Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: FC1018/20 DATE: 2023/10/26

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

FAMILY COURT

BETWEEN:

Ama Akyaa, Applicant

AND:

William Osei, Respondent

COUNSEL: Bayly Guslits, for the Applicant William Osei, in Person, for the Respondent

HEARD: September 25, 26, 28, 29, 2023

BEFORE: HENDERSON J.

Reasons for Judgment

[1] The parties commenced cohabiting in or about April 2009, purportedly married November 8, 2013, and separated in May 2020. They have one child.

[2] The parties have settled some of the issues by way of consent final orders. By order dated May 17, 2021, Sah, J. ordered that the applicant mother have sole decision-making in respect of the child who was to reside in her primary care. At the beginning of this trial, the parties consented to an order granting a restraining order against the respondent and setting out parenting time for the respondent with the child.

[3] The remaining issues left to be determined by the trial are:

1. Child support and s. 7 expenses;
2. Property division based either on an equalization payment pursuant to the Family Law Act or on the basis of a constructive trust;
3. Validity of the marriage; and
4. Divorce.

[4] The trial ended abruptly when the respondent in the midst of his cross examination of the applicant in the course of her reply evidence escalated to the point that security had to be called. The respondent apparently left the building before security arrived. I adjourned the trial to the next day and despite invitations from counsel and the court the respondent did not return to the trial.

Child Support

[4] Pursuant to the order of Sah, J. dated May 17, 2021, the applicant has sole decision-making in respect of the child, who resides in her primary care. As a result, the respondent has an obligation to pay child support pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg. 391/97 (“CSG”).

[5] The respondent is employed through a temp agency and his tax returns filed since 2018 show his income as a combination of employment income and employment insurance benefits. The respondent testified that he works two to three months at a time before he is laid off. His line 150 incomes disclosed on his T1 General and Notices of Assessment are as follows:

2018: $60,062.92 2019: $20,468.56 2020: $40,130 2021: $50,175.44 2022: $39,050.04

[6] On January 6, 2021, Price, J. ordered the respondent to pay child support in the amount of $402.00 per month on an income of $43,680.00. That order was varied by Sah, J. on May 17, 2021, when she ordered the respondent to pay child support in the amount of $192.00 per month on an income of $24,000.00 retroactive to January 1, 2021. At no time has the respondent voluntarily paid child support. Mitrow, J on December 14, 2021 ordered child support arrears of $2304.00 be remitted from the advance on the net sale proceeds to the respondent he also ordered. No payment has been received since January 2022.

[7] The applicant seeks an order for child support from November 1, 2020 based on the respondent’s income in 2020, 2021 and 2022, pursuant to the CSG. The respondent testified that he was reassessed in 2021 to a lower income. Despite being invited to produce his Notice of Re-Assessment, he failed to do so by the end of trial. I accept the incomes listed above as the respondent’s incomes for the purposes of determining appropriate child support. I calculate therefore the retroactive child support owing as follows:

Year Child support Months Amount Owed 2020 $360.48 2 $720.96 2021 $462.54 12 $5550.48 2022 $342.59 12 $4171.48 $10,442.92 Less child support received $2304.00 Net owing $8138.92

[8] Moving forward, I am not prepared to base child support on the respondent’s income of $50,175.00 as the applicant invites me to do in her draft order. In view of the inconsistent nature of the respondent’s employment, historically, I would impute an income based on s. 17 and s. 19(1)(a) of the CSG.

[9] Section 17(1) speaks to a parties’ pattern of income:

17 (1) If the court is of the opinion that the determination of a spouse’s annual income under section 16 would not be the fairest determination of that income, the court may have regard to the spouse’s income over the last three years and determine an amount that is fair and reasonable in light of any pattern of income, fluctuation in income or receipt of a non-recurring amount during those years.

[10] Section 19(1)(a) permits the court to impute an income where “a spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed.” No information was provided regarding the respondent’s skills, training or education. He did say he had had a wide variety of jobs including truck driver and factory worker with a car manufacturer. He was not able to explain why he could not retain a position for more than two to three months. He did not complain of any medical issues aside from his age (53).

[11] Taking into account his historical income over the past five years, I find that an imputed income of $45,000 per year to be appropriate. Therefore, I order that commencing January 1, 2023 until October 1, 2023, the respondent shall pay support for the subject child in the amount of $418.00 per month on that income. This results in retroactive child support owing of $4,180.00. Total retroactive child support is $8138.92 + $4,180 = $12,318.92, which I order to be paid from the respondent’s share of the sale proceeds sitting in trust as I discuss below.

[12] Finally, I order that commencing November 1, 2023, the respondent shall pay support for the subject child in the amount of $418.00 per month based on an imputed annual income of $45,000.00.

Property Division/Validity of the Marriage

[13] The applicant pleads that she is entitled to an equalization payment pursuant to the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3. In the alternative, she requests an order that half the net proceeds from the sale of the family residence at 46-3270 Singleton Avenue (the “Singleton property”) in London, Ontario be imposed with a constructive trust in her favour.

[14] The respondent responds with the argument that the parties were never married and hence the applicant is not entitled to an equalization payment. The provisions of Part I (Family Property) and Part II (Matrimonial Home) only apply to married couples.

[15] In respect of the constructive trust, the respondent argues that the Singleton property was registered in his name only purchased with his money. The applicant therefore has no equitable claim against monies sitting in trust.

[16] The fundamental question is who is entitled to the trust monies and, if both, to what extent? The trust monies are the net proceeds of sale of the Singleton Avenue property. It is not disputed that the money for the purchase of that home included $176,000 from the sale of a home in Brampton that was jointly owned.

[17] The respondent argues the marriage with the applicant was not valid on three grounds:

1. The applicant was not validly divorced from her first husband;
2. The purported marriage certificate was not valid as there were issues with the applicant’s name and she could not produce proper identification to verify her name. In addition, the applicant could not produce a Registrar’s Certificate which is the marriage license enabling the parties to marry; and
3. According to the respondent, it is a requirement that a “traditional” marriage take place before the civil marriage. Because the applicant’s parents did not approve of the marriage, there was no traditional marriage before the wedding ceremony and therefore rendered that ceremony invalid.

[18] Credibility came to play a significant role in determining the facts that supported the parties’ respective positions. In that respect, I found the respondent’s credibility sorely wanting. His answers were evasive. He could not answer a simple yes or no answer without embarking on a long recitation of his view of the facts that did not address the question asked. These diatribes followed similar themes including that most of the signatures on any document were either forged or fake, without producing any corroborating evidence.

[19] In one example, the respondent denied that it was his signature on his Answer that was filed on his behalf by counsel at the time. Applicant’s counsel in cross-examination had put to the respondent his Answer and a letter dated June 21, 2020 apparently from him. In that letter, the respondent declares that the applicant is a joint co-owner of the Singleton property. In his haste to say the letter was forged including his signature he also stated that his signature on the Answer was also forged, possibly by his counsel. This statement led to an unintended consequence.

[20] When I pointed out that if the Answer was not his, then there was no Answer before the court rendering the proceeding an uncontested trial. I adjourned the trial for a day to allow the respondent time to speak to counsel to understand the implication of his evidence. He returned with two other Answers. The one filed with the court was dated March 9, 2021, and the other two Answers were dated March 5, 2021, and February 5, 2021. All three Answers appear to have been signed by the respondent. The respondent admits he did sign the earlier two forms of the Answer. The February 5, 2021 version appears to be a draft as it contains a question regarding a date presumably asked by his counsel.

[21] The substance of all three Answers are identical and speak to the issues before the court. There are only two significant differences. The date on the March 9, 2021 version of the respondent’s signature is in small case whereas in the previous two drafts the date was all in capitalized letters. The respondent says he writes only in capitalized letters. He says someone else inserted the March 9, 2021 date and, because of that, his signature was forged.

[22] I do not come to the same conclusion. The substance of all three documents was the same and spoke to the issues raised in the Application. The respondent admits to signing the earlier two drafts. On the face of it, the respondent has a distinctive signature which appears similar on all three documents. The respondent did not provide any expert opinion to the contrary. The respondent could not explain why anyone would forge his signature on a document that was substantively identical to two prior drafts he admits to signing.

[23] The only other difference is that the two earlier drafts were on a court form dated March 1, 2018. The form had been changed effective December 1, 2020. The court had rejected the March 5, 2021 draft and the respondent had to sign the proper form and refile it. For whatever reason, it is reasonable to assume that the respondent neglected to date his signature and either his counsel or staff inserted the date so they could file the Answer to head off the scheduled uncontested hearing in April 2021.

[24] I find that there was no reason for the respondent to deny his signature on the March 9, 2021 version of his Answer. Indeed, it was not in his interests to do so. I find that the only reason he denied it was that his signature on the Answer was similar to his signature on the letter dated June 21, 2020, in which he declared that the applicant was a joint co-owner of the Singleton property.

[25] A further reason I do not find the respondent to be a credible witness is that his position at trial contradicted what he pled in his Answer. At trial, as I have indicated, the respondent testified that one of the reasons the ceremony on November 8, 2013 was not valid was that it was not preceded by a traditional marriage custom. In his Answer, at paragraph 5, the respondent states:

The Applicant and I entered into a religious union in November 2013, according to our traditional African-Islamic customs while we were in Ghana.

[26] At paragraph 9, he continued:

I terminated my union with the applicant in accordance with our traditional African-Islamic customs on July 7, 2020 with the applicant’s parents.

[27] During the entire course of his evidence, the respondent made no mention of this termination.

[28] Finally, I find that the respondent would do anything to “protect his investment” in his words, including attacking the applicant’s integrity without basis, badgering the applicant to the point where a restraining order has been in place since the inception of these proceedings and with the respondent’s consent shall continue as a final order. I also note the respondent’s conduct at the end of this trial, in which he escalated to the point of having security called, alleging the court had lost an exhibit that had never been produced. The respondent strikes me as a man who has gone through life relying on bluster and bluff whenever he believes he has been dealt a bad hand.

[29] For these reasons, where the parties’ evidence contradicts, I prefer the applicant’s version.

[30] I will now address the respondent’s three grounds for the invalidity of the marriage.

[31] The first is that the respondent alleges the applicant was not divorced from her first husband. He says the divorce certificate was forged and that the judge who signed it had not yet been appointed. The applicant states that she had given money to the respondent to obtain the divorce on her behalf.

[32] I accept the applicant’s explanation and find that the divorce certificate produced by the applicant is valid. There is no doubt the parties wanted to get married. The respondent was already divorced, and it is reasonable to believe he would do what he could to facilitate his marriage to the applicant. He has provided no independent evidence that the document was forged nor that the judge who signed it was not on the bench at that time. The applicant tendered into evidence a document from the Assistant Director, Legal and Consular Bureau, Ministry of Foreign and Regional Integration of the Republic of Ghana dated August 22, 2013, certifying the signatures on the divorce certificate dated August 9, 2013 as true. I accept that document as proof that the applicant was validly divorced from her first husband prior to her marriage to the respondent.

[33] The respondent’s own conduct also undermines his arguments. As the evidence will show below, the respondent went through not one but two ceremonies confirming the marriage of the parties. At no time prior to or after November 8, 2013, did the respondent raise an objection to the marriage because the applicant was not divorced. He was aware of the necessity of a divorce prior to remarrying as he had obtained his own divorce from his previous wife.

[34] On February 10, 2018, the parties participated in a traditional wedding ceremony in Toronto. The applicant’s parents were by then convinced to approve of the marriage which they hadn’t up to this point. Two pastors blessed the union and the parties exchanged rings. At no time prior to or after this ceremony did the respondent object to the validity of the marriage on the basis that the applicant was not divorced.

[35] In March 2019, the parties went to Ghana for a visit. While there, they attended at the government offices to amend the applicant’s name on the marriage certificate. At no time before or after this event did the respondent raise an objection about the applicant’s marital status.

[36] It appears on the evidence, that the first time the respondent raised any objection to the validity of the marriage was when he served his Answer.

[37] With respect to the validity of the marriage certificate itself, the applicant testified that the parties participated in a wedding ceremony on November 8, 2013 in Accra, Ghana. It was a civil ceremony presided over by a Mr. Ibrahim, the Registrar. The respondent did not dispute that the ceremony took place.

[38] The applicant adduced into evidence several photographs taken during the ceremony. The respondent raised no objection to them going in. They show the parties signing the certificate, at least two of the witnesses, one of whom was the respondent’s mother, signing the certificate, the Registrar signing the certificate and congratulating the parties at the conclusion.

[39] This ceremony was followed by the traditional marriage ceremony in February, 2018. It was presided over by two Pentecostal pastors who blessed the union. Again, photographs were put into evidence showing the blessings and the respondent putting on a wedding ring on the applicant.

[40] The respondent testified that, following the ceremony on November 8, 2013, he noticed certain defects in the marriage certificate. Specifically, he pointed out the lack of license number and the applicant’s listed name of Ama Akyaa who was also known as Charity Appiah. According to the respondent, the parties tried to rectify the problem a few days later but were unable to proceed because the applicant was unable to produce government identification showing either name. They returned to Canada shortly after.

[41] In March 2019, they returned to Ghana and again took the issue up with government officials. Again, according to the respondent, the applicant was unable to produce acceptable government issued identification. As the respondent understood the situation, they would have to get remarried in the absence of the applicant producing proper identification.

[42] The applicant does not dispute that they went to get the marriage certificate amended. She said the respondent confronted the official with the defective certificate and the two went into an office together. They returned with a statutory declaration stating that the applicant used to go by the name of Ama Akyaa and that she has changed her name to Charity Ama Appiah, that that is the name she wishes to use “in all documents and execution” and that she is one and the same as Charity Ama Appiah (separately, the applicant had described Ama Akyaa as her traditional Ghanian name). The applicant swore the statutory declaration on May 2, 2019 in Ghana. On the basis of this, an amended marriage certificate was produced, effective the original wedding date. As far as the applicant was concerned, the problem was fixed. It was her understanding that the original marriage certificate was then destroyed.

[43] The applicant also dismissed the respondent’s claim that the marriage was invalid because she could not produce the Registrar’s Certificate that gave them permission to marry. The respondent said it was the custom that the marriage certificate was always given to the bride at the end of the ceremony. The applicant agreed and said the Registrar’s Certificate was given to her at the same time. However, the applicant says she gave them to the respondent afterwards. On the evidence, it is reasonable to assume that they were in the respondent’s possession at some point as he had noted the defects on the face of the marriage certificate.

[44] Regardless of the exact nature of the deficiency, the defects are of a technical nature that do not affect the validity of the marriage. I rely on s. 31 of the Marriage Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.3:

31 If the parties to a marriage solemnized in good faith and intended to be in compliance with this Act are not under a legal disqualification to contract such marriage and after such solemnization have lived together and cohabited as a married couple, such marriage shall be deemed a valid marriage, although the person who solemnized the marriage was not authorized to solemnize marriage, and despite the absence of or any irregularity or insufficiency in the publication of banns or the issue of the licence.

[45] The Court of Appeal discussed the ambit of s. 31 in the recent case of Lalonde v. Agha, 2021 ONCA 651. The facts of that case are similar to the present. The parties were married in an Islamic marriage ceremony in Tennessee. It did not comply with state regulations including the requirement that the parties obtain a marriage license and register the marriage.

[46] As is in the present case, the husband challenged the wife’s claim for an equalization of the parties’ net family properties on the basis they were not validly married. They were not therefore “spouses” under s. 1(1) of the Family Law Act for the purposes of a division of property under s. 5.

[47] The Court first addressed the husband’s argument that s. 31 does not apply to marriages solemnized outside of Ontario. It held that that interpretation was too narrow. While the Court agreed the formal validity of a marriage is determined by the law of the jurisdiction where the marriage is celebrated, it found there was an important distinction to be made. At paragraph 26, L.B. Roberts J.A writing for the Court, said:

[26] However, whether a marriage is formally invalid under the lex loci celebrationis is a different question from whether it can be deemed legally valid.

[48] Continuing at paragraph 27:

[27] Section 31 contemplates marriages that are otherwise not legally valid until the provision “deems” them to be so. It is the law of the jurisdiction where the parties reside that applies to the question of whether the marriage will be legally validated notwithstanding its formal irregularities. Julien D. Payne and Marilyn A. Payne explain in Canadian Family Law, 8th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2020), at p. 16: “Although based on a contract between the parties, marriage is a status to which the state attaches its own conditions as to its creation, duration, and consequences” (footnote omitted). As this court reiterated in Alspector, at pp. 685-86, a competent court has jurisdiction to define matrimonial status and, in particular, to declare a marriage valid.

[49] And at paragraph 29:

[29] The legal validation of marriages also reflects the long-standing societal importance of marriage that, in the face of a dispute between the parties, favours deeming the marriage valid…

[50] And finally at paragraph 31:

[31] Section 31 is a validation clause that protects a marriage contracted in good faith from invalidity on the ground of formal irregularities…

[51] The Court also held that it is appropriate to consider the parties’ subjective intentions when considering the words “intended to be in compliance with the Act.” L.B. Roberts J.A noted at paragraph 39 “the well-established public policy … that favours marriage as a social constitution.”

[52] At paragraph 44, she wrote:

[44] In my view, a marriage is “intended to be in compliance with this Act” where there is an intention to create a formally binding legal marriage, that is, one that would be recognized for civil, as opposed to only religious, purposes. That intention will not be present where the parties know of the relevant formal legal requirements and deliberately choose not to follow them, notwithstanding that their marriage is recognized as a valid religious ceremony or was solemnized in good faith. But that intention may be found where the parties believe they are marrying for all purposes, any non-compliance was non-deliberate, and where the parties’ subsequent behaviour confirms that they considered themselves, from the time of the marriage ceremony, to have become legally married.

[53] Applying the law to the facts of this case, I find the parties were validly married. The parties believed that the wedding ceremony celebrated on November 8, 2013 created a binding marriage in conformity with the laws of Ghana and Ontario. The ceremony was conducted by the Registrar in the presence of witnesses. The photographs confirm the parties’ voluntary participation and happiness in the event. They had the capacity to marry as both had been previously divorced. They married in good faith.

[54] Their subsequent behaviour confirmed their intentions. They returned to Canada, lived together, raised a child together and bought a house together. They held themselves out as a married couple. The respondent in his income tax returns as late as 2019 represented to the government that he was married to the applicant.

[55] In 2018, the parties had their marriage blessed in a traditional ceremony after the applicant’s parents came to approve the marriage. The applicant wore a wedding ring presented by the respondent at that ceremony. As late as 2019, they returned to Ghana to try to remedy the technical deficiencies on the marriage certificate.

[56] The respondent did not put forward any expert opinion that the marriage was invalid under Ghanaian law.

[57] I therefore dismiss this ground.

[58] Finally, the respondent argued that the marriage was invalid because the parties did not have a traditional marriage before the wedding ceremony. The respondent presented no evidence to support this claim. The applicant dismissed it as a requirement.

[59] I find that on the respondent’s own evidence that there is no merit in this ground. The respondent testified that there were no formal requirements to a traditional marriage. By way of customs and ceremony, the tradition varied from tribe to tribe. As the respondent described it, the custom was an engagement party that brought the two families together. In his own words, in terms of being legally binding, it was “meaningless.” Of itself, this would undermine the respondent’s argument that it was a requirement of being married civilly.

[60] As the respondent described the event, the 2018 ceremony in Toronto best reflected the nature of the custom. The couples’ union was blessed and as the applicant’s parents then approved the marriage, it brought the two families together.

[61] While I agree with the respondent that there was nothing legally binding by the ceremony in the formal sense, it did confirm the parties’ commitment to each other as a married couple.

[62] As a result, I also dismiss this ground of the respondent’s argument.

[63] Based on the foregoing, I find as follows:

1. The parties were married on November 8, 2013 in Accra, Ghana;
2. The applicant’s name Ama Akyaa is one and the same as Charity Appiah and Charity Ama Appiah; and
3. The parties are spouses of each other under s. 1(1) of the Family Law Act.

Property Claims

[64] As I stated above the fundamental question is who is entitled to how much of the monies. The net proceeds from the sale of the Singleton property were $307,058.38. Each party has received advances: the applicant $65,000 and the respondent $85,000 which leaves a balance of approximately $157,058.38.

[65] The applicant filed a draft Net Family Property Statement. Based on the available information, the applicant calculates an equalization payment of $1,750.00 in favour of the applicant.

[66] The applicant’s calculation is very tentative as the respondent’s disclosure of relevant financial information has been woefully inadequate. The only sworn financial statement before the court was sworn by the respondent on November 26, 2021. Although the statement was sworn 11 months into the year, the respondent reported that he had earned no income in 2021 and had been unemployed since December 23, 2020. His annual expenses totaled $54,504.00. Yet his 2021 income tax return disclosed an income of $50,175.00 which included income from employment and employment insurance.

[67] The financial statement disclosed no bank balances as of the date of separation. It showed that he closed and opened new accounts on the date of separation, but no balances were provided as of the date of separation. The financial statement also indicated that the respondent’s RRSP was cashed out in 2017 to purchase the Brampton home. Yet the respondent’s 2019 income tax return states that included in his income for that year was $1,615 drawn from an RRSP. No particulars of this RRSP were disclosed on the respondent’s financial statement.

[68] Courts at all levels have decried the evils of inadequate financial disclosure. It has been called the cancer of family law. The respondent’s lack of transparency prevents the court from preforming its judicial function and deprives the applicant of an ability to equalize accurately the parties’ net family properties.

[69] In the end the applicant seeks an equal share of the sale proceeds from the sale of the Singleton property, if not by way of an equalization payment, then by way of constructive trust.

[70] The Singleton property was purchased with the proceeds of sale of a home in Brampton, which the parties jointly owned. I am satisfied based on bank statements that the applicant contributed $56,000 to the purchase of that home with the respondent contributing the balance.

[71] Unfortunately, the applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and could not work on doctor’s advice. The parties fell into arrears on their mortgage and the bank moved to sell the property under power of sale proceedings. The parties were able to sell the home beforehand but at a considerable markdown of the market value.

[72] According to the respondent, the parties netted $176,000 from the sale which was used to purchase the Singleton property. For reasons unclear, the respondent persuaded the applicant that the title be registered in his name alone. The respondent went along believing that, as she was married to him, she would be protected. The title was ultimately registered in the respondent’s name 99% and a friend of the respondent 1%. The friend had to guarantee the mortgage in order for the bank to advance the funds for the purchase of the Singleton property.

[73] In order to impose a constructive trust, the applicant must establish three elements: an enrichment or benefit to the respondent, a corresponding deprivation to the applicant, and the absence of a juristic reason for the enrichment (see e.g. Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, [2011] 1 SCR 269 (SCC), para. 32).

[74] On the basis of the bank statements produced by the applicant, I am satisfied she made a significant contribution to the purchase of the Brampton home. Most of this contribution was from a settlement arising from a motor vehicle accident (different from the one referred to above). The title was registered in joint names and they jointly maintained it while they owned it.

[75] When the joint proceeds of sale from the Brampton home went to the purchase of a home 99% owned by the respondent, I find that the respondent benefitted from the applicant’s prior contribution and the applicant was correspondingly deprived of that value. There is no juristic reason justifying the respondent’s enrichment. For whatever reason, the respondent said that title had to go into his name and the applicant trusted him, to her regret.

[76] Therefore, I find that the proceeds are imposed with a trust in favour of the applicant to the extent of 50%.

[77] If I am wrong in this analysis, I would find that the applicant was a joint owner on the basis of the respondent’s declaration in correspondence to one Nizam Hashmi, a real estate lawyer in Toronto. This letter was dated June 21, 2020 following the parties’ separation. In the letter the respondent declares that the applicant is “joint co-owner” of the Singleton property and that she will be responsible for 50% of the mortgage and debts associated with the house during the mortgage’s current term and that the house would then be sold. The respondent denies that he signed the letter. In the absence of any corroborating evidence, I find that he did sign the note. His signature is similar to his signature on all other documents put into evidence. The terms are consistent with what he described as an offer to the applicant and his stated intent to ensure the applicant received some proceeds when the property was sold.

[78] The applicant seeks three adjustments to the distribution of the proceeds, with which I agree. The first is to equalize the difference between the $85,000 the respondent has received and the $65,000 the applicant has received to date. The second concerns a second mortgage that the respondent secured against title without the applicant’s knowledge or consent. The respondent used those funds for the wedding to his current wife. The adjustment is one half the payout on the sale, or $13,627.19, in the applicant’s favour. Finally, there is an outstanding cost award in the applicant’s favour in the amount of $750.

[79] I calculate the distribution of the balance of the sale proceeds as follows:

Total net proceeds – $157,058.38

	Applicant	Respondent
50% Sale proceeds	$78,529.19	$78,529.19
Equalization	+$10,000.00	-$10,000.00
2nd Mortgage	+$13,627.19	-$13,627.19
Costs	+$750.00	-$750.00
Retroactive child support	+$12,318.92	-$12,318.92
Total	$115,225.30	$41,833.08

[80] From the proceeds in trust, the applicant shall forthwith receive $115,225.30. The respondent’s share shall remain in trust pending the cost decision.

[81] The divorce may proceed by way of a basket motion on an uncontested basis.

[82] The applicant shall make submissions regarding costs within 15 days. The respondent shall have 15 days to respond. Costs submissions shall not be more than five pages double-spaced, not including offers to settle and bills of cost.

“Justice Paul J. Henderson”

Justice Paul J. Henderson

Released: October 26, 2023

COURT FILE NO.: FC1018/20 DATE: 2023/10/26 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE FAMILY COURT BETWEEN: Ama Akyaa Applicant

• and - William Osei Respondent REASONS FOR JUDGMENT HENDERSON J. Released: October 26, 2023