CITATION: Scorgie-Porter v. Porter, 2026 ONSC 2379

COURT FILE NO.: FC-20-00000389-0000

DATE: May 28, 2026

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

FAMILY COURT

BETWEEN:

Lindsay Scorgie-Porter

Salim J. Khot, for the Applicant

Applicant

• and -

Dennis Bernard Porter

In person

Respondent

HEARD: January 26, 27, 28, 29 & 30, February 23, 24, 25, 26 & 27, and March 9, 11, 12 & 31, 2026

TOBIN J.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

1The central issues in this trial concerned the equalization of the parties’ respective net family properties, the determination of the respondent’s income for support purposes, and his claim for spousal support. All parenting issues were resolved just before the commencement of trial.

2In these reasons, I will refer to the parties by their first names for ease of reference and mean no disrespect by doing so.

BACKGROUND FACTS

3The Applicant (Lindsay) is now 43 years old.

4The Respondent (Dennis) is now 49 years old.

5The parties met in 2011 while both were in Uganda. Lindsay was doing field work for her PhD from Cambridge University. Dennis was a journalist who made and produced film segments for various media organizations. These segments were usually about African society and politics. They began their relationship while residing in Africa.

6In November 2012, the parties began living together in Dennis’ apartment in Toronto.

7In January 2013, Lindsay defended her doctoral thesis and earned her PhD. She then set about finding an academic position.

8Dennis was then employed by Discovery Channel where he produced segments for a television show. He left his employment with a plan to undertake freelance work for this same channel.

9The parties’ plan was to move to whatever location Lindsay was able to secure employment.

10On September 7, 2013, the parties married.

11Sometime in the fall of 2013, Lindsay obtained an academic position at Western University, in London, Ontario. The parties then moved to London. Lindsay began teaching and Dennis continued his freelance videography business.

12On […] 2018, the parties became the parents of JSP. They refer to him as J.

13Unfortunately, the parties came to realize that they did not share the same goals or values with respect to their relationship. This led to the breakdown of the marriage.

14The parties agreed that for the purposes of this case, the date of separation was November 17, 2019.

15The parties remained living separate and apart in their matrimonial home until sometime in January 2020. Then, they briefly began a nesting arrangement so both could have independent parenting time with J. This arrangement ended when Lindsay moved out of the matrimonial home.

16Lindsay started this case by Application that was issued June 4, 2020. Dennis’ Answer was dated October 13, 2020.

17By the time this case came to trial, it had been outstanding for over 2,000 days.

18The issue of parenting remained unresolved on a final basis until shortly before this trial started. On January 26, 2026, on the consent of the parties, I granted a final parenting order that provides for shared parenting of their child.

PROCESS

19Dennis was self-represented during this trial. As such, he was entitled to the special duties the court has towards self-represented litigants. In Morwald-Benevides v. Benevides, 2019 ONCA 1023, 148 O.R. (3d) 305, at para. 34, the Court of Appeal wrote:

[34] It is no longer sufficient for a judge to simply swear a party in and then leave it to the party to explain the case, letting the party flounder and then subside into unhelpful silence. As this court has noted, "it is well-accepted that trial judges have special duties to self-represented litigants, in terms of acquainting them with courtroom procedure and the rules of evidence": Dujardin v. Dujardin Estate, [2018] O.J. No. 3545, 2018 ONCA 597, 423 D.L.R. (4th) 731, at para. 37, repeated in Gionet v. Pingue, [2018] O.J. No. 6661, 2018 ONCA 1040, 22 R.F.L. (8th) 55, at para. 30. The court added, at para. 31 of Gionet: "In ensuring that a self-represented litigant has a fair trial, the trial judge must treat the litigant fairly and attempt to accommodate their unfamiliarity with the trial process, in order to permit them to present their case", citing Davids v. Davids, 1999 CanLII 9289 (ON CA), [1999] O.J. No. 3930, 125 O.A.C. 375 (C.A.), at para. 36. See, also, Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services) v. A. (J.), [2006] M.J. No. 171, 2006 MBCA 44, at paras. 19-20.

20In the recent decision of Placca v. Umugiraneza, 2025 ONSC 7262, at paras. 7–8, the court provided a summary of the court’s duty to self-represented litigants as follows:

7. It is well-accepted that judges have special duties to self-represented litigants, in terms of acquainting them with courtroom procedure and the rules of evidence: Dujardin v. Dujardin Estate, 2018 ONCA 597, at para. 37, repeated in Gionet v. Pingue, 2018 ONCA 1040 at para. 30; Morwald-Benevides v. Benevides, 2019 ONCA 1023 at para. 34.

8. The Ontario Court of Appeal provided some guidance in dealing with self-represented litigants in Grand River Conservation Authority v. Vidhya Ramdas 2021 ONCA 815, at paras. 18 – 21, outlining the following considerations:

a. Self-represented litigants are expected to familiarize themselves with the relevant practices and procedures pertaining to their case and respect the court process;

b. The Court has the duty to ensure that self-represented litigants receive a fair hearing;

c. The court’s obligations to self-represented litigants are outlined in the Canadian Judicial Council’s 2006 Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons, which was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Pintea v. Johns, 2017 SCC 23, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 470, at para. 4.

d. The Court must permit the represented party and the self-represented party to explain how they understand where things stand in the litigation; and,

e. It is open to a judge to engage in active adjudication. However, a judge must not cross the line between assisting self-represented litigants in the presentation of their evidence and becoming their advocate.

21In addition to being self-represented, Dennis’ evidence was that he has been diagnosed and treated for ADHD. Dennis has attended with a social worker, Kayla Ruano Gowdy, since April 2021. Her primary clinical focus has been “strategies for managing the administrative burden of his legal issues.” In November 2024, Dennis reported to Ms. Ruano Gowdy the “onset of debilitating fatigue” manifesting as overwhelming cognitive “brain fog” rather than physical immobility.¹ I accept that Dennis did struggle with organization and maintaining focus.

22In Hayes v. Canada (Attorney General), 2023 FCA 158, at para. 31, the Federal Court of Appeal considered the court’s duty to accommodate litigants with disabilities. The court concluded that courts must “remain mindful of their duty to accommodate the needs of the disabled so as to ensure that they receive the same level of procedurally fair justice as that accorded to other Canadians.”

23I am also mindful of r. 2(2) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, which requires cases be dealt with justly. Dealing with a case justly includes ensuring a procedure that is fair to all parties: Family Law Rules, r. 2(3)(a).

24During this case, I explained to Dennis the process to be followed, the tests associated with the legal issues raised, and the rules to follow in having evidence admitted and considered by me.

25When the trial started, Dennis sought an adjournment because he said he needed more time to prepare. I declined that request. I did so for a number of reasons. This case has been outstanding for over 2,000 days. There has been plenty of time for disclosure to be provided. There have been 24 endorsements made. It was well beyond time for this case to proceed. The case had been on the trial list for almost two years.

26The disabilities identified by Dennis were accommodated.

27The courtroom was opened a half hour before court began so that he could set up the equipment and technology he needed. This included placing portable recording devices where persons, including me, were sitting and speaking so that he could listen to the day’s proceedings each night or weekend and prepare for the next and following days.

28Dennis was given extra time to find documents when they were needed during the proceeding.

29The pace of the trial was slowed when needed to allow him time to catch up with his notes or to gather his thoughts.

30During the trial, he was given real-time explanations of process and law, such as violations of the rule in Browne v Dunn (1893), 1893 CanLII 65 (FOREP), 6 R. 67 (H.L.). As well, suggestions were offered by me on how he could focus his cross-examination on relevant issues. Additional breaks were taken when needed.

31He was allowed to tell his story in the manner he wished to do so, even if at times it was unfocused.

32It was clear to me that Dennis is an intelligent and thoughtful person who was able to tell his version of events and make his position known.

ISSUES

33The following issues are to be determined in this case.

• a. The equalization payment owing;
• b. The amount of child support to be paid by the parties pursuant to the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175, s. 7, 9; and
• c. Whether Dennis is entitled to spousal support and, if so, its amount and duration.

Issue #1 – What equalization payment is owing?

34The issues linked to the equalization of net family property in this case include:

• a. the value of certain assets and debts on the date of marriage and the date of separation; and
• b. whether the court should order an unequal division of net family property under Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 5(6).

Positions of the Parties

35Lindsay submits that she owes Dennis an equalization payment of $84,087.89. As she advanced $73,000 to Dennis out of the sale of the matrimonial home, the amount owing by her to him is now $11,087.89. However, because Dennis “diverted significant family assets to third parties during the marriage” without her “full knowledge and despite her objections” she argues that s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act is engaged so that no further amount should be paid by her to Dennis to equalize their respective net family property.

36Dennis submits that Lindsay owes him an equalization payment of $208,612.25. He claims that s. 5(6) is not engaged as against him because it was not pleaded or raised before trial. However, even if it is considered, s. 5(6) should not apply because his actions were not unconscionable.

37Both parties provided their respective net family property calculations. I will consider the differences between the two calculations as set out in the comparison of net family property statements provided with Mr. Khot’s trial submissions.

38When determining issues of value, each spouse has the onus of establishing the value of their assets and debts. They must do so by providing credible evidence in support of the value claimed: Virc v. Blair, 2017 ONCA 394, 138 O.R. (3d) 191, at para. 59, leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.CA. No. 37678.

The Matrimonial Home

39The matrimonial home was purchased in 2016. It was registered in Lindsay’s name alone. The evidence of the parties is that Dennis was not on title because he could not qualify for a mortgage.

40After Lindsay had put in her case, Dennis wanted to amend his pleadings to assert a trust interest in the matrimonial home. After carefully considering the submissions made and r. 11(3) of the Family Law Rules, I declined to allow his request. It would have been prejudicial to Lindsay to allow the amendment at that stage of the case. Costs or an adjournment would not have ameliorated the prejudice to her.

41Lindsay valued the matrimonial home for equalization purposes at $650,000 as at the date of separation. This value is based upon the appraisal report of Aryn Visscher² dated January 2, 2020.

42Ms. Visscher was qualified as an expert able to give opinion evidence on the value of residential real estate.

43The basis for her opinion was not seriously challenged by Dennis. It was his view that a different analysis was called for when valuing matrimonial home.

44The appraiser explained her methodology and analysis including the use of comparables. She explained adequately why the comparables she relied upon were appropriate and why time adjustments were not provided.

45The appraiser did assume that the matrimonial home was in similar condition on the day she inspected it as it had been six weeks earlier on the date of separation. This was a reasonable assumption. There was no evidence that the matrimonial home changed in any significant manner between the two dates.

46Dennis claimed that the value of the matrimonial home was $741,650. He offered six different ways that he valued the property. All the values he relied upon were based on evidence or information that was determined after the date of separation. Even if all his evidence had been admissible, it could not be relied upon.

47Fair value of an asset or debt must be determined from facts known or foreseeable on or prior to the date of separation. Facts learned after the date of separation are not relevant to the issue of value. This is known as the hindsight rule. Hindsight evidence may be relied upon for the purpose of confirming a prior prediction or assumption, but not to determine actual value. In Debora v. Debora (2006), 2006 CanLII 40663 (ON CA), 83 O.R. (3d) 81 (C.A.), at paras. 46–47, the court held that in the family law context, when valuating an asset, hindsight information is generally inadmissible and cannot be used as part of the process in establishing the value of an asset at a particular date.

48Dennis did not persuade me that the appraisal report of Ms. Visscher was not accurate or reliable.

49Lindsay met her onus in establishing that on the date of separation, the value of the matrimonial home was $650,000.

Household Contents

50Neither party provided a list or valuation of household contents as of the date of marriage or of the date of separation.

51Lindsay’s evidence is that the parties took roughly one half of the contents, none of which had significant value, on the date of separation.

52Dennis claims that the household contents he retained following separation should be valued at $5,000 and those retained by Lindsay at $15,000. This was, at best, an estimate not supported by any relevant evidence.

53Neither party has met their onus of establishing a value of household contents at the date of marriage or date of separation. Consequently, no value will be included in the net family calculation for either party for these assets on either date.

Mortgage on Matrimonial Home

54Dennis asks that the value of the mortgage debt owing on the matrimonial home be calculated as at the date of sale in July 2020. This is not the correct date to use. The mortgage debt owing on October 23, 2019, was $368,486.04. This is the amount proven to be outstanding on the date closest to and before the date of separation.

Personal Loan

55The parties did not have savings to contribute to the purchase of the matrimonial home. To help with this purchase, Lindsay’s parents advanced $100,000.

56Lindsay claims that the $100,000 provided was a loan to her and, on the date of separation, $68,000 remained outstanding. She submits that the outstanding debt should be attributable to her alone because the money was used to purchase the matrimonial home which was registered in her name alone.

57Dennis argues that the monies were a gift or an “investment.” In the alternative, he argues that the $100,000 advanced was a loan to both of them. If it is categorized as a loan, he agrees that $68,000 remains outstanding with half being attributable to both parties on the date of separation.

58I accept the evidence of Lindsay’s father given in this trial that the monies advanced were a loan of $100,000 to be repaid over ten years. The interest charge was 1% over the interest rate charged to the parents on the line of credit they used to obtain the funds. The monthly payment was $1,021.98 (see Exhibit 26). Lindsay sent cheques to her parents every month for three and a half years. Ongoing payments were suspended by Lindsay’s parents following the separation, because of her precarious financial circumstances at the time.

59I find that the $100,000 advanced was a loan, not a gift. I do so even though Lindsay’s parents advised the first mortgagee that the monies advanced were a gift. Lindsay’s parents and the parties expected the monies advanced would be repaid. Lindsay’s parents borrowed the money to advance to Lindsay and Dennis.

60When the loan was advanced, I find that it was to both parties. Lindsay’s counsel categorized the loan as such in emails he sent (see Exhibits 64, 65 and 68). In her email of February 7, 2022, to Dennis, Lindsay also described the loan as being to both of them (see Exhibit 67).

61Despite clear and unambiguous evidence that the loan was to the parties, Lindsay asks that it be attributed solely by her as of the date of separation. The basis for this request is that the money was to be used to purchase the matrimonial home which was in her name alone. Additionally, she suggests that it is unlikely that Dennis will ever repay his share of the debt and he should not receive the advantage of being able to deduct one half of the loan when calculating his net family property and at the same time not be required to repay his half of the debt.

62I appreciate the position advanced by Lindsay and based upon the evidence Dennis gave at trial it is unlikely that he will voluntarily repay his half share; however, the provisions of the Family Law Act must be applied. On the date of separation, the expectation of all concerned was that the debt was owed by both parties and it was expected to be repaid.

63The debt must be divided equally between the parties in the calculation of their respective net family properties.

Loan from Cory Rubin

64Dennis claims he owed Cory $6,185.06 on the date of separation.

65His evidence was that he and Cory owned an apartment building in Windsor. Cory had a larger interest in that apartment building than did Dennis. They were having trouble finding people to effect repairs. They started a company called DC Porter. I infer from the evidence that it was a business that would find repair people for those who needed them. The company was short-lived. It lost money.

66Dennis prepared a document called “All Transactions In & Out.” It was marked as Exhibit 71. It purports to set out in ledger form all the expenses incurred by the company. The source documents were produced by Dennis to Lindsay some time ago but were not specifically referred to at trial. As of November 15, 2019, the amount shown on the ledger as owing by Dennis to Cory was $6,185.35.

67Dennis acknowledges that the document he produced is not well-organized; it is “a reflection of his executive functioning difficulties associated with his ADHD.”³

68Lindsay claims that the loan has not been proved because he did not call Cory as a witness or provide reliable documentation to support the loan amount claimed.

69Dennis was not seriously challenged about this loan in cross-examination. Dennis stated that the loan had not been forgiven.

70I agree with Lindsay that the documentation provided in support of the claim was not helpful. However, I accept Dennis’ evidence with respect to this loan. Money was advanced by Cory for the benefit of DC Porter and it was expected thar Dennis would be responsible for his share. I find that Denis met his onus in establishing on the balance of probabilities a debt was owing to Cory Rubin on the date of separation in the amount of $6,186.35.

CRA Income Taxes Owing

71Dennis claims he owed $23,429.47 in income taxes as of the date of separation. He based this calculation claim on the amount he owed as of November 12, 2019, according to his 2019 assessment of $24,894.18 that was not issued until June 22, 2020, found at Exhibit 51A.⁴ The amount was pro-rated to the date of separation.

72Dennis did not provide evidence as to what was known to be due in respect of his 2019 income taxes as of the date of separation. This would have required an opinion based on information that was available as at the date of separation. Also, there is no evidence what, if any, tax installments were paid or due as at the date of separation.

73I find that Dennis did not provide reliable evidence of his 2019 income taxes that were due and not paid as at the date of separation.

74I find that the best evidence of what Dennis owed in taxes to CRA as at the date of separation was $16,692.26 based upon the running account balance provided by CRA in the document found at Exhibit 33.⁵

CRA HST Owing

75The analysis applied to Dennis’ CRA debt on account of income taxes applies to this HST debt. According to CRA documents, he owed $16,038.83 as of October 18, 2019.⁶ The money he may have owed in respect of an unassessed period up to the date of separation was not yet known. Dennis did not provide evidence with respect to that calculation.

76Without considering hindsight evidence, Dennis has proved that, on the date of separation, he owed the CRA $16,038.83 on account of HST arrears.

Value of 125 Mackay, Windsor

77Dennis held a 20% interest in this property both on the date of marriage and on the date of separation. The parties agreed that the date of separation value of this property was $1,146,642.91. Dennis’ 20% share was valued at $229,328.58 on the date of separation.

78The parties disagree on the value of the property on the date of marriage.

79The onus is on Dennis to prove the value of the property that existed at the date of marriage.

80Dennis did not obtain a valuation of the property as at the date of marriage. He argues that the property can be valued by using a “…straight line interpolation between the known purchase price and the agreed to date of separation value…” This calculation results in a date of marriage value of the property being $101,125.

81The problem with this analysis is that it relies on hindsight evidence. Dennis’ analysis requires consideration of the value of the property on the date of separation. This is hindsight evidence.

82Dennis did not explain why he did not obtain an opinion of value of the property as at the date of marriage. This case has been outstanding for many years. There was time enough for him to obtain this evidence.

83The property will be valued for the calculation of Dennis’ NFP at $83,800, as proposed by Lindsay, being 20% of the purchase price the property in the amount of $419,000 paid ten months before the date of marriage. In these circumstances, this is best evidence of value of this property at the date of marriage.

Capital Gains in Relation to 125 Mackay, Windsor

84Dennis claims that he should be able to deduct, on the date of separation and date of marriage, notional capital gains liability in relation to this property.

85Dennis calculated his date of separation tax liability to be $24,500.

86Dennis calculated his date of marriage tax liability to be $2,600.⁷

87Both calculations were based on Dennis assuming an annual income of $65,000.

88Lindsay argues that no deduction should be allowed on either date because there is insufficient evidence. She states that it was incumbent upon Dennis to provide expert evidence of value and tax consequences. She relies on Cui v. Liwanpo, 2022 ONSC 4549, at paras. 82–83. In this case, the court rejected a claim for a contingent tax liability because there was no evidence of the adjusted cost base (ACB). In that circumstance, the court could not do the necessary calculation. The court stated that it expected either an agreed statement of facts or expert evidence.

89Dennis submits that Cui is distinguishable from the case before the court. I agree. In the case now before the court, there was no argument with respect to ACB being anything other than the original purchase price. Lindsay did not challenge that proposition. However, there are other matters to consider.

90Section 4(1.1) of the Family Law Act provides that contingent tax liabilities are allowable deductions when calculating a party’s NFP.

91In Sengmueller v. Sengmueller (1994), 17 O.R. (3d) 2018 (C.A.), the following principles were articulated:

• It was appropriate to deduct notional disposition costs as long as there is satisfactory evidence that they will be incurred in the future.
• These notional disposition costs may not be deducted when the timing of disposition and thus the disposition costs are speculative.
• If disposition costs can be ascertained but there will be a delay, then a deduction of a discounted amount is required to take into account the present value of the debt.

92In this case, Dennis did not tender evidence that there was an expectation of when the property might be sold, either on the date of marriage or date of separation. Also, there is no reliable evidence of available exemptions, nor applicable tax and discount rates. These could have been provided through expert evidence.

93Dennis has not met his onus of proving the notional capital gains tax debt either on the date of marriage or on the date of separation.

Equalization Payment

94Having regard to the components of the net family property calculation agreed to by the parties and those determined in these reasons, Lindsay presumptively owes Dennis an equalization payment of $121,231.06 calculated as a set out in the NFP calculation appended to these reasons as Appendix “A”.

95Lindsay is entitled to a credit of $73,000.00 towards the equalization payment that was already paid by her to Dennis. This results in a net amount owing by Lindsay to Dennis in the amount of $48,231.06. This sum is to be paid to Dennis out of the net proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home currently held in trust by White Law Professional Corporation with the balance being paid to Lindsay or as she may direct in writing. Below in these reasons, calculations related to the underpayment or overpayment of child support by Lindsay to Dennis are to be determined. Any amount found to be owing by one party to the other on account of this child support calculation shall be deducted from that party’s share of the net proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home and provided to the other.

Unequal Division of Net Family Property

96Lindsay asks that the equalization payment be less than the presumptive amount. Dennis asks that it be more.

Basis for Lindsay’s Claim

97Lindsay provided Dennis with $73,000 out of the net proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home. She asks that she not be required to pay any more towards an equalization payment. The basis for her claim is that Dennis “… diverted significant family assets to third parties during the marriage without [her] full knowledge and despite her objections.”

Basis for Dennis’ Claim

98Dennis asks for an equalization payment that is greater than one-half of the difference between their respective net family properties. The basis for his claim is that Lindsay sold the matrimonial home for an amount far less than its actual value. He maintains that the actual value at the date of separation was $741,650. He claims that when Lindsay sold the property for $665,000 in July 2020, she intentionally or recklessly depleted her net family property. As well, he claims he is entitled to more than half of the difference in their respective net family properties because he helped pay for and maintain the matrimonial home even though his name was not on title.

Legal Considerations

99Both parties rely on s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act, which provides as follows:

(6) The court may award a spouse an amount that is more or less than half the difference between the net family properties if the court is of the opinion that equalizing the net family properties would be unconscionable, having regard to,

(a) a spouse’s failure to disclose to the other spouse debts or other liabilities existing at the date of the marriage;

(b) the fact that debts or other liabilities claimed in reduction of a spouse’s net family property were incurred recklessly or in bad faith;

(c) the part of a spouse’s net family property that consists of gifts made by the other spouse;

(d) a spouse’s intentional or reckless depletion of his or her net family property;

(e) the fact that the amount a spouse would otherwise receive under subsection (1), (2) or (3) is disproportionately large in relation to a period of cohabitation that is less than five years;

(f) the fact that one spouse has incurred a disproportionately larger amount of debts or other liabilities than the other spouse for the support of the family;

(g) a written agreement between the spouses that is not a domestic contract; or

(h) any other circumstance relating to the acquisition, disposition, preservation, maintenance or improvement of property.

100The court’s discretion to order an unequal division of net family property is limited. In order to succeed in having an unequal division ordered, one of the enumerated items in (a)–(h) must be engaged and it would be unconscionable to equalize the parties’ net family properties.

101In Serra v. Serra, 2009 ONCA 395, at paras. 47–48, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that to cross the unconscionability threshold, an equal division of net family property in the circumstances must “shock the conscience of the court.”

Determination of Lindsay’s Claim

102During the marriage, Dennis sent money to third parties totaling $106,240. This sum included $78,755 to Lieve Kitsa. At the same time that he paid out these monies:

• a. Dennis incurred debts to the CRA and various credit card companies that went unpaid; and
• b. The amounts paid were significant in relation to his income.

103These factors resulted in Dennis’ net family property being reduced to what it otherwise would have been at the date of separation, resulting in a corresponding increase in the presumptive equalization payment she owes.

104Lindsay argues that when considered in the context of this case, Dennis’ actions amount to an unconscionable and reckless depletion of his net family property.

105Dennis argues that it is reasonable and right that he made these payments during the marriage. He was helping those who needed the money.

106Ms. Kitsa worked for Dennis when he was in Africa, as his “fixer.” She helped him with domestic services and in his work as a journalist and business person. She set up interviews, transcribed audios, translated French and Swahili for Dennis, and assisted in his Congolese businesses. When Dennis returned to Canada, Ms. Kitsa continued to work for him.

107From 2013 until 2016, Dennis’ payments to her averaged approximately $1,000 per month. These payments covered medical payments for the treatment of Ms. Kitsa’s PTSD which she suffered as a result of the wartime sexual violence she endured, and an assault while in Uganda. The money sent was also used as ransom for the kidnapping of her nanny ($5,000 USD), a security guard to protect her, her son’s schooling and for their health coverage.

108Ms. Kitsa testified that without the support she received from Dennis, she thought that she “could be dead.”

109Lindsay questioned Dennis whether these were valid wages and business expenses.

110I accept Lindsay’s evidence that she was not happy about these payments being made.

111I accept Lindsay’s evidence that Dennis said he would stop these payments when the two of them contemplated having a child to “ensure financial stability.” She did not discover that he continued these payments until sometime in 2019.

112I accept that Dennis paid these funds, especially to Ms. Kitsa, out of a sense of duty and to help people in need. He diverted money to third parties instead of addressing his family’s need for financial security. Dennis’ decision to be generous in the circumstances of him having ever increasing indebtedness was questionable and unfair to Lindsay and their child. However, these periodic payments do not rise to the level of “shocking the conscience of the court.” They were in support of vulnerable people and provided him with no personal gain.

113It is for these reasons that I am unable to accede to Lindsay’s request for an unequal division of the parties’ net family property.

Determination of Dennis’ Claim

114Dennis’ position is that Lindsay could have sold the matrimonial home for more than $665,000. Some of the arguments he made in support of that proposition follow:

• In March 2020, Dennis’ real estate agent received an unsolicited offer to purchase the matrimonial home in the amount of $680,000. On the advice of her agent, Lindsay did not want to accept the offer. She did not want to deal with the sale of the property on a private listing. She wanted to have the property listed on MLS.⁸
• Another agent, retained by Lindsay, provided a market analysis value in March 2020. The comparables contained in the analysis were all higher than the eventual sale price. The agent was not called to testify. The evidence could not be relied upon for the truth of the contents, but only that it had been provided.
• Lindsay received two offers after the matrimonial home was listed. She chose the offer with the shorter closing date but lower price. The evidence was not clear as to the difference in value between the two offers. Lindsay’s evidence was that the offer not accepted was for “a little more money” but with a longer closing date. She was not sure. She accepted what she thought was the better offer as she had to sell the property right away. She did not have money to continue to maintain the property.

115On June 18, 2020, George J. released an endorsement that dealt with the listing and sale of the matrimonial home. The court granted Lindsay the authority to make decisions related to the listing and sale of the matrimonial home “without the need for the involvement of [Dennis]” and making any of the decisions.⁹

116These arguments and others advanced by Dennis do not persuade me that Lindsay acted recklessly or in bad faith in selling the matrimonial home. In any event, she provided the only admissible and relevant evidence as to the value of the matrimonial home on the date of separation.

117Dennis also argues that he should be entitled to share in the post-separation increase in the value of the matrimonial home. This argument presumes that Dennis had an interest in the matrimonial home. He was not registered on title as an owner. Dennis did not assert a trust claim until after Lindsay’s case had been put in. He wanted to amend his pleadings to include a trust claim. As set out above in these reasons, this request was denied. The disadvantage to Lindsay could not be compensated in costs or by an adjournment. This case had been outstanding since June 4, 2020, almost six years. Dennis did not provide a compelling reason explaining why this claim had not been advanced some time ago. The record discloses that Dennis had been represented by experienced counsel for part of the time this case was outstanding.

118The increase in value in the matrimonial home asserted by Dennis, was in part based on records he obtained from the London and St. Thomas Real Estate Board dealing with trends in home prices in this region. Dennis did not provide compelling or admissible opinion evidence of the value of the matrimonial home.

119It is on the consideration of these factors that I find that Dennis has not made out an entitlement to an unequal division of net family property.

Issue #2 – What amount of child support is to be paid?

120The amount of child support to be paid is to be based on the parties sharing parenting time equally.

121The Federal Child Support Guidelines, s. 9, provides the statutory basis for determining the amount of child support to be paid when parenting time is shared. Section 9 is formulated as follows:

9. Where each parent or spouse exercises parenting time with respect to a child for not less than 40 per cent of the time over the course of a year, the amount of the order for the support of a child must be determined by taking into account,

(a) the amounts set out in the applicable tables for each of the parents or spouses;

(b) the increased costs of shared parenting time arrangements; and

(c) the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each parent or spouse and of any child for whom support is sought.

122The three factors structure the exercise of the court’s discretion when determining the amount of child support that is to be paid. These factors allow for sufficient flexibility to ensure that the economic reality and particular circumstances of all parties are taken into account.

123The court is to take into account the expenses and means of the parties when determining what amount of child support is ordered.

124These factors are meant to ensure a fair level of support: Contino v. Leonelli-Contino, 2005 SCC 63, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 217, at para. 67.

Set-off

125Lindsay’s income was not disputed. It has been as follows:

Year	Income
2019	$85,136
2020	$107,444
2021	$133,181
2022	$107,386
2023	$119,380
2024	$121,518
2025	$146,000

126Lindsay is a tenured professor whose income is derived solely from her employment.

127Dennis’ income, for the purpose of calculating his child support obligation, is difficult to determine. He is self-employed and has rental income. The difficulty in fairly determining his income is that Dennis has not provided the disclosure expected of him. This is so even though this case has been outstanding as described earlier in these reasons.

128Dennis did not provide his (a) income tax returns or notices of assessment for 2023 or 2024, nor (b) T2 corporate tax returns for fiscal years 2021–2025.

129Dennis claims he provided “approximately 2,800 pages primarily of bank and credit card statements from every possible account through the entire marriage…”¹⁰

130The problem with the disclosure contained at Exhibit 51 is that it is without context. It is not the responsibility of Lindsay to fairly determine—if it is even possible with the documents provided—what Dennis’ income and expenses were in the years in question.

131For the years 2023–2025, Dennis provided a list of invoices he sent out and amounts received on account thereof. He then calculated his average profit margin during the years 2015–2022. He deducted this average profit margin from the monies he received on account of paid invoices and claimed that it was his net income for child support purposes from his self-employment.

132Dennis estimated his total income for child support purposes as follows:

Year	Income
2019	$33,486
2020	$41,375
2021	$60,208
2022	$53,056
2023	$64,738
2024	$56,018
2025	$37,076

133Dennis argues that his child support obligation going forward should be based on his 2024 income of $56,018.

134Lindsay asks that income be imputed to Dennis in an amount similar to her income. She does so on the basis Dennis had and continues to have the capacity to earn income in an amount similar to her and because of his lack of financial disclosure.

Legal Considerations

135The first step in determining a party’s income is to use the sources of income set out under the heading “Total income” in that person’s T1 General Tax Return: Child Support Guidelines, s. 16. The next step is to adjust that income calculation in accordance with Schedule III of the Child Support Guidelines, s. 16.

136In this case, Dennis asks that his rental income not be included in his income for child support purposes pursuant to Schedule III the Child Support Guidelines, s. 12, which provides as follows:

12 Where the spouse earns income through a partnership or sole proprietorship, deduct any amount included in income that is properly required by the partnership or sole proprietorship for purposes of capitalization.

137Section 19 allows the court to impute income to a parent. This section contains a non-exhaustive list of circumstances in which income may be imputed. This list includes circumstances where a payor’s income information has not been provided.

Discussion

Income will be Imputed to Dennis

138I find that in this case, it is appropriate in the circumstances to impute income to Dennis.

• He is earning less than he is capable of earning.
• He has failed to provide income information he is legally obliged to do.

Earning capacity

139Mr. Balcon, a mentor to Dennis and a person with relevant experience, gave evidence about Dennis’ skills and income potential. Dennis is an experienced, talented, and respected director of photography. His website sets out the many internationally recognized corporations for whom he worked.

140Dennis did not work as much as he could have, instead he devoted much of his time and energy to pursuing this and one other court case.

141Dennis also claimed that his medical conditions precluded him from working more often.

142Cogent medical evidence, usually in the form of a medical opinion, setting out that his reasonable health needs support him taking fewer work assignments was not provided.

Income information not provided

143The court is entitled to draw an adverse inference against Dennis because of his failure to comply with his disclosure obligations. His excuse was his health, in that he has had a hard time staying focused. This would have been a compelling argument had the case been before the court a number of years ago, but with the case being outstanding as described above, there has been time enough for him to complete what was required of him. He had the opportunity to complete the work in installments that he could manage.

144Dennis had an obligation as a self-represented person to provide clear evidence of his income and expenses. It was not sufficient to require Lindsay to sort through his bank statements and other records provided.

Amount of Income to Impute

145As stated above, Lindsay asks that Dennis’ income be imputed in an amount similar to hers.

The Poole Report

146Lindsay relies upon the “Income Available For Support” report prepared by Louise Poole, dated March 4, 2022. Ms. Poole was qualified as a certified business valuator, able to give opinion evidence on Dennis’ income for child support purposes.

147I accept that Ms. Poole completed her analysis in a proper manner based upon the disclosure that was provided to her. She testified that she requested additional documents as set out in Appendix “A” at para. 2 of her report. They were not provided.

148After the report had been completed, Dennis tried to deal directly with Ms. Poole in an effort to collaborate with her and have her change her report. This was not in keeping with Ms. Poole’s role as an independent expert retained by Lindsay. Ms. Poole was asked to read and review documents subsequently provided by Dennis. These documents included bank statements and cheques. Ms. Poole’s testimony was that bank transactions subsequently provided would not have been helpful because they do not show details about who was paid and for what purpose. The best evidence to rely upon is financial statements.

149Ms. Poole calculated Dennis’ income available for child support purposes between 2017 and 2020 as follows:

Year	Income
2017	$82,508
2018	$115,071
2019	$90,988
2020	$81,032

150Ms. Poole also noted that the annual expenses Dennis claimed in his Form 13.1 Financial Statement were $84,226. The total of these expenses exceeded his total income as reported in his income tax return.

151One assumption relied upon by Ms. Poole was to use public documents to determine industry profit margins for movie and production houses. She used the “zero dollars to one million dollars” category because Dennis’ companies fit into that category.

152Dennis provided evidence that the corporate entities were used for a single purpose, that is, to obtain film credits from the government. They were to fund above-the-line costs. The film credits could have provided the corporation with between $12,000 and $15,000 in income over three projects. Unfortunately, Dennis did not file the forms needed in time to receive the credits.

153I accept Mr. Balcon’s evidence that Dennis’ corporation did not fit into corporations referred to in the publicly available document relied upon by Ms. Poole. Dennis’ companies operated at a loss because the above-the-line fees were deferred pending the receipt of the tax credits.

154Dennis asks that the report not be relied upon or given little weight. He also submits that it should not be used to determine his current income because the report is four years old and, as such, is out of date.

155Dennis claims that Ms. Poole’s assumption that one-half of the vehicle expenses were personal is wrong. This is because his work is usually in Toronto, and he must travel 400 kilometers for each day of work. He said that mileage records were provided after the report was completed. These records were not put to Ms. Poole during her cross-examination or specifically referred to in Dennis’ evidence.

156Dennis also challenged other assumptions made by Ms. Poole related to certain individual expenses. I am not able to assess those challenges as the documents Dennis referred to were not specifically referred to or produced at trial.

157Dennis did not provide his own expert report on his income for support purposes.

158I find that Ms. Poole’s report is entitled to some weight with respect to the years she considered. The weight to be given to the report will be reduced because Ms. Poole was not provided with all the documents she requested. However, the responsibility for that belongs to Dennis. All documents that were requested were under his control.

Dennis’ 2023–2025 Income

159Dennis provided no source documents to Lindsay or the court with respect to his income for the years 2023, 2024 and 2025. The evidence relied upon by Dennis was a summary he prepared. His expense calculation could not be meaningfully analyzed or the subject of cross-examination based on the disclosure provided. Evidence about possible personal use with respect to expenses claimed and possible gross-up could not be considered.

160At best, the calculations provided by Dennis at Exhibit 75 are as Dennis described them—“estimated net income.”

Rental Income

161Dennis asks that his share of rental income from 125 Mackay, Windsor, not be included in his income for child support purposes. His evidence is that all net rental income is required to pay down the mortgage principal and property costs. He relies upon s. 12 of Schedule III of the Federal Child Support Guidelines and de Goede v. de Goede, 1999 CanLII 3629 (B.C. S.C.). In this case, the support payor and support recipient jointly owned an investment property. The support payor did not want his rental income included as part of his total income for child support purposes. He claimed that the net income was used to reduce mortgage principal, and this is not a tax-deductible payment. The court accepted that paying down mortgage principal constituted money required for capitalization and therefore was deductible from total income for child support purposes under s. 12 of Schedule III. The court concluded that “some, and perhaps all, of the principal payments should be deducted.” The court left it to the parties to agree on the amount to be deducted, failing which they could return to court for that determination.

162According to the report of Ms. Poole, the net rental income disclosed by Dennis and allocated to him was as follows:

Year	Income
2017	$5,001
2018	$3,002
2019	$4,506
2020	$5,386

163Dennis did not provide evidence of the amount of net rental income paid on account of mortgage principal reduction.

164If Dennis is allowed to deduct his rental income, then their child would, in effect, be contributing to Dennis’ acquisition of a capital asset. Once paid off, however, the child would not have an interest in it. That is the argument for not deducting the amount from Dennis’ income for child support purposes.

165On the other hand, it is reasonable to infer that Dennis and his partners could not obtain a mortgage without the requirement of a payment that included an amount to reduce principal. This makes the mortgage payment a necessary payment that is not available to pay child support.

166It would have been most helpful if there was evidence of the amount of the mortgage payment that was attributable to the principal reduction and the period over which the mortgage was amortized.

167Without this evidence, Dennis has not met his onus in establishing the basis upon which all of the net rental income can be deducted when calculating his total income.

Dennis’ Income Potential

168Dennis testified that his average daily rate as a director of photography is approximately $1,500. The lowest amount he works for is $1,050. Out of this amount he is required to pay equipment rental and mileage.

169Mr. Balcon testified that with Dennis’ experience, he could earn approximately $2,500 to $3,000 a day freelancing in Toronto.

170Dennis expressed that once this court case is concluded, he expects his income will “go back up.” He aspires to earn income between $80,000 to $100,000 and maybe more in the future.

Decision

171Taking all of these circumstances into account, I find that it is appropriate to impute income to Dennis from the date of separation to this trial in the annual amount of $75,000.

• This amount discounts the income suggested by Ms. Poole based on the frailties of the report identified above.
• This amount takes into account rental income attributable to Dennis as well as the evidence that he intends to sell his interest in the property.
• This amount recognizes that Dennis has some health issues. The extent and their effect on his earning potential, however, were not supported by cogent medical evidence.
• Dennis is a talented, intelligent, and experienced director of photography with many industry connections.
• The majority of Dennis’ work assignments will be in the Toronto area.
• I have not reduced Dennis’ imputed income for the Covid years of 2020 and 2021 as those years have been factored into the average that gives rise to the annual imputed income of $75,000.

172Going forward, I impute income to Dennis for the period April 1, 2026, until March 31, 2027, in the amount of $75,000. This will give Dennis time to increase his income as he intends. Commencing April 1, 2027, I impute income to Dennis in the amount of $90,000 per year. This recognizes that once this lawsuit concludes Dennis can devote more time to his career as a director of photography.

Child Support Calculations

Section 9(a) Set off

173The amount of table child support payable by both parties since the date of separation and based on Lindsay’s actual income and Dennis’ imputed income has been as follows:

Year	Lindsay’s Total Income	Lindsay’s Child Support per Mo.	Dennis’ Child Support per Mo. (based on Imputed Income of $75,000)	Setoff Amount
2019	$85,136	$793	$700	$93
2020	$107,444	$968	$700	$268
2021	$113,181	$1,014	$700	$314
2022	$107,386	$967	$700	$267
2023	$119,380	$1,063	$700	$363
2024	$121,518	$1,079	$700	$379
Jan–Sep 2025	$146,000	$1,270	$695	$570
Oct–Dec 2025	$146,000	$1,296	$695	$601
Approx. 2026	$146,000	$1,296	$695	$601

Increased Costs of Shared Parenting

174When considering whether shared parenting time results in increased costs, the court is to look at the parents’ budget and the expenditures they are making to provide for their child. One factor to consider is whether one parent is assuming a larger share of the expenses related to the child. Another factor is whether there are duplicated costs such as additional residential costs, associated with the child having two homes.

175In this case, neither party filed a child expense budget.

176Lindsay’s most recent financial statement was dated November 3, 2025. She included a modest amount of costs that are directly related to the child’s clothing, activities, and school expenses ($300 per month in total). She rents a home from her parents and is responsible for all expenses associated with it. Her 2025 child-related expenses are not significantly different than those included in her October 29, 2021, financial statement.

177The most recent financial statement filed in this case by Dennis was sworn November 5, 2021. This is the case despite Lindsay’s counsel asking for an updated financial statement and Dennis being required to do so pursuant to the Trial Scheduling Endorsement. He was to provide an updated financial statement by November 10, 2025.

178The financial statement Dennis did provide, sworn November 5, 2021, did not contain a child expense budget. However, it did include an expense for childcare. He provided no evidence about any current childcare costs he now incurs.

179Dennis did not offer a reasonable excuse that explained why he did not produce an up-to-date financial statement. The excuse Dennis provided was that, in order to prepare a financial statement, it takes him two weeks. He did not have the time to devote to that task.

180Based on the evidence contained in their most recently filed financial statements, the expenses incurred by both parties to manage their respective homes and meet their child’s needs were similar.

181Neither party provided evidence of increased costs associated with the shared parenting plan, except that they both have to maintain separate homes.

Section 9(c) – Means and Needs

182Lindsay’s income in 2025 and 2026 increased because she took on additional teaching assignments. She did so because she needed this additional income to help pay her legal fees associated with this case. She will return to her normal teaching responsibility going forward. This will better allow her to meet her teaching, research and administrative duties as expected of her by the university. This will result in a reduction of her annual income.

183Dennis has been meeting his expenses in part through borrowing. He has used credit cards and a line of credit and has borrowed from his father. He has not paid CRA and owes it approximately $70,000. He gave evidence at trial that he is in the process of selling his interest in the Windsor property for $200,000.

184Dennis’ income is expected to increase now that the trial has concluded. He will be able to devote more time to his work as a director of photography. This assumes that he remains stable and compliant with his doctor’s prescribed medicine regime.

185Dennis has identified that his strength is in dealing with short and urgent projects. This is consistent with his work as a director of photography.

186Both parties are able to provide similar standards of living for the child despite the disparity in their incomes as found in these reasons. Neither gave evidence that the child does without while in their respective care.

Conclusion

187The setoff amount is $601.

188It is expected that going forward, Lindsay’s income will reduce and Dennis’ will increase. This will necessarily affect their relative capacities to contribute or absorb the child-related expenses, including fixed costs like housing.

189With the sale of his interest in the Windsor property, Dennis will be able to reduce his outstanding indebtedness. It is reasonable to infer that he will then have more disposable income with which to meet child-related expenses.

190In Contino v. Leonelli-Contino, at para. 82, the Court observed:

The determination of an equitable division of the costs of support for children in shared custody situations is a difficult matter; it is not amenable to simple solutions. Any attempt to apply strict formulae will fail to recognize the reality of various families. A contextual approach which takes into account all three factors enunciated by Parliament in s. 9 of the Guidelines must be applied.

191I find that from January 1, 2025, the child support to be paid by Lindsay to Dennis pursuant to s. 9 is $600 per month.

192I also find that the monthly child support to be paid by Lindsay to Dennis from:

• a. July 2020 until November 2021 is nil. The start date coincides with the month the matrimonial home was sold. I accept Lindsay’s evidence that from the date of separation until the sale, she paid almost all of the expenses in relation to the matrimonial home. She estimated that she paid approximately $15,000 on behalf of Dennis.
• b. December 1, 2021, being the date the temporary child support was made by Sah J., until December 31, 2024, shall be in the monthly amount of $340.

193These amounts were determined using the same analysis as was used to determine ongoing child support.

194Lindsay is entitled to credit for all child support payments she made since July 2020.

195If the parties are not able to agree on this calculation, whether it be arrears or an overpayment, they may make further written submissions within 30 days of the release of these reasons.

196Beginning May 1, 2026, the parties are to share any special or extraordinary expenses to which they both agree, based on their respective incomes. Consent to the special or extraordinary expenses shall not be unreasonably withheld. At present, Lindsay is to pay 66% of special expenses based on her income of $146,000 per year, and Dennis is to pay 34% of those expenses based on his imputed income of $75,000 per year. This calculation will change commencing April 1, 2027, when Dennis’ imputed income is increased to $90,000 per year.

Issue #3 – Is Dennis entitled to spousal support, and if so, in what amount and for how long?

Legal Considerations

197The Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), s. 15.2(1)–(2), sets out the court’s jurisdiction to make a final spousal support order that it thinks reasonable.

198Section 15.2(4) sets out the factors the court is to consider as follows:

(4) In making an order under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2), the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including

(a) the length of time the spouses cohabited;

(b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and

(c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse.

199The objectives of a spousal support order are set out in s. 15.2(6) as follows:

(6) An order made under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should

(a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;

(b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage;

(c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and

(d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.

200In R.L. v M.F., 2025 ONCA 595, the Court of Appeal reviewed the principles related to spousal support including entitlement. These principles included the following.

• There is no presumptive entitlement to spousal support: R.L., at para. 36. See also Kerr v. Baranow. 2011 SCC 10, at para. 208.
• Income disparity alone does not determine entitlement to spousal support: R.L., at para. 36.
• When considering an award of spousal support, the trial judge is obliged to consider all the factors listed in the Divorce Act. No one factor is paramount: R.L., at paras. 26, 38.

201The threshold issue when considering a claim for spousal support is whether a spouse has established entitlement. Lindsay referred the court to Thompson v. Thompson, 2013 ONSC 5500, at paras. 54-59, where Chappel J. outlined the basis for compensatory and non-compensatory support.

ii. Compensatory Support

55 The compensatory basis for spousal support entitlement recognizes that upon marriage breakdown, there should be an equitable distribution between the parties of the economic consequences of the marriage. The objective of a compensatory award is to provide some degree of compensation for the sacrifices and contributions which a spouse made during the marriage, for economic losses which they experienced and may continue to experience as a result of the marriage, as well as the benefits which the other spouse has received as a result of these sacrifices and contributions.³³ A compensatory award recognizes that such sacrifices, contributions and benefits conferred often lead to interdependency between the spouses and merger of their economic lives.³⁴

56 Compensatory support claims arise most typically in situations where one spouse has suffered economic disadvantage and contributed to the other spouse's income earning potential as a result of assuming primary responsibility for child care and/or home management obligations. However, a compensatory claim can also be founded on other forms of contribution to the other party's career, such as supporting the family while the other party obtained or upgraded their education,³⁵ selling assets or a business for the benefit of the family unit,³⁶ or assisting a party in establishing and operating a business that is the source of that party's income.³⁷

57 In considering whether a compensatory claim exists, the court must undertake a broad and expansive analysis of advantages and disadvantages which each party experienced throughout the relationship as a result of the marital union. In some situations, a compensatory claim may be defeated or weakened by the fact that disadvantage suffered by the claimant spouse is offset by disadvantage of a different type experienced by the other spouse.³⁸

58 A compensatory claim for spousal support may be established even where the recipient spouse is employed and reasonably self-supporting at the time of the parties' separation. This situation can arise where, despite that spouse's ability to meet their own needs, their financial advancement has been impaired as a result of subordinating their career to that of the other spouse, or from adopting a less lucrative career path in order to accommodate the needs of the family.³⁹

iii. Non-Compensatory Support

59 Spousal support entitlement can also arise on a non-compensatory basis, as a result of the needs of a spouse. The Supreme Court of Canada discussed this basis of entitlement in Bracklow v. Bracklow. It emphasized in that case that a spouse may be obliged to pay support based on the other spouse's economic need alone, even if that need does not arise as a result of the roles adopted or sacrifices made during the marriage. Rowles, J.A. of the British Columbia Court of Appeal summarized the general concepts underlying this basis of entitlement in Chutter v. Chutter⁴⁰ as follows:

Non-compensatory support is grounded in the "social obligation model" of marriage, in which marriage is seen as an interdependent union. It embraces the idea that upon dissolution of a marriage, the primary burden of meeting the needs of the disadvantaged spouse falls on his or her former partner, rather than the state (Bracklow, at para. 23). Non-compensatory support aims to narrow the gap between the needs and means of the spouses upon marital breakdown, and as such, it is often referred to as the "means and needs" approach to spousal support. [footnotes omitted]

202In R.L., at para. 28, the Court of Appeal identified the difference between compensatory and non-compensatory support as follows

…Non-compensatory support entitlement centres on the needs of the spouses and their respective means; compensatory support recognizes an entitlement to support as compensation for the economic disadvantages to the recipient spouse or the economic advantages conferred on the payor spouse as a result of the roles assumed by the parties during their marriage…

203In the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines: The Revised User’s Guide English Edition (April 2016), p. 5 (“SSAG RUG”), the authors described compensatory support claims as being based on one spouse’s economic loss or disadvantage as a result of roles adopted during the marriage or on one spouse conferring an economic benefit to the other spouse without adequate compensation. One of the markers of a compensatory claim is moving for a spouse’s career. A non-compensatory support claim involves claims based on need. An example of need is where a spouse experiences a significant decline in their standard of living from that enjoyed during the marriage. As the authors of the SSAG RUG put it at p. 6, “[non]-compensatory support reflects the economic interdependency that develops as a result of a shared life… summed up in the phrase “merger over time”.

Positions of the Parties

204Dennis claims to be entitled to spousal support from Lindsay on a compensatory and non-compensatory basis.

205The compensatory claim is based on having moved to London from Toronto in support of Lindsay’s employment at Western University. He states that this move disadvantaged him because the geographic center of his industry is in Toronto.

206The non-compensatory claim is based on the disparity of the parties’ incomes during the marriage and after separation. He also relies upon medical concerns that he claims affect his ability to work.

207Dennis asks for spousal support from March 2020 until March 2026 in the amount of $49,737. For the month of April to and including June 2026, he asks for spousal support in the amount of $977 per month based on the parties’ 2024 incomes. Beginning July 2026, he asks that spousal support be paid in the amount of $2,322 per month based upon the parties’ 2025 incomes.

208Lindsay submits that Dennis is not entitled to spousal support from her on any basis. It is her position that both parties worked full time during the relationship. She was the parent who took a parental leave when their child was born. Dennis continued to work full time. When she returned to work, the parties hired a nanny.

209Lindsay also asserts that moving to London did not disadvantage Dennis other than having to incur additional travel time and vehicle expenses.

Discussion

210In deciding the question of entitlement, I carefully considered the Divorce Act’s statutory provisions and the case law cited. I find that Dennis has not established that he is entitled to spousal support from Lindsay on a compensatory basis having regard to the following:

• a. The parties cohabited for approximately seven years. This is the low end of a medium-term relationship. During this time the evidence does not support a finding that an interdependency developed “as a result of a shared life…summed up in the phrase “merger over time.”
• b. During the marriage, Lindsay took an eight-month parental leave after their child was born. Dennis continued to travel for his work. When Lindsay returned to her employment, the parties engaged the assistance of a nanny. The nanny was present even when Dennis was working at home on his videos. I accept Lindsay’s evidence that Dennis did not assume primary care of the child prior to separation. She did.
• c. Following the separation, both parties have had the same childcare responsibilities under their week-about parenting plan.
• d. While cohabiting, both parties were able to contribute equally to their household expenses from their own resources. The evidence did not disclose that the parties intermingled their finances. For example, Lindsay was not aware of the amount of money Dennis was sending to third parties. Each month Dennis provided Lindsay with $2,500 which she used with her $2,500 to pay family expenses.
• e. The parties’ move to London did not adversely affect Dennis’ career including his ability to work and earn income as a director of photography and maintain contact with his clients. The only disadvantage was his travel time and expense to and from Toronto. I find that in all the circumstances of this case, this is not a sufficient disadvantage to give rise to spousal support entitlement.
  • There was no evidence that Dennis had to live in Toronto to maintain or advance his career.
  • I am not able to conclude on the evidence that while the parties cohabited and subsequent to the parties of separation Dennis had to turn down or was unable to take work assignments because he lived in London.
  • While the parties lived together and after they moved to London, Dennis’ income increased. According to his records, in 2014 his income was $21,103 and in 2015 it was $17,293; after moving to London, his income in 2016 was $29,031; in 2017 it was $49,478 and in 2018 it was $55,896; the year the parties separated, Dennis’ income dropped to $37,992 but rebounded in 2020 to $46,765; and in 2021 it was $60,809.
  • While together and afterwards, Dennis continued to travel for the purposes of his employment.
• f. I am not persuaded that Dennis’ earning capacity was reduced or adversely affected by the move to London, other than having to incur additional travel time and expenses. As a freelancer, he traveled wherever the job needed him to be, whether in Toronto or elsewhere.
• g. Lindsay did benefit from the move to London. She was able to obtain and maintain employment with the university. This move did not disadvantage Dennis except as described: travel time and expense. He did not subordinate his career to Lindsay’s.
• h. Dennis did incur debt during the marriage. He did not establish that this debt benefited the family. During the marriage, Dennis sent approximately $100,000 to others as described earlier in these reasons.
• i. Based on the financial disclosure provided, since separation Dennis and Lindsay have experienced similar standards of living, as described earlier in these reasons. In these reasons I found that Dennis has the capacity to earn $75,000 this year and $90,000 next year. Dennis’ evidence is that he aspires to earn between $80,000 and $100,000 as long as he remains healthy. These amounts are far more than he disclosed that he earned during the marriage.
• j. I accept that Dennis has ADHD, which has been treated with medication for the last 13 or 14 years, which he takes as needed. However, there is no cogent medical evidence in evidence that supports a finding that Dennis’ ability to work is adversely affected by his condition. His evidence is that he is well suited as a director of photography to the short-term and urgent work that he undertakes. I accept that the timely preparation of paperwork is not one of his strengths.
• k. The parties’ respective net family properties have been equalized. Lindsay will be obliged to pay an equalization payment to Dennis.
• l. Both parties are able to be economically self-sufficient through their respective employment and with child support being paid by Lindsay to Dennis.

211I also find that Dennis has not established that he is entitled to spousal support from Lindsay on a non-compensatory basis having regard to the following:

• a. The evidence does not support a finding that Dennis has experienced a significant decline in his standard of living from that enjoyed during the marriage. As stated above, based on the financial disclosure provided, since separation Dennis and Lindsay have experienced similar standards of living. In these reasons I found that Dennis has the capacity to earn $75,000 this year and $90,000 next year. Dennis’ evidence is that he aspires to earn between $80,000 and $100,000 as long as he remains healthy. These amounts are far more than he disclosed that he earned during the marriage.
• b. As stated above, the parties cohabited for approximately seven years. This is the low end of a medium-term relationship. During this time the evidence does not support a finding that an interdependency developed “as a result of a shared life…summed up in the phrase “merger over time.”
• c. The parties’ respective net family properties have been equalized. Lindsay will be obliged to pay an equalization payment to Dennis.
• d. Both parties are able to be economically self-sufficient through their respective employment and with child support being paid by Lindsay to Dennis.

212Dennis’ claim for spousal support is dismissed.

213If I am incorrect in my finding that Dennis has not established entitlement, I would find that his entitlement on compensatory or non-compensatory basis is at the low end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines range. With Dennis’s income to be increased to $90,000 next year, and Lindsay’s being reduced to approximately $135,000 so that she assumes all the responsibilities expected of her at the university, the amount of spousal support payable would be $0.00 at the low end of the range, under the With Child Support Formula.

DIVORCE

214The usual requirements necessary before a divorce may be granted have been met in this case. Accordingly, a divorce order shall issue.

ORDER

215For these reasons, the following order shall issue:

1. A divorce order is granted.

Equalization

2. Lindsay shall pay to Dennis the sum of $121,231.06 to equalize the respective net family properties.
3. Lindsay is entitled to a credit towards the equalization payment owing in the amount of $73,000, resulting in a net amount owing of $48,231.06. Subject to para. 11 below, this sum of $48,231.06 is to be paid to Dennis out of the net proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home currently held in trust by White Law Professional Corporation with the balance being paid to Lindsay or as she may direct in writing.
4. Lindsay’s claim for an unequal division of net family property is dismissed.
5. Dennis’s claim for an unequal division of net family property is dismissed.

Child Support

6. Income shall be imputed to Dennis in the annual amount of $75,000 per year from the date of separation until March 31, 2027.
7. The monthly amount of child support payable by Lindsay to Dennis for the period July 1, 2020, until November 30, 2021, is $0.00.
8. The amount of child support payable by Lindsay to Dennis for the period December 1, 2021, until December 31, 2024, is $340 per month.
9. Commencing the first day of January 2025 and on the first day of each month thereafter, Lindsay shall pay to Dennis for the support of J. the monthly amount of $600 based upon: (1) Federal Child Support Guidelines, s. 9; and (2) Lindsay’s annual income of $146,000 and Dennis’s imputed income of $75,000.
10. Commencing April 1, 2027, income shall be imputed to Dennis in the amount of $90,000 per year. Child support shall then be determined based on Lindsay’s actual 2027 income and Dennis’s imputed income.
11. Lindsay is entitled to credit for all child support payments she made since July 2020. If the parties are not able to agree on this calculation, whether it be arrears or an overpayment, they may make further written submissions within 30 days of the release of these reasons. Any amount found to be owing by one party to the other on account of this child support calculation shall be deducted from that parties’ share of the net proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home and provided to the other.
12. Commencing May 1, 2026, the parties shall share any special or extraordinary expenses to which they both agree, based on their respective incomes. Consent to the special or extraordinary expenses shall not be unreasonably withheld. At present, Lindsay is to pay 66% of special expenses based on her income of $146,000 per year, and Dennis is to pay 34% of those expenses based on his imputed income of $75,000 per year. This calculation will change commencing April 1, 2027, when Dennis’ imputed income is increased to $90,000 per year.

Spousal support

13. Dennis’s claim for spousal support is dismissed.

Costs and prejudgment interest

14. The parties are encouraged to resolve the issue of costs and prejudgment interest between themselves. However, if they are unable to do so, they shall each submit written costs and prejudgment interest submissions. Prejudgment interest submissions shall consist of not more than three pages in length. Costs submissions shall not consist of more than three pages in length. These written submissions are to be double-spaced and using a minimum 12-point font together with a bill of costs and any offers to settle on the following schedule:
    • a) Lindsay is to serve her submissions by June 12, 2026;
    • b) Dennis is to serve his submissions by June 26, 2026; and
    • c) All submissions are to be filed with the court, copied to LondonUFCAdmin@ontario.ca and uploaded to Case Centre by June 30, 2026.
15. If costs and prejudgment interest submissions are not filed in accordance with the timelines provided, costs and prejudgment interest shall be deemed settled.

A Final Word

216I wish to commend and thank the parties and counsel for the respect they showed one another and the court throughout this trial.

Footnotes

1. 1See Exhibit 78 – Letter of K. Gowdy dated November 27, 2025. This letter was admitted in evidence not for the truth of the contents but only for the purpose of confirming statements Dennis told his counsellor.
2. 2When she testified, her surname had changed to Abbott.
3. 3Respondent’s trial submissions, at para. 52.
4. 4Case Center H1453.
5. 5Case Center H684.
6. 6Case Center H686.
7. 7See respondent’s trial submissions, at paras. 56–58, Case Center B3828–3829.
8. 8See Exhibit 88.
9. 9Case Center H4489–H4492.
10. 10Exhibit 51.