Christina Ninham

The children's aid society sought extended care and deemed custody orders for four Indigenous children who had been in temporary care for five years following the death of their two-year-old sibling.

The parents sought the return of the children under a supervision order.

The court found the children remained in need of protection due to the mother's severe anxiety, which manifested in unfounded medical and sexual abuse allegations, and the parents' historical neglect.

Applying the best interests of the child test under the CYFSA and the Federal Act, the court granted the society's plan, placing two children in extended society care and two in the deemed custody of kin caregivers.

Supervised access was ordered for three children, while no access was ordered for one child whose severe special needs resulted in extreme dysregulation following parental visits.

The applicant children's aid society brought a motion to vary a temporary care and custody order, seeking to remove two children from the care of the respondent mother and place them with the respondent father or in society care.

The motion was precipitated by a physical altercation between one child and the mother's roommate.

The court found a material change in circumstances for the older child, who exhibited severe behavioural issues and conflict with the mother, and ordered him to remain in the father's care.

However, the court found no material change for the younger child and ordered her returned to the mother's care, subject to strict supervision terms.

This temporary care and custody hearing involved three Indigenous children affiliated with Caldwell First Nations.

The Family & Children’s Services of St. Thomas and Elgin sought to place the eldest child (L.A.) with the father and the two younger children (M.W. and H.W.) with the mother, subject to supervision.

The father opposed, seeking custody of all three.

The court, applying the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and the paramount An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, found that L.A. could remain with the father under terms.

However, M.W. and H.W. were at risk of physical and emotional harm with the father due to ongoing verbal and physical abuse, neglect, and the father's non-compliance with previous court orders.

The court ordered M.W. and H.W. into the temporary care of the mother, with terms to ensure their safety and cultural connection.

The appellant father appealed a summary judgment order placing his twin children in extended society care.

The children, who are of First Nations heritage, had been in the care of the society since birth.

The appellant failed to meaningfully participate in the appeal hearing.

The Divisional Court reviewed the motion judge's findings regarding the lack of a genuine issue for trial, the best interests of the children regarding access, the absence of viable kinship placements, and the adequate consideration of the children's Indigenous heritage.

Finding no palpable and overriding error or error of law, the court dismissed the appeal.

The father brought a motion to dismiss a child protection application on the basis that a customary care agreement had been signed by the parents, the First Nation, and the Children's Aid Society.

A former foster parent brought a cross-motion to be added as a party to the proceeding.

The court granted the father's motion, emphasizing that customary care is the preferred approach for Indigenous children and that the agreement was valid and in the child's best interests.

The former foster parent's motion was dismissed as adding her would cause undue delay and conflict in a resolved proceeding.

The Society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of a four-month-old Indigenous child.

The parents opposed, seeking the child's return under supervision.

The court analyzed whether the provincial child protection legislation conflicted with the federal Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, concluding there was no conflict and the augmented provincial best interests test applied.

Finding that the child could be adequately protected by strict terms of supervision while residing with the maternal great-aunt, the court dismissed the Society's motion and placed the child in the joint care of the parents.

The applicant child, J.N.-L., brought an openness application seeking an order for continued contact with her four siblings, who were respondents along with the Children's Aid Society.

The primary issue addressed was the procedural requirement of notice to a biological parent (Ms. N.) who had not signed a consent to the openness order, particularly concerning a child in her primary care.

The court determined that while statutory notice provisions for openness applications do not explicitly extend to such parents, the court retains discretion under the Family Law Rules to add parties or require service.

Given Ms. N.'s engagement in the process and subsequent consent to one of the openness orders, the court found it unnecessary to add her as a party or serve her with the application.

The court granted two separate openness orders, one for J.N.-L. with three siblings and another for J.N.-L. with J.N., finding them to be in the best interests of the applicant.

The court addresses a preliminary issue in an openness application concerning whether a parent, K.N., who has not consented to the openness order and is the custodial parent of one child (J.N.) and non-custodial parent of others (C.S.-N., A.S.), is entitled to receive notice of the application.

The proposed order affects J.N. by providing for access arrangements and prohibiting K.N. from attending visits.

The court raises questions of due process, confidentiality, and the exhaustive nature of notice provisions under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, adjourning the matter for further submissions and inviting the Attorney General to participate.

The Children's Aid Society of London and Middlesex brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order of Crown wardship for the child M.J.D-N. without access.

The child's father concurred, but the mother opposed, seeking a six-month wardship with access.

The court found no genuine triable issue, noting the mother's extensive history of mental health issues, drug use, criminal charges, and failure to follow through with programs or maintain consistent access.

The court granted Crown wardship, finding it to be the least intrusive order consistent with the child's best interests, and determined that the mother failed to satisfy the statutory conditions for continued access to a Crown ward.