourable to the Society and/or Mr M., or the outcomes favoured by the Society, Mr M. and the children. For numerous reasons, (which I think it best to outline in more detail below, when much more context has been provided to explain why I had difficulties with many aspects of Ms C.’s testimony), I generally did not regard Ms C. as a credible or reliable witness. To be clear: I have no doubt that Ms C. loves her daughter Ms H., and her six grandchildren who are the subject of these proceedings. In my view, (for the reasons outlined in greater detail below), that affection nevertheless has made Ms C. inclined to provide testimony that was less than candid, reflected a willingness to overlook or avoid certain realities, (whether deliberately or subconsciously through a viewpoint clouded by a desire to support to her daughter and outcomes desired by her daughter), and/or speak confidently about matters in respect of which she realistically had little or no opportunity to make necessary foundational observations.

h. As noted above, Ms H. is the mother of all six children who lie at the heart of these proceedings, and she provided extended testimony at trial. In my view, she was in many ways a challenging witness; i.e., insofar as she was the sort of witness who defies broad across-the-board characterization in term of having or lacking credibility and reliability. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

i. At times, Ms H. spoke with astounding candour and obviously heartfelt, raw and unfeigned emotion, especially when recounting numerous tragic and devastating experiences she has been obliged to endure, and which most Canadians will never know; e.g., sustained abuse when she was a child as she grew up in a world dominated by parental conflict, substance abuse and extended exposure to a succession of abusive men, wherein she was tragically victimized by repeated sexual assault, forced teenage pregnancy, the tragic death of her first child, struggles with mental health issues and attempted suicide leading to hospitalization in restraints, and a seemingly never-ending struggle to simply survive one crisis after another without adequate resources and support. I have no doubt that Ms H. spoke at trial with profound sincerity as she recounted vivid memories of the trauma she had experienced in that regard. In other words, I found her to be an entirely reliable and credible witness in relation to such testimony, and her emotional indications about the profound love she has for each of her six children.

ii. In my view, it nevertheless also was repeatedly clear to me, at various points throughout the trial, and in relation to various subjects, (with numerous examples noted below in my principal and footnoted comments), that there were many matters in respect of which Ms H. was providing me with assertions that were very dubious and/or demonstrably inaccurate, and that her deviations from accuracy in that regard consistently trended in favour of denying or downplaying concerns about failure to meet the needs of the children while they were placed with Ms H., (as well as identified concerns and impediments standing in the way of having the children returned to her), and/or in favour of deflecting responsibility or “blame” for such concerns towards others without appropriate recognition of the role Ms H. herself may have played in precipitating concerns or making matters worse than they needed to be.

iii. In hearing, reviewing and reflecting on Ms H.’s testimony, I often was reluctant to attribute such inaccuracies and minimizations to deliberate dishonesty/lying on the part of Ms H.; i.e., as she frequently delivered such testimony with rapidity and emotion strongly suggestive of genuine belief in what she was saying. In other words, it seemed to me that the underlying reason for Ms H.’s provision of testimony I found to be implausible, inconsistent, dubious and/or otherwise demonstrably inaccurate was not an absence of “credibility”, insofar as that term is generally understood; i.e., referring to the ability of a witness to provide testimony that is honest, forthright and sincere.

iv. In my view, the more fundamental problem with Ms H.’s testimony was her lack of reliability as a witness; i.e., insofar as she frequently seemed to exhibit figurative “blind spots”, “tunnel vision” and/or a tendency to perceive or reflect back upon events through proverbial “rose tinted glasses”, rather than fully appreciating the nature and extent of troubling conditions and experiences to which her children were exposed, and the role Ms H. herself effectively may have played in that regard regardless of unquestionable love for her children. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, it seemed to me that, when addressing matters in retrospect, as they existed at the time of trial, and/or as they might be when discussing plans for the future, Ms H. fervently wanted things to have been or be better than they realistically were or could be, with her testimony frequently being shaped accordingly, (and inaccurately), even if that may not have been deliberate. In other words, it seemed to me that Ms H.’s testimony frequently sought to convey truth and probabilities as she perceived them to be, but her perceptions and hopes in that regard were simply not accurate or realistic.

19With those general witness impressions and assessments in mind, I turn to the following outline of my underlying factual findings in relation to this matter, up until the time of trial, noting at the outset that the outline is necessarily not a completely exhaustive recitation of all the matters that were addressed by the evidence. I nevertheless have attempted to provide a fairly detailed summary in that regard, which hopefully will suffice to convey the varied and challenging circumstances giving rise to this child protection litigation, and the corresponding issues to be addressed. To that end:

a. Events prior to court judgment rendered in July of 2019

As noted earlier, the five oldest children were the subject of a child protection application that proceeded to trial in June of 2019, leading to a judgment rendered by Justice McArthur on July 11, 2019. That judgment forms part of the continuing record, and speaks for itself. However, by way of broad summary of events leading up to that judgment, and reflecting the court’s findings of fact noted therein:

i. Involvement between Ms H. and the Society dates back to 2009, when her oldest child, D1, was found to be in need of protection, resulting in a 2010 supervision order. Further supervision orders subsequently were granted in relation to D1 and A1, (Ms H.’s second child), leaving the boys in the care of Ms H. with their father Mr M. being granted rights of access.

ii. In August of 2011, Mr M. was arrested for various criminal offences, (including break and enter, assault, weapons-related offences and other charges), which led to a five-year jail sentence. The earlier supervision order was terminated shortly thereafter.

iii. The Society renewed its involvement in 2015, by which time Mr M. had been released from custody, and he and Ms H. had four children; i.e., D1, A1, K. and D2. A child protection application resulted in the four children being placed in the care of Ms H. under a supervision order, with Mr M. once again being granted rights of access.

iv. In June of 2017, Ms H. and Mr M. separated for the final time shortly before their fifth child (A2) was born. Mr M. thereafter began to live with Ms P., (described as someone who formerly had been the best friend of Ms H.), and the three children of Ms P. from a prior relationship, creating a situation involving Ms H. feeling “betrayed and threatened”, and to relationship dynamics characterized by “difficult feelings, perceptions, conduct and dysfunction”, and poor communications between the parents; developments that intensified “an already very challenging situation” that “negatively affected the children in many troubling ways”. In particular, child protection concerns, leading to renewed involvement of the Society as of December, 2017, included ongoing domestic conflict, Mr M.’s use of drugs and alcohol, both parents demonstrating limited parental skills, the inability of Ms H. to manage the children’s behaviours or recognize and meet their developmental needs, physical punishment of the children, substantial school non-attendance by the children old enough to attend school, “questionable” living conditions, and a general lack of follow-through and cooperation with services and the Society. Matters of particular identified and pressing concern included, (beyond the need for immediate improvement in school attendance), D1’s struggles with significant Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder (“ADHD”), (resulting in substantial educational and developmental challenges, associated anxieties, and need for greater guidance and help with regulation of his emotions), and A1 being investigated and treated for what was generally described as a “kidney ailment”, and later formally diagnosed, (in or about 2017, following his parents’ separation), as nephrotic syndrome or “minimal change disease”; i.e., a condition involving one kidney developing more slowly than the other, causing occasional swelling and hospitalization, (clearly terrifying at the time, based on Ms H.’s vivid account of the experience), and requiring regular appointments with doctors and regular home testing of A1’s urine for excessive protein to ascertain whether A1 might be experiencing possible kidney failure requiring immediate medical intervention.¹²

v. Justice McArthur found all five children to be in need of protection; e.g., noting that that both parents had demonstrated misjudgments and conduct resulting in failure to address significant needs of the children, (noted above), with both exhibiting a marked tendency to regress towards past conflict and behaviour rather than progress towards acquisition of more objective understanding and any focus on the creation of positive outcomes for the children. Communication between the parents had become ineffective, making effective co-parenting impossible. The situation and behaviour of each parent also continued to be problematic. For example:

1. Mr M. was having difficultly nurturing rather than “playing” with the children, while his living situation and relationship with Ms P. lacked security and stability; and

2. Ms H., in addition to undermining the relationship between Mr M. and the children via negative comments and discouraging or frustrating access between them, was “less than forthcoming” in disclosing information about her ongoing history of “frequent”, “questionable” and “murky” relationships with other men to which the children were being exposed, despite concerns about their past history of criminal conduct, domestic conflict and drug addition, as well as concerning ongoing associations between such men and others with troubled histories and behaviours.

vi. Mr M. sought to have only D1 and D2 placed in his primary care, (i.e., during the week), with the Society and Ms H. supporting placement of the remaining three children primarily with Ms H. However, Justice McArthur placed considerable emphasis on the importance of keeping the children together, (insofar as their ongoing good relationships with each other was a “significant and positive feature in their lives”, providing a “core sense of belonging stability, security and support for each other”), and made an order placing all five children with Ms H. pursuant to a six-month supervision order, with Mr M. being granted rights of access on specified terms and conditions.

b. July of 2019 to further interim supervision order in August of 2020

Over the course of the 13 months following Justice McArthur’s judgment, Ms Horenberg and the Society continued to work with the parents and their five children, as the children continued to reside in the primary care of their mother, (in a three-bedroom “bungalow” type residence on [Specified Street No.1] here in London), and Mr M. exercised rights of access when possible – although incidental conflict between the parents in that regard continued, with both parents failing to follow an agreed upon schedule, such that the access was sporadic. The exercise of access also was complicated by confusion amongst volunteer drivers facilitating access, and by the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. By way of further details regarding some of the events of that period:

i. Ms H. continued to express resistance to the children and Mr M. having access with each other; i.e., expressing strong opinions about whether and what access should be occurring in that regard, with the Society repeatedly having to encourage her adherence to the access that had been ordered, agreed and scheduled, and reflected in Minutes of Settlement noted earlier; an agreement by which Ms H. then refused to abide. In the result, Mr M. was unable to see his children and vice versa between February and June of 2020. While that coincided with the Covid-19 pandemic, Ms H. also was not facilitating or permitting any virtual access between the children and their father, despite the court’s order.

ii. While Ms H. cooperated with the Society at times, (e.g., during which she allowed access to her home and the children, and asked the Society if her new partner Mr G. could move into her home), there were also indications of non-cooperation, including cancellation of scheduled visits, sustained periods of Ms H. delaying, not responding to and/or outright refusing to permit Society efforts to maintain contact, (e.g., with Ms H. refusing to engage or allow Ms Horenberg to speak with the children at all between March and July of 2020)¹³, and non-disclosure or delayed disclosure to the Society of events affecting the children.

iii. Particular mounting concerns regarding Ms H.’s care of the children included the following:

1. Although the period began with solid school attendance with lunches, by the time of the Christmas break, the Society received numerous referrals from the children’s school expressing concerns about A1’s health. and by early 2020 there also were ongoing reports from the school regarding the children having inadequate breakfast and lunches, exhibiting significant hygiene issues, and Ms H. demonstrating lack of cooperation with school staff. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the school and the Society also were unable to have Ms H. engage the children in online learning, despite the principal of the school taking extraordinary steps to drop needed technology in that regard off at the home.

2. Following Ms H.’s commencement of a relationship with Mr G., he began spending significant time in the home with the children, despite his having a history of substance abuse and outstanding criminal charges for robbery. (Although the Society agreed with Ms H.’s request to have Mr G. move into the house in exchange for her promise to provide the Society with a copy of Mr G.’s criminal record, such a record was never provided.) Mr G. thereafter threatened the children’s school principal with violence, and was prohibited from attending the school. He also threatened Ms A., who had continued to act as a primary support for Ms H. and the children, (e.g., via provision of groceries, transportation for medical appointments, and other assistance), despite the children no longer being in Mr M.’s care.¹⁴ Mr G. also was the subject of direct reports from the children regarding domestic violence and substance abuse; reports which led to a Society direction that Mr G. was to leave the home, (a direction which was not obeyed), followed by police attendances at the home, their observation of Mr G. being under the influence of substances in the home, their observation of property damage inflicted on the home by Mr G., and the police noting visible injuries to K.’s arm consistent with the children’s accounts of domestic violence, (e.g., Mr G. grabbing K.’s arm), such that Mr G. was charged with various offences including uttering threats, property damage and assault, and subjected to a non-association order.¹⁵

3. Indications of housing instability surfaced, with Ms H. receiving notice in January of 2020 that she was being evicted from the [Specified Street No.1] residence, with that eviction being temporarily delayed by the pandemic, and Ms H. reporting to the Society that she had secured new housing with a scheduled move in September of 2020.

iv. On July 10, 2020, Ms H. gave birth to S..¹⁶ There were no health concerns or concerns about Ms H.’s ability to immediately care for the infant, such that mother and child were discharged from the hospital without Society intervention. However, the Society brought its separate application seeking a supervision order formally placing the child with Ms H. under the Society’s supervision, and an interim supervision order was granted accordingly on August 17, 2020.

c. August of 2020 to December of 2020

Following S’s birth, concerns regarding Ms H.’s cooperation with the Society, instability, school attendance and corresponding detrimental impacts on the lives of the children continued to mount, until they evolved into what might fairly be characterized as a crisis. Details in that regard included the following:

i. Ms H. refused to permit Ms Horenberg into the home for weekly visits, (in accordance with Ministry standards regarding supervision orders and infants, having regard to their inherent vulnerability), insisting that monthly visits were sufficient.

ii. Ms H. contemplated plan for new housing fell through, but she and the children were able to avoid immediate eviction from their current residence because of the ongoing pandemic.

iii. Ms H. nevertheless still chose not to send the children to school in September of 2020, notwithstanding the school’s express advice to her in that regard, and efforts by the Society to persuade Ms H. that such school attendance was important; i.e., with Ms H. repeatedly indicating that she saw “no point” in the children continuing to attend their existing school when a residential move was contemplated. A follow up attendance at the home by Ms Horenberg found Ms H. overwhelmed, leading to concerns about her ability to ensure consistent school attendance.

iv. During the same month, (i.e., September of 2020), police found Mr G. in Ms H.’s garage, in contravention of the non-association order, and in apparent possession of drugs, leading to his arrest on various charges including breach of his release conditions and resisting arrest.¹⁷

v. In October of 2020, Ms Horenberg began expressing concerns about the state of cleanliness in Ms H.’s home, (e.g., having regard to a notable smell of animal urine in the home, and a great deal of piled boxes and other belongings around the residence that made it difficult to access certain areas, including D1’s room), and offered assistance with arrangements for an “Extreme Clean” of the residence, as well as purging/packing of the home’s contents in anticipation of the family’s relocation. Concerns also were noted about the children’s bedding, including a lack of sheets and blankets, D1’s need for a new bed to replace his broken one, A1’s need for a new bed to replace the toddler bed he clearly had outgrown, and A2’s need for a crib; e.g., with the Society attempting to provide support and assistance in that regard, until the relevant Society worker was obliged to close the Society’s particular subfile in that regard owing to Ms H.’s repeatedly missed visits and lack of engagement. It appeared to Ms Horenberg that Ms H. was struggling to manage all the needs of the children. In her testimony, Ms H. confirmed that she was indeed struggling at the time; e.g., looking after the needs of the five oldest children, while also struggling to cope with the additional demands placed upon her by a newborn and ongoing/increasing conflict with her landlord.

vi. By early November of 2020, Ms Horenberg also had assisted in the making of arrangements to have D1 and A1 attend Mr M.’s home twice a week to engage in a remote learning program, (as agreed upon in court), but Ms H. subsequently indicated her refusal to cooperate in that regard as well, citing historic issues with Mr M..

vii. On November 12, 2020, Ms Horenberg suddenly advised the Society by text that she had been “evicted” and was leaving London with the children, without providing the Society with any advance notice of her plans in that regard, nor any information as to where she and the children would be going, apart from an indication that they would be residing with “family members”, who lived “two hours away”. In the days that followed, the children failed to attend online schooling, Ms H. advised a volunteer driver that D1 and A1 would not be attending their scheduled access visit with Mr M., and Ms H. refused to provide the children’s paternal grandmother Ms A., (when she attended the home and found it packed up and ready for a move), with information as to where Ms H. and the children were going.¹⁸ The weeks that followed were ones marked by considerable instability, with the Society and the Court, (via Justice McArthur’s ongoing case management), expressing increasing concern about the children’s whereabouts and welfare. By way of brief summary in that regard:

1. In her testimony at trial, (but not at the time relevant events were happening), Ms H. provided a very detailed account of how her tenancy at the [Specified Street No.1] residence came to an end as the result of mounting conflict with the property’s landlord. For present purposes, suffice it to say that the dispute was said to involve the following: failure of the property’s hot water heater; the landlord’s refusal to pay for its repair; Ms H. consulting the Landlord Tenant Board, which was said to have advised Ms H. to submit a maintenance request form while withholding rent; the landlord then initiating steps to evict Ms H. for non-payment of rent; Ms H. being unable to obtain free legal services over the phone during the pandemic; the landlord’s initial eviction efforts being unsuccessful; the landlord then initiating steps to list the property for sale and arrange viewings of the property; Ms H. growing increasingly concerned about people visiting the property and taking photos of the property that incidentally included her children, while also having concerns about A1, (who had been in and out of hospital), and/or the newborn S. contracting the Covid-19 virus; Ms H. calling the police for assistance; and the landlord becoming extremely angry with Ms H. and screaming at her. In those circumstances, Ms H. decided that she and the children could no longer stay in the [Specified Street No.1] residence, (i.e., with all the associated turmoil there), and that it was best for them all to leave. In that regard:

a. Ms H. testified that arrangements for a contemplated four-bedroom residence, in respect of which she had been “approved”, nevertheless “fell through” such that the unit was rented to someone else. She says she then “reached out” to several people for assistance without success,¹⁹ and found that the only option available to her was one suggested by Mr G.’s mother, (i.e., “N1” or “N2” G.), who proposed a plan whereby the G.s would buy a second house in Kitchener that would be rented to Ms H. at below market rates, or simply provided to Ms H. and the children free of charge.²⁰

b. Ms H. acknowledged in cross-examination that she was “in fear” because she did not really know anything about Mr G.’s parents, and had only met them once before at the hospital on the day S. was born. However, she said Mrs G. had been “very detailed about the plan”, and Ms H. felt there were no other options.

c. In what Ms H. described as a very rushed process that she generally was obliged to perform on her own while simultaneously looking after the children, (albeit it with some limited help from her mother), Ms H. made urgent arrangements to dispose of all the family’s furniture, (including couches and beds), as she considered it too expensive to put those larger items in storage, while packing up the remainder of the family’s clothing and other items and putting “everything” in that regard into storage; actions rationalized by Ms H. at the time on the basis of not knowing how large the new home would be or when they would be moving into it. Ms H. acknowledged that it was a “stressful” and “chaotic” moving process, which resulted in her inadvertently also packing the children’s identification and winter clothes, (despite it being November), and putting those personal items into storage as well.²¹ As Ms H. put it: “In the chaos of packing, everything just got packed”. In further cross-examination, Ms H. acknowledged that such chaos was not a good plan for the children, but she felt at the time that they “didn’t really have a choice”, as they simply “had to be out” of the [Specified Street No.2] residence.

d. Ms H. said that she and the children initially went to stay at the home of Mr G.’s parents, on the understanding that Mr G. was in custody and would be incarcerated “for a while”; i.e., with Ms H. saying she did not know how long Mr G. would remain in jail, apart from having been told that he would be there for “a significant amount of time”. However, Ms H. added, when there was an indication that Mr G. might be released and coming home to his parent sureties around the time in question, (although Ms H. said she was not aware of the parents’ surety status in that regard at the time), Ms H. and the children were obliged, at the request of Mr G.’s parents, to then relocate to a Kitchener motel room for a while; i.e., allowing Mr G. to return to the residence of his parents. Ms H. testified that, at the time, she was not aware of those developments either. According to Ms H., when there then was a further delay in Mr G.’s expected release, Ms H. and the children were welcomed back to the home of Mr G.’s parents. However, Ms H. says, Mr G. then was released and returned to his parents’ home at a time which just happened to coincide with the Society’s attendance in Kitchener to apprehend the children pursuant to Justice McArthur’s order in that regard. In the result, Ms H. claimed that she inadvertently had been placed in a situation or “crossfire” not of her making; i.e., insofar as the resulting situation presented an obvious contravention of the prevailing non-association order.²²

e. Ms H. acknowledged that the children did not “really fully understand” what was going on at the time, but could see that she was “way more stressed out than [she] usually was”. She nevertheless insisted that the children generally regarded what was happening as an “adventure”.

2. Ms H. eventually disclosed to the Society via text that she and the children had relocated to Kitchener, not to stay with “family members”, but at the home of Mr G.’s parents, without any address initially being provided. However, there were also indications that Ms H. and the children had been obliged to stay at a hotel for five nights during a period when Mr G.’s parents obliged them to leave the home before permitting their return. As Ms Horenberg confirmed, the Society nevertheless was unable to ascertain the precise location and movements of Ms H. and the children for “quite a while”, (i.e., approximately one month), during that period, as Ms H. was not engaging with the Society, refused to provide the Society with any address for many weeks, and effectively prevented the Society from visiting with the children.²³

3. Repeated efforts by Ms Horenberg to meet with Ms H. were unsuccessful, (despite Justice McArthur making an order in that regard), with Ms H. repeatedly cancelling arranged meetings for a variety of professed reasons; e.g., supposed lack of permission from Mr G.’s parents to meet in the Kitchener home, lack of transportation, and the described inability of Ms H. and the children to walk anywhere because they had no winter clothing – although Ms Horenberg undertook arrangements to obtain such clothing for the children. Ms Horenberg also volunteered to drive to the relevant Kitchener residence to park outside and have Ms H. and the children come to the vehicle. Ms H. nevertheless still continued to refuse any such in person meetings, and also indicated that Ms Horenberg also would not be permitted to speak independently with the children. She initially agreed only to a “video chat”, during which Ms Horenberg was able to see that Ms H. and the children were in a hotel room at the time. Ms Horenberg eventually, (on December 10, 2020), was able to visit the home of Mr G.’s parents, where she found Ms H. and the five children living in the basement; e.g., with the four older children sleeping on three mattresses on the floor, A2 sleeping in a playpen, and S. sleeping in a bassinette. It was clear to Ms Horenberg that Ms H. and the children lacked many items; a situation Ms H. attributed to having put most of the family’s items in storage. Ms Horenberg took the opportunity to provide the family with some winter clothing, as well as gift cards for necessities and Christmas gifts. Although the children appeared clothed, fed, bathed and happy, they also were indicating independently to Ms Horenberg that their mother had moved them out of London to “get away from their dad”, whom she “hated”.²⁴ It was also made clear by the children that they were not attending school. Mr G.’s mother “N1”, (also in attendance during the visit), expressed a hope that Ms H. and the children would be vacating within the week, and an understanding, (apparently based on information provided by Ms H.), that the Society would be arranging housing.

4. In the meantime:

a. Justice McArthur had made an order, (on December 4, 2020), requiring Ms H. and the children to return to London to reside in a shelter or as otherwise arranged in consultation with the Society, failing which there would be a further hearing to consider alternative plans for the children.

b. Ms H. had indicated to Ms Horenberg that she was receiving assistance from Mr G., (who had been released from custody at the end of November and was said to be residing elsewhere in Kitchener), despite ongoing release conditions whereby Mr G. was not to be associating with Ms H. or K..

c. The children still were not attending school, with Ms H. attributing that failure to her having packed the children’s birth certificates in a storage locker such that they could not be retrieved before she obtained housing – prompting unsuccessful efforts by Ms Horenberg to see if the children’s previous school could provide copies in that regard. In the result, the children would not attend school at all during the entire time, (approximately one month), that they were in Kitchener; a reality that compounded their failure to attend school in London between Labour Day and Ms H.’s taking them to Kitchener.

d. During the time the children were in Kitchener, they also had no access whatsoever with their father, Mr M., who had no contact whatsoever with the children, and did not know where they were, despite his court ordered entitlements in that regard.

e. Efforts by Ms Horenberg to assist with location of shelter accommodation in Kitchener or London were unsuccessful, with Ms H. indicating that her calls to such shelters had confirmed her ineligibility for such accommodation, (e.g., because she and the children currently had accommodation, and she was not in an abusive relationship), despite an earlier indication provided to Ms Horenberg that a room would be made available to Ms H. at the Anova women’s shelter here in London.

viii. On December 14, 2020, Justice McArthur granted an application by Mr M., (supported by the Society), to have A1, D1 and D2 placed in the interim care of Mr M., while K. and A2 were placed in the interim care of their paternal grandmother Ms A., with Ms H. being granted generous access subject to the Society’s discretion. The following day, Ms Horenberg attended in Kitchener, (with the assistance of assistance of additional child protection workers and Ms A.), to retrieve the children from Ms H.’s care and transport them back to London, pursuant to Justice McArthur’s order. During that attendance, Mr G. was seen going in and out of the residence occupied by Ms H. and the children, in direct contravention of the prevailing court non-association order, and contrary to the assurances that had been given by Ms H. that Mr G. was not there. In the circumstances, the police attended and removed from G. from the premises, apparently in the presence of the children. The children then were transported back to London, exhibiting and voicing considerable confusion as to what was happening. They nevertheless generally were content to go to the homes of their father and paternal grandmother, (approximately 10 minutes distant from each other), in accordance with Justice McArthur’s order.²⁵

ix. On December 18, 2020, Ms H. and S. returned to London, where they lived with Ms H.’s maternal great-grandmother for a time.

x. At the end of 2020, all of the children were struggling with the changes to their lives.

d. January 2021 to August of 2021

The next eight months saw further adjustments to the children’s placement, mounting concerns about the care being provided by Mr M., and ongoing frustrations in relation to the Society’s efforts to continue working with Ms H.. Details in that regard include the following:

i. Primary care of the five oldest children initially was shared between Mr M. and the children’s paternal grandmother Ms A., (with that “fluid” arrangement being approved by an order made by Justice McArthur permitting the placement arrangements in that regard to remain “flexible”, including a relocation of A1 to the home of Ms A. and a relocation of S. from the home of Ms A. to that of Mr M.)²⁶, and no significant concerns were noted or confirmed by the Society during that period.²⁷ However, a six-month work leave taken by Ms A. to facilitate such arrangements then came to an end in June of 2021,²⁸ resulting in all five of the oldest children thereafter staying full time with Mr M., his partner Ms P. and her three children; i.e., making for a crowded and stressful household of up to 10 people at a time, in a three-bedroom home.²⁹ The formal placement of all five of the oldest children in Mr M.’s care was endorsed by a further interim order made on August 6, 2021.³⁰

ii. In relation to the care being provided by Mr M.:

1. There were positives; e.g., insofar as the children were provided with appropriate accommodation and food, resumed virtual learning through their school, and were attending school fairly regularly. Ms A. also was permitted to visit with the children whenever she liked, which was something Ms A. and the children all enjoyed. Ms A. also continued to provide additional support in various ways, including assistance with transportation and groceries.

2. There nevertheless were numerous reports and observations of growing concerns, particularly after all five of Mr M.’s children were relocated to his residence along with Ms P. and her three children. In particular:

a. Mr M. and Ms P. were struggling more with the increased financial burden of supporting 10 individuals, as he was unemployed and having difficulty obtaining Ontario Works assistance, making the entire residence dependent on the income of Ms P., (being earned while she also was continuing her studies), and child tax benefits.

b. There were concerns about Mr M. smoking in the home, and increasing concerns about the home’s cleanliness; e.g., with observations of dog feces in various parts of the residence.

c. There were reports, (including reports made by the children), of the children being exposed to various forms of anger and violence; e.g., with the children witnessing Mr M.’s abuse of the two small dogs in the home, Mr M. and Ms P. yelling and swearing at each other and the children, domestic violence between the couple witnessed by the children, and Mr M. and Ms P. engaging in various forms of inappropriate discipline, including A2 admittedly being confined to a room for a day despite her very young age, and reported instances of Ms P. striking A2 which Ms P. denied but the children confirmed. The children also informed Ms Horenberg that Mr M. and Ms P. had been showing the children court documents and speaking to them inappropriately about court matters.

d. At times, Mr M. admittedly and repeatedly was denying D1 his prescription medication for ADHD, (despite D1’s requests in that regard), because of Mr M.’s personal concerns about the medication and D1’s reliance on it. In the result, D1 was not always taking his medication consistently while in the care of his father. However, steps thereafter were taken to rectify the situation, (with Mr M. following up with the family doctor, and with assistance provided by Ms A.), and D1 thereafter took his medication consistently while in his father’s care.

e. Ms Horenberg, personally observing Mr M.’s anger and mounting stress in the household, continued to provide counsel regarding appropriate parenting behaviour while also directing Mr M. to the “Caring Dads” program, (i.e., because of concerns regarding Mr M.’s anger), although Mr M. thereafter failed to attend scheduled and rescheduled appointments in that regard.³¹ Inquiries also were made regarding the provision of respite care via Merrymount, although such requests apparently were declined.

iii. In relation to the difficulties and challenges being encountered in relation to Ms H.:

1. Ms H. relocated with S. for a time to the London home of her mother, Ms C., but continued to struggle with housing issues.³² Although Ms Horenberg worked with Ms H. to complete a London Housing application, Ms H. failed to finalize her selections. In response to inquiries from the Society, Ms H. continued to advise that she was searching for housing, but apparently remained focused for a time on a contemplated return to Kitchener; e.g., to leased premises in respect of which Mr G.’s parents allegedly would “co-sign”, once the Society provided requested written confirmation that the children definitely would be returned to Ms H.’s care so that she would receive corresponding Child Tax Benefit income. Ms Horenberg explained why that was not possible; i.e., that there were other indicated concerns to be addressed, and Ms H.’s stated plans in that regard needed to be assessed. Ms H. nevertheless informed the children to prepare for a return to Kitchener, which caused them further considerable confusion and distress.

2. Hs H. repeatedly failed, over sustained periods of time, to exercise her rights of access vis-à-vis the five oldest children, despite arrangements made by Ms A. and the Society, (through volunteer drivers), to provide transportation and assistance in that regard on a bi-weekly basis. In the result, months passed without there being any such access between the children and their mother, despite the absence of limitations on Ms H. in that regard, despite the Society encouraging Ms H. to develop an access plan, and despite the children very much wanting to see their mother.³³ In that regard, Ms Horenberg firmly attributed the absence of such access to numerous excuses repeatedly made by Ms H., and not to any resistance to such access by Mr M., who gladly would have welcomed the respite.

3. More generally, Ms H.’s willingness to engage and cooperate with the Society deteriorated significantly over the eight-month period; i.e., falling off from initial regular visits to minimal engagement, with Ms H. expressly indicating she was not going to work with Ms Horenberg, (e.g., in relation to ongoing concerns about cooperation with the Society, housing instability and meeting all of the children’s needs, including education of the school-aged children), refusing to permit visits with Ms H. and S., (taking the position they were not needed)³⁴, and sending numerous text communications containing swearing and other insults directed at Ms Horenberg and her family.³⁵ Ms H. also continued to remain focused on concerns and complaints regarding the care being provided by Mr M..

e. August 2021 to June of 2022

The next ten-month period was marked by growing concerns about the care the five oldest children were receiving while placed with Mr M., and deterioration of the situation in his residence, while the position of Ms H. saw some improvement, (albeit accompanied by some ongoing significant challenges), eventually resulting in a further interim supervision order placing all six children back in Ms H.’s care. Details in that regard included the following:

i. In relation to the care being provided at the residence of Mr M.:

1. There were increasing concerns about the observed state of disarray and lack of cleanliness in the home, and about the children’s reports of inadequate food; something Ms Horenberg attempted to address through the assistance of food banks. There were also increasing concerns about the children’s hygiene, cleanliness and clothing, which Ms Horenberg also attempted to address. At one point, the home also was without water for a sustained period of time. Moreover, the children were reporting essentially being left unattended while the adults slept during the day.

2. School attendance also became more problematic; something Mr M. and Ms P. attributed to their own inability to sleep and get the children to school in the mornings, and inability to send the children to school with adequate food. There was also a failure, (at one point for an entire month. and until Ms A. intervened), to ensure that D1 received his prescription medication to assist with his ADHD and a supplemental formal diagnosis of being on the Autism spectrum,³⁶ and also ensure D1’s attendance at a specialized classroom.

3. There were persistent reports and observations, (e.g., of Ms P. having black eyes on a number of occasions), indicating that the children were being exposed to anger and domestic violence, (e.g., Mr M. and Ms P. yelling at the children, and fighting with each other and with others), including an incident wherein Mr M. was charged with assault in relation to his admittedly grabbing and striking another youth who was said to have followed D1 home while making threats.³⁷

4. On the whole, things in Mr M.’s home were visibly getting worse, with it appearing to Ms Horenberg that Mr M. and Ms P. clearly had become overwhelmed and stressed to the point of “giving up”, despite ongoing provision of assistance from Ms A. and Ms Horenberg; a situation that was accompanied by occasional anger and frustrations directed towards Ms Horenberg, and Mr M. and Ms P. overtly blaming the children for their escalating difficulties and frustrations.³⁸

ii. As for the progress of Ms H., over the same period:

1. In September of 2021, Ms H. was able to obtain alternate London housing on [Specified Street No.2] with the assistance of her mother Ms C., who co-signed the relevant lease documentation.³⁹ Ms H. thereafter was adamant that all of the children needed to be returned to her care simultaneously, (despite Ms Horenberg’s concerns about the likelihood of that creating an overwhelming situation), as Ms H. did not want the children to remain in Mr M.’s care any longer, did not want any of the children to feel “left out”, and emphasized her need for the income from Child Tax Benefits to maintain her residence. Although there indications in February of 2022 of ongoing disputes between Ms H. and her landlord owing to non-payment of rent, and a notice of intended eviction,⁴⁰ such concerns were downplayed by Ms H. in her reports to the Society; i.e., via indications that proceedings before the Landlord and Tenant Tribunal had resulted in her not being evicted, and that she nevertheless was voluntarily looking for alternate housing because of her poor current landlord-tenant relationship.

2. Although Ms H. willingness to exercise access became more consistent after she obtained housing, she frequently cancelled or shortened the access that had been scheduled for each weekend, citing various reasons that sometimes relied on professed illness or lack of food, (although the Society made efforts to provide support in that regard), but also included indications that she was too stressed and angered by the current situation; i.e., of the five older children being in the primary care of Mr M.. Such anger was reflected in Ms H. engaging the children in adult conversation, and comments about their father, during such access visits. Moreover, even when Ms Horenberg took steps to address the concerns regarding lack of food, and offers of transportation assistance provided by Ms A. and the Society, Ms H.’s reluctance to exercise her rights of access with the children continued; e.g., with entire weekends of scheduled access being cancelled by Ms H..

3. Although there were no apparent concerns with Ms H.’s ability to care for S., or S.’s well-being, the Society continued to receive reports that Ms H. was continuing to communicate with Mr G., and that Mr G. was seeing S., despite conditions of his release from custody prohibiting such associations. Despite Ms H. denying such associations, Mr G. admittedly attended Ms H.’s residence in February of 2022, threatening to kill Ms H., her supposed new male partner, and himself, smashing his head through the residence door, and cutting his wrists on the front porch; an incident in respect of which Ms H. admittedly did not contact the police immediately, but eventually resulted in police attendance, (after Mr G. left before the police arrived in accordance with Ms H. warnings in that regard), and Ms H. admitting to police that Mr G. had been to her home on a number of other occasions. In subsequent conversation with Ms Horenberg, Ms H. minimized the obvious risks of Mr G. attending the residence where S. was living, and where the other children were making access visits, with Ms H. simply emphasizing that the children loved Mr G.

iii. Following “family meeting” discussions in June, it was decided, with the consent of all concerned, that the children would not leave to spend the summer with Ms H. upon the commencement of their summer camp arrangements, (as originally contemplated), but sooner than that; i.e., owing to the deteriorating situation in Mr M.’s home. On June 10, 2022, the five oldest children therefore relocated to Ms H.’s [Specified Street No.2] residence, such that she once again had care of all six children. Ms Horenberg noted efforts by Ms H. to start work on settling the children, getting the children back into a routine, keeping them clean, sending them to school with adequate food and appropriate clothing for the balance of the school year in June, (with transportation assistance provided by the Society), getting D1 back on his prescription medication, and communicating with the school regarding D1. D1 himself nevertheless was continuing to express a desire to remain with his father; e.g., to have more space away from his siblings. Ms A. also continued to proffer various forms of support, despite the children’s relocation to the care of Ms H.; assistance which included but was not limited to facilitating access visits between the five older children and their father. Ms C. also was providing intermittent support in relation to food and rent payment. Ms Horenberg described the [Specified Street No.2] residence as “okay” and “a little bit better” than Ms H.’s previous [Specified Street No.1] residence, although it continued to contain a “lot of stuff” that seemed to travel with Ms H. everywhere, in addition to the additional belongings she apparently maintained in storage.

iv. On June 27, 2022, the altered placement arrangements described above were formalized by the Society moving for and obtaining, on consent, a without prejudice supervision order placing the five older children in the temporary care and control of Ms H., with Mr M. being granted reasonable access. The order nevertheless did not address any access between the children and Ms A., (who was not a party to the proceedings), and Ms H. generally declined proffered assistance from Ms A., and did not let Ms A. see the children, after the children had been returned to Ms H.’s care.

f. June 2022 to August 2022

The summer of 2022 brought increased challenges, in various forms, including the following:

i. Less than two weeks after all of the children had been returned to her care, Ms H. once again began to acknowledge housing instability; i.e., indicating to the Society that she received an eviction notice on July 7, 2022, in relation to the [Specified Street No.2] residence, apparently owing to non-payment of rent.⁴¹ That was followed by a reported Sheriff attendance, advising Ms H. that she and the children would be required to vacate the residence by August 11, 2022. Ms Horenberg tried to provide guidance and help in that regard, (e.g., by supplying Ms H. with information regarding numerous services that could provide housing assistance, arranging a visit from the Society’s family support worker, and calling London Housing on Ms H.’s behalf to check on her housing application), and Ms H. said she would provide Ms Horenberg with timely updates on the situation. On August 16, 2022, however, Ms Horenberg learned from Ms H. that she and the children had been forced from the [Specified Street No.2] residence, and were staying at [Specified Motel No.1] in east London for a week,⁴² (a stay paid for in advance), after which they would have nowhere else to go, as Ms H.’s professed attempts to work with London Housing and local shelters in that regard had been unsuccessful. However, further calls were made by Ms Horenberg to the Anova shelter here in London, as well as the city’s Housing Access Centre, and resulted in Ms H. and the children being admitted into the Anova shelter.

ii. In the meantime, access visits between the five older children and their father, and cooperation between Mr M. and the Society, had become increasingly problematic; e.g., with Ms H. indicating that the children did not want to visit with their father and were upset by such access, (although such concerns initially were not mirrored in direct reports from the children, who expressed to Ms Horenberg that they had enjoyed such access), Mr M. expressing growing resentment and resistance in relation to the Society’s efforts to have him participate in the “Caring Dads” program, (with Mr M. denying that he had any problems with anger, suggesting the Society should focus instead on Ms H.’s issues and her participation in programming, and missing his scheduled intake session), and Mr M. and Ms P. both expressing frustration focused on Ms H. and her perceived efforts to “turn the children against [Mr M.] again”. Attempts at productive discussion to address and resolve such issues were frustrated by Mr M. and Ms P. simply yelling at Ms Horenberg.

iii. Matters also then were complicated further by serious and disturbing reports/disclosures by the children, (relayed to the police), of violence said to have been directed towards them by Mr M. and Ms P. while the children had been residing in Mr M.’s home. In particular:

1. In private conversations, K. reported that, during an incident wherein D1 and D2 had been fighting, Mr M. decided to “teach them a lesson” by picking D2 up by the neck and choking him before D1 intervened. K. said her father also had physically hit D1 a number of times, (when D1 had reported lack of food to the school), slapped K. “on the butt” for “playing in windows”, and broke K.’s phone by throwing it across the room. According to K., Ms P. also had hurt A2 a number of times; e.g., by throwing her against walls, and slapping/hitting A2’s arm or cheek, making A2 cry and leaving red marks and bruises.

2. In similar private conversation with Ms Horenberg, D2 said that his father had hurt him “many times”, and recounted the same incident where Mr M. was said to have lifted him off the ground by his neck. D2 also recalled his father trying to hurt him, (i.e., by slapping his face but missing and damaging/denting a staircase wall in a manner that was still visible), when D2 had tried to intervene to prevent his father from hurting A1. According to D2, his father also would physically damage property around the house, and then blame that on the children.

3. Although Ms Horenberg attempted a similar private conversation with D1 about such matters, D1 exhibited problems with focusing, while repeatedly indicating that he did “not know” if his father had hurt him, and that he wanted to be with his father.

iv. On August 24, 2022, Justice McArthur made a further temporary supervision order formally placing D1 in the care of Mr M., (an arrangement opposed by Ms H. but consistent with D1’s repeated requests in that regard)⁴³, and placing the other four older children in the care of Ms H..

g. August 2022 to December of 2022

The situation between August and the end of 2022 continued to be challenging and problematic in various ways. In particular:

i. On August 25, 2022, Ms H. and the children were permitted to relocate to the Anova shelter. Ms H. initially refused to comply with Justice McArthur’s most recent order, and permit D1’s relocation to Mr M.’s residence, but relented after a further day of “lengthy” conversation with a Society representative. Although Ms H. thereafter telephoned the Society with further complaints and concerns about the children’s access with their father, such access continued for a time.

ii. On August 31, 2022, however, the five older children were interviewed by the police, leading to:

1. the arrest of Mr M. on charges of assault by choking and assault by suffocation, stemming from the incident described above wherein Mr M. was said to have held D2 off the ground by his neck and another incident where Mr M. was said to have pinched D2’s nose closed while eating such that he was unable to breathe and started choking; and

2. the arrest of Ms P. on charges of assault and assault by suffocation, stemming from an incident wherein A2 was said to have been punished for writing on a wall by being pushed into the wall, and having her mouth and nose then covered such that she was unable to breathe.

iii. A further police interview of Ms P. led to Mr M. also being charged in relation to various further incidents of reported domestic violence, including assault, assault with a weapon and property damage.

iv. The criminal charges described above led to the imposition of conditions on Mr M. and Ms P. which effectively prevented any association between the two, or any association with Ms H. or any of the children. The latter restrictions also applied in relation to D1, who was placed back in the care of Ms H. along with his five younger siblings.

v. During the initial period of the stay of Ms H. and the six children at Anova, Ms H. appeared to be meeting the needs of the children; i.e., such that things seemed to be going fairly well. In particular, Ms H. was commended for making progress through active engagement with Anova staff and the Society; e.g., in the making of arrangements for health care appointments, S.’s daycare, Victim Services counselling, volunteer mentors for the children, respite at Merrymount, application for housing benefits and looking into London Housing.⁴⁴

vi. Over the ensuing months, however, there were emerging problems; e.g., via failure of the children to attend counselling or scheduled Merrymount drop-offs; e.g., owing to Ms H.’s reported inability to attend owing to a lack of childcare for the other children, coupled with observations that Ms H. had not sought out help to care for the other children. There were also mounting indications of renewed housing instability; e.g., insofar as it was discovered that Ms H. was actually not on the London Housing list, and she declined to renew her application in that regard because of a stated preference for and/or hope of using Canada-Ontario Housing Benefits to pursue accommodation available in the community at market rents. In the meantime, D1’s school began reporting concerns about his clothing, his behaviour, his being sent to school with inadequate food, and his mounting anxiety about possibly having to leave the Anova shelter without a housing plan. In that regard, Ms Horenberg confirmed that the situation being experienced by the children was “very chaotic”, with the children expressing constant anxiety about what was going to happen, and feeling that they “weren’t settled anywhere”. D1 in particular was described as having a particularly empathetic nature that made him even more concerned about what the other family members were going through. and feeling a responsibility to do something about it but an inability to help.

vii. In December of 2022, Anova informed the Society that Ms H. and the children needed to leave the shelter immediately as they had reached the maximum time of occupation there, with the shelter already having granted several earlier extensions because Ms H. apparently had nowhere else to go.⁴⁵ In the result, Ms H. and the children left the Anova shelter on December 13, 2022, without any plan regarding further accommodation. Ms Horenberg worked into the evening to call various motels, and eventually arranged motel accommodation for the family on an urgent basis. In that regard:

1. Ms H. described how she and the children initially accompanied Ms Horenberg to [Specified Motel No.2] in London that was “clean and nice”, and thought to have a program to assist the homeless, only to find that the program formally in operation there had been discontinued. In the result, the children sat in the hotel lobby for approximately four hours, (with D2 “running off” and disappearing at one point, so as to require an urgent search of the hotel to locate him), while Ms Horenberg attempted to work with Ms H. and the hotel’s staff to arrange emergency accommodation for the night. That process proved to be difficult and “torture”, (in the words of Ms H.), as Ms H. admittedly lost her temper repeatedly with the hotel staff, and had no credit card and no money whatsoever; i.e., as all of her funds remained tied up in the deposit arrangements, described above, for a potential rental property near Victoria Hospital that had fallen through. In the end, Ms Horenberg somehow made arrangements to pay the hotel for accommodation of the family that evening, and the family was permitted to stay at [Specifed Motel No.2] that night as the children were visibly exhausted.

2. Ms Horenberg thereafter made arrangements for the family to return to [Specified Motel No.1], (described above), for a few weeks. Again, the motel nevertheless was located in a “rough area” of London that “wasn’t particularly nice”, with Ms H. and all six children being obliged to occupy a single room, and a number of the children being obliged to sleep without a bed. For the balance of the calendar year, the Society assisted Ms H. in getting the children to and from school, while continuing with efforts to work with London Housing, motels and shelters in London and elsewhere to arrange further accommodation.

h. January 2023 to July 2023, and Removal of Children from Mother’s Care

The next seven months unfortunately were characterized by what objectively can only be described, in my view, as a downward spiral of Ms H. and the children into a situation that became increasingly dire. Details in that regard included the following:

i. In early January of 2023, Ms H. and the children left their motel accommodation without informing Ms Horenberg and the Society of where they were going. Through the Anova shelter, the Society learned that Ms H. had moved herself and the children into the two- bedroom rented apartment residence of a male she had met “online”; i.e., after posting an indication on Facebook that she and her children needed a place to stay, and the unknown male had responded. Ms H. initially was non-responsive and then resistant to communications from the Society indicating a need for further information in that regard, inspection concerning the children’s new residence, and details as to who was living there with them. Ms H. repeatedly and in my view unreasonably questioned why the Society needed to know such things, or to visit the new residence where she and the children now were staying.

ii. During further telephone discussion, Ms H. indicated that the relevant apartment was the residence of a man named B., described as a construction worker from [a specified province other than Ontario], with an acknowledged criminal history of past stealing behaviour that was said to be “better now”. Ms H. further identified B. as a “Facebook friend” who had responded to her online inquiries for ideas regarding help for her and her children, resulting in an initial in person meeting and Ms H. and the six children moving into B.’s residence the following day.⁴⁶ The apartment, located on [Specified Street No.3] here in London, was described as a “second level kind of attic” residence, consisting of “two small rooms”, a “small kitchen area”, and a bathroom, accessible via an interior staircase. At trial, Ms H. denied having immediately entered into a romantic relationship with B.; e.g., saying that, initially, she and all six children slept in one bedroom of the small apartment while B. alone occupied the other. However, she also acknowledged that she and the children quickly came to “love” B. and vice versa, such that Ms H. and B. then began sleeping together on a mattress in the floor in his bedroom, with A2 and S sleeping nearby in the same room, while the remaining four children were sleeping with blankets and pillows on the floor of the other bedroom.⁴⁷ On behalf of the Society, Ms Horenberg voiced understandable concerns about Ms H.’s new residential plan, (which included a relatively unknown man sleeping in the same room as the two youngest girls), and the reality that there was no confirmed information about B. or his past, including details of any criminal history posing a potential threat to the children.⁴⁸ Ms H. initially was reluctant to provide further information in that regard, but eventually did provide the Society with the relevant apartment address, details about B. sufficient to permit the Society’s running of a child welfare search with B.’s agreement, (a search which subsequently confirmed no concerns in that regard), and an assurance that the children would not be left alone with B.; i.e., an entirely new person in the children’s lives, about whom Ms H. and the Society had relatively little information.

iii. Over the ensuing weeks and months, the Society continued its efforts to work with Ms H. while concerns mounted about Ms H.’s willingness to cooperate, and about the children’s basic needs being met. In that regard:

1. Ms H.’s decision to suddenly move herself and the children into B.’s residence was contrary to existing court orders in that regard, (i.e., orders imposing restrictions that prohibited any adult from spending significant time in the family’s home without prior Society approval), and seemed entirely consistent with past precipitous and troubling cohabitation arrangements entered into by Ms H. while paying little heed to applicable court orders; e.g., insofar as she had acted in a similar fashion in having Mr C. move in with her and the children without Society approval, had allowed Mr G. to reside with her and the children without ever producing a promised criminal record for Mr G. or authorization for the Society to obtain such a record, and had continued to associate with Mr G. despite known conditions of his release from custody and court orders prohibiting such continued interaction. Although the Society came to have no concerns about B. or his being in the residence,⁴⁹ Ms H.’s clearly precipitous and risky decision-making affecting the children, based on little or no adequate information and appropriate inquiries, remained a significant concern.

2. Space constraints within the tiny attic apartment were creating significant tensions between the children, (e.g., with notable arguing and fighting), because the children effectively were unable to “have their own space” to go to if/as necessary. Things in that regard were particularly hard for the older children, and D1 in particular, who wanted his own space, frequently became frustrated with his siblings and vice versa, and increasingly resorted to frequent pacing around outside the residence.⁵⁰ D1 also was expressly indicating that he wanted to return to his father’s residence.

3. Society efforts to extend continued assistance and support included provision of help with arrangements to transport the children to and from their schools, (via bussing, volunteer drivers and cabs, when Ms H. declined to walk four of the children the relatively short distance to and from their school), provision of food vouchers, food bank assistance, and grocery store gift cards. The Society also repeatedly offered to provide mattresses so that the children would not be sleeping on floors with nothing but blankets and pillows. However, Ms H. repeatedly declined such offers for several months, on the stated basis there was inadequate room in the apartment for such things. Several months later, in response to Society emphasis on various needs of the children that needed to be addressed on an urgent basis, Ms H. eventually relented and allowed mattresses to be delivered by the Society.

4. Offers by Ms Horenberg to assist with arrangements to do laundry for the family also initially were frustrated by Ms H. failing to co-operate and/or follow through in that regard. In particular, Ms H. would not allow Ms Horenberg to help repeatedly with laundering of the family’s clothes, (i.e., with Ms Horenberg repeatedly bringing Ms H. and the family’s laundry to a laundromat, and Ms Horenberg paying for use of the machines there), until May of 2023.

5. Society offers to assist Ms H. with reaching out to other family members for assistance frustratingly met with only qualified agreement by Ms H.; i.e., with Ms H. indicating, despite the obvious struggles being encountered with meeting the children’s needs, that members of Mr M.’s family were not to be contacted with any requests for assistance. In that regard, the Society learned from Ms A. that her support and involvement with the children had been frustrated and curtailed since the children had returned to their mother’s care; i.e., by Ms H. indicating that she did want further assistance from Ms A., despite ongoing encouragement from the Society to permit such support.

6. The Society brought the family to the “Situation Table”, with a number of London community services in attendance to make arrangements for emergency support to address perceived significant declines in the children’s care. Individual “volunteer friendly visitors” were arranged for three of the children, (i.e., D1, K. and D2), so they could do “fun things” together in the community. The Canadian Mental Health Agency (CMHA) also offered to provide help, and continued to follow up with Ms H. despite her initial failures to engage in that regard. The Society also continued to provide weekly emails to Ms H. about housing listings.

7. In the meantime, there were repeated indications that the needs of the children, (despite generally regular school attendance), were not being met. For example:

a. D1’s specialized classroom and school voiced concerns on a weekly basis about his lack of breakfast and lunch. his hygiene, his dirty clothing, (which now had holes near his private areas), and his increasingly concerning behaviour apparently associated with not taking his prescribed ADHD medication. D1 also had visible open sores associated with his impetigo condition that apparently were not being treated, with Ms H. failing to express any concern in that regard when Ms Horenberg attempted to follow up to arrange appropriate medical care.

b. The latest school attended by A1, K., D2 and A2, (their third school in four years, in respect of which the Society was obliged to facilitate registration when Ms H. failed to do so), provided similar reports of the four children being sent to school without lunches, (which were being provided by school staff), and the four children coming to school many days in a row in the same clothing, while being dirty and smelly.

c. When such concerns were raised by the Society with Ms H., she acknowledged that the “situation was not good” but she was “saving money for a house”. She also indicated that she had been unable to purchase breakfast and lunch meals for the children as her child tax benefits had been redirected towards repayment of arrears in that regard,⁵¹ such that she effectively was relying on the schools to provide meals for the children. At trial, Ms H. supplemented those explanations by saying that the apartment and its limited refrigerator were so small that there simply “wasn’t a lot of room for groceries”, particularly when she was shopping for groceries only bi-weekly and the children seemed to be eating up the available food very quickly.

d. When Ms Horenberg attempted to follow up with Ms H. about received indications that a further relocation of Ms H. and the children was being contemplated, Ms H. was non-responsive for weeks at a time.

8. Visitations to the relevant apartment over time repeatedly indicated and/or confirmed a situation that was increasingly dire. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

a. By April, the unit admittedly was infested with bed bugs, with the children sustaining bites in that regard;⁵² a situation the Society attempted to alleviate by the provision of above-ground cots despite Ms H.’s repeated lack of agreement in that regard.

b. By May, hydro service to the apartment had been terminated, resulting in food preparation being limited to use of a toaster oven being powered by lengthy extension cords and food being ordered in. Ms H. initially failed to respond to the Society’s follow up inquiries in that regard, openly and defensively questioning why it mattered to the Society whether or not hydro service to the apartment had been restored; i.e., on the stated basis that Ms H. was an adult, and the Society’s repeated requests regarding restoration of hydro service to the apartment supposedly were treating her like a child.⁵³ By the same point in time, the apartment’s remaining water service also was limited to cold water alone. It was clear that the children were not bathing regularly. When the Society raised concerns in that regard, Ms H. responded by saying the children did not need to shower, and by disagreeing with the Society’s view and requests that the children shower at least every other day, and certainly more than once a week.

c. By June, the apartment setting was described as “chaotic”, full of stress, and so infested with bedbugs and cockroaches, (according to reports from Ms H. herself), that there admittedly were extensive and visible bedbug bite marks on Ms H. and the children “from head to toe”. Moreover, there was observed itching by the children, A2’s bedbug bites appeared to be bleeding, K. was seen grabbing bugs off the mattresses to show them to visiting child protection workers, and B. had taken to sleeping on the apartment’s front porch in an effort to avoid the insects. At least one of the above-ground cots that had been supplied by the Society for use by the children had developed significant holes, apparently created by bedbugs eating through it. Another one of the cots, (the one used by D1), was also broken; something which D1 attributed to the bedbugs, although Ms H. asserted that D1 had been the cause of that damage. Beyond such concerns, the apartment also was very cluttered; i.e., with “a lot of stuff, all over”. Food inadequacy continued, with the family trying to make do with food bank support. There was still no hydro service to the apartment, the landlord was pursuing eviction for non-payment of rent, and the family dangerously was relying on electricity via long electrical cords running from distant outlets on the outside of the building to run numerous appliances, including the apartment’s fridge, air conditioner and television. The London Fire Department understandably also was expressing concerns about the hazards created by the apartment’s lack of hydro service and use of long extension cords to power its various appliances, as well as the absence of a properly installed smoke alarm and carbon monoxide detector.⁵⁴ D1 was observed to be filthy; i.e., wearing clothes that were worn and dirty, and socks that looked “crunchy”, with D1 indicating he could not remember the last time he had worn different clothes, and indicating that might have happened at least two weeks earlier.

d. In her continued direct interactions with the children, it was increasingly clear to Ms Horenberg that the children were finding their living situation very uncomfortable and knew things could not go on as they were, giving rise to their experiencing renewed uncertainty and anxiety. In that regard:

i. The situation was the culmination of what Ms Horenberg described as “constant chaos” that was a very uneasy time for the children; i.e., with the children not liking the situation they were in, knowing that their mother was stressed, and not knowing where their next move might be.⁵⁵

ii. Ms H. herself noted that, while there had been some happiness during the time she and the children resided with B. in the [Specified Street No.3] apartment, (e.g., with the playing of outdoor games like baseball and soccer with B., and an enjoyable purchase of fireworks for the children to watch on Canada Day), the family’s situation at the [Specified Street No.3] apartment admittedly all “fell apart” towards the end.

e. As of July 5, 2023, the London Fire Department had issued an order requiring the apartment’s landlord to remove all temporary wiring and extension cords within 30 days, and the landlord had obtained a court ruling requiring the family to vacate the apartment within 11 days of the corresponding order being issued. In the circumstances, Ms Horenberg and Ms Gardiner spoke with Ms H., and agreed upon immediate arrangements to have the four younger children go to Merrymount, (where they were bathed, provided with new outfits, and accommodated in emergency respite beds), while the Society paid for Ms H., D1 and A1 to stay in temporary motel accommodation, (where Ms Horenberg provided also them with fast food), and the Society arranged cab transportation accordingly.⁵⁶ Ms H. was urged by the Society to keep contacting shelters “all over” to seek alternative accommodation there, and keep the Society informed in that regard. In response, however, Ms H. stated her intention to look for a house instead.

f. By July 10, 2023, Ms H. was contacting the Society to indicate that motel staff were knocking on the door and asking her and the two older children to leave, and that she had no money or plan to go elsewhere. She indicated that she had called shelters which had said they were full, but admittedly had not followed through on the shelters’ instructions to call Coordinated Access at London Housing to be placed on its waitlist. She also indicated a contemplated return to the [Specified Street No.3] apartment from which they had just been evicted, (an inherently impossible option), in response to which the Society emphasized that the children could not return to that residence in any event. In the circumstances, the Society made arrangements to pay for another night’s motel accommodation, and obtained Ms H.’s consent to embark on a kin search; an urgent search carried out by the Society’s kinship search worker Mr Wiebe, who made a variety of inquiries, including efforts to reach out to Ms H.’s mother Ms C., (from whom no response was received), as well as other relatives. In the result, the Society was able to confirm that Ms H.’s Aunt M. was able to provide respite care. However, Ms H. would not agree to that proposal, and remained focused on her inability to find housing she could afford in light of her poor credit history.

iv. Over the same period, the Society had remained in contact with Mr M. and Ms P., in an effort to support alteration of prevailing court orders to permit Mr M. having supervised access with the children in the community; i.e., as Mr M. and the children had not seen each other since the time of his arrest in August of 2022, and Mr M. was hopeful of reconnecting with any of his children who were interested in the possibility of that happening. However, any immediate return of the children to Mr M.’s care effectively was impossible owing to the outstanding criminal charges and bail conditions. Moreover, in addition to restrictions on each of their ability to associate with the children, Mr M. and Ms P. also were not to associate with each other, which had resulted in Mr M. having to vacate the couple’s residence to reside with his mother, Ms A., while Ms P. remained in the couple’s home.

v. With no further discovery of possible kinship placements, and no less intrusive options being available, the Society sought and obtained a warrant on July 10, 2023, to remove all six children from Ms H.’s care, (owing the ongoing child protection concerns), with Ms H. being advised that the Society had developed a plan to place the children in foster care.

vi. At the time of the children being formally removed from their mother’s care on July 11, 2023, it was discovered that D1’s prescription medication had almost run out, (with no refills having been obtained or the pharmacy having been contacted in that regard), and that Ms H. also had not been testing A1’s urine, as required in relation to crucial monitoring of his nephrotic syndrome, because Ms H. had not obtained the testing strips needed to do so.⁵⁷ Ms H. herself was indicating she personally had nowhere to go, including an inability to stay with her mother Ms C.

i. July of 2023 to Trial

I also was provided, at trial, with extended evidence regarding the care and status of the children following their removal, continued efforts by the Society to work with the children’s parents to address the identified child protection concerns, and progress or lack thereof of the parents in that regard. My further findings about such matters include the following:

i. As for the care, progress and status of the children after they were removed from the care of Ms H. on July 11, 2023:

1. Initially, D1 and A1 were both placed in foster care in the home of M-A, while the four younger children were placed in foster care in the home of PE and SC. In that regard, there was a relatively smooth initial transition of the children into foster care; e.g., insofar as none of the children were crying or unable to sleep, and all of the children appeared to be happy without any expressed concerns. Indeed, the children all confirmed during individual meetings that they missed their mother but were happy that their needs now were being met.

2. Shortly after their initial placement in foster care with M-A, D1 and A1 nevertheless were displaying sibling rivalry and anger that occasionally got “out of hand”, (e.g., with disputes about D1 bothering A1 or touching A1’s things), and with A1 removing himself from the situation and self-isolating.⁵⁸ M-A also increasingly felt that she would not be able to provide D1 with the care he required, owing to his additional developmental needs, (requiring a notably different way of speaking with him about concerns and the provision of necessary clarifications), and his greater reluctance to abide by certain rules of M-A’s household, (e.g., regarding daily changing of clothes and daily showering,⁵⁹ not using profanities, adherence to schedules, eating meals together, adherence to bedtime routines, and shared responsibility for household chores), which M-A sometimes found physically intimidating; i.e., as D1 is tall, (approximately six feet in height), and somewhat overweight. In the result, the Society searched for and located, (after D1 had been in M-A’s home with A1 for approximately six-to-eight weeks), a group home placement for D1 with three other youths in the city of Hamilton; i.e., a facility specializing in care of autistic children, and near to a school offering specialized small classroom programming, similar to what D1 had been receiving in London, that would meet D1’s developmental needs. A1, however, remained in the home of M-A.

3. Following the children’s placement in society care, (and as discussed in further detail below), the Society attempted and/or made arrangements to have the children enjoy continued access with their mother and with each other, on a bi-weekly or at least monthly basis, with Ms A. once again providing transportation and other support in that regard, (e.g., in terms of funding such outings), such that Ms A. and the children once again were able to see each other, at a minimum, in that context.⁶⁰

4. As for D1’s progress thereafter:

a. I received considerable evidence in that regard from Ms Studerus, Mr M., Ms P. and Ms A., in addition to the representations from Mr Van Meppelen. That information made clear that D1, although somewhat inclined to “shut down” when feeling uncomfortable, generally speaks in a straightforward way and has no difficulty communicating his needs, concerns and/or complaints.

b. D1’s relocation to Hamilton and a different schoolboard delayed his return to education for a month after the start of the school year in September, (owing to the necessary completion of assessment procedures), but he eventually was accepted into a self-contained specialized classroom where he generally did well.

c. Although D1 initially enjoyed his group home environment, (where he received counselling as part of its regular programming), and had a good relationship with its program director, D1 nevertheless increasingly struggled somewhat in the group home setting; e.g., with reported challenges and non-compliance in terms of being respectful to staff and peers, doing assigned chores, and following procedures to shower regularly, “air out” his room to reduce accumulated body odour, and otherwise maintain his hygiene. D1 also continued to express feelings of loneliness, (as a result of his being in Hamilton and more distant from other members of his family), and a growing desire to reconnect with his father. In time, his stated end goal became a return to living with Mr M..

d. In circumstances outlined in more detail below, (when discussing Mr M.’s progress between July of 2024 and trial), D1 began receiving visits in Hamilton from his father, (supervised by D1’s paternal grandmother Ms A.), which transitioned over time to unsupervised visits (initially during the day and then overnight) with his father back here in London. That in turn eventually transitioned into a formal court order placing D1 in the interim care of his father Mr M., supervised by the Society.

e. At the time of trial, D1 was living with his father and Ms P. in a large, safe and clean apartment residence owned by his paternal grandmother Ms A., with a bedroom of his own. His food, hygiene, medical and educational needs also were being met; e.g., with D1 intermittently being provided with verbal and written/visual reminders about hygiene maintenance, (as he works on developing and following an independent routine in that regard), and now regularly attending specialized classroom education appropriately suited to his intellectual and developmental limitations. (In that regard, D1 was said to be enjoying and doing well in his school program, which focuses more on learning daily life skills over academics, and therefore generates little homework – although Mr M. and Ms P. have asked if more assistance could be provided to D1 in relation to practical mathematics.)⁶¹ D1 also now has a number of friends, including a girlfriend, who attend the same specialized classroom. Although D1 still remains socially awkward in a number of ways, in terms of meeting new people and making friends, Mr M. has been working with D1 and trying new strategies in that regard; e.g., via D1’s communication with classmates to suggest more organized visits and interactions outside of class.

f. Generally described as a “great kid”, D1 prefers video games to participation in sports, often playing with his brother A1, and now with his father as well. He admittedly is “not very active”, and sometime bored and lonely.⁶² In that regard, he acknowledged struggling a bit mentally with such things, and a plan had been developed, (in consultation with the Society, Mr M. and Ms A.), to put additional supports in place for D1 to address such mental health concerns; e.g., whereby D1 will be leaving his room more to spend greater time in public and with his peers, via gaming nights at a local youth “Hub” centre. At the time of trial, D1 also was scheduled to commence counselling shortly thereafter with Humana; i.e., a community service offering mental health support and various forms of counselling for adolescents and youth in the city of London. Further appointments with D1’s family physician also had been scheduled to discuss D1’s occasional feelings of depression. In the meantime, additional efforts were being made, (via weekend trail walks of D1 and M., and overnight visits allowing D1 to spend time with Ms P.’s son R.), to reduce the isolation of D1 on weekends.

g. As noted earlier, D1 nevertheless is generally now happy in his current environment, “obviously” wants to stay where he is, and “loves being in the care of his father”, with Mr M. now spending a good deal of time with D1, and remaining “absolutely” cooperative with the Society.⁶³ Ms Studerus also has regular conversations with D1 to ask about possible physical or abuse in the home, (e.g., having regard to Mr M.’s criminal convictions in relation to the other children), and D1 consistently has reported no concerns in that regard.⁶⁴ The Society feels that continued formal supervision by the Society is needed for the time being primarily to “see how things settle”, and to ensure that there is continued “follow through” to obtain recommended services and supports for D1 as he prepares for his transition to life as an adult.⁶⁵ In that regard, the Society is intent on continuing to visit with D1 at least once a month, and D1 also has contact information for Ms Studerus; i.e., with the understanding he also is able to contact her independently at any time with any concerns. To date, D1 has not felt the need for any such contact.

h. D1 has indicated that he would like to continue seeing his grandmother Ms A. and all of his siblings, whom he has continued to see regularly on a bi-weekly or monthly basis at the times when his mother was to have been visiting with the six children. In addition to those visits, D1 also sees Ms A. regularly, (and at least once a week), when she visits the apartment she owns, and where D1 now lives with his father and Ms P.. D1 remains “very close” with Ms A., and has visited Ms A.’s home along with A1. D1 and A1, (the sibling with whom D1 remains closest), also continue to communicate regularly and play games together via an online gaming platform, within the time limits placed on their respective gaming time. D1 acknowledges that his four youngest siblings do annoy him at times, and he apparently does not communicate with them directly outside of in person visits involving all six siblings. D1 nevertheless emphasized that continued contact with all of his siblings remains important to him.

i. D1 also has indicated that he still cares for his mother, and worries about her. He would like to resume access visits with her, and generally have more contact with her.⁶⁶ He has a tablet, phone and corresponding plans that permit contact with his mother at any time. However, he also admittedly remained frustrated and somewhat angry with his mother, (something he himself described as a “dark shadow that follows him”), in the period leading up to trial. In that regard, Ms A. testified that she is unsure whether D1 himself really understands why he feels such anger, or if his anger simply reflects his autism and need to “lash out” at someone. However, D1 himself attributes his anger to his not seeing or hearing from his mother for a lengthy period of time, and to her not providing him with his Xbox after Ms H. sent him texts and/or emails, (shown by D1 to Ms Studerus), indicating that Ms H. had his desired Xbox unit but was refusing to give it to him.⁶⁷

j. Generally, however, D1 wants his current situation and placement with his father to continue.

5. As for A1’s progress thereafter:

a. The evidence I received in that regard included not only the affidavit and oral testimony of Ms Gardiner and Ms Studerus, but extended testimony from A1’s foster mother M-A, and his paternal grandmother Ms A., in addition to the representations of Mr Van Meppelen.

b. Although A1 was described as being the most “reserved” and somewhat guarded of the six children, (i.e., in terms of his often not providing insight into his thoughts and feelings without being asked about such matters directly), he also was described by all concerned as someone who is clearly quite intelligent, very independent, and capable of making his feelings and preferences known when asked.

c. In that regard, A1 reported that he was happy with D1 being relocated to somewhere other than the same foster placement with M-A, as he and his older brother had not been getting along in the same residence, and A1 appreciated time on his own and more focused attention.

d. It also was clear that, despite some initial navigation of challenges relating to A1’s introduction to household routines and chores, (with resistance in that regard sometimes resurfacing when other foster children temporarily were also entrusted to M-A’s care), M-A and A1 thereafter formed a close, respectful and successful bond with each other, and A1 has been thriving in his placement with M-A. In that regard, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

i. M-A herself describes her residence as a “big old house”, with three large bedrooms as well as a former nursery, situated in a relatively small and close-knit community, and equipped with an outdoor swimming pool. Apart from the children she has fostered, M-A generally has lived in the house alone, (apart from a number of pets), since her two children have grown up and relocated to Alberta and Toronto. Describing herself as now being “older”, M-A currently works “very part time” outside of the home, with a flexible schedule that evidently allows her to provide considerable time and attention to the foster children in her care. For the most part, she and A1 now live in the home alone, apart from her provision of occasional respite childcare to another foster child, (much younger than A1), who is predominantly placed elsewhere. In any event, A1 now has his own bedroom, as well as a nearby bathroom primarily for his use.

ii. A1 says he has very much enjoyed the “nice” and relatively quiet environment of M-A’s home, and the “one-on-one” attention he receives there.⁶⁸ He also likes the pets in the home, his school, and the friends he has made at that school. He expressly confirmed that there is “nothing he doesn’t like” about his placement with M-A. To all appearances, he is “very respectful”, “very clean”, and now extremely happy, with a frequently smiling and laughing demeanour, and a keen sense of humour.⁶⁹

iii. A1 resumed schooling in September of 2023, was loved by his teachers, and did extraordinarily well academically, (i.e., with his performance variously described as “stellar” and “phenomenal”), and was actively and successfully involved in school projects, as well as the school volleyball team, prior to his senior public-school graduation in June of 2024. At the time of trial, he was in grade nine, still attaining good grades, and still very much enjoying going to school regularly, (and socializing with the friends he has made there), while also performing his required school “community hours” by working at a greenhouse.

iv. Although A1 initially had no interest in counselling, he thereafter changed his mind, and began attending counselling M-A organized in consultation with [another specified children’s aid society]. While A1 initially attended on a bi-weekly basis, he now feels sufficiently better to decrease the frequency of such counselling to once a month. Having said that, M-A has noted lingering unusual behaviours suggestive of past trauma that she continues to find sad and disturbing. In particular, A1 still exhibits a habit of hoarding and secreting food in his room, (although there is clearly plenty of food available to him in the kitchen), and demonstrating a compulsive need to “squirrel away”, “inventory” and safeguard his belongings, while also not using new items he has been given, (such as clothing), unless forced to do so.⁷⁰ In short, notwithstanding his time and experience with M-A, A1 apparently still exhibits a residual fear of being left without adequate food and having his belongings taken; behaviour providing further indirect indications of the life he experienced prior to being taken into society care.

v. A1 also arrived at M-A’s home with a number of health challenges which now have been and/or are being addressed, or which now thankfully have gone into remission. In particular:

1. As noted earlier, when A1 arrived with D1 at the home of M-A, she noted that both boys had visible “bites all over them”, and on their arms and legs in particular. Not surprisingly, those went away in the absence of further exposure to bedbugs.

2. M-A also noticed that A1 was not able to chew or eat his food properly. Upon taking A1 for medical examination in that regard, it was discovered that A1 was suffering from a “tongue-tied” condition; i.e., whereby his tongue was incapable of stretching sufficiently. M-A then took the steps necessary to have A1’s condition in that regard corrected; i.e., via outpatient surgery at the children’s hospital here in London. However, the fact the condition was left unnoticed and unaddressed for so long has left A1 with corresponding orthodontic deformities, in respect of which further corrective treatment and braces are being organized; i.e., steps designed to “pull out” and redirect his A1’s teeth such they meet and enable him to chew properly. In the meantime, A1 has been left with an instilled and longstanding inclination towards “soft” foods and anything “easy” to eat.⁷¹

3. As noted above, A1 was diagnosed as suffering from nephrotic syndrome, which requires regular testing of his urine to ensure that he does not go into ketosis. M-A has continued to work with a specialist for A1 in that regard, carefully monitoring A1’s diet as recommended, (e.g., reducing his fast food and sodium intake via M-A’s personal cooking and preparation of meals), while continuing to ensure regular testing of A1’s urine as instructed. The nephrotic syndrome now has gone into remission, such that testing of A1’s urine has been reduced to once a week, and consultation with A1’s specialist is now down to one telephone call each year.⁷²

vi. Although something of a “homebody” who initially never wanted to leave the house after his foster care placement, A1 and M-A now do a lot of activities together, and he will go with her “anywhere” and “everywhere”. The two of them regularly engage in long drives and extended talks, having found ways to communicate which A1 finds comfortable. They also share a love of humour, and clearly interact in a very positive and mature way. Moreover, A1 now knows, understands and follows M-A’s house rules and expectations, and is very respectful and compliant in that regard. More generally, M-A describes A1 as a “good kid”, who is “smart”, “does his chores”, “loves the animals”, is “good company”, and “just nice to have around”. M-A’s adult children also have met and like A1, and are very supportive of A1 remaining in their mother’s care.

vii. While M-A and A1 would like to engage in more extended travel together, (e.g., with A1 joining M-A on flying visits to see her son and son’s family in Alberta, or to the United States), their hopes in that regard have been frustrated to date by A1’s lack of a passport; something which A1 himself attributes to his mother’s refusal to sign the necessary paperwork, consistent with her stated indication to A1 that he does not need a passport.⁷³

viii. A1 is content to visit and communicate with his parents, indicating in particular that he misses and would like to see his mother, (with whom he is still texting to some extent), and also would like his enjoyable contact and community visits with his father, supervised by Ms A., to continue.⁷⁴ He also has made it clear that he enjoys and greatly values continued contact and visits with his siblings and with Ms A..⁷⁵ He nevertheless consistently has reported that he wants to stay with M-A. For her part, M-A has confirmed her intention to encourage and support continued involvement of A1’s parents, siblings and Ms A. in his life.

ix. Although M-A has indicated that her formal adoption of A1 is not contemplated, the evidence I received made it quite clear that she and A1 are now very committed to each other. In particular, M-A has indicated that A1 is welcome to remain in her care and residence even after reaching his age of majority and even if she relocates, for as long as A1 wishes to stay with her, and so long as he completes his high school and remains in full time post-secondary education of some sort, in whatever form he wishes to pursue. For his part, A1 has indicated that he very much wants his placement with M-A to continue even if she relocates geographically to another community.⁷⁶ Having said that, A1 also would like to maintain contact and interaction with his parents, siblings and paternal grandmother Ms A..

6. As for the progress of K., D2, A2 and S. in their foster placement:

a. Beyond the evidence provided by Ms Gardiner, Ms Studerus and Ms A. in that regard, and the representations of Mr Van Meppelen in relation to K., D2 and A2, the extended testimony provided by PE added to an overall detailed and vivid account of how the four youngest children generally have been happy and thriving since their arrival at the home of PE and SC.

b. That home was described by the Society’s child protection workers as “culturally a match” for at least three of the four younger children; i.e., as PE and SC are black and white respectively, and the children’s biological parents, (Mr M. and Ms H.), represent a similar mixed heritage. In particular, it was not disputed that Mr M. has black American roots, (including some very renowned musical talent), along with his mother Ms A.’s white ancestry which apparently has been traced back to William the Conqueror, while Ms H.’s cultural background is Polish and Portuguese.⁷⁷

c. The home is located at the rural edges of a specified town, (approximately 5-7 minutes from the town’s centre), and is equipped with a large backyard frequently used by the children for soccer and other outdoor play. Its indoor space includes two large living room spaces also frequently used by the children. The three girls enjoy occupying the same bedroom, (with K. having a bed of her own while A2 and S. happily share a bed), while D2 very much appreciates now having a bedroom of his own.

d. PE and SC both work outside the home, but their schedules generally allow for their constant care of the four younger children when they are not in school, daycare or other scheduled activities. PE’s brother and his family, (including a wife and two children aged eight and seven at the time of trial), also live nearby, get along with the four younger children, and provide further childcare support, playmates and an extended family circle.

e. All four children also now attend regular doctor and dental appointments, and meet individually with workers from the Society once a month, every month. They also now have well-established daily routines of school and bedtime preparation, which they follow with prompting.

f. The three older children began attending school in September of 2023, while S. started in junior kindergarten at the same school in September of 2024, after a year in daycare. They have attended that same school regularly since their enrolment, (traveling to and from school together on the same bus), except on dates reserved for visits with workers from the Society. Although A2 was found to have some educational needs, (owing to her own ADHD diagnosis), all four children have done well academically, and seem particularly happy in their particular school environment; e.g., participating in the school’s various programs and athletics. As noted in further detail below, the children also have engaged in various forms of extra-curricular activities; e.g., through attendance at church with their foster parents, participation in church youth group programs, and further individual programs and hobbies.

g. By way of further individual comment on progress of the four youngest children since being taken into society care:

i. K., (in grade seven at the time of trial), is described as a “very kind”, “very sweet”, “well behaved” and “mature young lady”. Indeed, the evidence indicated that K. seemed mature beyond her years in some concerning ways; e.g., insofar as she apparently was “quite parentified” when she initially arrived in her foster placement, having apparently spent a lot of time looking after her siblings and remaining intent on doing so. In particular, she was notably intent on serving as a role model for her siblings, while also gravitating more towards adults and preferring not to socialize as much with children her own age. With the encouragement of her foster parents, however, K. now is gradually allowing herself to “let go” and allow others to take care of her siblings, while giving herself permission to act like a child again. Although generally healthy, without any diagnosed concerns, K. nevertheless did seem somewhat quiet, introverted, “closed off”, depressed and anxious when she arrived in foster care. With apparently strong self-insight, she herself then asked to start therapy to address such issues, and her outlook and presentation notably have improved greatly since then. In particular, while occasionally still quiet, K. is said to have “come a long way”, to the point where she now often seems like a “completely differently person” since her placement in foster care; e.g., having “blossomed” into a more social, playful and chatty girl. She takes increased pride in her personal appearance, is helpful in class, and now seems “driven” to achieve academically, (e.g., by taking on extra homework), while enjoying numerous extra-curricular activities and still “watching over” her younger siblings. For example, in addition to her church and church youth group activities, K. has participated in her school’s soccer program, karate lessons,⁷⁸ and the “Big Sisters” program, while also volunteering to help with her school’s kindergarten lunch program; something which now allows her to see and work with her sister S. during the school day.⁷⁹ K. also enjoys art and reading, and at the time of trial had been registered for summer camp. When asked about her wishes and preferences for her future placement, K. initially indicated some uncertainty, and a thoughtful weighing of “pros and cons” in relation to the alternatives. In particular, while she misses and worries about her mother, (to whom she feels great loyalty), she is also very happy in her current placement and situation, and does not want to “restart” at a new school, lose her current friends, give up her numerous extracurricular activities, or be parted from her siblings. On balance, K. generally wants things to continue as they are, (i.e., living with her three younger siblings at the home of PE and SC), while hoping for increased contact with her mother, building on resumed contact with her father⁸⁰, and maintaining her ongoing contact with all five of her siblings and her grandmother Ms A..⁸¹ When specifically asked by Ms A. how she felt about the possibility of being adopted by PE and SC, K. indicated that she was “okay with it", as she felt “settled” in her new home, liked her friends there, and, despite loving her mother, did “not want to be in an uncertain, unstable situation anymore”.

ii. D2, (in grade six at the time of trial), was described as “curious”, “active”, “energetic” and a “very, very busy boy”; a child who can be a “handful”, but who is “always happy”, in addition to being extremely intelligent and smart. Since arriving in his foster care placement, he generally has done very well at school, where he has experienced occasional peer struggles in relation to what were described as “silly” matters, (e.g., occasionally being too much “in the space” of others and not realizing when to “back away”), but now generally has many friends. Also described as “funny”, D2 nevertheless is said to have struggled his entire life with an independent and defiant streak; i.e., a resistance to authority that occasionally leads him to “push back” on rules and expectations, although he is then “easily re-directed” – with his grandmother Ms A. noting a “big improvement” in that regard during his time in foster care. D2 is said to be “at his best when kept busy”; something addressed by his participation in church youth group activities, school teams, karate lessons, and continued meetings with his “Friendly Home Visitor” arranged by the Society. D2 also enjoys reading, and at the time of trial also was registered for the same summer camp K. would be attending. Although formally diagnosed with ADHD,⁸² D2 functions well without any prescription medication and does not need or wish to take any.⁸³ He has engaged in counselling, at his request, to “talk and get some stuff out”; something PE and SC have supported as a “good outlet” for the many feelings D2 otherwise sometimes seems inclined to “bottle up”. He loves the privacy of having his own bedroom, but also remains very close with his siblings, and K. in particular, despite occasionally being “too rough” in his interactions with A2 and not always being honest about that. While missing, worrying about and wanting to see his mother, and sometimes missing his old school, D2 has emphasized that he now “likes it” where he is, and wishes to remain there with his siblings; something that is very important to him.⁸⁴ D2 also “loves his grandma” Ms A., and all the “fun activities” she organizes for him and his siblings. He remains interested in the possibility of seeing his father again, but for now is content with just having more phone calls with his father to help make that decision.⁸⁵

iii. A2, (in grade two at the time of trial), is described as a healthy young girl who generally is “adorable”, “very giggly”, “chatty”, “affectionate” and a generally “good kid”, who has no trouble talking with people and making friends. Also characterized as “energetic”, (with formally diagnosed ADHD in respect of which she now regularly takes prescription medication, which has improved her academic performance)⁸⁶, A2 frequently enjoys being the centre of attention, often assumes the role of “leader” or the little “boss” when interacting with her siblings, and “wants to be involved” in everything, including any meetings or other activities in which her siblings happen to be engaged. She nevertheless sometimes experiences what were described as “big feelings” of sadness and anger, and a corresponding need for help from adults to calm her down. Having said that, the “attitude” difficulties, tantrums, name calling and swearing A2 used to display in the initial period after her arrival at the home of PE and SC generally now have gone away, (particularly in the wake of starting her ADHD medication), such that A2 generally is now more calm and respectful of others. She is also now an excellent reader, who loves art as well, (e.g., drawing and colouring), with some interest in joining K. and D2 in taking up karate lessons. At the time of trial, A2 also was registered for the same summer camp K. and D2 would be attending. It was emphasized that A2 enjoys a very close relationship with all of her siblings,⁸⁷ but with her younger sister S. in particular; i.e., a relationship described as sometimes a bit competitive, but one that generally involves A2 “loving her little sister to pieces”. Although that occasionally has involved attempts by A2 to physically “discipline” S., PE and SC have taken steps to address that appropriately. Although A2 also misses and worries about her mother, (because she has not seen her mother for a long time now), she says she is very happy in her current placement and circumstances, “loves being there”, is “very connected” to her foster mother PE in particular, and generally wants things to stay as they are now. She also loves her grandmother Ms A., and “doing the fun activities” Ms A. organizes. A2 currently does not talk about contact with her father, although she will speak with Mr M. when he is on the phone with K. and/or D2 and the phone is “passed around”.⁸⁸

iv. S., (who initially was attending fulltime daycare after her placement in foster care, but had transitioned well into formal schooling and junior kindergarten by the time of trial), also was described as a generally healthy, “affectionate” and “great” child; a child who is prone to “cuddling”, (e.g., with her foster parents and Ms A.), sometimes “chatty” but also sometimes “very quiet”,⁸⁹ and generally still “growing into her own person”. She has no medical diagnoses, requires no prescription medication, and is doing “excellent” in school. She also is described as being “very close” with her siblings. In particular, while it was emphasized that S. “loves everybody”, and “gets along with everybody”, she is particularly close with A2, on whom S. patterns much of her behaviour; something which led to S. also demonstrating similar tantrums, name calling and swearing in the initial period after her arrival at the home of SC and PE, although that behaviour similarly has gone away. S. generally is now “very happy” and enjoys the constant attention she receives. She seems perfectly content with her current situation, but also appears to have few if any memories of living her life in any other way; i.e., insofar as she was still very young when she came to live with PE and SC, and her memories are mostly of life with them.

h. While the four younger children have been in their care, PE and SC have been fully supportive of the children having continued contact and/or access with their parents, siblings and paternal grandmother Ms A. In that regard:

i. PE described how in person access visits between the children and their mother initially were bi-weekly or monthly, (visits which seemed to go well, and resulted in no significant behaviour concerns thereafter apart from the children other than K. seeming a bit more “hyper” for a time), but those visits then seemed to taper off to the point where they had not happened for “quite a long time”; i.e., since August of 2024. PE and SC understood that situation to stem from the Society’s inability to get in touch with Ms H. over that period. However, it was emphasized by PE that Ms H. was still welcome to see the children at any time.

ii. PE also described how she and SC had continued, despite the inability of the children to meet with their mother, to facilitate monthly in person access between the children, their two older siblings and their paternal grandmother Ms A.; i.e., by coordinating arrangements directly or indirectly through the Society and Ms A., and helping with transportation arrangements. In that regard, PE noted that Ms A. always has welcomed S to join in such visits, without ever treating S differently from her own grandchildren.

iii. In addition to facilitating that general access between all six siblings, PE and SC also have welcomed A1 to their home for a number of overnight visits with his siblings; visits that apparently went well, albeit with A1 spending most of his time with K. and D2.⁹⁰

iv. PE was aware that there had been some telephone contact between all four children and Ms H., (supplemented by some texting between K. and D2 with Ms H.), all usually in response to PE and SC encouraging the children to reach out to their mother whenever they want; e.g., using PE’s phone, or the phones belonging to K. and D2 that allow texting or “app” communication when connected to WiFi. However, it appeared to PE and SC that such virtual contact between the children and their mother was infrequent and rare, and Ms H. had never contacted PE, (despite PE’s understanding that Ms H. has her number), to inquire about the children or otherwise.

v. As for contact between the children and Mr M., PE recalled three particular calls between D2 and his father, (during the early months of 2025), in response to D2 reaching out to his father. During those calls, K. and A2 also would speak with their father. PE also was aware of K. also separately reaching out virtually to her father, (e.g., so that Mr M. now helps K. with her homework for up to 45 minutes at a time), which PE and SC viewed as a welcome development.

vi. Beyond the virtual contact between the children and their biological relatives noted above, PE recalled one December telephone call, around Christmas time, when Ms H. had responded to a call from K., and during which the four youngest children had spoken with their mother, their maternal grandmother, (Ms C.), a maternal uncle and other maternal relatives. The children’s relatives, including their parents, otherwise had not called the children on holidays, or on any of the children’s birthdays.

vii. As noted earlier, PE and SC have indicated their willingness to have the four younger children remain in their home, as well as their interest in presenting an adoption plan for the four younger children, should the children become available for adoption. In that regard:

1. PE emphasized that she and SC would continue, on a “100 percent” basis, to facilitate in person and virtual access between the children, their siblings, both of their parents and Ms A. In particular, PE indicated that she and SC would be able to accommodate monthly meetings between the children and their mother and between the children and Ms A., (i.e., even if conducted separately so as to occur on two week-ends each month), as they had developed the ability to work flexibly with the Society, in relation to the scheduling of such visits, in a manner consistent with their work and other scheduled activities, including the children’s hobbies. Moreover, PE emphasized that A1 also would be welcomed back to their home at any time,⁹¹ and that PE and SC would even consider having A1 come to live with them as well; e.g., if and when A1’s placement with M-A ever broke down for some unexpected reason.

2. PE and SC also remained committed to ensuring a continued connection between the children and their cultural heritage.

3. In short, all of the children’s needs consistently have been and are being met in their foster care placements, and/or via D1 being placed in the supervised interim care of his father. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

a. They have been provided with stability, clean housing and clean clothes, adequate meals, consistent schooling and various forms of recreation, and have been doing well in their respective care environments.

b. Reports on the children’s status and progress in that regard routinely were provided to Ms H. and Mr M. during their respective meetings with Society workers, when those meetings were permitted to occur.

c. The relevant foster parents have demonstrated a commitment to past and future continued contact between the children and their siblings, parents and paternal grandmother.

8. More generally, it is noteworthy that, despite the considerable challenges, instability, uncertainties and inherently traumatic changes outlined above, all concerned, (including the children’s schools), consistently have emphasized, in various ways, the fundamental good nature and likeability of these six remarkable children. As counsel observed during the course of submissions, the children’s parents clearly “must have done something right” in that regard, despite the unfortunate concerns that have led to the current situation.

9. It also needs to be emphasized that these six siblings, and the four youngest children in particular, share a strong bond with each other and form what has been described as a “very, very tight sibling group”; i.e., with all six being “quite close” and “very excited to see one another” when possible.⁹² The youngest four children in particular were said to be “extremely close”, with K. still intent on looking after and “mothering” her three younger siblings, D2 sometimes needing time apart from his three sisters but still very much enjoying their company, and A2 and S being “constantly together” and “always” playing with each other. In that regard, a number of witnesses spoke directly and indirectly about the inevitable and serious emotional harm and upset that would be caused if the four younger children were separated from each other. For example:

a. Ms Gardiner felt strongly that it would be “terrible” if the four younger children were separated and unable to live with each other, as they were so very close. Indeed, she felt it impossible to imagine the four younger children not living together.

b. Ms Studerus similarly emphasized her view that it would be “extremely difficult” for the four youngest children if they no longer lived in the same home, because of their very strong attachment to one another. In particular:

i. While D1 and A1 enjoyed and greatly valued time with their younger siblings, both were older and valued their independence and having their “own space”, whereas the four younger children have a “stronger relationship” and are much more dependent on each other; e.g., insofar as they are used to spending a lot of time together, playing together, and generally enjoying each other’s company.

ii. As Ms Studerus described it, the four younger children sometimes quarrel and have sibling arguments around things like the sharing of toys, but they “truly care for each other and love each other and love being with each other”, forming a “strong sibling unit”.

iii. It was emphasized that, while all of the siblings love S., and K. and A2 feel particularly close to her, S. herself is particularly bonded with A2; i.e., insofar as she “follows A2 around everywhere”, and “mimics A2’s every move”.

c. Ms C., who supported an outcome effectively separating S. from her three older siblings, her current foster parents, and the only home S. has known since she arrived there in July of 2023 at the age of three, readily acknowledged that the four younger siblings were quite bonded and attached to each other. However, Ms C. was inclined to downplay the trauma that would be experienced by the children as a result of S. being separated and removed from that environment in order to live in Ms C.’s home,⁹³ and suggested that any such trauma could be readily addressed by permitting S. to call her siblings and former foster parents if she was missing them, and by arranging visits between S. and her siblings, even though Ms C. admittedly had no experience in making such arrangements. However, even Ms C. eventually acknowledged, during further cross-examination, that the change she was proposing for S. could be “quite a shock” for such a young child, and “a shock to all four siblings”.

d. Ms H. herself acknowledged that S. had been removed from her mother’s care at the age of three, that S. had spent more than forty percent of her life in Society care up until the time of trial, and that uprooting S. from her current placement and separating her from K., D2 and A2 would be “hard” and “tough on” all the children. In that regard:

i. Ms H. also expressly acknowledged, in particular, the very close bonds between S. and K. who, in Ms H.’s opinion, has been like a “second mommy” to S.; i.e., a view consistent with other observations indicating that K. had become quite “parentified” while living with her mother and all her other siblings.

ii. Ms H. also expressly acknowledged that “S adores her sister A2, and does everything that she does”, such that it was not Ms H.’s desire to separate them.

iii. Ms H. also stated her concern that, if S. alone was placed in the care of Ms C., (and effectively in the care of Ms H.), K., D2 and A2 would be hurt by feeling that S. had been permitted to come home to their mother while they were not; something that would run counter to Ms H. having always done her best to treat the six children evenly and fairly.

iv. Ms H. also acknowledged in cross-examination that her primary motivation for supporting placement of S. alone with Ms C. had been a fear that S. otherwise would be “adopted out on her own”, in a manner that would separate S. permanently from the rest of her siblings. In that regard, Ms H. conceded that the testimony presented at trial, indicating that PE and SC contemplated adopting all four of the younger children and keeping them together, had alleviated some of her concerns in that regard.

v. Notwithstanding all such acknowledgements, Ms H. nevertheless was insistent that, if all six children could not be returned to her care, she still wanted S. separated from the other children and placed with Ms C., so that Ms H. effectively could look after S. As Ms H. put it: “I still want my daughter with me.”

10. I also am inclined to put a great deal of weight on the views expressed by Ms A., who appears to have been the one supportive and selfless constant in the lives of these children, and who clearly seemed intent on adopting an attitude that put the needs and best interests of the children first. From her perspective, all six of the children are now doing well and are the most settled they have ever been, (e.g., not stressed, getting along, and mentally “in a much better place”), and it would be best if the children now remain where they are. In particular, Ms A. emphasized her sense that the children now have been in their current respective placements long enough to establish community connections, make friends, and gain a deep appreciation for the stability that comes from knowing “that next year, they’re not going to be somewhere else and have to say goodbye to everybody that they’ve made those connections with”.

11. Despite the realities of what extended care orders might mean, in terms of having a future relationship with his four youngest children, Mr M. also felt that, although it was something he found “hard to say”, it now would be “for the best” if the children’s wishes would be respected, allowing them to remain where they are. His comments in that regard, which I found to be some of the most poignant expressed during the course of the trial, were as follows: “The only thing I can really think is, you know, these children…for the longest time, they’ve… they’ve held their own family together when they shouldn’t have had to. I believe… I believe the majority of them are, at this point, wise enough that they…that their preferences and wishes…should be strongly heard by this Court”.

ii. As for the progress of Ms H. after the children were removed from her care in July of 2023:

1. Having her six children removed from her care clearly and understandably was a traumatic experience for Ms H.; something she admittedly has struggled greatly with since then.

2. Further contact between the Society and Ms H. after the children’s removal initially was limited to calls and texts, with the Society trying to arrange access, but with Ms H. not always responding. In that regard, Ms Gardiner confirmed that it was challenging and frequently difficult to maintain contact with Ms H.; e.g., with Ms H. responding only fifty percent of the time during Ms Gardiner’s involvement in the case.⁹⁴

3. A “family meeting” to discuss the situation took place in August.

4. By September 5, 2023, the Society had provided Ms H. with a “letter of expectations”, indicating a variety of concerns that would need to be addressed before the children could be returned to her care. They included Ms H. obtaining an assessment at Regional Supports, her engaging in child-centred access with the children, Ms H. working on budgeting with her supports, her obtaining secure housing, and her working to address her mental health by following through with community supports. Ms H. reviewed the letter with her then lawyer. Ms Gardiner thereafter also reviewed the letter with Ms H., and referred to it repeatedly, over time, during their subsequent conversations; i.e., as the Society tried to encourage and monitor the progress of Ms H. in that regard.

5. Ms H.’s finances unfortunately remained precarious, with her sometimes requesting Society payment of her rent, (which the Society was unable to do), and sometimes requesting Society payment of other expenses, (such as cab fare to various destinations, including dental appointments), while also acknowledging that a significant amount of the limited government benefit and programming income she receives has been diverted to repayment of debt and ongoing costs associated with her rental of multiple storage units. Ms H. also repeatedly indicated that she does not feel ready to pursue any form of employment, owing to past and present trauma.

6. Ms H. unfortunately continued to struggle with housing instability; i.e., changing her residence a number of times between July of 2023 and trial of this matter in April of 2025, while the Society did its best to follow her progress. In that regard:

a. On July 27, 2023, Ms Gardiner spoke directly with Ms H.’s mother, Ms C., asking how Ms C. might be able to provide assistance to Ms H. However, Ms C. responded that she was unable to assist, as she was working two jobs and “had her own family” to look after. In subsequent conversations between Ms Gardiner and Ms H., the latter repeatedly and consistently indicated that her mother was unable to provide any assistance, even in relation to the facilitation of access visits between Ms H. and the children, (apart from some food provision from time to time), because her mother was “busy” and unable to help. Indeed, Ms C. thereafter has had no in person contact with the children.

b. As of August 2023, Ms H. had come to reside at the home of her Aunt M., and her aunt’s family. From the outset, however, there was uncertainty as to how long Ms H. would be able to remain there. Initially, there was some discussion of her aunt’s family moving to another location, and vacating their existing home to permit Ms H. and her children to live there, but such plans never came to fruition. While it seems her aunt and uncle initially were supportive, (e.g., permitting Ms H. to remain in the home and use the home as a venue for access visits with the children, while also working with the Society to help Ms H. obtain food support), a rift in that regard apparently had developed by early September of 2023; e.g., with Ms H. informing the Society that it was no longer to discuss her situation with her aunt and uncle, and her aunt calling the Society to express concerns and inform the Society that Ms H. was no longer living at the residence as of September 6, 2023, with their previous offer to let Ms H. and the children reside there being “no longer on the table”.

c. During the ensuing month or so, Ms H. apparently lacked stable housing, and did not let the Society know where she was staying. In particular, for much of September of 2023, Ms Gardiner had difficulty reaching or meeting with Ms H.; e.g., to ascertain her new residence, and to discuss arrangements for her to have access with the children, if only at the Society’s office and/or via one of the limited spots in its “Family Visiting Program”. Calls from Ms Gardiner to Ms H. went unanswered, an arranged access visit with the children was missed, (and attended instead by Ms A.), and arranged meetings between Ms Gardiner and Ms H. did not occur.⁹⁵ Near the end of the month, Ms H. indicated to Ms Gardiner that she was living “in the Berkshire area of the city”, with the Society thereafter receiving further information that Ms H. was sharing a one-bedroom apartment residence with a roommate named D3, whom Ms H. was said to have known for approximately six months.⁹⁶ The residence was inspected and confirmed to be safe, and D3 initially was supportive of Ms H. and co-operative with the Society; e.g., in terms of signing consents for a child welfare check, agreeing to have the residence used as a venue for access visits from the children, (including overnight access visits), and indicating her intended support to ensure the children would have adequate food during such visits. Over time, however, there were increasing indications, (including from Ms H. herself), that the residential arrangement with D3 was unstable. In particular, the situation apparently proved overwhelming for D3, (insofar as the apartment proved too small for the two adults and six children), and for Ms H. as well; e.g., such that further access visits in the residence were put “on hold” as of May 2024. By the end of that month, Ms H. was asking Ms Gardiner for assistance with efforts to obtain another placement with Anova, with Ms Gardiner indicating in response that she would provide Ms H. with direction, but that it was up to Ms H. to complete the necessary steps in that regard. To underscore that point for Ms H., Ms Gardiner noted that she already had two families on the waitlist for Anova who “did the work to get in”. In the result, Ms H. did not relocate to Anova at the time, but apparently did complete paperwork and continue with efforts to secure subsidized housing. Indeed, by the third week of June 2024, Ms H. had been offered a one-bedroom apartment in that regard, (which the Society would have regarded as sufficient for access visits, including overnight stays), but Ms H. declined it because it was not big enough to facilitate all the children being returned to her full-time care.⁹⁷

d. During the last week of June 2024, the Society assisted with Ms H.’s admission to the CMHA Crisis Stabilization Program for a few days, with Ms H. indicating that things were “not good” at her home, as she was experiencing verbal abuse from D3, D3 wanted no further access visits from the children, and Ms H. was very interested in support to obtain alternative housing. In the result, Ms H. was discharged from the centre to the Anova shelter, where she was eligible only for a one-bedroom apartment as she had no children in her care. The CMHA also provided written confirmation that Ms H. was eligible for a one-bedroom apartment. However, Ms H. remained intent on obtaining a “big house” for her and the children, despite admittedly being confronted with indications that she lacked the income, credit rating and references required in that regard, in an already challenging real estate market. Emphasizing to the CMHA and Ms Gardiner that she still felt unable to obtain any job to assist with rendering such a large home affordable, (owing to her ongoing mental health issues), she continued to press Ms Gardiner for a letter confirming that all six children definitely would be returning to her care; i.e., to facilitate her receipt of corresponding child tax benefit income that would help to make a large home affordable. In response, Ms Gardiner repeatedly explained why other issues needed to be addressed, (e.g., those set out in the Society’s letter of expectations), before such a placement of the children back in Ms H.’s care could happen.

e. By the first week of August 2024, the Anova shelter was indicating that Ms H. would have to vacate the shelter by August 31, 2024; a date that subsequently was extended by Anova to September 3, 2024. However, staff at Anova were reporting that Ms H. was exhibiting no apparent concern in that regard, insofar as Ms H. appeared to be leaving the shelter a great deal to spend time at a nearby amusement park, the beach and bars.

f. During meetings, calls and text communications, during the latter part of August, Ms Studerus, (in addition to discussing arrangements for a scheduled August 31st access visit between Ms H. and the children), repeatedly tried to focus Ms H. on the importance of formulating a plan for where she would go following her discharge from Anova; e.g., suggesting that Ms H. follow up with her Anova social worker, and make calls to other shelters and possible residence alternatives. However, Ms H. remained primarily intent on discussing a recent troubling incident with her new roommate at Anova, and requests for the Society to support and pay for Ms H. and the children to have their forthcoming access visit at the Western Fair; something whicH. (as Ms Studerus repeatedly indicated), the Society could neither pay for nor support.⁹⁸ In the result, Ms H.’s final access visit with the children prior to trial took place at the Society, on August 31, 2024.

g. On September 3, 2024, Ms H. vacated her residence at the Anova shelter without informing the Society as to where she was going. Anova staff subsequently informed the Society that Ms H. had asked to stay longer at Anova, but was turned down. Anova also informed Ms Studerus that a bed had been available for Ms H. at the Ark Aid shelter, but Ms H. had refused to go there.⁹⁹ In the result, Ms H. had been picked up from the Anova shelter by her mother Ms C. and her brother, and Anova provided the Society with Ms C.’s current address. As discussed in further detail below, repeated Society calls and texts to Ms H., (e.g., to discuss arrangements for further access visits), thereafter generally went unanswered between September of 2024 and the time of trial.

h. Ms Studerus was able to see Ms H., and meet her mother Ms C., on September 26, 2024; i.e., when both attended the London courthouse and Ms Studerus saw them there. However, Ms H. was reluctant to speak directly with Ms Studerus, who was informed that Ms C. generally would “be doing the talking” for Ms H. that day. Ms H. also would not disclose where she was residing, telling Ms Studerus that she had only stayed with her mother the night before to facilitate her attendance at court.¹⁰⁰ Ms Studerus emphasized that the children were looking forward to further access with Ms H., and attempted to discuss arrangements in that regards; discussions that included a Society offer to provide passes for the London Children’s Museum, in relation to a visit that had been scheduled for the coming weekend, if Ms H. needed a place to exercise such access. In response, neither Ms H. nor Ms C. suggested the possibility of any access visit taking place at the home of Ms C. Nor did Ms C. ask about the children. Ms H. simply indicated she was “not in a good head space” for any in person access visit with the children, and suggested virtual access as an alternative. However, as Ms Studerus indicated in response, it was simply too late to organize such virtual access as an alternative to the scheduled and imminent in person access visit. Ms Studerus then provided her contact information to Ms H. and Ms C. and asked them to call in order to discuss the matter further, but neither did so.

i. Ms Studerus nevertheless thereafter regularly attempted more calls to Ms H., in an effort to arrange further access visits between the children and their mother, including weekend and Christmas access. Ms Studerus also continued to text Ms H. on a weekly or minimum bi-weekly basis; e.g., asking Ms H. to let Ms Studerus know her contemplated plans for exercising proffered bi-weekly Saturday access visits with the children by a certain date, (so that Ms Studerus could figure out necessary transportation arrangements in that regard), failing which it would be assumed that a proffered/scheduled visit between Ms H. and the children would not be proceeding. However, such calls, detailed voicemail messages and texts generally went unanswered. Indeed, between September of 2024 and the trial of this matter, Ms H. responded to contact efforts by Ms Studerus only four times; i.e., once in September of 2024 to address some court paperwork, once in October of 2024 to indicate that she would not be providing D1 with his Xbox unit as requested, (with Ms H. telling Ms Studerus the unit was “packed away” and she “could not get to it”), once in November of 2024 to indicate that she had changed her mind about co-operating with a passport application for A1, and once in March of 2025, approximately three weeks before trial, without Ms H. ever indicating any desire to exercise any of the proffered in person access visits with her children.

j. On the latter occasion, (in March of 2025), Ms H. called Ms Studerus to indicate that she had not been aware of a particular court appointment, and would not have been able to attend that appointment in any event because of a scheduled meeting with Regional Supports. Ms Studerus welcomed the call, (as it had been a long time since she had heard from Ms H.), and used the opportunity to emphasize to Ms H. that the children missed her, indicating that plans needed to be made for further access. However, Ms H. responded by indicating that no access visits were possible because the Society had refused to provide a requested letter confirming the children would be returned to Ms H.’s care, enabling her to obtain housing where such visits could be exercised. Ms Studerus once again reminded Ms H. that access visits could occur in the community, (with the Society willing to assist in that regard by way of things like provision of passes to the London Children’s Museum), but Ms H. was not interested in that possibility.¹⁰¹ When Ms Studerus asked Ms H. for further information about what had been going on, and why she had not been responding, Ms H. indicated she had to go and would call back. She never did so.

k. In the result, between Ms H.’s departure from Anova on September 3, 2024, and the time of trial in April of 2025, the Society had no information or knowledge about where and with whom Ms H. was residing, or whether she was addressing any of the child protection concerns that had been identified. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the non-responsive approach adopted by Ms H. effectively prevented Ms Studerus and the Society from any meaningful engagement to address progress in relation to the concerns outlined in the Society’s original letter of expectations provided to Ms H.

7. Ms H. admittedly struggles with mental health issues.¹⁰² As described by Ms H. to the Society, those challenges have included developmental and processing struggles experienced throughout her childhood. Moreover, that condition which seems to have continued into adulthood, insofar as Ms H. admittedly still struggles to understand and remember conversations, to the point where Ms Gardiner sometimes felt compelled to have Ms H. repeat things back, and/or to provide Ms H. with written confirmation and reminders of matters they had discussed, to ensure things had been heard and understood by Ms H. Ms H. also has indicated that things have been made worse in that regard owing to separation from her children; i.e., such that she finds it more difficult to commit to planning, access with her children and other matters. By Ms H.’s own account, she also has resorted at times to calling crisis lines on a weekly basis, and suspects that there may be “something going on in her brain” related to childhood trauma and injury; i.e., to the point of wondering whether a hospital psychological assessment might be appropriate.¹⁰³ However, notwithstanding such acknowledged challenges and issues, Ms H. was slow to follow up on recommended help from the CMHA; e.g., repeatedly failing to engage and/or follow up with specifically identified/designated CHMA workers in that regard, to discuss her mental health and trauma and organize a plan of treatment, to the point where those workers felt obliged to close their file. That failure happened despite repeated encouragement and reminders from the Society emphasizing the importance of Ms H. meeting regularly with her designated CMHA contacts regarding her mental health, with Ms H. indicating in response that she felt such contact to be unhelpful. It was not until August of 2024, (more than a year after the children had been removed from her care), that Ms H. began working with an assigned CMHA worker to discuss a possible referral to Dale Services Brain Damage; i.e., as Ms H. was continuing to speak about the possibility of having sustained a traumatic injury as a child.¹⁰⁴ However, for the reasons noted above, the Society generally was provided with no further information as to whether Ms H. continued to follow up on addressing her mental health issues, apart from receiving an indication that Ms H. did not follow up on an outpatient connection offered to her by the CMHA.¹⁰⁵

8. Ms H. also was reticent and non-cooperative about following up on other important concerns identified in the Society’s letter of expectations, and during ongoing Society efforts to promote Ms H.’s progress. In that regard, and by way of example:

a. In addition to numerous missed meetings, and her belated response or lack of response to Society communications, by January 17, 2024, (i.e., more than four months after receipt of the Society’s letter of expectations emphasizing the importance of completing the Regional Assessment process, as a means of obtaining the suggestions and supports it would recommend), Ms H. was indicating to the Society that she had called only a week before to request the Regional Assessment package that needed to be completed before the relevant intake could be scheduled. By that time, there apparently was an indicated waiting period of at least a further eight-months before the assessment could or would be completed. At the same time, Ms H. was indicating to the Society that she would not share the results of the assessment with anyone when they were obtained. Ms H. also seemed reluctant to follow up on Society reminders about the need to obtain a family doctor.

b. By April of 2024, Ms H. was indicating that she had submitted her intake package for Regional Supports but had heard nothing back. She admittedly had not yet found a family doctor, nor followed up on the promises she made in November of 2024 to obtain assistance for her acknowledged mental health issues. Nor had she been able to make any progress in finding housing.

c. By May of 2024, Ms H. admittedly still had not addressed any of the concerns identified in the Society’s letter of expectations provided more than 10 months earlier, (i.e., in September of 2023), apart from being fairly consistent with bi-weekly access visits with the children and meeting their needs during those visits. She confirmed that her mother actually had not “dropped off” her necessary application package required for the contemplated Regional Assessment, and that she had not found a family doctor, had not called CMHA as promised to complete the referral process and seek services, and had not looked for counselling. Ms Gardiner provided Ms H. with a further list of written reminders in that regard, along with a booklet clearly showing other supports available in the community. While Ms H. remained fixated on her stated need for subsidized housing, Ms Gardiner emphasized that mental health and medical issues needed to be addressed prior to improved housing; e.g., with it being clarified and confirmed to Ms H. that she effectively would need to get a job to obtain the sort of large housing she apparently desired.

d. By June of 2024, Ms H. was indicating that she had placed calls to Ontario Works and someone at Regional Supports, (who was said to have confirmed recent receipt of Ms H.’s “paperwork”), but also was indicating that her “calling around” had not resulted in location of any family doctor. She pressed Ms Gardiner for a letter confirming the children definitely would be returned to her if she obtained housing, (to facilitate Ms H. obtaining such housing), obliging Ms Gardiner to respond that such a letter was impossible in the circumstances; i.e., as almost a year had gone by since the children had been removed from Ms H.’s care, and she had only recently started addressing the various needs and expectations long identified by the Society. In the view of the Society, there was still a great deal of work to be done before any such reunification placement would be possible.

e. By July of 2024, (by which time Ms H. had relocated to the Anova shelter), Ms H. had completed the intake forms for Thames Valley Counselling and been approved for eight sessions, but had not yet attended any, and was declining Society offers to assist with their scheduling. She had contacted a doctor via Health Care Connect, but was indicating that the doctor in question was only taking child patients. Her CMHA intake information confirmed that she was eligible for a one-bedroom apartment geared to income, but Ms H. remained fixated on obtaining a “big house” for her and all six of her children, despite indicating that she felt unready to obtain a job to make that desired outcome affordable because of her ongoing mental health issues. Ms H. also reported that it was a “busy time” for her, as she had been “going out a lot” lately, and was socializing with family and friends. She once again requested a letter from the Society confirming that all the children would be returned to her care, (thereby facilitating her receipt of child tax benefit income), if she obtained such housing. Ms Gardiner once again was required to explain why such a letter was not possible, as Ms H. still had a lot to do to address the Society’s other repeatedly indicated concerns before the children could be returned to her care.

f. On August 29, 2024, the Society was notified, (via a text sent to Ms Gardiner), that Ms H. had revoked her consent for the Society to communicate with Regional Supports about her progress.

g. For the reasons noted above, the Society thereafter received no further information from Ms H. about her progress in relation to such matters from September of 2024 through to the commencement of trial in April of 2025.

h. When asked in cross-examination why she had failed to meet with Ms Studerus since August of 2024, Ms H. indicated her view that the Society had not sufficiently recognized steps she had taken to address the Society’s concerns, (e.g., with Ms H. perceiving that the Society was “just trying to say that [she] didn’t do anything to satisfy them”), and she therefore decided not to do anything further in that regard.

9. At various times, Ms H. also has not co-operated in efforts to facilitate the provision of items or help that would have made matters easier or more pleasant for the children; e.g., provision of the children’s actual healthcare cards, birth certificates and other identification, (needed to apply for bank accounts, school registrations, travel, etc.), return of an “Xbox” system desperately wanted by D1, and signing of an application to obtain a desired passport for A1.

10. Although the Society continued to encourage Ms H. to exercise her rights of access to the children, and to offer and provided various forms of assistance and support in that regard, Ms H. repeatedly has failed to exercise those rights of access, often for very extended periods of time, despite being made aware of the children’s ongoing fervent desire to see their mother and their concerns about her welfare. In that regard:

a. In my view, the evidence clearly indicates that the Society consistently has made efforts to facilitate Ms H.’s exercise of such access; e.g., through repeated conversations and calls, the making of arrangements, offering and/or providing use of the Society’s facilities, proactive suggestion of access visit alternatives, and the provision of bus tickets and other forms of driving support where possible.

b. In my view, the evidence also nevertheless makes it clear that, since the children were removed from her care in July of 2023, the Society’s efforts in that regard frequently have been frustrated and unsuccessful for reasons usually centred on Ms H.. Numerous attempts at communication with her in that regard met with no response, or no timely response. Numerous scheduled visits were cancelled, and/or not attended by Ms H., and Society suggestions of “make up” visits and/or expanded visits repeatedly were declined, with Ms H. also expressing resistance to Society suggestions of other access venues and activities. Nor did Ms H. take Ms Gardiner up on an offer to have Ms H. accompany Ms Gardiner on a visit to see D1 at his group home in Hamilton,¹⁰⁶ or offers to arrange access with D1 and A1 supervised by Ms A. – with Ms H. once again indicating that she wanted no help from Ms A. A wide variety of other reasons were indicated by Ms H. in relation to such visitation issues and failures; e.g., her discomfort with letting her aunt assist with visits, her disagreement with proposed times for the exercise of such access, her professed concern that Ms A. would be attending access visits, (although it was made clear that Mr M. would not be accompanying Ms A.), her professed difficulty in riding buses (despite the Society’s frequent provision of bus tickets) because of her ongoing trauma, her lack of alternate transportation, (although arrangements often were made and/or offered to provide her with alternative driving transportation where possible), her concerns about possible inability to provide adequate food for the children, her desire/insistence at one point for access to take place in the children’s foster homes, stated problems with her phone, repeated indications of illness being experienced by her and/or her roommate, (although some of those indications were undermined by other information provided to the Society, indicating that Ms H. had simply engaged in other social activities), Ms H.’s roommate being unwilling to permit such visits at their shared residence, and Ms H.’s admitted delay in speaking with shelter workers at Anova to discuss access occurring there. A number of those provided reasons seem legitimate; e.g., in terms of confirmed illness and surgical treatment for appendicitis, and/or the described mental health issues that inhibit Ms H.’s use of public transportation on her own. On any objective view, however, the number of cancellations, delays and extended failures in relation to Ms H.’s exercise of such rights of access with the children seems inordinate and extraordinary; i.e., in relation to any parent truly interested in maintaining a relationship with his or her children.

c. When such access visits did occur, (including an extended visit over the Christmas holidays in 2023), they generally appeared to go well. In particular, the children consistently were very happy to see their mother and each other, despite also indicating a degree of boredom and certain tensions¹⁰⁷ associated with the limited activities they usually engaged in during such visits, and/or with venue space constraints; e.g., at the Society, in the small apartment Ms H. shared with her roommate D3, and at the Anova Shelter. However, Ms H. was resistant to the Society’s suggestions of alternative activities and venues in that regard; e.g., with Ms H. emphasizing it was hard for her to manage access visits with six children in the community. Ms H. also occasionally lapsed into raising the children’s expectations about possible changes in their placement that had not been confirmed. Again, however, such visits generally went well, with the children generally expressing an interest in having more time with their mother. Moreover, at no point did the Society ever feel that the visits required formal supervision; i.e., as Ms H. never exhibited any behaviour suggesting that she would overtly harm the children, and the children never stated any fears in that regard. Ms H. also attended A1’s senior public-school graduation with absolutely no issues in that regard, and with the Society providing transportation assistance. In my view, the success of such visits and interactions, and the obvious value the children have placed on them, and maintenance of a relationship with their mother, makes Ms H.’s failure to exercise her rights of access and/or otherwise see the children in person more frequently, over very extended periods of time, all the more difficult to understand. That difficulty is compounded by what presumably was an awareness that the children would be and indeed were disappointed by their mother’s cancellation of access visits and/or failure to pursue such visits – although their disappointment in that regard apparently now has transitioned into acceptance; i.e., as they became accustomed to such cancellations and failures, and stopped asking about them.

d. As noted above, at the time of trial, Ms H. had failed to have any in person access visits whatsoever with any of the children since August 31, 2024, despite the Society continuing to offer her bi-weekly visits with the children.¹⁰⁸ Ms H. nevertheless has maintained some phone and text contact with K., D2 and A2, as per their wishes, and with the knowledge and support of their foster parents, although that virtual contact has been somewhat limited.¹⁰⁹

e. In cross-examination, Ms H. was confronted with her extended and ongoing failures to engage in any access visits with her children. In that regard:

i. Ms H. acknowledged that she has refused to respond to the Society’s numerous inquiries regarding access visits between the children and their mother, and that more than 7½ months had passed between her last access visit and the time of trial. Ms H. also confirmed her awareness that her children miss her and worry about her, and said that “it breaks her heart”. However, when asked if she was going to do anything about that, Ms H. said she “unfortunately didn’t know how”.

ii. By way of further explanations in that regard, Ms H. offered the following:

1. She said she made it very clear to Ms Studerus, when leaving the Anova shelter, that she “couldn’t do access” at the time, as she had been “going through a lot”.

2. She testified that having access visits at the home of her mother was not possible, as she knew her mother’s husband would not be “on board” with the idea.

3. She explained that she has significant anxieties and an almost “paralyzing fear” which inhibit her use of public transit; e.g., as she struggles with her sense of direction, is confused by multiple stops, and experiences a sense of panic that someone is “going to attack” her while using public transit. Such anxieties admittedly become much more manageable if someone is with her, (including the children), but she otherwise prefers “point to point” cabs or similar driving provided by others.

4. Ms H. also was reluctant to exercise access in the community in any event, emphasizing that doing so was “a struggle” for her; e.g., insofar as she felt uncertain as to what would happen if she was attempting to do that, without the help of others, if any of the children became sick, hurt, hungry or in need of a bathroom. While Ms A. formerly was willing to assist Ms H. with such access visits, and helpfully had a vehicle in that regard, Ms H. understood that Ms A. was no longer willing to help her in that regard. For reasons discussed in more detail below, Ms H. also has been reluctant to even ask her mother or other family members to assist with facilitating such access.

5. Ms H. indicated that she also was reluctant to have any access visits with the children take place at the Society, as she had found the last access visit there “cramped” and “not very fun”. In particular, she and the children had been confined to one room, (i.e., as opposed to the ability they had enjoyed to play in different areas of the Society’s building and/or go outside during a previous visit), and she felt the lunch the children had received was rather small. Ms H. nevertheless acknowledged that, although further access visits between her and the children at the Society’s building therefore might not seem beneficial for her personally, they would still be beneficial for the children; i.e., insofar as the children at least would be able to see their mother and not worry so much about her.¹¹⁰

6. As for possible access visits with D1 alone, Ms H. indicated that she did feel sufficiently comfortable or safe to engage in such visits while D1 was living with Mr M. and Ms P.; i.e., emphasizing that she remained too traumatized by her relationship with Mr M., (which was said to have ended with abuse and violence), by Ms P. taunting her and trying to provoke fights with her during past encounters, and by reports of the children being subjected to violence while in the care of Mr M. and Ms P. In that regard, Ms H. said she had not been able to put such incidents sufficiently behind her, (i.e., to pursue in person visits with D1 while he remained in his father’s care), despite her having completed eight sessions of counselling and having enrolled for four more.

f. In the meantime, Ms A. routinely has continued to facilitate and attend regular visits with and between the children, sometimes with the assistance of the children’s foster parents and/or drivers organized by the Society. That generally has happened at least monthly but usually bi-weekly, although some weekends necessarily were missed because of Ms A.’s work schedule. During such visits, Ms A. usually takes the children and/or meets with the children for various activities in the community; e.g., for restaurant lunch outings and/or visits to recreational areas such as a trampoline park, a bowling alley or another well-known children’s centre here in London, with Ms A. paying for everything in that regard. During independent conversations with the Society’s child protection workers, all six children spoke highly of their paternal grandmother, as did M-A and PE during the testimony they provided at trial.¹¹¹

iii. As for the progress of Mr M. following the children being taken into society care in July of 2023:

1. In relation to the criminal charges regarding the children noted earlier, Mr M. pled guilty to two counts of assault by asphyxiation and one count of failure to comply with an undertaking. On July 24, 2023, he received a nine-month conditional sentence, (with the first half to be served under house arrest spent in the residence of Ms P.’s parents, and the remainder by way of curfew arrangements, with GPS monitoring), to be followed by two years of probation.¹¹² The terms of sentence included various other specified terms and conditions, including a requirement that Mr M. attend various forms of programming, (e.g., anger management, parenting classes, and “Caring Dads”), and not communicate with A1 or D2 except with their permission and/or pursuant to a family court order.

2. As early as August of 2023, Mr M. was emphasizing to the Society that he would like to rebuild a relationship with his children if they were amenable to that, (although he would respect their wishes in that regard)¹¹³, with he and his mother, Ms A., expressing their willingness to co-operate with any suggested arrangements to facilitate contact and/or visits, (with those visits being supervised by Ms A. if that would make the children and/or the Society more comfortable in that regard), and with Mr M. indicating a desire to engage in counselling with the children at some point if possible. In the meantime, Mr M. made it clear that contact from the children in any form, (e.g., via letters or telephone), would be welcome. Mr M. also indicated a willingness and desire to have D1 returned to his care, (in accordance with D1’s apparent wishes in that regard), and a willingness to attend any necessary meetings and appointments in that regard to the extent his sentence and its conditions permitted him to do so.

3. Mr M. embarked on and completed the programming mandated by his criminal sentence; e.g., attending bi-weekly anger management sessions organized by the John Howard Society, as well as “actively and positively” participating in the “Caring Dads” program starting on January 31, 2024, once he made his way through its waitlist – and once the terms of his sentence permitted renewed contact with the children.¹¹⁴ To Mr M.’s credit, he supplemented that mandated programming by voluntarily attending more than the number of sessions required in that regard; e.g.,, attending 16 sessions of the programming offered by the John Howard sessions rather than the required 12, (in order to combine group anger management training with further one-on-one counselling with his group’s facilitator), and continuing to attend and actively participate in “Caring Dads” sessions well into May of 2024. (A representative from “Caring Dads” advised the Society that Mr M. appeared insightful of his parenting choices and the potential harm he may have caused, had a good perception of how his children might be experiencing him as a result, and “took ownership” of what he had done.) Mr M. thereafter also made arrangements to attend weekly in person “one on one” counselling at Family Services Thames Valley, with the focus in that regard including stress management and realization of how Mr M.’s childhood had affected his own parenting. All of that supplemented Mr M.’s engagement with other sources of programming and support, (e.g., via the Pathways Employment Centre and a Union Hall), to secure renewed employment. As there are limits on the extent and frequency with which Mr M. is able to engage in such programming, he commendably now has adopted approach of “staggering” his further enrolments, in order to receive further voluntary counselling on a relatively ongoing basis, approximately every two weeks. He remains committed to ensuring that any ongoing mental issues he may have, (e.g., in relation to memories of his past criminal behaviour, time in jail, or poor parenting decisions in the past), will not result in any further misconduct on his part.

4. With Society support, (and despite Ms H.’s continued stated opposition to such suggestions), approval was granted in November of 2023 for the initiation of child-centred telephone contact between D1 and his father, at D1’s request. Those calls went well and, by December of 2023, (by which time the “house arrest” component of Mr M.’s conditional sentence had come to an end), arrangements were made, (again with Society support and the approval of Mr M.’s probation officer), to have Mr M. visit D1 in Hamilton and enjoy access in the community there. That initially occurred under the supervision of Ms A., (on three to five occasions), and then without supervision. Those visits began on December 9, 2024, and went well; e.g., with Mr M. picking D1 up from the group home and taking D1 out for meals, hiking excursions and swimming outings, and one of Ms P.’s sons sometimes joining Mr M. and Ms A. on such visits with D1. At the same time, telephone contact between Mr M. and D1 was continuing on a weekly basis. In private meetings with Ms Gardiner, D1 confirmed that all of that growing contact with his father was very positive, and gave him no concerns.

5. Mr M. also continued to work with the Society in relation to his long-term goal of D1 being able to return to Mr M.’s care, as D1 apparently wanted. In that regard:

a. By March of 2024, Mr M. and Ms P. were once again living together in a new residence, without any children; i.e., as Ms P.’s children were residing with their stepmother Ms B., as noted earlier. By April of 2024, Ms P. also had been found “not guilty” of the criminal charges against her relating to Mr M.’s children; i.e., such that Ms P. still has no criminal convictions whatsoever, and is not bound by any criminal terms or conditions.¹¹⁵

b. In calls and meetings with Ms Gardiner, (to discuss Mr M.’s potential plan for the future with D1), Mr M. himself acknowledged the need for incremental steps in terms of D1 returning to London and his father’s care; e.g., indicating an initial desire for D1 to make day visits without Ms P. being present in the new home, which admittedly was too small to accommodate overnight visits by D1 in any event. Mr M. himself indicated that he also needed to get a job and upgrade to a larger home before there could be a possibility of overnight access visits by D1 or D1 generally returning to Mr M.’s care.

c. Interaction between D1 and Mr M.’s partner Ms P. also remained a concern for the Society, despite dismissal of the criminal charges against her. To that end, a meeting was held between Mr M., Ms P. and Ms Gardiner to discuss such concerns, (including Mr M. having included Ms P. in phone contact with D1 when such phone contact with Ms P. had not been requested by D1 or the other children), and to provide Ms P. with an opportunity to convey her perspective and views to the Society. During that meeting on May 15, 2024, (wherein Ms P. was described as nervous but extremely polite and respectful), Ms P. acknowledged that the earlier period of her and Mr M. having eight children living with them, while she simultaneously also was working two jobs and attending school, had been very overwhelming for her. She admitted apologetically to having “smacked” D1 on one occasion, when she had discovered D1 physically fighting with her much smaller daughter, but otherwise denied allegations that she had ever hurt any of the children, emphasized her commitment to ensuring there would be no similar physical discipline in the future, and expressed a real desire to see D1 again.¹¹⁶

d. Concerns about the use of substances by Mr M. and Ms P. also were expressly and candidly addressed. In that regard, both acknowledged use of legal marihuana, albeit not when caring for D1. Mr M. acknowledged consuming relatively moderate amounts of alcohol, while Ms P. was consuming no alcohol at all, and had ceased her previous use of other illicit substances; e.g., using various forms of exercise and meditation to deal with stress.¹¹⁷ She also had made arrangements for her own counselling through Family Services.

e. In the result, both the Society and D1 were content with Ms P. being present in Mr M.’s apartment from the commencement of D1’s overnight access visits, and D1 thereafter has never reported any concerns regarding Ms P.¹¹⁸

6. In April of 2024, the provisions of Mr M.’s sentence requiring non-association with A1 and D2 came to an end, and the boys were advised about that by the Society. In response to Society emphasis that renewed contact with the children should be in accordance with their wishes and preferences, (which Mr M. accepted), it was agreed that Mr M. would remain receptive to any contact from the children but not initiate such contact; i.e., that he would wait for the children to “reach out” to him, after they were made aware of his willingness to hear from them or meet with them in accordance with whatever they wanted or did not want to happen. D2 thereafter initiated telephone contact with Mr M., to which Mr M. responded, and A1 and Mr M. also began texting and speaking by telephone, “getting to know each other again”. K. had indicated to Ms Gardiner that she was not yet ready to speak again with her father, which was something that had been conveyed to Mr M., and which he had accepted. However, Mr M. obtained permission to provide the Society with a letter to K.; i.e., if she changed her indicated desire not to communicate with her father, and wished to receive the letter. All of the foster parents, (who were supervising the children’s phones), were made aware of the situation and supported such contact.

7. In June of 2024, Mr M. met A1 before and after his public-school graduation, (after obtaining Society approval in that regard, and working out agreed arrangements to avoid any possible friction between A1’s parents that might spoil the event for A1), and the personal interaction and communication between A1 and his father proceeded easily and well.¹¹⁹

8. By July of 2024, D1 was expressing feelings of loneliness, unhappiness with his mother’s cancellation of access visits, and troublesome behaviour in his group home environment. He nevertheless was working to address such behaviour; i.e., as a condition of having day visits with his father at the home of Mr M..

9. By August of 2024, Mr M. was having continued telephone interaction with D2, during which K. and A2 also were speaking with Mr M.. Numerous home day visits between Mr M. and D1, (during which Ms P. was to be absent, but in respect of which Ms A. would drop in to ensure all was appropriate), also were scheduled for the months of August, September and October; visits which thereafter would go well.

10. By September of 2024, Mr M. had been able to obtain employment, allowing him to obtain a larger residential unit with his landlord’s assistance. With support from Ms A., (who continued to visit the residence every one or two weeks, and always check in directly with D1), and from the Society, (which conducted a further home assessment and inquiries to ensure cleanliness of the home, as well as the continued absence of any substance abuse by Ms P.), D1’s visits with his father transitioned in October to overnight stays every other weekend; i.e., through use of a pull-out couch that was relocated to a private upstairs area of the residence. Although there were concerns about D1 not changing into new clothes during his initial overnight visits, and coming back tired because of excessive late-night gaming, Mr M. worked to address such concerns after they were brought to his attention. During subsequent attendance at the home of Mr M. during visitation there by D1, D1 was taking showers, appeared clean, was wearing clean clothing, and was following an appropriate hygiene regime.

11. Although D1 initially had indicated to Ms Gardiner that he did “not feel safe” around Ms P., Ms Gardiner emphasized that also “absolutely changed” at some point, approximately six months after renewed interaction between D1 and his father; i.e., after some form of conversation between D1 and Ms P. that succeeded in changing their relationship for the better. Ms P. herself made it clear that, although D1 has been “a handful” in the past, (e.g., when things were “a lot harder”, with eight other children in the residence at the same time as D1), she and D1 now have “no issues” and “no problems”, and she has been both surprised and very pleased with his behaviour. In particular, when she now asks D1 to do something, he does it. She, Mr M. and D1 also now enjoy a very close relationship, where all three eat family meals together, and D1 “opens up” to her a lot about things. Ms P. does not feel intimidated or scared at all by D1’s much greater size, and instead describes D1 as her “little sweetie”.¹²⁰

12. Although Mr M. was laid off in November owing to company downsizing, he once again worked through the Pathway Employment Centre to find further employment.

13. With the support and assistance of the Society, arrangements were made for D1 to have five days of extended access at Mr M.’s home over the Christmas 2024 holidays, with Ms A. also supervising an additional simultaneous December weekend visit of D1 and A1 to Mr M.’s home, supervised by Ms A.

14. By the end of December of 2024, D1 was indicating that he wanted to leave his group home in Hamilton and return to the care of his father, and a reunification plan was discussed with the Society and agreed upon by D1.

15. As noted earlier, D1 was formally placed in the care of his father Mr M., supervised by the Society, on an interim basis, pursuant to an order made by Justice Tobin on January 24, 2025. Between the making of that order and the time of trial, the Society continued to visit with Mr M., Ms P. and D1 on a regular basis, and provide continued support.¹²¹ In that regard, Mr M.’s parenting progress was not perfect, but in my view demonstrated continued commitment and progress. In that regard:

a. Mr M., (as well as Ms P.), have remained committed to smoking only outside of their residence; e.g., on the balcony there.¹²²

b. In accordance with Society advice and directions, Mr M. worked to secure a family doctor for D1, to obtain doctor’s notes needed for various funding and support applications recommended by the Society, and to have D1’s prescriptions for ADHD and Autism Spectrum Disorder medications transferred to London. Despite some initial oversights in that regard, D1 apparently thereafter has been taking his prescription medication on a regular basis.¹²³ With the assistance of Ms A. and Ms P., Mr M. also has followed up by attending medical appointments with D1, (although D1 is given the option of speaking with his doctor independently), and paying for any uncovered medical expenses in that regard.

c. Mr M. worked diligently with the Thames Valley District School Board to locate an appropriate and available school with a specialized classroom for D1, and to ensure necessary tours, registration, IEP information transfer from D1’s former school, transportation arrangements, and attendance at transition meetings in that regard. In the result, D1 eventually was able to resume his education here in London, (initially via half days before transitioning to full days), was attending regularly in that regard at the time of trial,¹²⁴ and was doing well given his limitations; i.e., his mild intellectual disability, global developmental delays, his ADHD and Autism Spectrum Disorder, and his tendency to pace and stutter slightly when stressed.

d. Working with Ms Studerus and the Society, Mr M. completed intake arrangements to have D1 referred to Humana and Tandem programming here in London, (programs which promote children’s mental health), and was able to get D1 waitlisted in that regard – with his programming scheduled to commence shortly after trial, as noted earlier. A referral to the Anchor Behavioral Support Services program was also submitted. In her testimony, Ms P. emphasized her view that such counselling to address D1’s lingering mental health issues was important, as he indicates that he is depressed at times. Moreover, both she and Mr M. described how D1 still exhibits residual behaviours they find troubling; e.g., insofar as D1 is very protective of his belongings, (and his computer in particular), and engages in unusual behaviours to protect anything belonging to him from the possibility of it being taken away by others; e.g., by consistently putting his laptop and other devices in bags and ensuring they are “stowed away”, rather than leaving them out on the desk of his bedroom.¹²⁵ D1 himself is also looking forward to such counselling, and having someone outside the family with whom he can discuss his feelings.

e. Mr M. also has been working with the Society to obtain further services and supports for D1 through the Ontario Autism Program, and is committed to getting “every possible assistance” that may be available to D1 in the circumstances.

f. Despite some initial lapses, (as D1 transitioned from the routines of his group home to life in Mr M.’s residence), a hygiene regime was implemented, (with the assistance of visual cues/reminders), to ensure that D1 thereafter was bathing every day or every other day. In the result, D1’s hygiene has improved since his relocation to Mr M.’s residence. Steps also were taken to limit D1’s use of technology; i.e., to prevent excessive and/or late-night gaming.

g. Generally, there was no suggestion that Mr M. has not been complying with the terms and conditions of the existing order placing D1 in Mr M.’s supervised care, and Mr M. confirmed his commitment to continue abiding by the terms and conditions of any further supervision order made in that regard, including full cooperation with the Society and whatever visits the Society felt necessary and appropriate to monitor the situation.

16. When it proved challenging to secure larger accommodation via his employment income, as planned, Mr M. worked with Ms A. to secure larger long-term accommodation for himself, Ms P. and D1 through an agreement whereby Ms A. purchased a suitable apartment that was then leased to Mr M. at below market rent; i.e., with Mr M., Ms P. and D1 relocating there in February of 2025. In the result, D1 obtained his own private bedroom,¹²⁶ (the larger of the two bedrooms in the unit), with a work desk and a new bed provided by the Society, in a clean, safe and stable environment.¹²⁷ Although Mr M. indicated that things were a “bit tight” financially, (and more so while Ms P. was between jobs and collecting Ontario Works), the smaller family unit was managing, (with the support of Ms A. and Ms P.’s relatives making things easier), and the Society has offered to provide further assistance via grocery cards.

17. In the meantime, M. also continued to work on rebuilding his relationship with his other children; texting and enjoying access visits with A1 supervised by Ms A., texting and spending more time on the phone with D2 as per his wishes, (to rebuild their attachment and work towards in person access), and communicating with K. and A2 via text and phone, as per their wishes.¹²⁸ By the time of trial, D2 was the only one of Mr M.’s three youngest children who had expressed an interest in the possibility of arranging in person visits with Mr M., although Mr M. remained open to the possibility of visits with all three, (with supervision if/as necessary), subject to the children’s wishes and preferences.

Evidence regarding further competing plans of care

20The extended findings of fact set out above focus primarily on events up to and including the time of trial.

21However, insofar as the Society, the children and Mr M. all support future plans of care that essentially request court orders permitting the six children to remain where they currently are, (i.e., via the proposed supervision order placing D1 with Mr M. for a further six months under Society supervision, and the proposed orders in relation to the remaining children that would place them in extended society care, with a view to the children remaining with their current foster parents), the evidence and findings outlined above regarding the children’s present circumstances essentially represents the plans of care put forth by the Society, the children and Mr M., supplemented by the evidence to which I have referred indicating their stated intentions and hopes for the future.

22I turn now to an outline of the evidence I received from Ms C. and Ms H. regarding the alternative plans of care they essentially put forward at trial, including my more extended reasons as to why I had difficulty regarding Ms C. and Ms H. as credible and reliable witnesses.

23As for the testimony Ms C. provided, regarding alternative plans of care for the children:

a. Ms C. explained that she currently resides in a semi-detached home with three bedrooms, located at a specified address here in the city of London. The home is owned by Ms C. and her current husband, (“R2”), and they have lived there for over 10 years. The home was described as having two stories, (i.e., an upstairs and downstairs), as well as a large backyard, swimming pool and hot tub.

b. Ms C.’s current husband has five adult children, (who are between the ages of 41 and 23, and some of whom have children of their own), and Ms C. has four adult children, including Ms H. At the moment, all four of Ms C.’s children, (aged 35, 34, 27 and 22), are living in the home with Ms C. and her husband. Ms C. and her husband occupy one of the three bedrooms, while her two sons, (A. and L.), separately occupy each of the home’s other two bedrooms. Ms C.’s two daughters, (Ms H. and her sister A.), sleep in the downstairs recreation room. As Ms C. repeatedly indicated during the course of her testimony, the home admittedly is very crowded, having regard to its six current adult occupants and a good deal of items stored where possible therein; e.g., such that the kitchen necessarily has a number of spare mattresses stored there, making it difficult to move around the kitchen. Indeed, the home was said to be so crowded, with so many occupants and such “a lot of stuff everywhere”, that the addition of one more adult resident, (when Ms C.’s daughter A. returned to the home), thereafter made it impossible to use the residence as a venue for access visits of Ms H. and the six children, even though it previously had been used in that way on occasion.

c. Ms C. testified that, although she had “always wanted” her grandchildren and daughter to live with her, and would absolutely love for that to happen, it was simply impossible for her to put forward or participate in any plan of care whereby Ms H. and all six of the children would be accommodated in Ms C.’s residence. Not only did space constraints in the home make that impossible, (as she simply did “not have a big enough house”), but her husband, (the joint owner of the home), repeatedly had indicated his opposition to any such suggestions. According to Ms C., Ms H. also had been made aware of all that. That was why Ms C. instead had continued to assist Ms H. with efforts to obtain low-income housing large enough to accommodate Ms H. and all six children; e.g., by co-signing with Ms H. on a townhouse lease, and helping Ms H. with preparation and submission of other applications for such housing.

d. However, Ms C. also indicated in her testimony that she personally nevertheless “always wanted S.”, and therefore repeatedly pressed her husband for his consent and co-operation in that regard; i.e., to put forward a plan whereby S once again would come to live in their house. In that regard, Ms C. acknowledged that it had taken “some effort” to convince her husband to agree to the proposal, as he remained concerned that it was a “small house”, making it “hard to fit everybody in” and “figure it all out”. However, Ms C. testified that she now recently had done so; i.e., informing Ms Studerus by telephone on or about April 8, 2025, (the second day of trial), that she and her husband had decided to take S into their care, and wanting to know what the Society’s terms and conditions of such a placement would be, so that Ms C. would know, in her words, “how to get [her] granddaughter”. While that admittedly was the first time Ms C. had put forth any such suggestion since the children were taken into society care in July of 2023, (i.e., approximately 20-21 months earlier), Ms C. said she was simply unable to “figure this out sooner”.

e. When asked where S. would sleep in Ms C.’s already crowded residence, Ms C. indicated that she “would either have to put her in the rec room, or the living room”. A bed admittedly would have to be purchased for S., but Ms C. indicated that she already had saved some advertisements in that regard.

f. Ms C. indicated there were two specified schools S. could attend if such a plan of care was implemented; i.e., one operated by the public-school board and one operated by the separate school board, with both located within a 10–15-minute drive of Ms C.’s home, and with Ms C. indicating a willingness to do the driving in that regard. Ms C.’s part-time work outside of the home was said to be flexible enough to accommodate such things; i.e., that her employer was “really good about working things around” for her.

g. As for S.’s health care, Ms C. acknowledged that possible arrangements had not yet been clarified in that regard. However, she was said to have “left a message” about that with her own longtime family doctor on April 4tH. (i.e., three days prior to commencement of the trial), with that doctor having since called back, but without Ms C. being able to respond and follow up owing to her attendance at the courthouse. In any event, Ms C. also thought that S. might be able to return to the care of a paediatrician previously used by Ms H.

h. In terms of S having access to others, if formally placed in the care of Ms C. under the Society’s supervision:

i. Ms C. emphasized that Ms H. would be staying with her as well, so that S. and her mother would see each other every day. If Ms H. moved out, Ms C. said she would bring S. to Ms H. “as much as she wanted”.

ii. Ms C. acknowledged the importance of having all six of the siblings enjoy continued visits with each other, (such that arrangements would need to be made to have S. see all of her siblings on a regular basis), but Ms C. clearly had not given any detailed consideration to such matters; e.g., saying only that “We’d have to set something up”, and “I guess we could arrange something”, making use of “different parks” and “different museums”. In that regard:

1. Ms C. nevertheless acknowledged that there had been a complete failure by her and Ms H. to arrange any such visits since August or early September of 2024.

2. Ms C. also acknowledged that she and Ms H. were not in a position to fund any access visits in the nature of those regularly organized by Ms A., and would have to find something “more affordable”.

3. In terms of making specific arrangements for access visits, Ms C. suggested that, going forward, she simply would need to ask the Society for contact information relating to the children’s foster parents, (which she currently did not have), and then “work with them on how to exercise the visits”. As for involving D1 and Ms A. in such arrangements, Ms C. would only say that she had “no problem” with either.

i. It was apparent in cross-examination that Ms C. also had given little (if any) thought to the clear and longstanding history of Ms H. struggling to co-operating with the Society and its workers; e.g., in terms of maintaining a good relationship with the Society and its workers, keeping the Society adequately informed, agreeing to visits by the Society, and/or co-operating with the Society to address issues of concern. Ms C. indicated that she personally would not have any problems doing so. However, when asked how she would “troubleshoot” further issues in that regard in relation to Ms H., (who would be living with Ms C. and clearly involved with S. if S. was formally placed in Ms C.’s care as suggested), Ms C. really had no suggestions apart from indicating that she would “just deal with it as best” she could, trusting in faith that Ms H. loved her daughter and would “put her interests first”. In my view, however, that simple hope seemed at odds with the extended history of the matter that had brought things to their current state, and the apparent indications that Ms C. and Ms H. were determined to have S. returned to Ms H.’s effective care without much apparent regard to other considerations relating to S.’s best interests.

24As indicated above, I have no doubt that Ms C. is well-intentioned, but in my view much of her most significant testimony lacked credibility and reliability. My reasons in that regard are multi-faceted, but include the following:

a. Ms C. was less than candid about her own Children’s Aid Society involvement over the years. Her initial testimony indicated that her involvement was limited to just one occasion involving a voluntary request for worker assistance many years ago, (i.e., in or around 1989 when she was 20 years old and a single mother), and Ms C. absolutely denied that one occasion of isolated involvement with the Society had involved any child protection concerns. However, when it became clear that the Society had checked its records over a break in the trial proceedings, Ms C. acknowledged in cross-examination that she actually had been involved with the Society via at least three and possibly four ongoing files, extending into 2002, and that the involvement had included child protection concerns involving verbal and physical abuse by Ms C.’s male partners, including an occasion wherein one of those partners had harmed Ms H.’s arm.

b. Ms C. similarly seemed less than candid about the consistency of any supportive relationship with her daughter. In that regard, Ms C.’s testified that she and Ms H. had a close bond, that she had helped her daughter “through so many times”, that she and her daughter grew closer through counselling, that they have had a “strong bond” that has been consistent since D1’s birth, and that she and Ms H. remained closely bonded at the time of trial. That nevertheless seems strikingly at odds with repeated indications that Ms C. expressed unwillingness to help Ms H. when the latter was at times in desperate need of assistance, and that Ms C. and Ms H. sometimes lack clear lines of communication and understanding in relation to important matters. In that regard, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

i. I think it notable and telling that, in earlier dealings with the Society, Ms C. never offered her home as a regular venue for access visits, (i.e., making it clear such access generally had to take place in the community or elsewhere), let alone as long term or even temporary accommodation for Ms H. and any of the children, even when such accommodation, even for a night, was desperately needed. There is no indication that Ms C. ever was willing to provide even respite care in that regard.

ii. At the time of the children’s removal from Ms H.’s care, Ms H. indicated to the Society that even she alone was unable to stay at the home of her mother, and that sad reality was confirmed directly by Ms C. during the course of cross-examination.¹²⁹

iii. As noted earlier, Ms C. herself spoke directly with Ms Gardiner after the children were removed from Ms H.’s care to indicate that she was unable to assist, as she was “working two jobs and had her own family”, (clearly suggesting that Ms C. did not consider Ms H. part of that family at the time), and Ms H. herself thereafter indicated repeatedly, in response to Society inquiries, that her mother was busy and unable to assist.

iv. At the time of the proceedings before me, Ms H.’s formal proposals for care of the children included a suggestion that all six of the children be returned immediately to her care, subject to the Society’s supervision, such that Ms H. and the six children effectively would be living with Ms C. and her husband in their London residence. In cross-examination, Ms C. indicated that she was aware of that suggestion, but simultaneously testified that such a plan unfortunately was not currently possible, that she and her husband had discussed it but did not know how that possibly could be facilitated in their current circumstances, and that Ms H. had been made aware that such a plan was simply not something they could facilitate.¹³⁰ Ms H. nevertheless put that supposedly workable plan before the court for formal consideration. At the very least, mother and daughter clearly were not on the same figurative page as to what was possible and impossible in that regard, despite its essential importance to this proceeding.

v. In short, Ms C.’s relationship with her daughter Ms H. has seemed, at the least, somewhat inconsistent and less than engaged, supportive, committed and close over the course of this matter prior to trial.

c. In my view, Ms C.’s praise for her daughter Ms H.’s care for the six children was sufficiently laden with demonstrable inaccuracies, (based on facts otherwise undisputed or clearly established by other evidence), and/or reluctance to be forthcoming or state the obvious, to make it clear that she was someone either incapable of making accurate observations of events and recalling them accurately, and/or someone with an obvious disinclination, (for reasons of maternal loyalty and affection or otherwise, preventing her from viewing matters objectively), to provide testimony that was accurate and fair. By way of example, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

i. In the course of cross-examination, Ms C. acknowledged, albeit with apparent reluctance, and some effort to downplay such concerns to the extent they were brought to her attention, that some of the Society’s child protection issues had stemmed from her daughter Ms H.’s relationships with various males. In that regard:

1. Ms C. acknowledged that she “unfortunately” had met C.C., but said that she was unaware of Ms H. indications to the Society that Mr C. liked to fight, had weapons, and committed break and enters. Ms C. said she was only aware that Mr C. had helped to care for the children.

2. Ms C. said she knew of Mr G., and “really had hope for him”, but denied knowing that he had threatened the children’s school principal and Ms A. She admitted to hearing “stories” about the incident wherein Mr G. had assaulted K., resulting in a non-association order, but denied knowing whether Mr G. had been criminally charged in that regard, and was reluctant to comment on such “hearsay”. She also denied knowing anything about Ms H. following Mr G. to Kitchener in breach of such an order.

3. Ms C. testified that she herself did not always respond to messages sent to her via Facebook, as doing so was “not always safe”; i.e., indicating that there were “decent people” on Facebook, but “sometimes it is scary”. However, when asked about Ms H. having moved herself and the children in with B., having never met him in person before, Ms C. said she would have “preferred” her daughter to meet someone and “get to know them first”, before such a move, but she felt unable to speak to what her daughter’s thoughts and words were at the time.

4. In the result, I was left with the impression that Ms C. actually had not been close enough to her daughter and grandchildren at the relevant times to make meaningful observations regarding the males being introduced into the lives of her grandchildren, or was reluctant to speak candidly about such matters insofar as doing so may have suggested criticism of choices made by her daughter in that regard.

ii. Ms C. denied that the children had ever lacked for food while in the care of Ms H., emphasizing that Ms H. had always taken care of the children in that regard, ensuring that the refrigerators were always “full of food”. In my view, such assertions fly in the face of objective indications from the Society and the children’s schools, (which have no incentive to lie about such matters), of the children experiencing ongoing food insecurity; i.e., such that they frequently were being sent to school without breakfast or lunch, despite ongoing assistance with groceries provided by the Society, foodbanks, Ms A. and Ms C. herself, according to her evidence. Ms C. indicated in cross-examination that she was unaware of the children’s forced reliance on lunches provided by the school.

iii. Ms C. claimed that Ms H. always looked after the children’s education, and was always trying to get them to school. However, that assertion flies in the face of substantial evidence, (supplied by the objective indications of school officials to the Society, and statements made by Ms H. herself), indicating that the children frequently failed to attend school, sometimes for very extended periods, either in person or virtually, while they were in Ms H.’s care. In cross-examination, Ms C. seemed to confirm that her assertions regarding the children’s schooling in Ms H.’s care were based primarily on Ms C. occasionally having assisted with school transportation. She nevertheless confirmed her awareness that the children had not attended virtual schooling while in Ms H.’s care during the Covid-19 pandemic, despite the school’s active efforts to supply necessary tablets and other equipment in that regard, because Ms H. had refused to accept such equipment; i.e., on the stated basis that it might be broken by the children.

iv. Ms C. claimed that Ms H. always looked after the children’s health and medical needs. However, such claims cannot be reconciled with the more objective evidence I received about obvious concerns in that regard while the children were in Ms H.’s care; e.g., failure to ensure adequate arrangements in relation to D1’s prescription medication or adequate treatment of his impetigo, failure to ensure adequate testing of A1’s urine to monitor his nephrotic syndrome, failure to notice let alone take steps to address A1’s “tongue-tried” condition, and failure to prevent the children from being inundated with bites from bedbugs.

v. Ms C. professed to have no awareness at all of the children having any hygiene issues, claiming that the children were always “clean” and wearing “clean clothes” whenever she saw them in Ms H.’s care.¹³¹ However, assertions that there were no such issues are clearly contradicted by objective observations and serious concerns in relation to such matters noted and reported by the children’s schools and the Society’s workers. In the result, I can only infer that Ms C. was either not being candid about such matters, or actually was not visiting the children with sufficient frequency or attention to make any reliable observations in that regard.

vi. Even in relation to housing issues, (which Ms C. suggested was the only “big issue” in relation to child protection concerns), Ms C. asserted that Ms H. always had ensured decent and safe housing for the children, and arranged residences where she was “managing and paying the rent”. However, it became clear to me that Ms C. was simply reluctant to admit any possible failings by Ms H. in that regard, despite abundant evidence to the contrary. By way of example:

1. Ms C. was reluctant to acknowledge that Ms H. had been formally evicted from the townhouse on [Specified Street No.2], initially claiming instead that Ms H. and the children left because the landlord was selling the premises. In further cross-examination, however, Ms C. admitted that there had been an eviction, which she blamed on unreasonable positions taken by the landlord in relation to damage to the property.

2. Ms C. acknowledged that Ms H.’s abrupt relocation with the children to Kitchener had been “unfortunate”, and was brought about by Mr G.’s mother having offered to provide Ms H. with necessary assistance with housing and schooling. However, Ms C. admittedly did not know much more about that relocation to Kitchener, as she was never there.¹³²

3. Ms C. claimed to have visited the [Specified Street No.3] apartment Ms H. and the children shared with B. a number of times; e.g., supplying her daughter and grandchildren with an air conditioner and food, observing that the children were attending school, and generally thinking that the situation was “fine”. However, in further cross-examination, Ms C. acknowledged that she actually never saw where the children were sleeping, (although she understood that they were using blankets, and that cots had been delivered by the Society at one point), that she never saw any cockroaches or bedbugs in the unit, (although presence of the latter was clearly obvious to the Society’s workers and admitted by Ms H.), that she had seen that the apartment was crowded with “a lot of stuff”, that she had seen the family having to rely on extension cords for power, and that she had been made aware that hydro service to the apartment had been cut off. Indeed, Ms C. testified that she personally had attempted to reach out to the landlord to address and rectify the hydro service issue, but to no avail.

4. Ms C. acknowledged that Ms H. had taken the children to stay in motels in the east end of London at various points in time, but initially was reluctant to acknowledge the problematic environments in that regard; e.g., emphasizing it admittedly was “not great”, but “as best as it could be” for a motel, with the children having their “mom” and “stuff with them”, such that they “were happy”. In further cross-examination, however, Ms C. admitted that it was difficult having a mother and six children in one motel room, that the sleeping arrangements in that regard were inadequate, and that it was not a very safe environment for the children, having regard to the nature and location of the particular motels involved.

5. Like Ms H., Ms C. repeatedly attributed Ms H.’s inability to secure adequate housing for herself and the six children to the Society’s refusal to provide a letter confirming that the six children would be returned to Ms H.’s care; a shared view that, according to the testimony of Ms C., led the two women to refrain from even submitting timely applications for housing, believing that doing so would be futile without such a letter from the Society. However, such a position ignored the reality that Ms H. experienced demonstrable housing instability, and inability to secure safe and stable housing for herself and the six children, even at times when there was a court order in effect formally placing the children in her care. The position also ignored the reality, (addressed elsewhere herein), that the Society required additional identified needs and concerns to be addressed adequately before the Society could support a return of all six children to Ms H.’s care.¹³³

d. I also had great difficulty accepting the credibility and reliability of Ms C.’s repeated assertions that she has always enjoyed a very close relationship with each of her six grandchildren, giving her professed insight as to what they want. In that regard, Ms C. was adamant that the children have always loved their mother, and have never not wanted to reside with their mother. In that regard, I have no doubt that Ms C. has great affection for her grandchildren. In my view, however, the totality of the evidence I received, including admissions made by Ms C. herself during the course of cross-examination, made it clear that her interactions with the children actually have been somewhat limited and/or superficial, (especially during a very extended period prior to trial), and certainly not current enough to provide her with any sufficient basis for credible or reliable indications regarding the children’s current needs and preferences, or what might be in their best interests. In that regard:

i. Ms C. professed to have always had a close relationship with D1; e.g., emphasizing that she was present at every doctor’s appointment prior to his birth, was there at the hospital when he was born, and helped with his night feedings after his birth. She described A1 as “smart and clever”, and “one of a kind”. She said that K. was “bright like A1”, and testified that she and K. had “such a close, close bond”, and she loved K. with all her heart. She felt D2 was “bright too”. A2 was described by Ms C. as being “just a doll”. Ms C. also professed to have a close bond with S., whom she described as an “angel”, emphasizing that S. previously had resided in her home for approximately 1½ years, (along with Ms H.), and that she still had the car seat she had purchased for S. “several years ago”.

ii. However, other evidence presented at trial, including answers provided during the cross-examination of Ms C., revealed that there actually was relatively little depth to Ms C.’s somewhat cursory assertions of a close relationship with the six children. For example, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

1. The detailed affidavit evidence and testimony presented by the Society’s objective child protection workers included no mention whatsoever of Ms C. ever seeing any of the children between the time of their apprehension in July of 2023 and the time of trial in April of 2025.

2. Ms C. herself initially indicated that the last time she had seen the children in person was during a Christmas access visit between Ms H. and the children that took place in December of 2023, at the Berkshire area apartment Ms H. was then sharing with her roommate D3; i.e., approximately 17 months before trial. However, in the course of further cross-examination, Ms C. then indicated that she actually may have seen the children on that occasion only by way of a video call.

3. Even in relation to virtual access, Ms C. was unsure of the last time when she may have seen the children; i.e., thinking that may have happened during another Christmas video chat Ms H. had with the children in December of 2024, (i.e., approximately four months before trial), although she thought there may have been other “Zoom calls” between Ms H. and the children in which she (Ms C.) may have “joined in” briefly; i.e., by coming into the calls “quickly”, in passing, such that she had no exact memories of them.

4. Evidence provided by the Society’s workers, which I accept, confirmed that, apart from a chance and cursory conversation between Ms H., Ms C. and Ms Studerus that occurred at the courthouse on September 26, 2025, (during which Ms H. and Ms C. had made passing reference to making arrangements for virtual access, in respect of which they nevertheless then failed to follow up through further telephone conversation Ms Studerus had requested), Ms C. had never asked the Society’s workers about the children after they had been taken into society care and prior to trial. Nor did Ms C. make any requests to visit or have direct contact with any of the children during that period. In that regard:

a. Ms C. initially claimed that she did not know how to proceed in that regard. However, when pressed in cross-examination for an explanation as to why she had not contacted the Society to obtain such information, Ms C. acknowledged that she had familiarity with the child protection workers involved in the matter, had been provided with the business card of Ms Studerus, and had the ability to obtain further contact information relating to the Society and its workers via the internet.

b. Ms C. then asserted that she had misplaced the business card of Ms Studerus, and failed to follow up regarding in person or virtual access with her grandchildren because things in her home had been “stressful”, in part because she and her husband had been trying to figure out how to assist Ms H., and in part because Ms C.’s father was dying. Such pressures obviously are deserving of sympathy. However, the ongoing failure of Ms C. to take even basic steps to obtain information about her six grandchildren and how she might visit with them in person or virtually, over a period of 21 months, seems entirely at odds with Ms C.’s assertion that she enjoys an extremely close relationship with the children. While she was aware that Ms A. was continuing to see and organize visits for the children at least once a month, and professed to have a “good relationship” with Ms A., Ms C. admittedly had not contacted Ms A. to request any participation in such visits until she did so during the trial of this matter.

c. In any event, in my view such an admittedly prolonged absence of meaningful contact between Ms C. and the children inherently and inevitably led to Ms C. demonstrably lacking current awareness of the children’s needs, status and preferences. That was confirmed repeatedly in various ways during the course of cross-examination; e.g., with Ms C. admitting she had “no idea where the children are exactly”, (apart from their being out of town), and unfortunately no current information as to “what their needs are right now”. That was coupled with admitted lack of knowledge about various others matters, such as any definite memory of the last time she had seen D1, any awareness until recently that D1 had possessed a phone of his own for quite some time, and any knowledge of K. acting as S.’s lunch helper because of her close bond with S. In relation to S. in particular:

i. When asked if S. had any medical conditions, Ms C.’s response was not a definitive or reassuring answer; i.e., simply an indication that Ms C. had “not seen” any.

ii. Ms C. admittedly had no idea how much S. now weighed, and said she would “have to find out” in order to purchase a new car seat for her.

iii. When asked what toys S. liked to play with, Ms C. said the answer was “probably dolls and books … and stuff”, but it admittedly had “been a little while” since she had any indication of S.’s preferences in that regard.

5. Despite admittedly not having seen or communicated with the children for such lengthy periods of time, Ms C. professed to know what the children were like now and what they currently wanted simply because she “always had a close relationship with them”, knew that they “adored” her”, and she was sure she “wouldn’t have any problems reconnecting with them”. [Emphasis added.] In my view, the assertions may have been aspirational, and a reflection of a grandmother’s love for her grandchildren, but they made no logical sense and were belied by the totality of the evidence.

25As for the testimony of Ms H. regarding alternative plans of care for the children:

a. Ms H. provided compelling testimony describing the intense love she felt for her children and vice-versa; e.g., including details as to some of her extended history and involvement over time in raising the children, (and D1 in particular), noting her constant efforts to treat all the children equally and fairly, emphasizing her consistent emphasis on what a good thing it was for the siblings to have a connection with each other, and explaining why she therefore felt it was important to have all six children returned to her care.

b. Ms H. confirmed that she currently was not in a relationship, and that she was now residing at the specified London home owned her mother Ms C. and Ms C.’s husband; i.e., with the home being occupied by that couple, Ms H.’s three adult siblings, and Ms H., consistent with the sleeping arrangements in that regard described in Ms C.’s testimony.¹³⁴

c. Although Ms H. wants all six children immediately returned to her care, she acknowledged in cross-examination that there actually is no residence immediately available to her and the children, (i.e., where the seven could all live together), and she candidly indicated at trial that she simply did not know where she and the children would go, or where the children would be staying, if the children were immediately returned to her care; i.e., if they were ordered “returned to her tomorrow”. In that regard:

i. Ms H. acknowledged that her mother Ms C. has indicated that Ms H. and the six children coming to live at Ms C.’s home is simply not a possibility. Indeed, Ms H. acknowledged in cross-examination that she had not even talked to her mother about the possibility of access visits by the children other that S to the home; i.e., as she knew “it’s not up to” her mother, that “it’s up to [her mother’s husband] R2”, and Ms H. knows he “doesn’t really want the children there” as “it’s overwhelming for him”. In the circumstances, Ms H. says, she has not wanted to “push” things any further, beyond the boundaries permitting her to remain in the home, as she had “already been on the streets” and “knew that [her] coming into the home was a last option”.

ii. Ms H. felt that she and the children therefore would “have to have access to the housing [available] through London Housing”, and that she simply did not fully understand the process of how that worked. However, it was her hope that, if the Society provided her with a letter confirming that the children were going to be returned to her care, she and the children might then be placed on a “special priority” list allowing them to be “fit in” somewhere if an unexpected residential opportunity came along, failing which the normal waitlist in that regard likely would not result in her and the six children obtaining London Housing accommodation for at least a year, and perhaps as long as 10 to 12 years, which is the current waitlist time even for a one-bedroom apartment.

iii. When asked how she would be able to adequately fund such housing and the children’s other needs, if all six were returned to her care, Ms H. acknowledged that she currently was not working and receiving income only via Ontario Works, (although she was hopeful of also receiving further support from the Ontario Disability Support Plan or “ODSP” once she received the results of her DSO assessment), and reiterated that she would also be receiving child tax benefits in relation to all six children if they were returned to her care. However, Ms H. was pressed in cross-examination as to how her sources of income would be sufficient to fund all the housing, food and other needs of the children, especially now that they are older and inherently require more resources, when her income admittedly had fallen far short of an ability to meet those needs in the past when the six children were in Ms H.’s care and she was in receipt of their corresponding child tax benefits, and Ms H. struggled to provide any meaningful answer; i.e., apart from saying “obviously, I’ll have the money, so I would be buying groceries”.

iv. In the meantime, however, while Ms H. continued to wait for such housing to become available, she also reluctantly acknowledged in cross-examination that “the children can’t wait any longer”.

d. Ms H.’s testimony was also rather vague and nebulous when addressing contemplated plans to address the children’s future educational needs, and their access visits with others, if all six children were returned to her care. For example:

i. Ms H. testified that she would address the children’s educational needs by enrolling the children, other than D1, in whatever school happens to be in proximity to wherever she and the children eventually obtain housing in London, and have the children take buses there (if available) or walk to school if/as necessary. As for D1, Ms H. noted that he was already taking a “special priority bus” to his current specialized classroom location, and felt that it would not be an issue to simply have that bus redirected to D1’s new residence; i.e., once D1 was removed from the care of Mr M. and once again placed with Ms H. along with his five siblings.

ii. As for plans to facilitate ongoing access between the children and Ms A., if all six children were returned to Ms H.’s care, Ms H. indicated that she would support continuation of the existing monthly access taking place in that regard, (“unless the Society has any issues with that”), but was just “guessing” that Ms A. and/or the Society would have to facilitate that.

iii. As for arrangements to have the children possibly visit with their father, Mr M.:

1. Ms H. disclaimed any ability to control what would happen in that regard, emphasizing her understanding that the children currently are “supposed to say whether or not they want to have visitation in that regard”, and that the “Society is in control of that”.

2. Ms H. said she “obviously would have discussions” with the Society about that, and would abide by future recommendations of the Society in that regard. At the same time, however, Ms H. denied or downplayed past instances, documented by the Society’s workers, wherein Ms H. actually had not acted in accordance with court orders and the recommendations of the Society; e.g., in relation to encouraging access visits between the children and Mr M., or the children attending Mr M.’s residence to participate in online schooling.¹³⁵

e. As for the alternate plan of having S. alone placed in the supervised care of Ms C., if all six children could not be returned to the care of Ms H.:

i. Ms H. confirmed her support for that alternative, and also confirmed in cross-examination that, if S. formally is placed in the care of Ms C. and in Ms C.’s home while Ms H. continues to live there, Ms H. effectively would provide much of S.’s ongoing care.

ii. As for plans to facilitate ongoing access between S. and her siblings, and between S. and Ms A., (i.e., if S. was separated from all of her siblings and relocated to the home of Ms C.), Ms H. candidly indicated that simply was not something she and her mother had discussed. However, Ms H. said she would support continued monthly access visits between S. and Ms A., if Ms A. and/or the Society would facilitate that.

f. In relation to the proposed plans to have all six children returned to Ms H.’s care, or S. formally placed in the care of Ms C. such that she effectively would be cared for by Ms H.:

i. Ms H. acknowledged, in cross-examination, that she has not had the “best relationship” with the Society’s child protection workers over the years; e.g., sometimes refusing to meet with Ms Horenberg for extended periods and/or quarreling with her, (although Ms Horenberg admittedly had been helpful to the family, including during particularly stressful episodes such as the family’s relocation to Kitchener, or urgent need for hotel accommodation upon being evicted from Anova), responding to Ms Gardiner only 50 percent of the time, and communicating with Ms Studerus very infrequently, (i.e., no more than five times, and never about access visits), over the course of many months.

ii. Ms H. nevertheless indicated that she was committed to working with the Society going forward if all of the children were returned to her care, or if S. alone was formally placed in the care of Ms C.

g. As for the proposal of having D1 formally placed in the care of Mr M. pursuant to a further six-month supervision order:

i. Ms H. confirmed during the course of her testimony that she remained opposed to that plan, primarily because she still had concerns that the plan would endanger D1’s safety.

ii. When pressed in cross-examination as to whether such concerns were reasonable, (e.g., having regard to the situation in Mr M.’s home now being completely different from the situation prevailing when the five oldest children were in his care, the Society’s ongoing current monitoring of the situation, the weekly visits to Mr M.’s home by Ms A. to specifically check on D1 and the apartment, and D1 now regularly attending a specialized classroom where his needs and progress were being closely monitored), Ms H. was insistent that she still had concerns.

iii. In that regard, Ms H. once again cited past instances of violence, (e.g., the admitted slapping of D1 by Ms P.), and asserted that Mr M. had made D1 and the other children fearful of reporting abuse and food deprivation in the past while they were in Mr M.’s care. However, when pressed in cross-examination for further details in that regard, (particularly when Ms H. admittedly did not see the children at all for six months prior to their being removed from Mr M.’s care), Ms H. said she could not remember any details of such abuse or food deprivation, or whether they had been investigated by the Society to confirm that they were unverified.

Findings Regarding Whether the Children Remain and/or Are in Need of Protection

26The circumstances in which a child may be found to be “in need of protection”, (a determination to be made on a simple balance of probabilities)¹³⁶, are set forth in s.74(2) of the CYFSA, and I have regard to those provisions in their entirety.

27The applicant Society nevertheless specified that, in relation to its child protection and status review application brought in court file number C807/10-06, it was relying on the following provisions of the CYFSA to support its request for a finding that the five oldest children remained in need of protection:

a. subsection 74(2)(b)(i), whereby a child is in need of protection where there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer physical harm inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person’s failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child; and

b. subsection 74(2)(h), whereby a child is in need of protection where there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer emotional harm of the kind described in subclause (f)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv) or (v), (i.e., emotional harm demonstrated by serious anxiety, depression, withdrawal, self-destructive or aggressive behaviour, or delayed development), resulting from the actions, failure to act or pattern of neglect on the part of the child’s parent or the person having charge of the child.

28In relation to its child protection application brought in court file number C807/10-07, the applicant Society specified that it was relying on the following provisions of the CYFSA to support its request for a finding that the youngest child, S., was a child in need of protection:

a. subsection 74(2)(b)(i), whereby a child is in need of protection where there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer physical harm inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person’s failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child; and

b. subsection 74(2)(b)(ii), whereby a child is in need of protection where there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer physical harm inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person’s pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising or protecting the child.

29In this case, the parties expressly indicated their agreement, (supported by counsel for the five oldest children), that the court should make corresponding findings that the five oldest children remained in need of protection, and that the youngest child, S., was in need of protection; i.e., on the specified grounds relied upon by the Society in its applications.

30However, I independently find that such findings are justified and appropriate, having regard to the presented evidence, and also find that intervention through court orders is necessary to protect the children in the future. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, my reasons in that regard include the following:

a. While in the care of their father Mr M., the five oldest children repeatedly were placed in situations where they suffered and/or were likely to suffer physical and emotional harm, in the sense and manner contemplated by ss.74(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the CYFSA, resulting from the conduct of Mr M. and his partner Ms P. In that regard:

i. As outlined in detail in the factual findings set forth above, while the five oldest children were placed in the care of Mr M., (and thereby effectively in the care of his partner Ms P.), the children were obliged to live in an over-crowded residence, (filled with ten people and a number of animals), characterized by inadequate financial resources and insufficient/inappropriate parenting attention, as a result of which various needs of the children were neglected. There was lack of cleanliness in relation to accommodation and clothing, occasional lack of running water, resulting hygiene concerns, food insecurity, and concerns as to whether health and prescription medicine concerns relating to the two oldest children in particular were being adequately addressed, as well as the children sometimes being left unattended and/or failing to attend school properly. As concerning as all that was, the children also were exposed to domestic conflict between Mr M. and Ms P., as well as inappropriate discipline, verbal abuse and physical violence directed towards the children, resulting in criminal charges and convictions. While such concerns were mounting, Mr M. also began demonstrating failure to co-operate with the Society to address such concerns. Court matters, and other matters of an adult nature, also were being discussed with the children.

ii. While I think the evidence outlined herein clearly demonstrated significant changes in the underlying circumstances, insights and attitudes of Mr M., (as well as his partner Ms P.), in my view it also would be irresponsible to simply return any of the children to Mr M.’s care or unrestricted interaction, (or to do so even in relation solely to the oldest child, D1), without a court order ensuring a measure of ongoing Society monitoring and supervision; i.e., to ensure that the apparent changes are real and lasting, and that Mr M. and his children, (including but not limited to D1), receive adequate supports to facilitate a successful transition to a situation where further court orders in that regard reasonably are no longer necessary. In short, some form of court order is necessary to ensure the safety and proper care of the children, including D1.

b. While in the care of their mother Ms H., the six children repeatedly were placed in situations where they suffered and/or were likely to suffer physical and emotional harm, in the sense and manner contemplated by ss.74(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the CYFSA, resulting from the conduct of Ms H., demonstrated by repeatedly demonstrated patterns of neglect and/or crisis in various forms. In that regard:

i. As outlined in detail in the factual findings set forth above, at various times while the six oldest children were placed in the care of Ms H.:

1. Over the course of many years, the children were subjected to repeated housing instability and sudden relocations, in circumstances marked by last minute chaos, poor planning and confusion, with the children frequently being transitioned to over-crowded, sometimes dangerous and otherwise inappropriate accommodation, often in situations characterized by their obviously transitory nature, and without adequate clothing or personal belongings, with such circumstances therefore inevitably accompanied by the children experiencing profound and emotionally harmful uncertainty as to their future. As outlined in these reasons, Ms H. was disposed to blame others for each such unstable situation and forced relocation, and to characterize each such forced relocation as a crisis not of her own making. In my view such characterizations ignore the fundamental reality of Ms H. being the consistent common denominator in that regard; i.e., with her displaying a sustained and marked pattern of inability to ensure adequate and proper housing for her children over the course of many years, even when provided with substantial planning assistance and support from others, and even when equipped with a formal order placing the children in her care. Clearly, Ms H.’s struggles with financial budgeting and priorities, (e.g., placing herself in a situation where she was obliged to repay rather than receive child tax benefits, and/or was devoting a significant portion of her limited government support income to payment of storage costs rather than immediate needs of the children), have not helped matters in that regard.

2. Such housing instability has resulted in repeated and sustained interruptions to the children’s education, while correspondingly depriving the children repeatedly of the opportunity to build or maintain connections in their communities. Those deprivations also undoubtedly have been inherently harmful to the children’s educational and emotional development.

3. Even when Ms H. and the children remained in certain locations for more extended periods of time, Ms H. was unable to ensure food stability, the children’s cleanliness and ongoing proper hygiene, and/or consistent school attendance. Moreover, cluttered, overcrowded, unclean and/or inadequately furnished and serviced residences exposed the children to stress and anxiety, the risks and emotional embarrassment associated with poor hygiene, insect infestations and bites, and fire hazards. Other medical needs of the children, (e.g., adequate treatment of D1’s impetigo sores, adequate arrangements in relation to D1’s prescription medication, adequate urine testing required in relation to A1’s nephrotic syndrome, and timely detection and treatment of A1’s tongue-tied condition), also were insufficiently noticed or addressed, with corresponding risk and/or manifestation of physical harm to the children.

4. Throughout the same period, Ms H. has demonstrated a continued proclivity to engage precipitously in friendly, amorous and/or frequently cohabiting relationships with individuals she did not take the time to adequately investigate or know well, thereby exposing the children to the risks inherent in close contact with people who are essentially strangers. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, Ms H. has formed and persisted in relationships with males who were essentially unknown to her, and/or who had violent histories or tendencies that were demonstrated to Ms H. directly or made known to her by the Society, with Ms H. thereafter knowingly persisting in such relationships despite such violent histories and behavior, and despite applicable court orders. Ms H. herself has admitted, (albeit usually only after the fact), that such relationships were unhealthy and ill-advised. However, it is Ms H.’s repeated willingness to embark upon and continue in such relationships that represents the concern; i.e., insofar as Ms H. clearly has demonstrated a worrying tendency to prioritize her own interests, and a willingness to expose the children to unacceptable risks, over ensuring the children’s security and best interests. In that regard, Ms H. once again was inclined to attribute such developments to forces beyond her control; e.g., to her ongoing housing instability, and/or her desire for security in whatever perceived form that might be achieved in moments of crisis. However, Ms H. is once again the common denominator in that regard; i.e., insofar as her demonstrated behaviour over the course of many years indicates a repeated lack of ability or inclination to adequately explore potential relationships before voluntarily assuming risks associated with exposing her children to cohabitation and other close contact interactions with relative strangers.

5. By her own admission, Ms H. suffers from mental health issues, including the sustained effects of trauma and a possible acquired brain injury and associated learning disability, not yet fully explored and diagnosed. In my view, such concerns clearly have made things more difficult for Ms H. and her children, even if Ms H. herself has not always been able to draw connections in that regard. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, it seems probable that Ms H.’s mental health challenges are related in some measure to her apparently limited planning abilities, her apparent inability to cope well in stressful situations, and/or her apparent inability to make decisions that objectively would be in her own best interest and/or the best interests of her children. In my view, such connections would help to explain matters such as:

a. successive disputes with landlords that were poorly navigated, and which therefore escalated into crisis situations that apparently could have been avoided;

b. a tendency to engage in precipitous relationships or other hasty decisions as perceived “last resort” mechanisms of survival, despite obvious and attendant risks; and

c. apparently self-defeating decisions, including repeated resistance or refusal in relation to accepting proffered assistance in various forms from various quarters, (e.g., from the Society, from the children’s schools, from Ms A., and from public agencies offering “bird in the hand” housing that nevertheless was declined by Ms H. in the unrealistic hope of somehow being offered something more suited to her liking and unrealistic aspirations), and her refraining from making any efforts to visit personally with her children for very prolonged periods of time, despite her professed love for her children, and her awareness that her failure to exercise such access was causing all of the children to experience significant emotional distress.

6. For related or other reasons, Ms H. repeatedly has made it clear that she cannot be relied upon to co-operate properly with the Society, (e.g., allowing appropriate visits, responding appropriately to communications, and providing adequate and timely information regarding the children and their whereabouts), or to abide by court orders; e.g., orders restricting cohabitation with adults not previously approved by the Society, orders requiring co-operation in facilitating mandated access between the five oldest children and their father, orders restricting or prohibiting continued interaction and association with Mr G., and orders requiring a return of the children from Kitchener to London.

ii. As noted above, the very nature of such child protection concerns carries inherent risks of physical and emotional harm to the children, but the manifestation of harm in this case seems clear; e.g., not only from the indications of health and hygiene concerns outlined above, and the children’s overt indications of emotional distress they experienced because of the chaos and instability they endured while in their mother’s care, (and their fears of returning to such an environment), but from lingering indications of trauma reflected in the children’s behaviour, such as the hoarding instincts still being exhibited by D1 and A1.

iii. In my view, it therefore also would be irresponsible to simply return any of the children to Ms H.’s direct or indirect care without a court order ensuring, at a minimum, Society monitoring and supervision in that regard, particularly insofar as Ms H. deliberately refused to provide the Society with sufficient updates and information regarding her progress between August of 2024 and the time of trial. In my view there is less than adequate evidence to instill any confidence that the patterns of behaviour resulting in realized and threatened physical and emotional harm to the children, noted above, would not materialize once again if the children were returned to Ms H.’s direct or indirect care. Once again, some form of court order is needed to ensure the children’s safety and proper care.

31Findings that the five oldest children remain in need of protection, that the youngest child is in need of protection, and that intervention through court orders is necessary to protect the children are therefore made accordingly.

Dispositions

32As emphasized in its first section, the paramount purpose of the CYFSA is to promote the best interests, protection and well-being of children.

33Pursuant to s.101(1) of the CYFSA, where the court finds that a child is in need of protection and is satisfied that intervention through a court order is necessary to protect the child in the future, (as I now have done), the court shall make one of the following orders, (or a custody order under section 102), in the child’s “best interests”:

a. a supervision order pursuant to s.101(1).1, directing that a child be placed in the care and custody of a parent or another person, subject to the supervision of the society, (and terms and conditions permitted by subsection 7 of section 101)¹³⁷, for a specified period of at least three months and not more than 12 months;

b. an interim society care order pursuant to s.101(1).2, directing that the child be placed in interim society care and custody for a specified period not exceeding 12 months;¹³⁸

c. an extended society care order pursuant to s.101(1).3, directing that the child be placed in extended society care until the order is terminated under section 116, (i.e., an order made on further application for review of a child’s status in or formerly in extended society care), or expires under section 123, (which provides that an order made under Part V of the CYFSA expires when the child who is the subject of such an order turns 18 of marries); or

d. consecutive orders of interim society care and supervision pursuant to s.101(1).4, directing that the child be placed in interim society care under s.101(1).2 for a specified period and then be returned to a parent or another person under s.101(1).1, for a period or periods not exceeding a total of 12 months.

34Pursuant to s.74(3) of the CYFSA, the court is required, (when directed by provisions of Part V of the Act to make or an order or determination in the “best interests” of the child), to consider, inter alia:

a. the child’s views and wishes, given due weight in accordance with the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;¹³⁹ and

b. any other circumstances of the case that the court considers relevant, including:

i. the child’s physical, mental and emotional needs, and the appropriate care or treatment to meet those needs;

ii. the child’s physical, mental and emotional level of development;

iii. the child’s race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, family diversity, disability, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression;

iv. the child’s cultural and linguistic heritage;

v. the importance for the child’s development of a positive relationship with a parent and a secure place as a member of a family;

vi. the child’s relationships and emotional ties to a parent, sibling, relative, other member of the child’s extended family or member of the child’s community;

vii. the importance of continuity in the child’s care and the possible effect on the child of disruption of that continuity;

viii. the merits of a plan for the child’s care proposed by a society, including a proposal that the child be placed for adoption or adopted, compared with the merits of the child remaining with or returning to a parent;

ix. the effects on the child of delay in the disposition of the case;

x. the risk that the child may suffer harm through being removed from, kept away from, returned to or allowed to remain in the care of a parent; and

xi. the degree of risk, if any, that justified the finding that the child is in need of protection.

35As emphasized by the Supreme Court of Canada in T. (B.J.) v. D.(J.), 2022 SCC 24, such a multi-factorial legal standard, applied to determine what is in the “best interests” of a child, is necessarily a highly contextual and fact-driven exercise. No priority generally is given to one statutory factor over another, and the question of which factors are relevant is a matter of judicial discretion, having regard to the evidence before the court.

36I nevertheless also am mindful that, when making an order required by section 101 of the CYFSA, subsections 101(2), 101(3) and 101(4) also require:

a. the court to make inquiries as to what efforts the society or another person or entity has made to assist the child before there was intervention under Part V of the Act;

b. that the court not make an order removing a child from the care of the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention under Part V of the Act unless the court is satisfied that alternatives that are less disruptive to the child, including non-residential care and the assistance efforts referred to in the preceding sub-paragraph. would be inadequate to protect the child; and

c. that where the court decides that it is necessary to remove the child from the care of the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention under Part V of the Act, the court shall, before making an interim society care order or extended society care order, consider whether it is possible to place the child with a relative, neighbour or other member of the child’s community or extended family under a supervision order with the consent of the relative or other person.

37Perhaps it would go without saying, but I am very mindful that an order placing a child in extended society care is probably the most profound order that a court can make. In particular, to take someone’s child away from them is a power that a judge must exercise only with the highest degree of caution, only on the basis of compelling evidence, and only after a careful examination of possible alternative remedies.¹⁴⁰

38Other general principles emphasized by our courts in relation to the determination of appropriate disposition orders, where a court finds that a child is in need of protection and is satisfied that intervention through a court order is necessary to protect the child in the future, include the following:

a. The court should give consideration to whether the Society has given the parent an opportunity to parent.¹⁴¹

b. Courts must recognize that families living in poverty may face challenges, and that parents are not to be judged by a “middle class yardstick”, provided that the standard used is not contrary to the child’s best interests.¹⁴² In particular, the issue is not whether children will be “better off” with parents other than their own, but whether the level of parenting received by children is below the minimum standard tolerated by the community.¹⁴³

c. Having regard to the significant “child-centred” approach at the disposition stage of a child protection proceeding, “good intentions are not enough”; i.e., such that a parent “seeing the light”, and intending to change, is subordinate to whether a parent has in fact changed and is now able to give a child the care that is in the child’s best interests.¹⁴⁴

d. An extended society care order may be justified where a parent lacks insight into issues, including physical and emotional harm, even where there may be other positive aspects of a parenting plan.¹⁴⁵

39Returning to the specifics of this particular case, while I independently have worked through the “statutory pathway” recommended by other cases addressing such matters,¹⁴⁶ during the course of my analysis, I think it helpful to indicate at the outset of this further discussion in that regard that I find the supervision order proposed by the Society in relation to D1 and the extended care orders proposed by the Society in relation to the remaining children to be appropriate, for reasons that include the following:

a. By way of some preliminary observations, before turning to assessment of the alternative disposition options put forth for my consideration, I note the following:

i. In my view, having regard to s.101(2) of the CYFSA, this clearly is not a case where the Society and other persons and entities failed to make efforts to assist the children, (as well as their parents), prior to intervention. To the contrary, as outlined in the detailed findings outlined above, I was provided with extensive evidence confirming such efforts by the Society, by the children’s schools, by the children’s grandmothers, (and Ms A. in particular), and others such as the staff at Anova and CMHA workers. Although Ms H. feels “the system has failed her”, and apparently attributes significant blame for her situation on the Society’s refusal to provide requested written confirmation that the children would be returned to her care, (thereby facilitating the receipt of child tax benefits and associated income capable of being devoted towards housing), in my view such an attitude reflects a fundamental lack of understanding of how child protection proceedings must be approached, and puts the proverbial cart before the horse in terms of ensuring that child protection concerns are addressed before placement outcomes may be “guaranteed”. As noted earlier, the unfortunate reality is that Ms H. also struggled with housing instability even when there was a prevailing court order formally placing the children in her care.

ii. Nor, in my view, is this a situation where the children have been removed from parental care simply because care being provided failed to measure up to any “middle class yardstick”. In this case, I think it clear that the level of care being provided to the children clearly and markedly fell below the minimum standard capable of being tolerated by the community.

iii. I also do not think this is a case where the Society has failed to give the children’s parents an opportunity to parent. As outlined above, each parent had extended opportunities to parent the children, and in my view the Society repeatedly has demonstrated efforts to work with each parent to help them succeed in that regard. The situation simply has not worked out in the manner either parent, or the Society, would have preferred.

iv. Finally, by way of preliminary comment on possible disposition options, I also think it helpful to note my view that further interim society care orders are no longer a possible option at this point, either independently pursuant to s.101(1).2 or as a component of a “consecutive order” arrangement pursuant to s.101(1).4 of the CYFSA, at least in relation to the five youngest children, having regard to the “non-optional” time limits on interim society care under s.101(1).2 of the CYFSA imposed by section 122 of the Act, (addressed earlier in these reasons), and the cumulative length of time the children already have spent in the care and custody of the society. In the result, the disposition orders available to the court, in the present circumstances, effectively are limited to supervision orders pursuant to s.101(1).1 and extended society care orders pursuant to s.101(1).3 of the CYFSA.

b. Mindful of ss.101(3) and 101(4) of the CYFSA, and the desirability of avoiding, if possible, orders more disruptive to the children than a return to their mother who had care of them prior to their being taken into society care in July of 2023, and the need to consider the possibility of at least placing S in the formal care of her maternal grandmother, (where she no doubt effectively would received considerable care from her mother), I have given serious consideration to the alternate supervision order proposals and corresponding plans of care put forward by Ms H. and her mother Ms C. I nevertheless feel unable to endorse either proposal, for reasons that include the following:

i. That the children love their mother and vice versa is neither doubted nor in issue. However, that sadly is not a sufficient basis on which to order the return of all six children to the immediate care of their mother.

ii. A fundamental and insurmountable practical impediment to the relief sought by Ms H. in that regard is the undisputed fact that there is simply nowhere for Ms H. and the six children to live together if the children immediately were placed in her formal care. For the reasons discussed in detail above, the children cannot go to live with Ms H. in the residence of Ms C., and no other available accommodation options were identified or even suggested. In particular, the evidence presented at trial also made it clear that there is a wait time of up to a year for single-bedroom accommodation via London Housing, (accommodation already proffered but rejected by Ms H. as being insufficient to meet her aspirations), and that accommodation sufficient to house Ms H. and all six of the children might not be available via London Housing for another 10 to 12 years. Ms H. understandably continues to hope, in Micawber-like fashion, that accommodation sufficient to facilitate her desired childcare outcome somehow will “turn up” unexpectedly and serendipitously before then; i.e., to facilitate her hopes of all six children being returned to her care. However, the “bottom line” for practical and legal purposes is that, at the time of trial, any possibility of Ms H. obtaining a unit from London Housing or other accommodation to facilitate such an arrangement was speculative and extremely remote, and a decision regarding the children needs to be made now. For the reasons outlined earlier, the time for further interim society care orders, (i.e., maintaining the status quo until such time as Ms H. might obtain such accommodation), is now over.

iii. At this point, I nevertheless would not be inclined to return all six children to Ms H.’s care even if doing so was a practical possibility; i.e., in terms of accommodation being readily available for her and all six of the children. In that regard:

1. Again, I do not question that Ms H. deeply loves her children, or that her parenting to date has been motivated by good intentions. However, as emphasized by the authorities, good intentions are simply not enough when it comes to safeguarding the interests of children. As noted above, the history of this matter demonstrates a sustained and chronic pattern of multiple child protection concerns while the children were in their mother’s care; e.g., a lifestyle characterized by instability, constant moves, frequent chaos, inadequate resources and care sufficient to meet the children’s basic needs, and profound anxiety and uncertainty from the children’s perspective, without any evidence of adequate planning or problem-solving on the part of Ms H.. Nor did the evidence presented at trial persuade me that Ms H.’s planning and problem-solving capabilities in that regard, or ability to adequately address the needs and safety of the children, have progressed in any significant way since then. Moreover, for reasons outlined earlier, I frankly have very serious doubt that Ms H. has any real or meaningful recognition, understanding or acceptance that there were such significant concerns, or concerns in respect of which her decision-making and/or capacity limitations have played a role.¹⁴⁷

2. Ms H.’s behaviour between the time of the children being taken into care and the time of trial also does not instill confidence that there has been any substantial progress or acquired insight in that regard, or that the situation would not trend inexorably back towards instability, a chaotic lifestyle and similar child protection concerns developing again if all six children were returned to Ms H. care. To reiterate but some of the concerns in that regard already mentioned in these reasons:

a. As noted earlier, the housing uncertainties clearly remain, with no indication that anything positive has happened to alter Ms H.’s struggles with financial budgeting or planning in that regard. Indeed, the mere fact that Ms H. pursued a formal request at trial to have all the children returned to her immediate care, without any plan for their accommodation, in my view reflects a startling ongoing disconnect between fervently desired outcomes and the need to address practical realities. So too does Ms H.’s acknowledged failure to turn her mind in any detailed way to how access visits between the children, Ms A. and Mr M. would be implemented going forward, if all six children were returned to her care.

b. Ms H. is still reluctant to acknowledge anything concerning about her tendency to enter relationships precipitously, or the serious nature of problems that have stemmed from such tendencies in the past; i.e., continuing to rationalize such decisions by an insistence that her impetuous decisions were appropriate to address and satisfy her perceived needs at the time.

c. The evidence presented at trial indicates that, at best, Ms H. has only begun to explore and address her acknowledged mental health issues, and that the trauma and anxieties significantly impacting her parenting ability remain largely unaddressed and unabated at this point.

d. Nothing about Ms H.’s very puzzling and prolonged failure to have any meetings or access visits with the children, even in less-than-ideal conditions, while knowing that all of the children miss and worry about her, is suggestive of child-centred focus.¹⁴⁸ The same is true about Ms H.’s determined failure to co-operate in relation to relatively minor matters for the benefit of the children without any downside to her, (e.g., in relation to arrangements to return D1’s Xbox unit, or to obtain a passport for A1), and indications of Ms H.’s attitudes in relation to more significant matters; e.g., Ms H.’s apparent readiness to disregard the wishes and preferences of the children regarding their current placements, and/or her particular eagerness to separate S. from K., D2 and A2, (despite recognizing how extraordinarily painful that would be for all four children), because Ms H. “wants her daughter back”, as opposed to furthering and fulfilling any desire on the part of S. to be with her mother. Again, none of that suggests any truly child-centered focus to me, or any real consideration of the harmful and possibly devastating impact such decisions by Ms H. have had or may have on her children. To the contrary, it suggests that Ms H. still struggles to put the needs and interests of her children ahead of her own.

e. In my view, Ms H.’s deliberate and obstinate refusal since August of 2024 to co-operate and work with the Society, or share information about her location and residence, let alone information about any progress she may have been making, also does not bode well for the future; e.g., in terms of Ms H. welcoming further supportive efforts from the Society and necessary monitoring and information sharing in that regard, and/or Ms H. co-operating with access visit arrangements, particularly insofar as Mr M. is concerned.¹⁴⁹ To the contrary, such conduct seems entirely consistent with Ms H.’s troubling past inclinations to act in contravention of court orders, withhold information from the Society, and refuse co-operation and assistance in that regard for extended periods of time.

iv. In my view, similar considerations make it inadvisable to accept or implement the alternative proposal put forward by Ms H. and Ms C.; i.e., the proposal seeking to have S. separated from her siblings K., D2 and A2, and formally placed in the care of Ms C. and the indirect care of Ms H. In that regard:

1. The proposal itself seemed rather vague and last minute in nature, and poorly thought out. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, very little thought seemed to have been given to precisely where S. definitely would even sleep or maintain her belongings. Nor did it seem that Ms C. and/or Ms H. had given any serious or extended thought to the practical arrangements that would be necessary to ensure access visits between S., her siblings, Ms A. and Mr M. I also think it reasonably clear that Ms C. would be an essential figurehead for the proposal,¹⁵⁰ with the reality “on the ground” likely to entail relatively little active provision of childcare by Ms C., and the bulk of such childcare effectively being provided by Ms H. In effect, the real nature of the proposal effectively contemplates S. being restored to the primary care of her mother; i.e., such that the parenting capability concerns noted above in relation to Ms H. apply to this proposal as well – although I recognize that Ms H.’s ability to manage with one child almost certainly would be greater than her ability to manage with six.

2. In my view, the proposed arrangement to have S. live in the residence owned by Ms C. and her husband seemed very precarious. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

a. As noted above, Ms C. herself had no demonstrated history of lending extensive or very active support to Ms H. and her children, and actually had demonstrated a marked reluctance to do so in the past.

b. Both Ms C. and Ms H. noted the longstanding reluctance of Ms C.’s husband to introduce anyone else into his already crowded household; a situation no doubt likely to be exacerbated by the possibility of the crowded home’s living room effectively being turned into a young child’s bedroom.

c. During the course of the trial, Ms H. emphasized her fear that she already was “pushing the boundaries” of tolerance in that regard, mindful that even her own occupation of the residence was a “last resort”, with her having nowhere else to go.

d. Having regard to such realities, the possibility of Ms H. and S. being forced from the home on relatively short notice seems significant. At the moment, the presented evidence suggests that Ms H. would have no capacity to shelter or care for herself or S. without urgent requests for assistance; e.g., seeking admission to a shelter, or once again precipitously forming a dependent and possibly abusive relationship with an entirely unknown or relatively unknown stranger. In the result, S. once again would be returned to the unstable, chaotic and potentially dangerous life she knew before being taken into care by the Society.

3. I will have more to say in the course of these reasons about the various factors relating to S.’s best interests, (i.e., when explaining my view as to why the extended care order proposed by the Society in relation to S. seems best suited to promote such best interests), but I think the stage of S.’s physical, mental and emotional level of development at the time she was removed from her mother’s care, and her level of development at the time of trial, is a crucial consideration in this case. In particular:

a. It bears repeating that S. was just three years old when she was taken into society care, more than 2½ years ago. Her memories of life in the care of Ms H. are inherently limited by her age at the time, and from S.’s perspective must now seem remote, if she retains such memories at all. She has spent more than forty percent of her life, (the most recent 40 percent), in her current foster care placement, with her three immediately older siblings. That is the life S. knows and enjoys. Ms C. and Ms H. are now complete or relative strangers to her; a situation not helped by Ms H.’s prolonged failure to engage in any in person visits with S. Nor does it seem likely that S. would have any memory whatsoever, at this point, of Ms C.’s husband or Ms H.’s adult siblings.

b. In such circumstances, an order at this point formally placing S. with Ms C. therefore essentially would involve removing S. from what may be the only life she now remembers, (i.e., living in the home of her foster parents PE and SC, shared with her siblings K., D2 and A2), in order to place her into an unfamiliar and already over-crowded home, in a different and distant community, occupied solely by adults who effectively are now either complete strangers or near strangers from S.’s perspective. At the same time, S. would be removed from the comfort of her shared bedroom with K. and A2, (and the bed she shares with A2), to occupy a bed inserted into a living room or recreation room used and/or occupied by such adult strangers; adults no doubt living lives pursuant to their adult schedules. From an educational perspective, S. also would be obliged to say goodbye to her current school and schoolfriends, (the only ones she has known), and “start over” at a new school entirely on her own, without the comfort of having her older siblings nearby at the same institution.

c. Based on the evidence presented at trial, I have absolutely no doubt that such court-ordered changes would be shocking and devastating to S.. I also think it clear that such changes would have a similarly shocking and devastating impact on K., D2 and A2; i.e., if S. was separated from them, severing the quartet’s extremely tight sibling bond.

d. Ms C. and Ms H. downplayed such concerns about S. being separated from her siblings and transferred abruptly into such an unfamiliar environment, (i.e., surrounded by completely unfamiliar or relatively unfamiliar adults, and having to attend an entirely new school after severing connections with all her existing school friends), and suggested that such concerns could and would be readily and easily minimized and addressed; e.g., by S. adapting to such changes as the children have been obliged to adapt before, and/or by S. relying on telephone calls and/or arranged visits with her foster parents and siblings to make her more comfortable with the transition. In my view, however:

i. Such an attitude ignores that the contemplated change, (unlike previous ones), would deprive S. of an entirely different life she has come to know and enjoy, and force her to adapt without the immediately available and familiar ongoing comfort and support of her siblings.

ii. It also was clear that Ms C. and Ms H. actually had given little or no thought to practical arrangements for such telephone calls, (insofar as they apparently did not even have the telephone number for PE and SC), or for such in person visits between S. and her siblings; e.g., when having such visits at Ms C.’s home apparently was something out of the question, and the transportation and funding assistance previously provided by Ms A. were no longer going to be made available to Ms H., given the estrangement in that regard brought about by Ms H..

iii. The prolonged lack of co-operation and communication between Ms H. and the Society, (effectively implemented by Ms H., but apparently condoned and/or supported by Ms C.), along with the previous lack of compliance with court orders by Ms H., and Ms H.’s prolonged demonstrated disinterest in taking the steps needed to have in person meetings with her children, also instill little confidence that Ms C. and Ms H. would take the steps necessary to co-operate and ensure that S. was meeting regularly with her siblings.

c. For such reasons, I cannot accept and endorse the proposed making of supervision orders returning all the children to the direct care of Ms H., (the person who had charge of them immediately before the children were taken into society care), or formally placing S. with Ms C. so as to return S. to the indirect care of Ms H.

d. In my view, however, at least one of the children, (i.e., D1), reasonably can be placed in the care of a relative, (i.e., D1’s father, Mr M.), pursuant to a s.101(4) of the CYFSA and the s.101(1).1 supervision order proposed by the Society, (and supported by D1 and Mr M.), and I think and find that such an order would be in D1’s best interests. In that regard, I have regard to all of the “best interest” considerations enumerated in s.74(3) of the CYFSA, but note in particular the following:

i. As for D1’s views and preferences, the evidence presented at trial and outlined earlier made it quite clear that D1 has expressed a longstanding desire to be with his father, wanted to be relocated to Mr M.’s residence during the period following apprehension and prior to trial, and now wishes to continue his current placement with Mr M. At the time of this judgment’s release, D1 will be [a specified age] and, despite D1’s recognized developmental delays, in my view his sustained and consistent views and wishes in that regard should be given considerable weight. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, D1 clearly has lived in the care of his mother, the care of his father, the care of a foster parent, and the care of a group foster home, and his now firmly stated preference to remain in the care of his father reflects a maturity borne of experience and awareness of the options essentially available to him.

ii. As noted to some extent in my earlier comments, D1 has some unique physical, mental, emotional and developmental needs; e.g., in terms of his formally diagnosed Autism, his ADHD and his ODD, (requiring treatment by prescription medication), his impetigo, (requiring treatment by ointments during outbreaks), his notably elevated hunger for food, his desire for space and isolation from others to avoid being picked on and bullied by others, and his need for specialized classroom education and training. In my view, such needs are now being adequately addressed in the significantly changed residential environment being provided to D1 by his father, and the more focused attention D1 is now receiving there from Mr M., Ms P. and Ms A., under the ongoing supervision of the Society. In particular, Mr M. had taken appropriate steps to ensure ongoing physician care for D1 and his conditions, there are no perceived issues with D1 now receiving his prescription medication on a regular basis, there are no current indications of food insecurity, and D1 now generally enjoys having his own bedroom, in a stable and secure residence, with sibling contact being limited to virtual interactions with A1 and intermittent in person visits with his five siblings. While in his father’s care, arrangements have been made for D1’s ongoing specialized education, consistent with D1’s challenges, abilities and needs. Mr M. and Ms P., with the assistance of Ms A. and help from the Society, also seem keenly aware of D1’s lingering mental health issues, and have been taking active steps to provide D1 with the counselling and other supports he may need in that regard.

iii. To the extent D1 remains in his father’s care, his black American heritage clearly will be remembered and promoted, and there seems no doubt that Mr M. will continue to celebrate the other holidays D1 previously observed while in the care of Ms H.

iv. While the relationship between Mr M. and Ms H. unfortunately remains strained, (e.g., preventing direct communication between them), Mr M. remained notably supportive of D1 maintaining a relationship with his mother. In that regard, nothing in the history of the matter suggests that there was any reluctance or resistance on the part of Mr M. to Ms H. enjoying access to any of the children while they were in Mr M.’s care, and in my view there was nothing to suggest that Mr M. has been anything but entirely co-operative with the Society since the children were removed from his care. In short, while I have doubts about Ms H.’s commitment to ensuring continued contact between the children and Mr M., (given the history of this matter and Ms H.’s ongoing feelings of antipathy towards Mr M.), I do not have any similar concerns regarding the prospects for Mr M. supporting a positive relationship between D1 and his mother, while D1 remains in Mr M.’s care.

v. I am mindful that the proposed placement of D1 is one involving general separation from his siblings, as far as his general day-to-day living is concerned; i.e., that he would no longer have contact with his siblings approaching anything near to that which he had when all six of the children were in their mother’s care. However, as noted earlier, D1 sought time and space away from his siblings when all six of the children were living together. D1 also exhibited significant sibling rivalry and conflict even when attempting to live solely with A1 at the home of M-A. Moreover, D1 has expressed a sustained and clear preference for the current living arrangements whereby he is the only sibling residing with his father, while simultaneously indicating that he generally is content with the virtual access he enjoys with A1 and the intermittent in person visits with his siblings; an arrangement whereby D1 is no longer as bothered by the behaviour of his siblings and vice versa.

vi. The supervision order currently being proposed by the Society, and supported by D1 and Mr M., obviously would result in sustained continuity of the reasonably successful placement D1 has enjoyed since the making of Justice Tobin’s interim care order in January of 2025, without any counterproductive disruptions to that arrangement or the substantial progress D1 has made in that environment.

vii. The supervision order placement being proposed in relation to D1 obviously would leave D1 in the care of one of his parents, and there is no suggestion or contemplation of D1 being adopted prior to attaining his age of majority.

viii. The making of a further supervision order in relation to D1 obviously prolongs Society involvement in relation to D1, but it seems unlikely to significantly delay any final disposition of child protection proceedings relating to D1. As noted earlier, the contemplated order is primarily intended to facilitate ongoing Society assistance to ensure that D1 receives all available supports, and to monitor D1’s ongoing transition into life in his father’s care, to ensure that continues to go smoothly. At the rate of progress demonstrated in the evidence presented at trial, it seems likely that Society involvement likely will come to an end when the proposed further supervision order in relation to D1 expires. If not, any further requested supervision order, if granted, likely would see D1 through to his age of majority, probably ending the Society’s involvement in D1’s life.

ix. As for the risk of D1 suffering harm through “being removed from, kept away from, returned to or allowed to remain in the care of a parent”:

1. For the reasons outlined above, although D1 was removed from his mother’s care, there was no request or suggestion that he be returned to Ms H.’s care in the absence of his other five siblings, and no evidence to suggest that would be possible or welcomed in Ms H.’s prevailing circumstances.

2. There is no evidence to suggest that D1’s current placement with Mr M. has been the cause of D1 being “kept away from” his mother. D1 and Ms H. clearly have the ability to communicate virtually, and in my view any failure of D1 and his mother to meet in person has been entirely attributable to Ms H.’s independent unwillingness or inability to engage in visits with any of her children.

3. I am very mindful that Mr M. has been criminally convicted of engaging in violence vis-à-vis his own children, and that Ms P. has admitted to striking D1 on at least one occasion. Moreover, those concerning realities were supplemented by prior domestic conflict, anger and other abusive conduct in Mr M.’s residence when he previously had his children in his care. Such serious matters raise obvious concerns about the possibility of D1 possibly being subjected to similar conditions, including the possibility of verbal and/or physical abuse, if the court makes an order allowing D1 to remain in the care of his father. Having said that:

a. Such incidents of past verbal and physical abuse, and exposure of Mr M.’s children to domestic violence, are now somewhat dated.

b. While I found some of Mr M.’s comments about his past behaviour troubling, (e.g., insofar as he still appears to think that violence committed in relation to a youth perceived to be threatening D1 was appropriate), the underlying stressful circumstances surrounding Mr M.’s earlier conduct are now largely gone. Moreover, I accept that Mr M., through his completed and ongoing counselling, has gained insight and made progress in relation to his thinking about such matters, particularly insofar as his awareness of distinctions between appropriate and inappropriate parenting is concerned.

c. The reality of the Society and Ms A. independently checking in with D1 on a regular basis to ascertain whether there are any concerns about life in the care of his father, and D1 reporting none, also provides a measure of reassurance that concerns regarding possible verbal and/or physical abuse of D1 effectively have passed.

d. In my view, it also needs to be borne in mind that, since the occurrence of verbal and physical violence while the children were in Mr M.’s care, D1’s situation has undergone a significant change in terms of his physical vulnerability. In particular, D1 is now approximately 17 years of age, and by all accounts is now a very tall and large young man. In my view, the prospects of Mr M. and/or Ms P. threatening or attempting to engage in physical discipline or other physical abuse of D1 are now significantly diminished in any event.

e. For such reasons, I find that it would be in the best interests of D1 to allow him to remain in the continued care of his father, albeit under the supervision of the Society pursuant to another six-month supervision order made pursuant to s.101(1).1 of the CYFSA, subject to appropriate terms and conditions in that regard; terms that will include provisions prohibiting any use of physical discipline in relation to D1. Such an order, (addressed in further detail below), will be made accordingly.

f. In my view, it also would be in the best interests of the remaining children to be formally placed in extended society care, effectively permitting them to remain in their current foster placements. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, while I have regard to all the enumerated considerations set forth in s.74(3) of the CYFSA in that regard, I note the following in particular:

i. I am satisfied that such dispositions are consistent with the children’s views and wishes, and that those indicated preferences should be given considerable weight in the circumstances. In that regard:

1. The extended evidence presented at trial regarding the children made it abundantly clear that A1 and K. are extremely intelligent and reflective young persons, wise beyond their years, who have given considerable thought to their past, present and future circumstances. While both love their mother, and are getting to know their father again, both also have made it clear that they very much enjoy life in their current placements, and have no wish to return to the previous instability and chaotic circumstances that dominated their lives while in the care of Ms H.

2. The age of the three youngest siblings, and evidence presented at trial concerning their level of development and expression, does not suggest that D2, A2 and S. have the same level of maturity and insight in terms of indicating their preferences in a reasoned way. Having said that, I accept the indications of Mr Van Meppelen, (buttressed by the testimony I received from multiple witnesses), that the three younger children also have indicated love and concern for their mother but effectively have made it clear that they too are very happy and content with their current placement, and have no desire to return to the unstable and challenging lives they once knew, (to the extent each remembers that time), in the care of their mother.

ii. In my view, the evidence presented at trial made it abundantly clear that the five younger children have been blessed with remarkably caring and committed foster parents who clearly have bonded with their charges in a significant way, have taken every measure required to co-operate with the Society, and have ensured that all of the children’s physical, mental and emotional needs are being met. All five of the children obviously are thriving and developing appropriately in their current environments.

iii. As for the cultural and linguistic heritage of the five younger children:

1. While M-A and A1 do not share a cultural heritage, I fully accept M-A’s stated commitment to respect and promote A1’s black American, Polish and Portuguese heritage to whatever extent she can. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, I was impressed by M-A’s sensitivity to racial issues, evident in her testimony about the difficulties she has encountered in the course of her life because she does not share the same skin and hair colour as her children, (similar to those of A1), owing to her children’s Italian heritage.

2. As noted earlier, PE and SC are a mixed-race couple, (being black and white respectively), which essentially mirrors that of the four youngest children in their care. PE testified, and I accept, that she and her husband also will respect and promote the children’s cultural heritage.

iv. As for the importance of the five younger children’s development of a positive relationship with a parent and a secure place as a member of a family, and fostering/preserving relationships and emotional ties to the five younger children’s parents, siblings and other members of the children’s extended family:

1. As noted earlier, M-A, PE and SC have been extremely co-operative and supportive in terms of permitting and facilitating virtual contact between the children and their parents, as well as supervised in person visits between A1 and his father, in person visits between the children and all of their siblings, and in person visits between the children and Ms A. PE and SC also have indicated a willingness to support supervised in person visits between Mr M. and his three youngest children if the children express a desire to have that happen. All of the foster parents also have indicated, (and I have no reason to doubt), that they similarly would permit and co-operate with facilitation of visits between the five younger children and their mother, if only Ms H. would express and pursue a willingness to engage in such visits.

2. In the meantime, the foster parents also clearly have worked hard to develop an extremely close and positive relationship with their respective charges, and to assure the five younger children that they have a secure place as a member of the family units headed by their foster parents. In particular, as described in more detail above:

a. M-A has made it clear that, although she does not intend to formally adopt A1, he is welcome to stay with her, wherever she may go, so long as he continues with his high school and post-secondary education; and

b. PE and SC have made clear their desire to formally adopt the four youngest children if and when that becomes possible.

3. In my view, the proposed plans of care for the five youngest children in extended society care, (i.e., allowing A1 to remain with M-A, and the four youngest children to remain with PE and SC), are clearly preferable in merit to the possibility of the five younger children being returned to their parents. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

a. I once again am mindful that such matters are not to be approached or decided on the basis of any monetary calculus that the proposed plans for the five younger children, in their contemplated extended society care placements, will more readily conform to some notional “middle class yardstick” of living standards available to other children here in Canada, as opposed to what the birth parents of these particular children might be able to offer via their more limited resources. Children obviously should not be removed from their parents simply because others are able to supply such children with more material things.

b. However, in my view, the fundamental reality in this case is that the proposed plans of care for the five youngest children in extended society care, continuing the current living circumstances of the children for the foreseeable future, and paving the way for simultaneous adoption of the four youngest children by PE and SC, will ensure that the basic needs of the children, (physical, mental and emotional), will be met in circumstances where the children’s parents have proven themselves incapable of achieving that goal. In their current placements, the children now have stability, security, appropriate food, appropriate medical care, appropriate education and exposure to extracurricular activities and opportunities. They were repeatedly described, during the course of the trial, as being and feeling more settled than at any previous time in their lives. Compared to their previous existence, A1 now has and will continue to have the focused attention, individual space and intermittent distance from his siblings he desires, while the four youngest children have and will continue to have the reassuring presence of each other without the uncertainty of fearing their potential separation. In the care of their parents, the overall welfare and development of the children was being neglected and compromised. In their current circumstances, (which the plans of extended society care proposed by the Society and supported by the children and Mr M. seek to continue), the five youngest children clearly are having their needs met, and are thriving.

4. For far too long, the future of the five youngest children effectively has lingered in limbo via delay in achieving a final resolution of these proceedings; e.g., via repeated temporary care orders, unsuccessful attempts by the children’s parents to improve their parenting capabilities and sufficiently address the clearly identified child protection concerns over an extended period of time, the time it took the matters to proceed to trial, and the length of time it has taken to render this decision. The extended care orders proposed in relation to the five youngest children bring a measure of finality to the lives of the children, allowing their lives to move forward in a more certain and predictable manner from this point onwards.

5. I see nothing in the proposed extended society care orders that would risk the five younger children suffering any harm through “being removed from, kept away from, returned to or allowed to remain in the care of a parent”. Certainly, there is nothing before me to suggest that the circumstances of their current foster care pose any apparent risk of physical, mental or emotional harm to the children. Moreover, removal of the children from their birth parents’ care, and their placement in extended society care, effectively will bring an end to the identified child protection concerns. At the same time, the proposed orders will ensure ongoing contact between the children and their parents, (as well as their siblings and Ms A.), until such time as there may be an openness hearing, at which time further requests for appropriate continued contact may be made by those concerned.

g. For such reasons, I find that it would be in the best interests of A1, K. D2, A2 and S. to grant the s.101(1).3 extended care orders proposed by the Society, and supported by the children and by Mr M., subject to the inclusion of appropriate terms and conditions in that regard. Such individual orders in relation to each of the five youngest children, (addressed in further detail below), will be made accordingly.

Access

40As for determinations regarding access, I am mindful of legislative provisions that include the following:

a. Pursuant to s.104(1)(a) of the CYFSA, when making an order under Part V of the Act, a court may, in a child’s best interests, make, vary or terminate an order respecting a person’s access to the child or the child’s access to a person, and may impose such terms and conditions on the order as the court considers appropriate.

b. Pursuant to s.104(2) of the CYFSA, those who may apply to the court “at any time” for an access order pursuant to s.104(1) of the Act now expressly include the child, “any other person, including a sibling of the child”, and the Society.

c. Pursuant to s.104(5) of the CYFSA, however, no order respecting access to a person 16 or older may be made under s.104(1) of the CYFSA without the person’s consent.

d. Pursuant to s.105(1) of the CYFSA, where an supervision order is made pursuant to s.101(1)1 removing a child from the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention under Part V of the Act, the court is required to make an order for access by the person unless the court is satisfied that continued contact with the person would not be in the child’s best interests.

e. In relation to extended society care orders made pursuant to s.101(1).3 of the CYFSA:

i. Pursuant to s.105(4) of the CYFSA, where the court makes such an order, any existing order for access made under Part V of the Act is terminated.

ii. Pursuant to s.105(5) of the CYFSA, a court shall not make or vary an access order under s.104 of the Act with respect to a child who is in extended society care, under an order made pursuant to s.101(1).3 unless the court is satisfied that the order or variation would be in the child’s best interests. As part of its determination of whether such an order or variation would be in the child’s best interests, the court is required to consider, pursuant to s.105(6) of the CYFSA:

1. whether the relationship between the person and the child is beneficial and meaningful to the child; and

2. if the court considers it relevant, whether the ordered access will impair the child’s future opportunities for adoption.

iii. Pursuant to s.105(7) of the CYFSA, where a court makes or varies an access order under section 104 of the Act with respect to a child who is in extended care under an order made under s.101(1).3 of the Act, the court must specify every person who has been granted a right of access, and every person with respect to whom access has been granted.

41I also am mindful of our Court of Appeal’s emphasis, in Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. G.(J.), supra, at paragraph 37, that the above provisions of the CYFSA regarding access reflect a deliberate and significant shift in the mandated approach to access for children in extended care; i.e., insofar as the CYFSA removed the presumption against such access mandated by the former legislation, (and its highly restrictive test that tended towards termination of access between children and those important to them), in favour of making a holistic consideration of the child’s “best interests” the predominant consideration in determining such access. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

a. A person seeking such access no longer has the burden of demonstrating that the person’s relationship to the child is beneficial and meaningful, and in no way impairs the child’s future adoption opportunities. More generally, it is not helpful to import the concept of onus when the court is required to consider and balance the various factors that affect the life of a child in need of protection.

b. While the court still considers whether the relationship is beneficial and meaningful to the child, and the potential impairment to future adoption opportunities that might be created by such access, (now only where the court considers that to be relevant), it does so only as part of the court’s overall “best interests” analysis; i.e., simply as one aspect of that analysis. In particular, the “beneficial and meaningful” test is no longer a separate precondition to the granting of such access, as it was under the previous legislation. Again, it is now simply a consideration within the context of determining whether such access would be in the overall “best interests” of the child.

c. There accordingly is no longer any “presumption against” such access, and while any evidence of possible impairment to adoption opportunities previously would have thwarted requests for such access, such access may be ordered for a child with otherwise excellent adoptive prospects if it is in the child’s overall best interests.

d. The reference to siblings, in the non-exhaustive s.104(2) list of persons who may apply for such access, was an inclusion in the new legislation specifically aimed at promoting consideration of sibling access requests, and as part of efforts to promote the rights and voices of children throughout the CYFSA.

42In this particular case, I think it helpful to note the following by way of preliminary observations relevant to the making of access orders requested by the parties:

a. It was not disputed that those in respect of whom rights of access might be granted include the children’s parents, the children themselves, the children’s siblings and Ms A.

b. D1 was already 16 at the time of trial, and [is a specified age at the time of this decision]. A1 was only 15 at the time of trial, but [is a specified age at the time of this decision]. I confirm, for the purposes of s.104(5) of the CYFSA and the record, that both boys have indicated, through their counsel Mr Van Meppelen, their consent to the proposed orders granting others’ rights of access to them. All adults in respect of whom rights of access are proposed, (i.e., the children’s parents and Ms A.), have indicated their consent as well.

c. No one disputed, and I independently find, that the relationships between each of the children and each of their parents, the relationships between each of the siblings, and the relationship between each of the children and their paternal grandmother Ms A., are beneficial and meaningful to each of the children. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:

i. While the interactions between the children and their mother Ms H. have been challenging and/or frustrating at times, in certain respects, no one disputed, and the evidence clearly shows, that the children love their mother. By all accounts, the children also always have exhibited happiness when visiting with their mother, and consistently have expressed their desire to see and speak with her. While Ms H. sadly has proven herself incapable of meeting the children’s needs, there is also nothing in the history of the matter to suggest that she has ever posed any overt danger to them requiring supervision of her access visits with the children or vice versa.

ii. The interactions between the children and their father Mr M. clearly pose more of a concern, given the history of anger, verbal abuse, physical abuse and exposure to domestic conflict the children experienced while they were in his care. No one, (including Mr M. himself), is suggesting that any in person interactions between the five younger children and their father should not be supervised, either by Ms A. or some other person approved by the Society, for the time being. However, in my view, Mr M. clearly has made progress; i.e., in terms of acquiring further insight through anger management and counselling programs, acknowledging and expressing regret for his previous parent-centred misconduct, and his commitment to acting appropriately towards the children going forward. Future interactions between the children and their father on that basis would be beneficial and meaningful to the children, and the children already have experienced that to some extent; i.e., insofar as D1 appears to have substantially rebuilt his relationship with Mr M. with successful cohabitation and interaction on a daily basis, A1 has enjoyed a number of successful interactions and visits with his father supervised by Ms A., and the remaining children are tentatively starting to enjoy virtual access with Mr M., and receive support and assistance from him to some extent in that fashion. The possibility of the children and their father building on that success to date should continue.

iii. All concerned, but especially the children, have emphasized the extremely important role Ms A. has played in the children’s lives as a constant and stable source of love and support. Each of the children has emphasized that they want their visits with Ms A. to continue, and vice versa.

d. No one disputed, and I independently find, that the access orders being contemplated will not impair any of the children’s future opportunities for adoption. For the reasons explained herein, no adoption is contemplated in relation to D1 or A1. As far as the four youngest children are concerned, PE testified and I accept that she and her husband SC contemplate adoption of all four children if and when possible, while fully supporting continued contact between the children and their parents, the children and their siblings, and the children and Ms A. The granting of access rights in the nature of those being requested, (subject to their frequency), accordingly would not seem to pose any potential impairment to adoption of the four youngest children by PE and SC.

e. No one disputed, and I independently find, having regard to the considerations outlined in s.74(3) and 105(5) of the Act, that the various access orders being proposed would be in the best interests of the children, insofar as they would facilitate the continued beneficial and meaningful relationships between the children and their parents, the children and their siblings, and the children and Ms A., without any apparent detrimental impacts apart from the possibility of incidental challenges that might flow from the frequency of such visits and associated scheduling conflicts.

43Frequency effectively was the sole area of disagreement, as far as the various contemplated access relationships and associated proposed orders in that regard were concerned. In that regard:

a. All concerned were agreed that the children should have access to their parents and vice versa, (to the extent the child was not placed in the parent’s care, as in the case of D1 vis-à-vis Mr M.), in accordance with the child’s wishes

b. All concerned also were agreed that the children should have access to Ms A. and vice versa in accordance with the child’s wishes.

c. Because D1’s rights of access to his mother, siblings and Ms A. would be pursuant to a s.101(1).1 supervision order, the draft final order submitted by the Society in relation to D1 speaks to the matter of frequency by reference to “reasonable” access, and I find that to be appropriate, adequately flexible and sufficient for present purposes.

d. Because rights of access relating to A1, K., D2, A2 and S. would be made in the context of s.101(1).3 extended care orders, further specification of access holders and access recipients is required pursuant to s.105(7) of the CYFSA, (e.g., to ensure standing and rights of participation in relation to any future “openness” application proceedings), and it was in respect of such orders that frequency, (and in particular, the “baseline” frequency with which certain access visits should be offered subject to the children’s wishes), was an issue. In that regard:

i. The competing positions of the parties were set out in more detail earlier, and I accordingly will not repeat those positions in detail here. In broad terms:

1. All concerned agreed with the Society’s position that access visits between the siblings should be offered a minimum of 12 times each year for two hours, and that access visits between the siblings and Ms A. similarly should be offered a minimum of 12 times each year for two hours.

2. However, in relation to the Society’s position that access between the siblings and each of their parents should be offered a minimum of six times each for two hours:

a. the five older children, (via their counsel Mr Van Meppelen), requested that access visits between the children and their mother be offered a minimum of 12 times each year; and

b. Ms H. requested that access visits between her and the children be offered once a month. (i.e., a minimum of 12 times each year), for a minimum of four hours.

ii. To the extent that the relevant access relationships being considered are meaningful and beneficial to the children, more frequent offering of such access visits seems attractive in the abstract.

iii. I nevertheless have concerns about the cumulative total of minimum offered access visits that would be generated by ordering, (in addition to the minimum of 12 visits per year between the siblings, the minimum of 12 visits per year between the children and Ms A., and the minimum of 6 visits per year between the children and their father), the augmenting requests by the children and Ms H. that there also be a minimum 12 (not six) visits per year between the children and their mother, and Ms H.’s request that the minimum duration of those visits be doubled. In particular, from the perspective the children and the foster parents, that likely would increase the number of minimum access visits to be offered to at least three and perhaps four each month. effectively raising the prospect of the children having an access visit commitment each and every weekend.

iv. I am mindful that would not always be the case. In particular:

1. The baselines being considered refer to the minimum number of times access visits would be offered, and not the number of times such offers would be accepted and corresponding access exercised.

2. Particular agreed upon scheduling arrangements might involve some of the minimum offered access visits effectively coinciding and occurring simultaneously; e.g., if all of the siblings and Ms A. continued to see each other simultaneously, as they have in the past.

3. Insofar as all of the contemplated access would be subject to the overarching condition that access occur in accordance with the wishes of the children, some of the otherwise minimum access visits to be offered effectively might have to be cancelled if a child indicates that he or she does not want those particular access visits to occur.

v. On the other hand, the number of access visits occurring, pursuant to the minimum amount of offers to be extended in that regard, arguably might increase considerably; e.g., if the children and Ms A. chose not to have their access visits with each other occur simultaneously, and/or in a manner involving Ms A. meeting separately with smaller subdivisions of the children or perhaps with one or more of the children individually.

vi. On the whole, I think the best interests of the children require guarding against the possibility of the cumulative total of minimum offered access visits becoming excessive in practice; e.g., to the point where all such visits may still be individually enjoyed by the relevant access holders and recipients, but their necessary organization and/or increased duration might begin to interfere with other desirable plans, extracurricular activities and/or travel opportunities, and/or otherwise become onerous and/or unwelcome for those involved in the implementation of such access visit arrangements. In that regard, I think it would be particularly unfortunate if the foster parents began to feel that way, (i.e., owing to a large and taxing number of access visits each month), which in turn might lead the foster parents to have second thoughts about their commitments.

vii. In that regard, I also am mindful that the focus of the draft final orders and suggested variations in that regard, as far as access is concerned, is on minimum rather than maximum baselines for the offering of such access visits; i.e., with each of the draft orders being put forward by the Society expressly indicating that further and longer visits may be agreed upon. In my view, the history of this matter strongly suggests that such cooperative increases are likely, without the possible complications and resentment that might flow from rigid adherence to enhanced mandatory minimums as to the number and/or duration of the access visits to be offered.

viii. For such reasons, in my view the approach to access proposed by the Society, in terms of minimum access visit frequency and duration, is to be preferred. The final orders to be made accordingly will include access visit provisions corresponding to the arrangements proposed by the Society in that regard.

Formal Orders

44For the reasons outlined above:

a. In relation to court file number C807/10-06:

i. There will be a s.101(1).1 supervision order made in relation to the child D1, placing him in the care of his father Mr M. for a period of six months subject to supervision of the Society, and with rights of reasonable access granted in relation to Ms H. and D1’s siblings, with the formal order in that regard to be made in the “final” form presented by the Society at trial, (i.e., the slightly revised version of the draft final order originally submitted by the Society, containing further incidental amendments identified by appropriate underlining), and therefore including the terms and conditions specified therein.

ii. In relation to each of the children A1, K., D2 and A2, there will be a s.101(1).3 extended society care order, placing each child in the extended care of the Society, subject to terms and conditions, and the specified rights of access, (including indicated access holders and recipients), to be reflected in the formal order in that regard, to be made in the ”final” form presented by the Society at trial, (i.e., the slightly revised version of the draft final order originally presented by the Society, containing further incidental amendments identified by appropriate underlining), albeit supplemented by further wording to indicate that the supervised access visits between Mr M. and the child may be supervised by Ms A. or another person approved by the Society.

b. In relation to court file number C807/10-07, and the child S., there will be a further s.101(1).3 extended society care order, placing S. in the extended care of the Society, subject to terms and conditions, and the specified rights of access, (including indicated access holders and recipients), to be reflected in the formal order in that regard, to be made in the ”final” form presented by the Society at trial; i.e., the slightly revised version of the draft final order originally presented by the Society, containing further incidental amendments identified by appropriate underlining.

45If any difficulties or disagreements are encountered in relation to finalization, issue and entry of the aforesaid orders, the parties may contact the trial coordinator of the London Family Court Branch to make arrangements for my settlement of the final form of the intended orders.

Final comments

46As noted and emphasized by our Court of Appeal in Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. T. (L.), [2016] O.J. No. 991 (C.A.), at paragraph 14, child protection proceedings, and particularly those leading to extended society care orders, (formerly “Crown wardship” orders), are very difficult for all concerned. They are especially difficult for any parent who stands to lose a child.

47In my view, those inherent difficulties nevertheless were eased somewhat in this case by the remarkably sensitive, civil and empathetic manner displayed by all of the parties, witnesses and counsel who participated in the simultaneous trial of these two matters. That certainly merits commendation and thanks. It also hopefully bodes well for the future welfare of these children.

“Justice I.F. Leach”

Justice I.F. Leach

Released: February 12, 2026

CITATION: Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex v. S.A.W., 2026 ONSC 352

COURT FILE NO.: C807/10-06 and C807/10-07 (London)

DATE: 2026-02-12

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

THE CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY OF LONDON AND MIDDLESEX

Applicant

– and –

S.A.W.

Respondent

– and –

G.K.M.

Respondent

AND BETWEEN:

THE CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY OF LONDON AND MIDDLESEX

Applicant

– and –

S.A.W.

Respondent

– and –

Z.G.

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Justice I.F. Leach

Released: February 12, 2026

• As emphasized by Ms Horenberg, Ms H. herself provided information to Ms Horenberg and the Society indicating that Mr G. definitely had assaulted her daughter K., and was aware that Mr G. pled guilty to the resulting criminal charge in that regard, making her willingness to engage in further interactions with Mr G., (despite her acknowledged awareness of the resulting non-association order imposed by the court in that regard), all the more concerning. Indeed, in cross-examination, Ms H. candidly acknowledged that she deliberately called and texted with Mr G., after his criminal trial relating to his assault of K., (apparently resulting in his conviction for that offence), and notwithstanding the court’s corresponding non-association order which Ms H. admittedly knew about, to speak further with Mr G. about his perspective on what had happened.

• In her personal dealings with Mr G., Ms Horenberg formed a clear impression that Mr G. obviously was mentally unwell; e.g., repeatedly demonstrating agitated and escalating behaviour. Such described observations, (which I accept and believe), seem entirely consistent with at least one extraordinarily troubling incident Ms H. herself described, noted again in context and with further details below; i.e., when Mr G., while on drugs and armed with a knife, attended one evening at the [Specified Street No.2] residence then occupied by Ms H. and S., and began slicing his wrists while threatening to stab and kill Ms H. and kidnap S., and/or kill himself, before eventually smashing his head through a window of the residence.

• Although I was provided with no direct evidence confirming the outcome of the criminal proceeding against Mr G., in relation to his alleged conduct regarding K., (and in respect of which K. apparently provided a formal statement to the police and/or testimony at trial), it was Mr M.’s firm understanding that Mr G. eventually entered a guilty plea in relation to the relevant charge of assault.

• In her trial testimony, Ms H. herself attributed the bedbug infestation in B.’s apartment to the insects making their way there from a lower apartment below, (occupied by an immigrant family who were said to have brought the insects with them from an infected hotel), into the upper apartment occupied by B., Ms H. and the children. If so, in my view there is no sensible reason to think that an infestation of bedbugs capable of migrating from one floor of the building to another realistically then would have confined itself to the area of Ms H.’s bedroom.

• The remembered and contemporaneously documented observations of at least two Society workers, (Ms Horenberg and Ms Gardiner), made it clear that Ms H. herself acknowledged at the time that the apartment was infested with bedbugs. Moreover, both workers were sure that they had observed and recognized bedbugs in the apartment, as well as visible bedbug bites on the children and Ms H.

• M-A also observed, recognized and vividly remembered both D1 and A1 having similar extensive bedbug bites when the two boys were placed in her care, shortly after being removed from the [Specified Street No.3] apartment.

• While Ms H. had an incentive to minimize such concerns in retrospect, (i.e., to counter suggestions that the children were experiencing harm in the [Specified Street No.3] apartment), in my view there was no reason for the Society’s workers and/or M-A to fabricate or misremember such matters, (and certainly no reason to think they had done so in the same way independently), and I prefer and accept their objective, credible and reliable evidence in that regard rather than the denials of Ms H.

• Ms A. emphasized that A1 has demonstrated a need and/or longing for space of his own ever since he was a young child, and that while A1 enjoys visits with all of his siblings, he “doesn’t like the chaos” of being with all of them all the time, and much prefers “a quiet situation like the one he has at M-A’s right now”.

• M-A emphasized that A1 looks forward to the group visits with his siblings, and actually seems to enjoy and appreciate them more now that he has become accustomed to the idea of returning from such visits to the reassuring stability, security and relative quiet of his own life away from his siblings; i.e., such that he now finds the visits less stressful. M-A is very supportive of such visits continuing now and into the future, and helps to ensure that they happen, (e.g., by working with Ms A. on the associated logistics), despite lapses in organization in that regard by A1; something which M-A attributes more to A1 being in his teenage years rather than any lack of desire on A1’s part to attend such visits.

• A1 specifically indicated that he has enjoyed making overnight visits to the foster home of his four younger siblings, (with four such visits having taken place before trial), but also found the atmosphere there very “busy”, “noisy” and sometimes at odds with his general preference to be independent and by himself; i.e., such that he asked the frequency of such visits to be “slowed down”. (Further overnight visits also require Ministry approval, given the number of children already in foster care at the home of PE and SC.) While A1 enjoys those visits, he also has made it clear that, because of the level of activity in his siblings’ foster home, and his perception that living there would not provide him with the adequate room and space he desires, he does not wish to live permanently with his four younger siblings at the home of PE and SC; i.e., that he instead wants to stay with M-A.

• A1 also enjoys regular virtual contact with D1 via their shared gaming platform, and D1 has been welcomed for a number of “in person” visits to M-A’s home since his initial time there, including a four-day stay over the summer. Those visits also have gone well, with M-A indicating that there was not a single instance of conflict between the brothers, that D1 seemed to have done “really well” during his time at the group home in terms of making progress, and that D1 is welcome to make further similar visits at any time in the future. A1 has indicated that he similarly would welcome “one on one” visits by K. and D2 to the home of M-A; something K. and D2 also have said they would welcome, and which the Society was working to arrange at the time of trial.

• A1 also enjoyed spending a weekend visiting the home of Ms A., (a visit cooperatively arranged by M-A, Ms A. and the Society, and coinciding with a day visit by D1 to his grandmother’s home), when M-A was obliged to travel out of province without A1. In that regard, it was noted that A1 also got on very well with his paternal uncle, (i.e., Mr M.’s significantly younger brother, who still lives with Ms A. while completing his doctorate), as they appear to have similar personalities and a shared interest in mechanics and engineering; an interest whicH. according to Ms H., A1 has had since he was a young child.

• Ms C. did not dispute the evidence that D1 enjoys and prefers living with his father and seeing his siblings only from time to time, or that D1 gets “picked on” when he is with his other siblings. Indeed, Ms C. acknowledged that Ms H. had informed her of D1 being picked on by his siblings. In response, however, Ms C. said that, in addition to her feeling “nervous” about D1 being in Mr M.’s care, (owing to the “history” of this case and past violence), she also felt strongly that D1 would be “better with all his siblings”, as siblings “sometimes don’t get along” but that “doesn’t mean they shouldn’t be together”.

• Ms C. did not dispute the considerable evidence indicating that A1 loves his current placement with M-A, is thriving in that environment because it is more suited to his desire for quiet, would prefer to see his siblings only from time to time, and therefore very much wants to stay where he is rather than return to the care of Ms H. In response, however, Ms C. said she could not say whether A1 would be “happy” or not with being removed from his current placement, but she was sure that A1, like all the siblings, “would adjust over time” to being back in their mother’s care together; i.e., just as A1 and all the siblings “unfortunately have had to adjust” in the past.

• Ms H. said that she was homeless for a period of time, (lasting approximately three or four days), after being “kicked out” of her aunt’s residence, at which time her aunt also was said to have taken all of Ms H.’s money. In particular, Ms H. said she had nowhere else to go at the time, and recalled living on the street in London, primarily sleeping in blankets outside a bar on Dundas Street she then used to frequent. That homeless arrangement was said to have continued until D3, a woman Ms H. then met at the bar, realized that Ms H. was sleeping on the street and immediately insisted that Ms H. stay at her residence, at which point Ms H. moved in with D3. During that period of described homelessness, Ms H. admittedly did not always have her phone with her, as she was worried the phone and photos it contained would be taken from her; i.e., such that she stored her phone and her purse with the DJ of another downtown bar Ms H. used to frequent.

• At other times, Ms H. said, her ability to respond to messages was compromised by use of a “pay as you go” telephone plan, such that she sometimes lacked the funds to “top up” and use her phone for a few days or a week at a time.

• While one can have nothing but sympathy for the homeless and the steps they must take to protect themselves, or for those lacking funds to maintain use of a telephone now so frequently essential to life in the modern era, in my view the explanations provided by Ms H., even if accepted, do not begin to explain her noted and in many cases documented extended failures to respond to the messages from the children and the Society for many weeks and indeed months at a time. The inescapable conclusion is that Ms H. simply chose not to respond to such messages in a more timely way, if at all. Indeed, in the course of further cross-examination, Ms H. eventually acknowledged that there were certain time frames within which she failed to respond to messages from the Society and the children because she had “kind of given up”; e.g., as she had become “severely depressed”, and was “sleeping a lot during the day”, as life had become generally “unenjoyable”, such that she “didn’t want to exist” anymore.

a. reasonable terms and conditions relating to the child’s care and supervision;

b. reasonable terms and conditions on the child’s parent, the person who will have care and custody of the child under the order, the child, and any other person, (other than a foster parent), who is putting forward or would participate in a plan for the care and custody of or access to the child; and

c. reasonable terms and conditions on the society that will supervise the placement, although the court is not permitted to require the society to provide financial assistance or purchase any goods or services.

Footnotes

1. 1By way of representative indications in that regard, I note and accept the evidence of Ms Horenberg, who described Ms A. as “amazing”, and the “one stable positive person” in the children’s lives who would “do anything for the kids; someone who was “always positive”, and “always open to helping”, particularly in relation to the facilitation of visits, and “supporting both parents, even if one was resistant to that”. Such sentiments were echoed by Ms Gardiner, who emphasized that Ms A. remained “actively involved” with the children, regularly visiting and communicating with them, and always being willing to assist the children, Mr M. and indeed Ms H., (in the past at least), if and when needed; e.g., to provide assistance with transportation and any supervision that might be needed or wanted. During the course of his testimony, Mr M. characterized his mother as the person who has been “the most consistent staple” and “cornerstone” in the children’s lives, and supported the making of a court order whereby independent rights of access should exist between A. and the children.
2. 2In the course of testimony from Ms Studerus, it was confirmed that the Society would approach the contemplated order providing the children and Ms A. with rights of access to each other as a “baseline” whereby the children and Ms A. would continue their current practice of all seeing each other simultaneously during regular group access visits. To date, none of the children specifically have requested regular and similarly scheduled “one on one” visits with their paternal grandmother. However, the Society nevertheless also is committed to facilitating such supplemental “one on one” between Ms A. and her grandchildren individually, subject to Ms A.’s wishes and availability.
3. 3Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. J.G., 2020 ONCA 415, [2020] O.J. No. 2822 (C.A.), at paragraph 60.
4. 4The basic form of that draft final order can be found at Tab 11 of the Document Brief filed by the Society at trial. However, I am referring here to the slightly revised version of that draft final order, (i.e., containing further incidental amendments identified by appropriate underlining), that was presented by the Society at trial.
5. 5The basic forms of those draft final orders can be found at Tabs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the Document Brief filed by the Society at trial. However, I am referring here to the slightly revised versions of those draft final orders, (i.e., containing further incidental amendments identified by appropriate underlining), that were presented by the Society at trial.
6. 6Although the revised draft final orders filed by the Society included an indicated amendment specifying that the contemplated access visits between the child and Mr M. would be “supervised by the paternal grandmother, Ms A.”, all participants in the trial agreed with the Society’s request for a further amendment of the final draft orders such that the contemplated access visits between the child and Mr M. would be “supervised by the paternal grandmother, Ms A., or another person approved by the Society”.
7. 7It was repeatedly emphasized that the suggested frequency and duration of the contemplated visits to be offered in accordance with the proposed terms and conditions were minimums. In practice, the Society generally has been content to allow such visits to continue for as long as the children wish with the support of the foster parents and Ms A.; e.g., with such visits routinely lasting up to four hours at a time, from approximately 11:00am to 3:00pm on a Saturday.
8. 8The basic form of that draft final order can be found at Tab 16 of the Document Brief filed by the Society at trial. However, I am referring here to the slightly revised version of that draft final orders, (i.e., containing further incidental amendments identified by appropriate underlining), that was presented by the Society at trial.
9. 9It should be noted that Ms H., in her testimony, continued to deny allegations that she ever said disparaging things about Mr M. to the children or told the children to hate their father. She also denied having discussed any of the court proceedings with the children, although she did somewhat inconsistently then indicate having felt a need, from time to time, to tell the children that certain things had not happened. As noted below, however, reports made by the children independently to workers from the Society, indicating that their mother “hated” their father, seem difficult to explain unless Ms H. made her negative views of Mr M. very clear to the children.
10. 10At the time of trial, the three children of Ms P., (aged 19, 16 and 14), had been living with their stepmother K.B., (i.e., the wife of Ms P.’s former partner and father of her children), for a number of years. Ms P. indicated that she generally was content with that care arrangement and not currently asking for it to change at any time in the foreseeable future, (having been concerned principally that the children not be in the care of their father), but remained engaged in ongoing family law litigation about decision-making responsibility for the three children. In the meantime, Ms P. says, she and Ms B. have remained civil in front of the three children, and Ms P. has remained in contact with her children. Notwithstanding those general care and living arrangements, Ms P.’s oldest child, R., also comes to visit and stay in his mother’s residence from time to time. As R. gets along well with D1, (and with A1, as noted below), R. sleeps on a mattress in D1’s room during such visits; something which D1 is said to welcome and enjoy.
11. 11In addition my comments above and below in that regard, I note and accept Ms A.’s testimony that, owing to the significant amount of time Ms A. and S. have spent together during access visits, and the supportive and affectionate role Ms A. has played in relation to all six of the siblings, without differentiation, S. has come to call Ms A. “grandma”, (perhaps without really understanding the absence of any biological connection between the two), and Ms A. regards S. “in her heart” as another one of her grandchildren.
12. 12In the course of her testimony, Ms H. noted that, while A1’s swelling before his initial hospitalization and diagnosis included extensive swelling of his stomach. (to the point of looking pregnant), the visible swelling occasionally experienced by A1 thereafter during relapses generally was limited to A1’s face and groin areas. At the time of such relapses and hospitalizations, Ms H. repeatedly relied on the assistance of Ms A.; i.e., insofar as it was difficult for Ms H. to take A1 to hospital while the remaining children still required care. Ms H. emphasized that, after A1’s condition initially was diagnosed, she was aware, (after meeting with a dietitian at the hospital), that A1’s diet “needed to be monitored”; i.e., to avoid his having too much salt or sugar, which would aggravate his condition. In that regard, Ms H. provided the example of her “taking the salt off” fast food she purchased for A1 from McDonald’s; an example that seemed troubling in itself, insofar as it suggested a failure to recognize that an underlying diet involving frequent consumption of fast food, (rather notorious for its high salt content), was problematic in itself.
13. 13In cross-examination, Ms H. challenged the Society’s indications that months went by in that regard without her meeting with Ms Horenberg; e.g., refusing to acknowledge, (unreasonably in my view), that the contemporaneous notes made by Ms Horenberg in that regard were likely a more accurate record of what had and had not happened than Ms H.’s memory of what transpired during that period several years later.
14. 14As an example, Ms A. provided a vivid account, (which I believe and accept), of Mr G. threatening her repeatedly during and after one particular shopping excursion to purchase groceries; i.e., an occasion during which Ms A. had asked for Ms H.’s help in bagging groceries, and Mr G. reacted with highly inappropriate aggressive behaviour claiming that Ms A. was not being sufficiently respectful to Ms H.. For example, in Ms H.’s presence, Mr G. threatened to slash Ms A.’s tires, and thereafter told Ms A., (while referring to the number of people he claimed to have killed in the past), that Ms A. would “answer” to him for her supposed misconduct. Mr G. also sent Ms A. texts calling her “all kinds” of names. Such hostility and threats resulted in Ms A. feeling a need to keep her distance from Mr G., and to her therefore not feeling able to visit and support Ms H. as much while Ms H. allowed her relationship with Mr G. to continue, despite his troubling and inappropriate behaviour.
15. 15In the course of her testimony, Ms H. claimed that she was never “sure exactly” as to what had “played out” in that regard, as it was a “very confusing time”. In particular, she claimed to have been sleeping when the relevant underlying events had occurred, that she was only “notified afterwards” that something had happened, and that “everyone was saying different things” in that regard. She also repeatedly and in my view unreasonably suggested that it was the Society that “caused issues with [the] relationship” between her and Mr G.; e.g., by repeatedly emphasizing its awareness of Mr G.’s involvement in serious and violent criminal activity, (which Ms H. professed not to know about prior to the Society’s provision of information in that regard, although she says she was aware Mr G. had engaged and/or was engaged in a lot of theft), and repeatedly indicating that Mr G. should not be living with the children, which in turn was said to have led Mr G. to think that Ms H. no longer loved him or now loved someone else. I also found such assertions impossible to reconcile with the testimony of Ms Horenberg in that regard, which I prefer and accept, and believe Ms H. consciously or subconsciously was attempting to downplay or minimize obvious concerns about Mr G. and about the children being exposed to Mr G.; e.g., attempting to emphasize that Mr G. generally was “extremely attentive” and “extremely loving” in his behaviour toward her, and suggesting that Mr G. had only harmed K. by accident while trying to help her down from a high cupboard onto which she had climbed, and from which he had not wanted K. to fall. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:
16. 16Although there was no reference to the circumstances surrounding S.’s birth in the evidence provided by the Society’s witnesses, Ms H. testified that Mr G. attended the hospital for the birth of S., (with supposed permission from the Society, although that seems unlikely having regard to the court’s prevailing non-association order), and that she met Mr G.’s parents, (i.e., S.’s paternal grandparents), for the first time that day, after they had travelled to the hospital from their home in Kitchener.
17. 17It should be noted that, at the time, Ms H. denied knowledge of Mr G.’s presence, and therefore complicity in further violation of the non-association order put in place for reasons including K.’s protection. During the trial before me, Ms H. asserted that she had not wanted Mr G. at her residence, and that he kept attending without her permission, prompting her to call the police.
18. 18Despite the support Ms A. had been providing to Ms H. and the children, Ms A. learned they had left their London residence only when Ms A. attempted to visit the residence again, after Ms H. stopped responding to text messages, and discovered via Ms H.’s former landlord that Ms H. and the children were simply gone.
19. 19Ms H. thought Ms A. had been one of those people, but I find that was not the case. In that regard, I accept and believe Ms A.’s testimony that she had no idea what had happened to Ms H. and the children when Ms H. failed to respond to her messages regarding access visits, and Ms A. then attended at the [Specified Street No.1] residence to discover that Ms H. and the children had gone. Moreover, in further cross-examination, Ms H. acknowledged that she deliberately had decided to put her trust in a relative stranger like Mrs G., rather than turn to Ms A. for assistance, (despite acknowledging that Ms A. unquestionably had the children’s best interests at heart), because there had been some “turmoil” in the relationship between Ms H. and Ms A.; i.e., insofar as Ms H. felt that Ms A. had tried to “sabotage” Ms H. at one point during ongoing conflict between Ms H. and Mr M.. In doing so, it seemed clear to me that Ms H. prioritized her ongoing antipathy towards Mr M. and those Ms H. considered to be on his “side” over the best interests of her children.
20. 20In my view, the latter suggestion seems inherently implausible; i.e., insofar as it seems doubtful that the G.s would have extended such extraordinary and indefinite generosity to Ms H., (a person supposedly no longer in a relationship with their son, and whom they had met only once and briefly), and to Ms H.’s six children, only one of whom was a grandchild of Mr and Mrs G., and with that grandchild being one Mr and Mrs G. also had met only once and briefly. Ms H.’s description of the offer of assistance extended by Mrs G. also was strikingly at odds with Mrs G.’s later direct indication to Ms Horenberg, (when she eventually was able to locate and visit the G. home in the circumstances described below), that the G.s expected Ms H. and her six children to vacate within a week, on the understanding that they would be moving into accommodation arranged by the Society.
21. 21Ms H. testified to having a recollection of putting the children’s birth certificates out on a counter in the residence, and the children’s clothing being put into suitcases, to keep those items separate from those going into storage. However, with “so much going on”, she says those items then inadvertently wound up going into storage anyway.
22. 22I frankly found this tortuous account of prolonged unawareness on the part of Ms H. regarding the underlying situation regarding Mr G. to be implausible. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, Ms H. testified that she did not know that Mr G. was being released from custody, but I found that difficult to reconcile with her indication, elsewhere in her testimony, that she was “obviously in contact with Victim Services” at the time, and thereby receiving indirect indications from Mr G.’s probation officer regarding Mr G.’s imminent release. Moreover, Ms H. also indicated, during the course of her testimony, that the proposal regarding her and the children relocating to Kitchener had been put to her by Mr G.’s parents after Mr G. himself had informed them that Ms H. was dealing with landlord issues and facing eviction. I think it unlikely that Mr G. could or would have had such information, to relay to his parents, unless he and Ms H. were communicating with each other in contravention of the prevailing non-association order; something Ms H. admittedly had done on earlier occasions. An ongoing relationship between Mr G. and Ms H. also certainly would go a long way to explaining why Mr and Mrs G. were so willing to provide generous assistance to Ms H. and her six children. As noted below, Ms H. herself also indicated to Ms Horenberg, (whose evidence in that regard I accept and believe), that Ms H. was receiving assistance from Mr G.. In short, I do not think Ms H. was being candid or accurate about her professed ignorance of Mr G.’s likely presence in Kitchener and probable interaction with her and the children, including K., despite the prevailing court non-association order, while they were there.
23. 23Although Ms H. eventually responded to Ms A.’s messages, and allowed the children to speak with Ms A. virtually via “Facetime”, (during which Ms A. was able to see that the children and their mother were all occupying one hotel room), Ms A. similarly was not provided with any further details of where Ms H. and the children were in Kitchener, and was not permitted to visit with the children in person.
24. 24In her testimony at trial, Ms H. claimed that she had no idea why the children would have “come up with” such assertions, as her relocation to Kitchener was a “crisis situation” that “wasn’t about G.”, (i.e., Mr M.), and she denied disparaging Mr M. in the children’s presence. She posited that the children were simply so “desperate” to be placed with her that they independently formed a view that saying such things, or acting up in Mr M.’s care, would further that goal. However, I accept the objective evidence of the Society’s workers that the children were making such statements and reports about their mother “hating” their father, and think it unlikely that the children would have done so without Ms H. making her negative views of Mr M. abundantly clear to the children.
25. 25In the course of his testimony, Mr M. noted that, when the children were returned to his care, D2 seemed particularly confused, with apparently little memory of who Mr M. was, while D1 and A1 were angry with their situation and continually fighting with each other. Matters were made more difficult by the fact that the children essentially had returned from Kitchener with almost no clothing (including winter clothing) or personal effects whatsoever, as all of their belongings and identification documents were said to have been put into a storage facility by Ms H. Ms H. also declined to assist in the retrieval and provision of such clothing and identification, taking the position that the children would have access to such items once they were returned to her care. In the result, urgent efforts then were undertaken by Mr M. and Ms A. to take the children shopping for new clothes, apply for new/replacement identification, and have the children enrolled as quickly as possible in appropriate online learning programs. Within a week of their return to London, the children had resumed their formal education, albeit it virtually given the ongoing pandemic.
26. 26Ms A. explained that the exchange occurred because A1 had expressed a preference to stay at Ms A.’s residence, (where it was less busy and more quiet), while Ms A. had been struggling to care adequately for A2, who was having nightmares, frequently not sleeping, and crying a great deal. In his testimony, Mr M. echoed those indications, adding that A2 also was not yet toilet-trained at the time, which also was making things more challenging for Ms A.
27. 27Ms H. apparently raised a concern about A1 having a slight “rug burn” on his back, which the Society investigated and confirmed to be the result of innocuous horseplay; i.e., during an occasion when A1 was joking with Ms A., and required her to literally drag him out of bed for school. The conduct was not repeated, and presented no ongoing concern for the Society.
28. 28As noted and emphasized by Ms A. and Mr M. in their testimony, it was their understanding that removal of the children from Ms H.’s care and their placement in the care of Mr M. and Ms A. was intended to be a relatively short-term arrangement; i.e., until Ms H. had stabilized her housing arrangements. In the result, however, the placement went on much longer than expected, which made the ensuing situation, described in more detail below, all the more stressful. In particular, although it had been anticipated that the children would be returned to Ms H. within a three-to-six-month period, the children were not returned to Ms H.’s care until June of 2022.
29. 29In his testimony, Mr M. clarified that the three children of Ms P. were only in the residence half of the time, (pursuant to the family law arrangements governing their parenting and care at the time), but matters also were complicated by a reality that D1 essentially required a bedroom of his own; i.e., as D1 frequently “rocks” in his sleep, (something apparently related to his autism), which was keeping the other children awake.
30. 30I note in passing that, during this period, the Society received a referral from the Thames Valley District School Board that one of its students had reported a hearsay allegation suggesting that one of Ms P.’ three children, (her daughter J.), had indicated to another child, (i.e., a child of Ms B., who was acting as a stepmother to the children of Ms P.), that J. had been sexually assaulted by Mr M. via “cuddling” or “hugging”. However, the allegation was independently investigated by the Society and not verified. In that regard, Ms P. herself indicated that she also had spoken directly to her daughter J. about that matter, resolved to believe and support her daughter if something inappropriate had happened. However, J. had indicated that the allegation, and the report of her making such an allegation, were untrue. In March of 2025, the same dated allegation was relayed to Ms Studerus at the Society by M-A, who had been told of the allegation by Ms B.; i.e., when M-A drove one of Ms P.’s other children home to the residence of Ms B. after a birthday visit with A1. However, Ms Studerus consulted with her supervisor and the London Police, and confirmed that it was the same unverified allegation from 2021.
31. 31As emphasized by Ms Horenberg, there were times when Mr M. was receptive to her comments in that regard, acknowledging concerns about his anger management. At other times, and particularly as stress in Mr M.’s residence escalated towards the end of the placement of all of the children in his care, Mr M. became quite resistant to such suggestions, and instead became more focused on Ms H.’s perceived failings.
32. 32In her testimony, Ms Horenberg indicated that, at the time, she was “viewing places”, (i.e., potential rental properties), and doing so “back-to-back” by visiting up to five properties a day without success; i.e., repeatedly being “shut down” in relation to each such inquiry for a variety of reasons, including her poor credit rating, lack of full time employment, and the size of her family.
33. 33In cross-examination, Ms Horenberg confirmed that all six of the children consistently displayed a positive relationship and strong bond with their mother, (albeit with the bond possibly being stronger with some of the children, and K. and S. in particular), and that the children never indicated a desire to not see Ms H.. However, Ms Horenberg also emphasized that, for similar reasons, the children were confused and hurt by Ms H.’s failure to exercise her rights of access to the children, often for very extended periods of time. In his testimony, Mr M. admirably noted that some of that failure to exercise access arguably was attributable to reasons beyond Ms H.’s control; e.g., her apparent contraction of the Covid-19 virus and associated hospitalization for a time. However, Mr M. also confirmed that Ms H. frequently failed to exercise her rights of access, often for very extended periods, (including the last six months of the children’s placement in the home of Mr M.), without any apparent explanation; something which greatly upset the children.
34. 34In cross-examination, Ms Horenberg indicated that, during the times she was able to visit with Ms H. and S. during this period, Ms H. appeared to be “doing well” with S.; i.e., with “no significant concerns” in that regard while Ms H. and S. were residing with Ms C. Having said that, those visits also were limited in number owing to Ms H.’s refusal thereafter to co-operate and work with Ms Horenberg and permit further visits in that regard during this period.
35. 35In cross-examination, Ms H. acknowledged losing her temper and swearing at Ms Horenberg, (because Ms H. was exasperated by A1’s condition when hospitalized during Mr M.’s care and “near death” experiences while there, while the Society was still intent on returning A1 to Mr M.’s care when discharged from hospital) but denied insulting/threatening Ms Horenberg’s family. I nevertheless prefer and accept the testimony of Ms Horenberg in that regard, given that Ms H. admittedly had lost control of her emotions, Ms Horenberg’s testimony was characterized by its objectivity, and such insults/threats no doubt would have been extremely memorable from Ms Horenberg’s perspective.
36. 36In their respective testimony, Mr M. and Ms H. both noted and confirmed that D1 not only suffers from ADHD and autism, but also has been diagnosed as exhibiting oppositional defiant disorder, or “ODD”. Both parents, as well as other witnesses who testified, (including the Society’s workers, Ms P. and Ms A.), described various unusual behaviours, obsessions and fixations occasionally demonstrated by D1 in that regard, which other children, in particular, sometimes find difficult to understand, and which correspondingly lead to D1 sometimes being bullied or “picked on”.
37. 37Despite acquired insight indicated by Mr M. in other respects, he apparently still has difficulty appreciating the inappropriate nature of his conduct in that regard; i.e., still feeling, to some extent, that his conduct was justified by a desire to defend his son.
38. 38In his testimony, Mr M. did not dispute and instead readily confirmed the evidence of Ms Horenberg in that regard, indicating his view that Ms Horenberg had “said it best”; i.e., that it “essentially seemed like [he and Ms P.] had just given up at the time”. In particular, with the benefit of hindsight, reflection and more insight acquired since then, Mr M. candidly acknowledged that he and Ms P. were “essentially more burnt out and stressed out than [they] had originally thought”; i.e., frequently arguing with each other about the care and upbringing of the children, losing patience with the children, (whom they believed to be deliberately misbehaving at the direction of Ms H.), and with Mr M. admittedly starting to adopt what he now understands to be inappropriate “parent-centred behaviour when it came to the children”.
39. 39In her testimony, Ms H. said she knew at the time there was “something wrong with the basement” of the property, but she felt obliged to take it, at the urging of her mother, as the landlord was willing to rent the property immediately.
40. 40Ms H. testified that the problems stemmed from a dispute regarding repairs that had been necessary to address a plumbing issue and sewage back up that occurred in the basement of the property on Christmas Eve of 2021; a situation requiring urgent and costly repairs that the landlord attributed to conduct of Ms H., and in respect of which the landlord sought substantial damages from Ms H. and Ms C.
41. 41In her testimony, Ms H. claimed that she essentially had been tricked by her landlord into signing an N11 “Agreement to End Tenancy” form, indicating her ostensible agreement to vacate the [Specified Street No.2] property within 10 days owing to non-payment of rent. In fact, Ms H., says, she had been pressured into signing the form by her landlord, who misrepresented the form to be something required by his insurance company, confirming that he had taken care of all the plumbing repairs needed in relation to the rental unit. Ms H. said she signed the form because the landlord was being “very pushy”, and promised that she could call later with any questions. Only after she had signed the document, and the landlord had departed, did Ms H. read the document and see that it required her and the children to vacate the property within 10 days. There no doubt are unscrupulous landlords, (as confirmed by reported proceedings before the Landlord Tenant Board, and associated Divisional Court appeals addressed by judges of this court), such that the account provided by Ms H. in that regard is not inherently impossible. I nevertheless found the account of Ms H. signing such a form without reading it somewhat improbable and/or implausible in this case, given the prior adversarial relationship with the same landlord described by Ms H., (which no doubt would have made her more wary in the circumstances), and the apparent reticence with which Ms H. has approached the requested signing of other documentation in the course of this matter, (e.g., to process applications for passports and other documentation), even when clearly for the benefit of her children.
42. 42In the course of cross-examination, Ms H. confirmed the poor environment in which she and the children found themselves while forced to stay at that location; i.e., a venue she described as a “shitty rundown hotel”, located in a dangerous part of the east end of London, where the atmosphere was “brutal”, and characterized by “sketchy people” including “drug users” and “criminals”, with Ms H. and the children all required to make due with sleeping arrangements permitted by their one room and its limited furnishings. At the time, Ms H. said the children nevertheless seemed more peaceful and well-behaved than usual during that stay, as there had been “so much chaos before that” relocation to the hotel that they “just wanted peace and quiet at that point”.
43. 43Ms Horenberg confirmed and I accept that, during her extended interaction with the children, D1 definitely wanted to be with his father more than the other children, and was consistently in favour of seeing his father.
44. 44In her testimony, Ms H. described how she was assisted with the completion of such forms by her mother and a helpful worker at the Anova shelter, (who also recommended an application for Canadian Housing Benefits or “CHB”, which was unsuccessful because Ms H. did not have a residence or a lease), but also felt frustrated by the apparent constant lack of progress in that regard; i.e., insofar as Ms H. formed the impression that there was “always something missing” from her applications, or “always something” else that made her applications unsuccessful. In my view, there was a remarkable sense of detachment exhibited by Ms H. when describing such matters and the corresponding failure to ensure housing stability; i.e., as if responsibility for making adequate applications and arrangements for housing lay entirely with others, and Ms H. was primarily a frustrated bystander in that regard.
45. 45In the course of her testimony, Ms H. described the traumatic experience endured by her and the children in that regard; i.e., with Anova staff coming into the room occupied by Ms H. and the children, and starting to put all of the family’s belongings into bags while threatening to call the police if Ms H. and the children did not leave the premises immediately; a situation resulting in Ms H. and the children all openly crying. Ms H. says she pleaded repeatedly for a further extension at Anova, explaining that all of her money was tied up in a money order she had directed towards the possible rental of a residence near Victoria Hospital here in London, which nevertheless had “fallen through” without her having retrieved her deposited funds. However, Anova refused any further indulgences, indicating that it had reached the limits of its ability to grant extensions.
46. 46In her testimony at trial, Ms H. provided significantly more detail, (not entirely consistent with her contemporaneous indications to Ms Horenberg), regarding the circumstances in which she and the children came to reside with B. at the relevant residence. In that regard, Ms H. emphasized that her situation at the time was one of desperation, as the motel in which she and the children had been living had indicated its unwillingness to continue providing accommodation to Ms H. and her children at the discounted rate originally negotiated by the Society, and Ms H. felt unable to pay the “regular” rate now being demanded by the motel. Unable to remain at the motel, and wanting to avoid “living on the streets” with her children, she placed advertisements on social media, (e.g., via “The Giving Tree” and “Facebook”), asking if “anyone” had an “extra room” or would be willing to rent her their basement. B. responded to both ads. Ms H. admittedly had never before met B., who had simply added her in a “random” way to his list of Facebook friends approximately six months earlier. However, Ms H. saw that B.’s general “profile” included photos of B. “loving dogs and cats”, as well as some photos of him with his children, from which she concluded that B. “seemed like a very loving, generous person”, and “friendly enough” that she could move into his residence with the six children despite their never having met before. Contrary to what Ms H. told Ms Horenberg at the time, Ms H. candidly indicted during her trial testimony that she actually did not meet B. in person at all until the time she and the children moved into B.’s residence.
47. 47In her testimony, Ms H. said that transition happened “over time”, but I find that it could not have been a long time on any objective assessment. In particular, by the time Ms Horenberg was able to locate and visit the [Specified Street No.3] apartment within weeks of the move, she observed that Ms H. and B. already were occupying the same bedroom and mattress, with A2 sleeping on the floor beside that mattress and S. sleeping in a stroller in the same room.
48. 48Ms Horenberg’s concerns in that regard were quite understandable, insofar as she was familiar with Ms H. having precipitously embarked on troubling relationships with male partners in the past, during the time of Ms Horenberg’s involvement, For example, Ms H. had allowed a male named C.C. to move into her home shortly after their meeting, and start caring for the children, without Society approval, and despite Ms H. herself indicating to Ms Horenberg that Mr C. had a gang affiliation and a criminal past involving assault and weapons. Ms H. then embarked on a similar sudden relationship and cohabitation with Mr G., notwithstanding his violent tendencies. In the course of cross-examination at trial, Ms H. confirmed, (in sometimes vivid detail), that she also had associated and cohabited with a number of other males, (prior to the trial before Justice McArthur in 2019), who had criminal histories or associations, (not always initially known to Ms H.), that presented concerns for the Society, and occasionally exposed the children to tumult and violence. (That history included one instance of extraordinary, terrifying and no doubt unforgettable threatened violence in particular, when a male associated with one of Ms H.’s female friends attempted to attack Ms H. and the children as they sheltered together in a locked bathroom.) I do not think it necessary to recite all the details of Ms H.’s relationship history in that regard. For present purposes, I think it sufficient to indicate that, in my view, Ms Horenberg made a fair and accurate assessment, in the course of her affidavit evidence and testimony at trial, that Ms H. has demonstrated a pattern of commencing relationships quickly, (often accompanied by permitted cohabitation with her and the children), with those relationships frequently turning out to be unhealthy, but with Ms H. also minimizing or “glossing over” concerns in that regard during the relationships while acknowledging to the Society afterwards that there had been issues, and that she had not always been aware of the problems she and the children were getting into. Indeed, during cross-examination at trial, Ms H. herself did not dispute that characterization and assessment of her problematic relationship behaviour. She instead emphasized, by way of explanation, that she had been “in a lot of crisis situations” where she “obviously didn’t’ know enough about” such people, but they had seemed “the only option at the time” before things then “fell apart later on”. That pattern apparently was noticeable from the children’s perspective as well; e.g., insofar as Ms H. herself noted in cross-examination that K., at the time of the family’s relocation to B.’s [Specified Street No.3] apartment, had expressly indicated to Ms H. that she did not want her mother “to date anymore”.
49. 49Although the Society expressed some initial concerns regarding the nature of B.’s employment, (prompted by observations that B. seemed to be making numerous short walking trips around the neighbourhood for unexplained reasons), its concerns in that regard were alleviated by further information confirming that B. was a construction worker doing renovation work on various houses in the area.
50. 50Such outdoor pacing by D1 was observed not only by Ms Horenberg, but also by Ms A. Although Ms H. was not permitting Ms A. to visit with the children, Ms A. drove past the relevant [Specified Street No.3] apartment location while travelling to and from work, and would see D1 outside and wave to him – albeit without being able to stop and visit.
51. 51At trial, Ms H. provided a more detailed explanation in that regard, indicating that she inappropriately had applied for and received child tax benefits for all the children in relation to a period of time when the five oldest children actually had been in the care of Mr M.; i.e., such that she inappropriately had received payment of child tax benefits for that period which she should not have received. In relation to that inappropriate overpayment, Ms H. testified that she did not “know what to do with it”, and therefore used it to pay down other debts. The CRA thereafter, (i.e., during the period from May 2023 up until the children being apprehended and taken into society care in July of 2023), began withholding payment of further full child tax benefits to Ms H., notwithstanding the fact that all six children had come back into her care; i.e., in order to address and correct the overpayment of benefits Ms H. previously had received.
52. 52During cross-examination at trial, Ms H. attempted to suggest that the bedbug infestation was confined to her bedroom alone, that the children accordingly had not been affected in that regard, and that the Society workers and M-A had been mistaken in suggesting that the children had sustained any significant bites in that regard. In particular, Ms H. suggested at trial that K. alone had experienced such bedbug bites and only minor ones at that, from sleeping with Ms H. on an isolated occasion, and that a flare up of D1’s impetigo, (caused by his picking and scratching of mosquito bites sustained while watching fireworks outdoors on Canada Day), had been mistaken for bedbug bites by the Society’s workers and M-A. In my view, however, this represented a striking instance of Ms H. effectively attempting to ignore or rewrite troubling aspects of the history of the matter, and downplay/minimize more serious aspects of the conditions experienced by the children. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing:
53. 53Ms H. thereafter indicated to the Society that she was making efforts through Ontario Works and her CMHA worker to resolve the rent payment and hydro issues, without any success. During cross-examination at trial, Ms H. provided a more fulsome explanation for the prolonged termination of hydro service to the apartment, indicating: that B. had requested maintenance on the unit; that the landlord had refused to perform the requested maintenance; that B. therefore stopped paying rent to the landlord; that the landlord then ceased the provision of utilities to the apartment, which the rent was intended to cover by virtue of the lease agreement; and that Ms H. thereafter was unable to address the situation with the landlord or London Hydro, as her name was not on the relevant lease or utility account.
54. 54In that regard, Ms H. left a lengthy voicemail with the Society, focusing little on the obvious dangers of the situation, and much more on her being “pissed off” because of her belief that the Society’s actions had brought the situation to the attention of the Fire Department and city officials; something Ms H. felt was consistent with the Society’s “way of destroying the lives” of Ms H. and her family; i.e., with Ms H. alleging that the entire unfortunate situation was the Society’s fault.
55. 55In cross-examination, Ms H. acknowledged that she and the children had been obliged to reside in eight or nine different places over the previous 4-5 years, and that the children therefore were forced to endure multiple changes in their homes and schools, as well as loss of friends. However, she felt that the children “just got used to the change”, and that any loss of connection with friends was mitigated by the siblings always having each other to socialize and play with; e.g., at whatever new home they happened to occupy or new school they happened to attend.
56. 56In cross-examination at trial, Ms Horenberg indicated that, although B. had taken to sleeping outside on the porch of the residence to avoid the bedbugs, her romantic relationship with B. endured until she and the children moved out of the [Specified Street No.3] apartment. At that point, Ms H. testified, B. indicated that he was returning to [a specified province other than Ontario] and asked Ms H. and the children to move there with him, but Ms H. felt that she “wasn’t allowed” to leave with him.
57. 57In cross-examination, Ms H. indicated that the relevant testing strips ceased to be covered by OHIP, and became “insanely” expensive to the point where she could no longer afford them. Ms A. previously had assisted with efforts to fill D1’s prescriptions, and with locating and paying for such testing strips for A1. However, as noted earlier, Ms H. was no longer willing to accept any assistance from Ms A. after the children were returned to Ms H.’s care from the care of Mr M. In effect, Ms H. once again put her personal feelings of animosity towards Ms A. over the needs of her children, and A1’s crucial medical needs in particular.
58. 58M-A described how both D1 and A1 seemed angry with their situation and each other when they arrived at her home; e.g., expressing an inability to understand why they were not together with their mother and siblings, and why their separation in that regard was lasting longer than expected. However, she also emphasized that, by the time of trial, such feelings of anger had disappeared. In particular, during subsequent visits of D1 to M-A’s home to see and spend time with A1, there has been no conflict whatsoever between the two brothers.
59. 59M-A noted that, when D1 and A1 first came to her, they apparently were used to wearing the same clothes each and every day, and resisted her efforts to ensure that they did not continue doing so, even though she had purchased new clothes for them to allow for daily changes. Nor would the two boys shower or use shampoo, insisting it was not necessary. The inevitable inference, in my view, is that such ingrained behaviours and beliefs reflected the personal hygiene practices (or lack thereof) that had been encouraged or at least tolerated while the boys were in the care of Ms H.
60. 60Ms A. has continued to facilitate such visits between the six siblings since their removal from Ms H.’s care, working cooperatively with the Society, Mr M. and the foster parents of the five younger siblings, with whom Ms A. enjoys a good relationship. Ms A. also has confirmed her willingness to continue doing so in the future. However, Ms A. also made it clear in her testimony that she regretfully now feels unable to provide any further support to Ms H. in the future; i.e., in relation to the exercise of access or otherwise. In particular, Ms A. felt that her relationship with Ms H. had deteriorated to the point where the further provision of such support and assistance was no longer possible, owing to Ms H. persisting in a view that Ms A. was “on the side of the enemy”, Ms H. wanting Ms A. to do too much for her, and/or Ms H. being unwilling or unable to take steps necessary to make progress, such that Ms A. now felt a definite need to “maintain boundaries” in that regard. In particular, while not adverse to communicating with Ms H. via email in relation to the children, Ms A. now feels uncomfortable supporting or speaking with Ms H. directly, barring some sort of dangerous situation involving the children. In that regard, I found it noteworthy that Ms A.’s comments and explanations about such matters were not adversarial, but characterized more by a sense of frustration coupled with indications of sympathy and empathy for Ms H.. In particular, Ms A. felt that, while Ms H. clearly loved the children and vice versa, Ms H. had “struggles of her own” that were not being addressed. In particular, Ms A. believed that perceived failings in Ms H.’s parenting often, (although not always), stemmed from Ms H. being unable to do certain things, rather than her choosing not to do certain things. In that regard, Ms A. readily disclaimed any professional expertise about such matters, but felt strongly that Ms H. had “undiagnosed issues”, including high anxiety, that rendered her incapable of doing many things on her own and caused her to be highly dependent on others, while frequently being unable to “understand practicalities”. Such inabilities, beyond Ms H.’s apparent control, in turn frequently would lead to “everything falling down”; e.g., in terms of Ms H.’s inability to use public transport, her demonstrated inability to take the steps necessary to get herself on a housing list and obtain realistically available accommodation, and/or her demonstrated inability to register the children for school and get them to school regularly and on time. From Ms A.’s perspective, her efforts to help Ms H. in relation to such difficulties repeatedly had been met by passive resistance or open resentment/hostility on the part of Ms H. In the result, Ms A. felt strongly that she simply could not “enmesh” herself, once again, in such stressful, frustrating and unsuccessful efforts to assist and provide support to Ms H.
61. 61In the course of his testimony, Mr M. provided further details of the program, reflecting the attention he now is paying to such matters, including maintenance of regular direct contact with D1’s teacher. In particular, Mr M. explained that D1 is formally on an “independent education plan” that will not result in his receipt of an Ontario Secondary School Diploma, but hopefully will provide D1 with the skills necessary to survive independently, (e.g., the ability to cook, do laundry, clean, perform applied mathematics and attain basic literacy), if and when D1 feels he is ready to move out on his own, or Mr M. is no longer present to provide care and support to D1. Mr M. also clarified that the total duration of D1’s program is seven years, with Mr M. and Ms P. indicating their willingness to have D1 remain in their care for at least that long, and longer if D1 needs that additional support. In the meantime, Mr M. also has been working with D1 to explore his interest in possibly obtaining work in the area of video game testing.
62. 62Ms A. explained that, because of his mental/developmental delay, D1 often likes to play with younger children rather than those in his own age group, (which other parents do not understand), while those in his own age group know there is “something different” about D1, leading to him being “picked on”. It accordingly is difficult for D1 to make friends, and find a group outside of D1’s special school setting with classmates that share some of the same challenges as D1.
63. 63Ms A. emphasized and I accept that, of all the children, D1 is the one who “always seemed to have had a connection” with Mr M.
64. 64The current terms and conditions of D1’s placement with his father include provisions that there be no verbal or physical aggression or substance abuse in the residence, and require D1’s consistent attendance at school and taking of his prescription medication.
65. 65Mr M., Ms P. and Ms A. described how D1 is increasingly practising life skills and greater independence; e.g., in terms of doing various chores, learning how to cook and prepare his own meals, developing unprompted adherence to daily school and hygiene routines as well as his daily taking of his medicine, being introduced to the operation of bank accounts and the significance of signatures on documents, learning how to let himself in and out of the residence through use of his own key, and dealing with the agitation that seems to accompany his transitions between different environments such as home and school. Having said all that, it repeatedly was indicated, as noted above, that Mr M. and Ms P. would be content to have D1 remain with them for many years after he attains his age of majority; i.e., until such time as he has a confirmed ability to obtain employment and maintain his own residence. In the meantime, Mr M. also has been working with D1 to explore his interest in possibly obtaining work in the area of video game testing.
66. 66Mr M. and his partner Ms P. have indicated that they are committed to supporting such ongoing contact, notwithstanding their earlier concerns that Ms H. was actively working to undermine the relationship between Mr M. and his children, and that the children, (including D1), would return from access visits with Ms H. acting differently and misbehaving. D1 is now older, and Mr M. and Ms P. are committed to allowing D1 the access he desires, in accordance with his wishes and preferences. Moreover, he has not exhibited the sort of behaviours that previously troubled Mr M. and Ms P. in that regard, for quite some time. It should be noted that D1 essentially has unmonitored control over his own telephone, as well as his text communications, in any event.
67. 67In cross-examination, Ms H. acknowledged that she had communicated with D1 via text or social media about his Xbox unit, and that she had in fact retrieved D1’s Xbox unit from D3’s apartment, despite D3’s efforts to “get rid of all their stuff” in “fits of rage”. (In particular, Ms H. testified that she found the relevant Xbox unit “buried” amongst items D3 had attempted to discard.) In further cross-examination, Ms H. also confirmed that she personally had no need for the Xbox; that there was no reason she could not give the Xbox unit to D1; that she expressly told D1 that she had his Xbox; but also then told D1 that she would not give it to him. In particular, Ms H. acknowledged that he had told D1 he could have the Xbox back only when he visited with her, or he was returned to her primary care. She also candidly acknowledged that she had “never thought about” D1’s feelings when sending him such messages. However, when asked in further cross-examination whether D1 now could have the Xbox, Ms H. inexplicably answered: “I don’t know”. In my view, such behaviour was inexplicably selfish and uncaring, (i.e., given Ms H.’s professed love for D1), and certainly did not reflect child-centred parenting. In the result, D1’s desire for an Xbox finally was addressed, shortly before trial, by the Society buying a used Xbox system for him.
68. 68There was a period, following D1’s departure from M-A’s residence, and when M-A was having additional foster children staying with her, when A1’s placement with her became slightly unstable; i.e., when M-A felt that the demands of foster-parenting might be too much for her, such that she would not continue with the program, and A1 would have to be placed elsewhere. (That coincided to some extent with exploration of the possibility of A1 being placed with the same foster parents looking after his four younger siblings, and the commencement of A1’s overnight visits with them.) However, after realizing that A1 generally was not doing well when other children of similar age were also living with her full-time, (i.e., with A1 then becoming unhappy, going into a “defiant” and “argumentative” mode, and not wanting to interact with such other children), M-A made the decision to thereafter restrict her foster-parenting to A1, apart from monthly respite care provided in relation to one much younger child, which A1 does not mind. In the result, M-A and A1 generally have continued to live alone together, and become even more closely bonded, with M-A indicating that A1 may stay with her “as long as needed”.
69. 69In her testimony, M-A emotionally described, (and I accept), that she has seen a “big change” in A1 since his arrival, and that he is now much happier than he was when initially placed with her. In particular, she recalled that he notably did not smile at all for six to eight months after his arrival. (This was consistent with Mr M.’s testimony that he had never seen A1 smile prior to being in the care of M-A.) A1 now smiles routinely. As M-A described it, A1 also is no longer “as inside himself” as he was when he came to her; i.e., in that he now tells her how he feels, and what he would like, although he still requires encouragement to do the same with others. More generally, he has grown physically and figuratively; i.e., having learned and continuing to learn to master everyday tasks of living.
70. 70M-A has noted that such behaviours tend to become more pronounced in the wake of A1 having visits with his siblings, or when something else is bothering him, although the situation in that regard has been improving.
71. 71In cross-examination, Ms H. initially indicated that all three of her boys had been diagnosed as being “tongue-tied” at birth. leading to struggles with breast-feeding, and D2 undergoing an operation while still in hospital after his birth; i.e., to “clip the webbing in his mouth” to address and correct the situation. However, Ms H. then inconsistently indicated that there never been such a formal diagnosis in relation to D1 and A1, such that she “didn’t know that they had it”. She also indicated that none of the doctors or dentists who had examined the boys over time also had failed to notice that A1 suffered from such a condition. Beyond the internal inconsistencies of Ms H.’s testimony in that regard, I prefer and accept M-A’s credible, reliable objective testimony that she was able to notice and detect A1’s physical difficulty in that regard fairly quickly, after watching A1 struggle to eat during their shared mealtime, and that the now confirmed orthodontic problems A1 realistically must be attributable to the condition having existed for a very sustained period of time without it being addressed. In the circumstances, the inescapable conclusion is that Ms H. simply was not paying sufficiently close attention to A1’s eating habits and physical challenges in that regard, or ensuring adequate medical or dental examinations, over an extended period of time; a failure that seems all the more remarkable when Ms H. admittedly was familiar with the relevant medical condition from the time of D2’s birth, if not before.
72. 72According to the testimony of Mr M., (who seemed quite knowledgeable about A1’s condition), A1’s specialist, (Dr S.), had indicated a hope that A1’s condition would resolve over time, and during adolescence in particular, as A1’s underdeveloped kidney essentially “caught up” with the other. However, it seems clear that the care now being taken in relation to A1’s diet also has helped to avoid exacerbating his condition in the meantime.
73. 73In that regard, M-A explained that attempting to fly with only a birth certificate and Society letter for A1 would be too difficult, owing to caution and excessive questioning by travel and border authorities as to why she would be a white person travelling with a child who “looks nothing like” her, with different coloured skin and hair. M-A is sensitive to such matters, and has experience in that regard, as her own children had an Italian father resulting in their having skin and hair colour similar to that of A1. In the course of her cross-examination at trial, Ms H. indicated that she “didn’t really understand” why A1 would need a passport, and it wasn’t explained to Ms H., (as she admittedly was refraining from contact with the Society’s child protection workers), that M-A wanted to travel with A1. In further cross-examination, Ms H. indicated that she now was agreeable to co-operating in completing the steps required to provide A1 with a passport; i.e., after hearing the trial testimony of M-A indicating why such a passport was wanted and needed.
74. 74While virtual contact between A1 and Mr M. has been infrequent, (as A1 is not in the habit of using his phone very often), it generally has gone well when it has occurred, with A1 and his father finding that they have certain gaming and other interests in common. As for in person contact, Ms A. emphasized that A1 enjoys spending time with Mr M., but “certainly doesn’t want to live with him”. A1 instead has indicated that he would like supervision of visits with his father by Ms A. to continue for the time being, in accordance with A1’s wishes and preferences; i.e., while he rebuilds a relationship with his father, with a view to eventual unsupervised access. (If there comes a point where A1 wishes to have unsupervised access with his father, that apparently can be accomplished by A1 simply indicating his desire in that regard to the Society, which then would provide an appropriate letter to Mr M.’s probation officer, who would then take the steps necessary to alter the terms and conditions of Mr M.’s terms of probation to permit such unsupervised access.) A1 also very much enjoys spending time with Ms P.’s oldest son, R., who sometimes joins in such visits.
75. 75By way of further information about such visits:
76. 76M-A was candid about needing and planning to sell her current home, (when market conditions are favourable), as she is “getting older”, has been experiencing knee surgeries and mobility issues, and increasingly finds her property and house too big to maintain, such that she needs to “downsize”. Accessibility to public transport is also an issue. She is hoping to find a suitable new residence nearby; i.e., one that will allow A1 to stay in the same school. Failing that, she intends to look for a new home in a similar small town and small school environment, as A1 has been thriving in that environment and M-A feels that is important for him. Other communities being considered in that regard are within 1-2 hours driving time, in any event, M-A is committed to obtaining a new residence where A1 would continue to have his own bedroom and space. For his part, A1 has emphasized his desire to remain with M-A even if it means having to switch to a new school and make new friends.
77. 77When asked about such matters in cross-examination, Ms H. noted that she had celebrated certain traditional holidays with the children, (e.g., Christmas, Easter and Valentine’s Day), but nothing else in particular relating to the children’s black American, Portuguese or Polish ancestry.
78. 78Karate is a particular interest that K. shares with Ms A., who engaged in martial arts for many years, such that K. and her paternal grandmother now enjoy doing katas together.
79. 79There were varying indications as to whether S. or D2 was the sibling with whom K. felt the closest bond. In particular, while K. is clearly very fond of S. and protective in that regard, K. is also much closer in age to D2 and they share many of the same interests. In any event, it was clear that K. does not want to be separated from either of them, nor A2.
80. 80K. has indicated that she is not yet “at a place” where she wants in person visits with her father, but she has been enjoying a recent increase in phone calls with Mr M. and his help with her math homework, and feels their relationship has been improving. From his perspective, Mr M. feels that he and K. have been finding “a lot of common ground” between them during their increased communications prior to trial, and that she particularly liked to reach out to him in relation to their shared interest in “scientific questions”.
81. 81K. has emphasized the importance to her of being with her three younger siblings, and also how much she loves it when all six siblings visit together. She also has made it clear how much she enjoys seeing her grandmother Ms A., (with whom she also communicates via phone, text and social media), and how much she appreciates the outings and activities Ms A. provides.
82. 82In the course of her testimony, Ms H. indicated her understanding that D2 had been formally diagnosed with Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD) as well. However, that admittedly was not something that had happened while the children were in her care, and she simply had a recollection of having “heard”, possibly from Ms Horenberg or Ms Gardiner, of the additional diagnosis. Ms H. acknowledged that she might have misremembered that and I find that she did; i.e., insofar as there is no mention of D2 having ODD in the otherwise detailed affidavit evidence and testimony prepared and presented by the Society’s workers while referring to their contemporaneous notes, and no other witness indicated or suggested that there had been such an additional diagnosis in relation to D2.
83. 83In her testimony, PE explained that she and SC took D2 for a formal ADHD reassessment after he came into their care, and after they and D2’s teachers had noted certain behaviours suggesting ADHD. However, the physician who conducted that assessment opined and recommended that D2’s situation was manageable without ADHD medication. PE and SC then accepted that professional medical advice, which was consistent with D2’s desire not to take such medication.
84. 84In addition to the importance of his living with K., A2 and S, D2 has emphasized that he enjoys spending time with his brother A1 in particular, and arrangements were underway to organize visits by D2 to the home of M-A and A1; i.e., to supplement the visits A1 has made to the home of PE and SC.
85. 85In the meantime, Mr M. also has been helping D2 with homework over the phone from time to time, when such contact is initiated by D2, but that so far has been happening less than Mr M.’s telephone contact with K. PE and SC had informed Mr M. prior to trial that he was welcome to call them at any time to reach out to D2, and Mr M. thought he might be trying that in the future. As in relation to A1, in person visits between D2 and his father would require a formal change in the terms and conditions governing Mr M.’s probation, but that could and would be facilitated by the Society simply writing to Mr M.’s probation officer to request the change if and when D2 indicates that he would like such in-person visits with his father.
86. 86In her testimony, PE explained that she and SC had A2 formally tested for ADHD as well, after her grade one teachers reported problems with A2 being easily distracted. Such problems have disappeared in grade two, after A2’s formal ADHD diagnosis and taking of prescribed medication. As in in relation to D2, Ms H. indicated, during the course of her testimony, an understanding that A2 had been formally diagnosed with Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD) as well. However, that admittedly was not something that had happened while the children were in her care, and she simply had a recollection of having “heard” of A2 receiving that additional diagnosis. Once again, Ms H. acknowledged that she might have misremembered that, and I find that she did; i.e., insofar as there is no mention of A2 having ODD in the otherwise detailed affidavit evidence and testimony presented by the Society’s child protection workers, prepared and presented while referring to their contemporaneous notes, and no other witness indicated or suggested that A2 had any such additional diagnosis.
87. 87A2 repeatedly has emphasized how much she values time with all of her siblings, (including D1 and A1), and having all six siblings together when possible -- although she thinks her two oldest brothers are “silly”.
88. 88In her regular visits with the children, Ms Studerus regularly asks the children about their wishes and preferences regarding contact with their parents. To date, A2 has not indicated, in response, anything about wanting to speak or meet with her father. Mr M. confirmed that, from his perspective, his contact with A2 has been limited to occasional talking on the phone, during his calls with K. and D2. However, even during those brief conversations, A2 seemed to be happy and outgoing; e.g., describing outings organized by PE and SC, and getting her first pair of glasses.
89. 89It was noted that S. is sometimes difficult to understand, such that she has now started speech therapy.
90. 90In cross-examination, PE indicated that no similar arrangement had ever been proposed in relation to D1, or requested by D1. However, it was emphasized that she and SC also would welcome such visits from D1, whom they have met during the six siblings’ visits with each other.
91. 91Again, PE said D1 would be welcomed for such visits as well, but such visits by D1 have never been proposed or requested.
92. 92As noted by Ms A., the times when all six children are together now seem even more enjoyable for the children than they once were; i.e., as they seem to be getting along better, with less sibling rivalry and conflict, now that D1 and A1 have their separate homes and spaces away from the other four siblings. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the five younger children are no longer as inclined to tease, pick on, “rile” or agitate D1 because of the obviously different behaviours associated with his autism disability, which they previously found more annoying and difficult to understand/tolerate when all six children were obliged to remain in close proximity with each other for extended periods of time.
93. 93In Ms C.’s words: “It might be hard. But [S.] knows us and she knows her mom, and I believe that’s more important”. As for the reaction of K., D2 and A2 to S. being separated from them, (despite what Ms C. acknowledged to be a “strong sibling unit” shared by the four children, and evidence that it would be “extremely difficult” for them if they were unable to live in the same home), Ms C. said this: “I think it’s hard, but I’m not unwilling to cooperate. And we love, we love them all as well.” In my view, Ms C. exhibited a similar rather dismissive attitude and answers when asked about the possible detrimental impacts likely to be inflicted on D1 and A1 if they were obliged to leave their current preferred placements; e.g., to have all six children returned to the care of Ms H. In particular:
94. 94During cross-examination, Ms H. felt she had responded more regularly than that, but I prefer the testimony of Ms Gardiner in that regard, insofar as it was more objective and supported by reference to Ms Gardiner’s contemporaneous notes.
95. 95In the course of her testimony, Ms H. provided a number of explanations for frequently being unresponsive, and/or responding only in a very delayed fashion, to messages from the Society and the children. In that regard:
96. 96I have no doubt that Ms Gardiner accurately recorded what Ms H. indicated to her during that call near the end of September of 2023; i.e., regarding Ms H. having known D3 for approximately six months at that point. However, given the testimony of Ms H. at trial indicating that she moved in with D3 immediately after meeting her at that bar on Dundas Street in September of 2023, and immediately after being homeless for three to four days following her forced departure from the home of her aunt, Ms H. clearly was not being honest or accurate when providing information to Ms Gardiner. Ms H. had not known D3 for six months before moving into her apartment. She had, instead, embarked on another precipitous relationship to alleviate another crisis.
97. 97In cross-examination, Ms H. denied having ever been offered a one-bedroom apartment by London Housing, but I prefer the evidence and testimony of Ms Gardiner in that regard, indicating that such an offer was made but declined by Ms H. in the hopes of obtaining a larger residence. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, Ms Gardiner had no apparent reason to provide inaccurate evidence in that regard, was providing evidence based on reference to her contemporaneous notes, and that evidence reflects specific Society consideration at the time of whether the proffered one-bedroom residence would have been sufficient for the purpose of access visits between Ms H. and the children. On the other hand, the description of Ms H. declining a one-bedroom residence, in order to “hold out” for the prospect of possibly obtaining larger accommodation sufficient to accommodate herself and all six children, seems entirely consistent with Ms H.’s steadfast but often inappropriately narrowed focus on having all six of her children immediately returned to her care.
98. 98Ms H. indicated to Ms Studerus that the foster parents had agreed to pay for and help supervise such a group attendance at the Western Fair. However, Ms Studerus then learned, via follow up with the foster parents, that simply was not the case. Nor was Ms Studerus able to secure Society approval to pay for such a group visit to the Western Fair. Moreover, even if a group trip to the Western Fair effectively was paid for by the children’s allowances, (as Ms H. was suggesting as an alternative), the Society felt that such a group outing to the Western Fair, without adequate supervision of the children, was not something the Society could support; i.e., as opposed to such access taking place in the community in a more appropriate and controllable interactive setting, such as the Children’s Museum or a park.
99. 99In cross-examination, Ms H. confirmed that she had indeed initially gone to Ark Aid with her CMHA worker, to see what it was like, but she felt unable to stay there as the facility only had overnight beds, (i.e., with residents being obliged to leave the facility during the day), and Ms H. had anxiety and fears about being out in public in that area of the city; e.g., given the obvious drug-related activity going on in front of the building. She therefore wound up going to her mother’s immediately thereafter, although she disputed, (for the reasons noted below), that she had had begun “staying” at her mother’s from that point onward.
100. 100When asked in cross-examination to explain the apparent discrepancy between that answer provided to Ms Studerus in September of 2024, and indications at trial that Ms H. has in fact been living at the residence of her mother, Ms H. said that, in September of 2024, she had been “couch surfing” between her mother’s residence and the residence of her friend Natalie, such that she was not really “staying” at her mother’s residence at the time of her chance meeting with Ms Studerus.
101. 101In cross-examination by counsel for Ms H., Ms Studerus was challenged as to why the Society had never facilitated individual visits between Ms H. and any of the children, or between Ms H. and a smaller number of the children; i.e., rather than having all the children visit with Ms H. at the same time. However, as Ms Studerus explained and emphasized in response, while the Society would have been open to arranging such visits, neither the children nor Ms H. ever made such a request, and Ms H. herself effectively prevented any discussion of such possibilities by refusing to communicate further with the Society about any visits with the children.
102. 102Given the horrific upbringing and past life experiences Ms H. described with gripping and tearful candour, (the accuracy of which I believe and accept), it seems difficult to imagine anyone who would not experience quite understandable ongoing trauma as a result of that wide array of negative experiences. Although Ms H. provided a detailed narrative in that regard, I think it unnecessary and insensitive to reiterate all aspects of her described experiences here. For present purposes, her traumatic past has included the following: separation of her parents following domestic conflict and parental substance abuse; repeated exposure to abuse inflicted by numerous men as her mother engaged in a prolonged succession of relationships, all of which inevitably entailed a very rough childhood; victimization by repeated sexual assaults during her young teenage years, one of which resulted in a forced pregnancy carried to term and the tragic subsequent death of that child; dramatic and almost successful attempts at suicide, resulting in prolonged restraint at a mental institution; and further abuse by her mother’s latest husband, until Ms H. began her prolonged relationship and cohabitation with Mr M., as well as further motherhood, at the still youthful age of 16. All of that traumatic experience then was supplemented by what Ms H. described as an abusive relationship with Mr M., (a relationship that ended very badly), followed by the traumatic and chaotic experiences described herein, including being separated from her six children.
103. 103In cross-examination, Ms H. explained that, as a baby, she suffered a serious head injury that “split her head open”, (i.e., an injury requiring numerous stitches, and which possibly resulted in a concussion), when her brother was chasing her and she ran her forehead into a portion of a brick fireplace. She therefore has been giving more thought as to whether she may have sustained damage to the frontal cortex of her brain, resulting in impaired ability to store short-term and long-term memories, (consistent with the deficits noticed by Ms Gardiner in that regard), as well as an inability to cope adequately in the face of scenarios she finds overwhelming.
104. 104In cross-examination, Ms H. described at some length how steps were taken through Regional Support Associates to arrange and complete an assessment of Ms H. in that regard. However, at the time of trial, that process was still ongoing, (e.g., requiring the completion of further surveys and assessment attendances), and Ms H. accordingly was still waiting on the Developmental Services Ontario, (“DSO”), for whatever the final outcome of that assessment process would be. In the meantime, however, while Ms H. continued to feel strongly that the assessment might confirm that she has a learning disability of some sort, she continued to believe that any mental health difficulties in that regard, including her admitted anxieties, were unrelated to her housing issues, parenting ability or budget appropriately. She instead attributed such issues to the actions of others; e.g., her inability to “control the landlords”, or the Society’s unreasonable demands.
105. 105As noted below, Ms H. indicated, albeit only during the course of cross-examination, that she had completed eight counselling sessions in an effort to address her trauma, and had enrolled for eight more sessions in that regard.
106. 106It seems Ms H. also only spoke with D1 once by telephone during his time at the Hamilton group home; a period that lasted approximately one year.
107. 107D1’s siblings sometimes reacted negatively to his dominating use of available video games and otherwise not sharing, which in turn led to his siblings saying negative things to him or otherwise not engaging with him, which made D1 feel “singled out” and bullied.
108. 108In that regard, Ms Studerus emphasized that, although she would need to know where Ms H. was living and who was living with her before any access visits could take place there, and would prefer to meet with Ms H. to have a more detailed discussion about regular arrangements for resumed visits between the children and their mother, visits between Ms H. and the children in the community would be arranged forthwith, without any supervision requirement, if only Ms H. would indicate a willingness for that to happen; i.e., even without any personal meeting between Ms Studerus and Ms H., or disclosure of Ms H.’s current residence. As Ms Studerus put it, “it is important for the kids to see their mom”, so arranging such access visits in the community “would be priority”.
109. 109During private discussions about such matters with Ms Studerus, K. has indicated that she sometimes communicates with her mother via text and Facebook, but struggles with the fact that her mother often takes weeks to respond.
110. 110In further cross-examination, Ms H. indicated, (albeit apparently with some difficulty), that she would commit to working with Ms Studerus and the Society to arrange such access visits with the children at the Society even if they were not ideal, (or in the community if possible), if that proved to be the only option of her seeing the children in the future; e.g., if the children remained in the care of others, with Ms H. and the children being granted rights of access visits with each other pursuant to the court’s orders in that regard.
111. 111Given such practical realities, and the children’s firmly stated wishes and preferences in relation to seeing their paternal grandmother, the Society has come to regard regular visits between the six children as something that should not only be facilitated by Ms A., or coincide with visits between the children and between the children and their parents, but something that should occur independently in any event. No one disagreed with that assessment.
112. 112In the course of his testimony, Mr M. described some of the events underlying his convictions in details which were very disturbing; e.g., engaging in what he felt was a “staged simulation” of choking D2 in an effort to prompt rescue intervention efforts by D1, to show D2 that his brother loved him, and choking D2 again on a separate occasion in response to D2’s indication that he wanted to die, in an effort to show D2 that dying would be painful. As disturbing as those candid accounts were, (coupled with equally disturbing indications by Mr M. that he knew at the time that his actions were wrong, but felt he had no other parenting options available to him), they nevertheless were accompanied by Mr M.’s current indications of regret and acceptance of responsibility for what he now realizes were completely misguided and inappropriate parenting behaviours, which obviously could have been avoided; something which had been expressly addressed, at length. during Mr M.’s participation in the “Caring Dads” program. When asked if he would ever be “hands on” again in relation to any of his children, Mr M. provided some initial answers that, in my view, were still troubling; e.g., indicating that he would “try not to” engage in “hands on” parenting, but also had “never absolutely excluded it", in accordance with his belief that doing so “should only be a last resort”, in cases of “emergency only”. In that regard, Mr M. also made explicit use of the term “spanking”. However, having regard to the answers Mr M. then provided in response to further clarifying questions about such matters, it seemed reasonably clear that Mr M. was talking primarily about contemplated physical intervention to protect his children, rather than corporal punishment; e.g., with Mr M. providing, as an example of “hands on” parenting as a last resort, physically intervening to stop D2 playing “chicken” with oncoming vehicles in the street, as D2 had done in the past. As a further example of what he was trying to describe as “hands on” parenting he might contemplate using as a “last resort”, Mr M. cited his understanding that the Criminal Code permitted use of force to protect another person from a perceived danger of harm being inflicted upon that other person; something which, Mr M. still felt, had justified his earlier described intervention to grab, disarm and slap a youth who had followed and threatened D1 while coming onto Mr M.’s property. In my view, it was clear that Mr M. still needs further counselling in relation to such matters; e.g., insofar as he requires a deeper understanding of the obvious alternatives to any resort to force, such as calling for the assistance of police to deal with a threat to others not posing any immediate danger. However, Mr M.’s further answers generally made it clear that he actually had no intention of resorting to any further corporal discipline in relation to any of his children; e.g., explaining that he would figuratively “spank” D1 for any misbehaviour by discussing that misbehaviour with D1 before then imposing sanctions such as the revocation of D1’s privileges regarding use of his electronic devices. Mr M. also was perfectly content to have the court’s orders expressly exclude resort to physical discipline of the children in any form, and to have his access visits with his four youngest children supervised by Ms A. or someone else approved by the Society.
113. 113Mr M.’s general position in that regard essentially remained consistent and unchanged up to and including the time of trial. In particular, he testified that, from his perspective, contact between the children and him should be solely dependent on what the children wanted in that regard, and that he would be content so long as the children have the ability to contact him if they wish. In that regard, Mr M. emphasized that he often feels uncomfortable initiating contact with the children, “given the history of everything that happened” when they were in his care. For similar reasons, Mr M. also was reluctant to suggest any minimum number of court-ordered regular in person access visits between himself and the children. As he put it, he had “never really given [that] any thought”, as he felt strongly “that number should be dictated by the children”; e.g., such that, if they did not want to see him at all, “that’s the answer”. Mr M. also felt that the children, (including but not limited to D1), generally should be able to communicate with and see their mother “essentially as often as they want”, and confirmed that no monitoring or restrictions have been placed on D1 in that regard. However, in contrast to his position regarding his own access with the children, Mr M. felt that the court’s order should require in person access visits between Ms H. and the children to be offered at least six to 12 times each year, without any need for those visits to be supervised if the Society felt that was okay; i.e., effectively endorsing court ordered in person access visit arrangements that would put Ms H. in a more favourable position than that of Mr M.. Mr M. also confirmed his willingness to keep Ms H. informed of any major decisions affecting D1, if only through an intermediary such as the Society; i.e., if direct communication in that regard remained unwelcome from Ms H.’s perspective or too difficult.
114. 114In the course of his testimony, Mr M. explained that the “Caring Dads” program requires its participants to have active access with their children while doing the program, in order to have participants immediately practice what they are learning. In my view, it was clear from Mr M.’s description of specific things learned in that regard that he had acquired at least some degree of further insight into appropriate parenting behaviour. In particular, he described his understanding of “the parenting spectrum”, and the fundamental difference between abusive parenting behaviour and being a child-centred parent. He also described now understanding that parenting decisions he had made in the past, believing them to be altruistic and the only decisions available to him at the time, actually had been “very abusive” and “cynical”; an awareness he intended to use going forward to help him identify and avoid such “parent-centered” thoughts, in order to have a more nurturing relationship with his children. As an example, he described engaging with D1 about D1’s stated anger with Ms H., (instead of avoiding the subject or challenging D1’s feelings), to emphasize that D1’s mother believed that what she was doing for him was in his best interests. Whether or not Mr M. remains consistent in putting what he has learned into practice remains to be seen. However, he now seems to understand the more appropriate paths he should be taking.
115. 115Ms P. was acquitted of the charges against her on February 16, 2024.
116. 116At trial, Ms P. emphasized, and I accept, that she was “not proud” of the occasion when she admittedly had struck D1, that she believed it was wrong to hit children, and that she was absolutely committed to making sure that there would be no further “physical involvement” between her and D1. She had not only discussed the matter with Ms Horenberg and Ms Gardiner, but also directly with D1, acknowledging that what she did was wrong, and apologizing to D1 for her conduct. She has also since studied autism and how to interact with autistic people, (as part of her professional PSW training), which has given her greater understanding of the condition as well as helpful strategies in that regard, (i.e., recognizing and supporting fixations and not forcing other interests onto him prematurely), all of which has significantly improved her relationship with A1. They now talk more, (e.g., discussing D1’s interests and hobbies), and spend more time together.
117. 117At one point, the Society received information from an unidentified source alleging that Ms P. was using cocaine, and suggesting that such cocaine would be found in a specific location in the apartment; i.e., behind the television. However, when Ms Studerus followed up on the information, there was no such cocaine, and D1 confirmed in private conversation that he had seen no signs of any substance use happening in the home. In the course of her testimony, Ms P. readily acknowledged that she had used methamphetamine “off and on” in the past, but not consistently, at various times since her twenties. However, she emphasized that had never used substances while in a caregiving role; e.g., only while her children were away with their father. She also firmly denied that it was an ongoing problem, emphasizing that she had managed on her own to “stop using” completely approximately two years before trial, and had been completely “clean” and sober since then; an assertion I am inclined to believe and accept, having regard to the independent Society inquiries and private observations and reports of D1 in that regard. Moreover, Ms P. and the Society’s workers have expressly addressed the issue in discussions to formulate an agreed upon plan in the event of any relapse; i.e., whereby Ms P. would leave her residence with Mr M. and D1 and relocate to the home of her mother while any such issues were being addressed. As noted above, Ms P. also has completed an intake for personal counselling, which she says she is willing to try in order to reinforce the progress she has made.
118. 118While none of the M. children other than D1 currently have expressed any desire to visit their father’s residence, Ms Studerus confirmed that the Society currently has no noted concerns about the children interacting with Ms P. in that regard.
119. 119It was explained by Ms A. that Mr M. voluntarily “stepped aside”, during the graduation ceremony itself; i.e., waiting out in the car during the ceremony, thereby enabling Ms H. to attend without the possibility of any confrontation or friction vis-à-vis the two parents having to be in the same room together, which might have jeopardized the graduation experience for A1. Mr M., along with Ms A. and Ms A.’s husband, instead took A1 out for dinner before the ceremony, and Mr M. then met and spoke with A1 afterwards, with Ms A. and her husband attending the actual ceremony.
120. 120During the course of his testimony, Mr M. candidly indicated that D1 and Ms P. now sometimes seem to enjoy a closer relationship that D1 has with Mr M., and that he sometimes feels it best to leave it to D1 to raise any concerns rather than pressing or “prodding” D1 in relation to such matters. However, during the course of cross-examination, Mr M. also committed to taking a more proactive approach to asking D1 about possible concerns in the future.
121. 121Justice Tobin’s order provided for decreasing frequency of such visits over time; i.e., with weekly visits in February, transitioning to bi-weekly visits in March. and monthly visits in April and thereafter.
122. 122Ms P. also remained committed to her personal sobriety, without any apparent relapses in that regard.
123. 123There was evidence presented at trial indicating that initial completion of required documentation by Mr M. and the family doctor was delayed for a number of reasons. In particular, Mr M. admitted to initial laziness and then forgetfulness in that regard; e.g., insofar as Mr M. eventually completed his portion of the forms but thereafter repeatedly forgot to bring the forms along to medical visits for the doctor’s completion. There was then further delay associated with non-payment of an unrelated account owed to the relevant doctor, and a misunderstanding as to whether that expense was to have been paid by the Society, before that difficulty was resolved through financial assistance provided by Ms A. At the time of trial, however, all intake forms had been completed, and everything appeared to be “on track” in that regard.
124. 124Testimony presented in that regard was supplemented by the correspondence, noted above, confirming D1’s enrolment in his program.
125. 125Mr M. believes such behaviour may be attributable to D1’s time in the Hamilton group home, when his things were taken a number of times, although there realistically is no such threat in his current environment.
126. 126In her testimony, Ms A. emphasized that D1 likes having his private space, and that having his own room, where he can safeguard his electronics and other belongings, is very important to D1. More generally, she noted that D1 does not do well when surrounded by other children on a constant basis, and is doing much better in an environment with adults that make allowances for his idiosyncrasies.
127. 127While Mr M. readily acknowledged the mounting concerns that the Society had noted in his former residence between January and August 2021, (e.g., financial instability, food inadequacy, lack of cleanliness and domestic conflict between Mr M. and Ms P.), he and the Society also confirmed that such concerns generally now have disappeared from Mr M.’s new living arrangements. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the stresses and “turmoil” of a household containing two adults and eight children, some of whom were very young and demanding, have now been altered to the relative tranquility of Mr M. and Ms P. living with and caring for D1 alone, who was 16 at the time of trial. As Mr M. put it, a comparison of the earlier problematic situation with that which prevails now is akin to comparing “apples and oranges”. There is now general finance and food stability, (with the ongoing assistance of Ms A.), the residence is clean, Mr M. and Ms P. are now able to “talk things out” in a normal fashion, and both now have time to focus a majority of their time on D1 and his needs.
128. 128Ms P. does not participate in such calls, apart from occasional interjections while Mr M. is helping the children with their homework, without her personally speaking with the children. More broadly, Ms P. admitted that she generally had no current contact with Mr M.’s four younger children, (i.e., at the time of trial), as she is not sure whether they would want or welcome that.
129. 129Ms C. attributed the refusal to her husband, who would not agree to Ms H. coming to live in their home, as they were “already dealing with a lot” at the time.
130. 130In particular, Ms C. made it clear that, for Ms H. and the six children to live together, they would have to obtain low-income housing elsewhere. In that regard, Ms C. confirmed her awareness that Ms H. had been accepted for a one-bedroom apartment through London’s low-income housing program, but rejected that proposal as unacceptable because more rooms would be required to house all six of the children when they were returned to Ms H.’s care. That testimony was at odds with Ms H.’s denial that she had ever rejected such an offer.
131. 131In that regard, Ms C. emphasized that she personally had bought the children clothing and shoes from time to time.
132. 132I nevertheless note in passing that, in my view, other evidence presented in relation to the relocation to Kitchener clearly undermined Ms C.’s general assertion that Ms H. always ensured that the children were relocated with all their belongings, in order to keep them happy. In particular, the other evidence I received, including testimony from Ms H. herself, made it clear that the children had been relocated to Kitchener with almost no belongings whatsoever, including any winter clothing or identification, as Ms H. had placed all of their personal items in storage.
133. 133In that regard, Ms C. emphasized her view, during cross-examination by Society counsel, that her daughter Ms H. had “done all you’ve requested on your list”, and “exceeded” those requests. However, Ms C. also admitted, with apparent reluctance, her belief that Ms H. had not told anyone at the Society about efforts she had made in that regard.
134. 134Ms H. supplemented those indications by noting that, while she and her sister A. both sleep in the home’s downstairs recreation room, A. occupies the bed there while Ms H. sleeps on the room’s couch.
135. 135For example, Ms H. attributed the failure of certain scheduled access visits between the children and the father to the views of the children. However, I prefer and accept the more objective testimony of the Society workers, (supported by their contemporaneous notes), that the children were expressing no such concerns in their independent interviews with the Society workers. Similarly, while Ms H. attributed the failure of the children to attend Mr M.’s residence to participate in online schooling to reasons for the relocation to Kitchener that were supposedly independent of anything to do with Mr M., such assertions do not explain why Ms H. was deliberately refusing to inform the Society or Mr M. of the children’s location in Kitchener so that such contemplated access with Mr M. to facilitate online learning could be facilitated, particularly when the children could not attend any new school in Kitchener owing to Ms H. admittedly putting the children’s identification documents into storage. As noted earlier, the children themselves also were independently indicating to the Society’s workers that the real reason for their relocation to Kitchener, and corresponding failure to attend access visits with Mr M. to facilitate online learning, had been their mother’s hatred of their father.
136. 136See, for example, Children’s Aid Society of Niagara Region v. PE(D.), 2003 CanLII 1932 (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No. 619 (S.C.J.).
137. 137Pursuant to s.101(7) of the CYFSA, if the court makes a supervision order under s.101(1)1 of the Act, the court may impose:
138. 138Section 122 of the CYSA nevertheless establishes limits on the length of time a child may remain in interim society care pursuant to s.101(1).2 of the Act. In particular, subject to the deemed extensions pursuant to s.122(4) of the Act and a maximum six-month extension pursuant to s.122(5) of the Act, s.122(1) generally mandates that a court shall not make an order for interim society care under s.101(1).2 that results in a child being in the care and custody of a society for a period exceeding 12 months if the child is younger than six on the day the court makes the order, or 24 months if the child is six or older on the day the court makes the order. Our Court of Appeal, at paragraph 33 of its decision in Windsor-Essex Children’s Aid Society v. E.W., 2020 ONCA 682, has emphasized that, as a matter of statutory interpretation and having regard to the importance of speedy resolutions in relation to matters affecting children, the timelines set forth in section 122 of the CYFSA are not optional – even if the unfortunate practical reality is that children do sometimes remain in interim society care for longer periods of time. In this case, the five oldest children are all over the age of six as of today, and the youngest child is under the age of six as of today. However, as also noted herein, the children were removed from their mother’s care on July 11, 2023; i.e., approximately 30 months ago as of today.
139. 139Our Court of Appeal has emphasized, in Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. Y. (A.), [2015] O.J. No. 3529 (C.A.), at paragraph 3, that a child’s wishes are an important component of the determination of the child’s best interests, especially as the child grows older.
140. 140See, for example: Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton-Wentworth v. G.(J.) (1996), 23 R.F.L. (4th) 79 (Ont.Div.Ct.), at paragraph 48; Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v. M.(M.A.), [2003] O.J. No. 1274 (Gen.Div.), at paragraph 12; Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.H., 2018 ONCJ 854, at paragraph 12; and Children’s Aid Society of Haldimand and Norfolk v. C.L. and C.S., 2020 ONSC 1816, at paragraph 70..
141. 141See Children & Family Services for York Region v. W. (A.), [2003] O.J. No. 996 (S.C.J.), at paragraph 7; and Children’s Aid Society of Haldimand and Norfolk v. C.L. and C.S., supra, at paragraph 71.
142. 142See, for example: Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v. M. (M.A.), supra, at paragraph 16; Catholic Children’s Aid Society v. I.(J.), 2006 CanLII 19432 (ON SC), [2006] O.J. No. 2299 (S.C.J.), at paragraph 38; Children’s Aid Society of London & Middlesex v. J.D., 2018 ONSC 6193, at paragraph 79; and Children’s Aid Society of Haldimand and Norfolk v. C.L. and C.S., supra, at paragraph 72.
143. 143See, for example: Family and Children’s Services of St Thomas and Elgin v. C. (A.), 2013 ONCJ 453, at paragraph 158; and Children’s Aid Society of Haldimand and Norfolk v. C.L. and C.S., supra, at paragraph 72.
144. 144See, for example, Halton Children’s Aid Society v. T.D.L.D.S.L., [2015] O.J. No. 2422 (O.C.J.).
145. 145See, for example: Catholic Children’s Aid Society v. Hamilton, supra, at paragraph 7; and Children’s Aid Society of Haldimand and Norfolk, supra, at paragraph 74.
146. 146See, for example: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. L. (T.), 2010 ONSC 1376, at paragraph 25; and Children’s Aid Society of Haldimand and Norfolk v. C.L. and C.S., supra, at paragraph 65.
147. 147I accept that Ms H., as noted by the child protection workers, has made intermittent efforts over the years to improve her situation and that of the children. However, as already noted in these reasons, in my view the evidence also indicates a troubling and persistent inclination on the part of Ms H. to minimize the troubling nature of concerns identified by the Society, and to attribute responsibility or “blame” for challenges faced by her and the children almost entirely on external forces and the conduct of others, (especially in relation to inadequate stability and housing), without recognizing that many of the challenges in this case have been created or made worse by her own impetuous or otherwise poor decision making, unrealistic aspirations, and her resistance to assistance and more appropriate options when they have been presented or offered. In relation to the latter concern, (and as noted in more detail earlier in these reasons), the evidence presented at trial provided repeated instances of Ms H. refusing or delaying, (for reasons often apparently attributable to resistance based on unreasonable or unrelated grievances, and/or persistent focus on unrealistic possibilities and preferences), the acceptance of various forms of assistance when offered; e.g., help with cleaning and packing arrangements, help with laundry, assistance with transportation to facilitate and ensure school attendance and access visitation, various offers of continued assistance from Ms A., the provision of mattresses for the children, and/or the possibility of alternative forms of respite or other accommodation.
148. 148In my view, Ms H.’s repeated and prolonged failures over the course of this matter to meet her children in person or even discuss arrangements in that regard, whenever her desire for complete care of the children has been denied, despite her awareness that her children long to see her and are saddened by her prolonged in person absence from their lives, is by far one of the most troubling aspects of this matter. As courts have noted in the past, a parent’s commitment to access is a telling indicator of his or her commitment to a child; see, for example, Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa-Carleton v. K.F., Ottawa Registry No. 02-FL-602. In that regard, I certainly am sympathetic to those who may suffer from trauma and anxiety, (including anxiety that makes it difficult to travel by public transport), or who may lack resources available to others to enable ease of mobility. However, I also find it remarkable and telling that Ms H. somehow was able to attend trial each day over the course of two weeks, but nevertheless failed to exercise any in person rights of access to the children at any point over the seven-month period prior to trial.
149. 149As noted and described above in much more detail, Ms H. repeatedly has failed to be forthcoming or cooperative in relation to the Society’s efforts to monitor the situation in order to provide assistance; e.g., via Ms H.’s repeatedly demonstrated reluctance to advise or provide the Society with information in relation to contemplated and effected relocations, respond to Society inquiries, and/or facilitate Society visits and interviews.
150. 150While the presented evidence includes indications that Ms C. has provided intermittent assistance to Ms H. and the children in the past, (e.g., by way of food provision and assistance with arrangements to rent accommodation), her level of involvement in this matter prior to trial, and the concerns noted above in relation to her credibility and reliability, frankly do not instill much confidence in terms of Ms C.’s commitment to assuming primary care for S. in her home.