Randolph Claire Hammond

At an unopposed trial arising from deficient residential renovation work, the court considered the effect of unanswered requests to admit and struck the statement of defence.

The court accepted deemed admissions to establish liability for breach of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent misrepresentation, while declining to decide oppression-remedy standing because it was unnecessary to the monetary result.

The court held the defendants jointly and severally liable for proven damages of $1,046,438.14.

The court rejected the request for contractual 12% compound pre- and post-judgment interest and applied Courts of Justice Act interest rates.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal in a child protection case.

The appellant, T.M., sought partial indemnity costs against the individual respondents (parents and aunt) and the Oneida Nation of the Thames.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario, guided by the Family Law Rules, declined to award costs against the individual respondents but found it appropriate to order costs against the Oneida Nation.

The court noted that the Oneida Nation's costs submissions contained unsworn, unproven, and disrespectful statements attacking the appellant's character, and that the appellant had to bring a contested motion for continued access pending appeal.

The court ordered the Oneida Nation to pay $10,000 in costs to the appellant.

The appellant, a kin caregiver for a First Nations child, appealed an order dismissing a child protection proceeding and denying her motion to be added as a party.

The motion judge had dismissed the proceeding based on a customary care agreement signed by the biological parents, the child's aunt, the First Nation, and the Children's Aid Society, which excluded the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant met the statutory definition of a 'parent' under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and was entitled to party status.

The Court further held that the proceeding could not be dismissed on consent without the appellant's participation and a proper analysis of the child's best interests.

The plaintiff contractor and defendant owners disputed which of two quotes formed the basis of their construction contract for a medical clinic build-out.

The court held that the plaintiff's December 2018 quote constituted a valid offer that was accepted by the defendants through an agent who had ostensible authority to bind the plaintiff.

The court found that the subsequent January 2019 quote was never accepted and lacked consideration, and therefore did not amend the contract.

The court also determined that the contract was solely between the plaintiff and the defendants' corporate entity, not the individual defendants.

The father brought a motion to dismiss a child protection application on the basis that a customary care agreement had been signed by the parents, the First Nation, and the Children's Aid Society.

A former foster parent brought a cross-motion to be added as a party to the proceeding.

The court granted the father's motion, emphasizing that customary care is the preferred approach for Indigenous children and that the agreement was valid and in the child's best interests.

The former foster parent's motion was dismissed as adding her would cause undue delay and conflict in a resolved proceeding.

The defendants, Walsh Construction Company Canada and WCC Construction Canada, ULC o/a Walsh Canada, brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiff, Gowing Contractors Ltd., under Rule 56.01(1)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing Gowing lacked sufficient assets in Ontario.

Gowing opposed, asserting that significant unpaid holdback funds from completed subcontract work constituted sufficient assets.

The court dismissed Walsh's motion, finding that Walsh failed to meet the threshold onus of demonstrating Gowing's lack of assets.

The Associate Justice held that the holdback funds, even subject to Walsh's set-off claims, were properly considered an asset of Gowing, especially since Walsh had not sufficiently particularized or quantified their alleged set-offs beyond a certain amount, leaving an excess holdback amount that exceeded the requested security for costs.

The defendants brought a motion to compel answers to questions refused during the cross-examination of the plaintiff's principal on her affidavit, in advance of a pending security for costs motion.

The court granted leave for the refusals motion, finding it necessary to ensure procedural rights.

The court ordered the plaintiff to answer questions regarding its cessation of operations and the principal's relationship with a former employee, as these matters were raised in the affidavit.

However, the court dismissed the requests to compel answers regarding the plaintiff's assets, liabilities, banking records, the defendants' bill of costs, and human rights claims, finding them irrelevant or improper.

The plaintiff, a general contractor, commenced an action against the defendant mechanical subcontractor regarding a construction project.

The defendant had previously commenced a construction lien action which was referred to a Master for trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion on consent to refer this action to the same Master to be tried with or immediately following the lien action, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and inconsistent findings.

The court granted the consent order.

The Society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of a four-month-old Indigenous child.

The parents opposed, seeking the child's return under supervision.

The court analyzed whether the provincial child protection legislation conflicted with the federal Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, concluding there was no conflict and the augmented provincial best interests test applied.

Finding that the child could be adequately protected by strict terms of supervision while residing with the maternal great-aunt, the court dismissed the Society's motion and placed the child in the joint care of the parents.

The applicant children's aid society sought an order to commit a youth to a secure treatment program for 180 days due to severe substance abuse and mental health issues.

The youth's parents supported the application, while the youth opposed it.

The court found that the youth suffered from a mental disorder that grossly impaired their capacity to make reasoned judgments, and that the youth had attempted to cause serious bodily harm to themselves through severe drug use and resulting emaciation.

The court granted the application, finding that secure treatment was the only effective and least restrictive method available to prevent further serious bodily harm.

The applicant child, J.N.-L., brought an openness application seeking an order for continued contact with her four siblings, who were respondents along with the Children's Aid Society.

The primary issue addressed was the procedural requirement of notice to a biological parent (Ms. N.) who had not signed a consent to the openness order, particularly concerning a child in her primary care.

The court determined that while statutory notice provisions for openness applications do not explicitly extend to such parents, the court retains discretion under the Family Law Rules to add parties or require service.

Given Ms. N.'s engagement in the process and subsequent consent to one of the openness orders, the court found it unnecessary to add her as a party or serve her with the application.

The court granted two separate openness orders, one for J.N.-L. with three siblings and another for J.N.-L. with J.N., finding them to be in the best interests of the applicant.

The Children's Aid Society of London and Middlesex brought an application concerning the child V., who was found in need of protection.

The dispositional hearing considered three options: return to the mother (D.P.), placement with the father (T.M.), or custody to the non-parent caregiver (M.B.), who had cared for the child since six weeks old.

The court dismissed the mother's claim due to her non-participation and risk of harm.

It also dismissed the father's claim, finding his parental connection did not grant him a special advantage over the child's best interests, and noted his inconsistent access efforts.

Custody was awarded to M.B., emphasizing the child's psychological bond and the importance of continuity of care.

The mother was granted supervised access, and the father was granted reasonable access, including alternate weekends and summer weeks.

The Children's Aid Society apprehended a newborn child at birth due to concerns about the mother's mental health, history of abusive relationships, and lack of support.

The Society and the father sought an order finding the child in need of protection and placing the child in the joint custody of the father and paternal grandparents.

The mother opposed the order and sought the return of the child.

The court found the child in need of protection due to the risk of physical and emotional harm in the mother's care.

The court concluded that a supervision order would be inadequate and granted joint custody to the father and paternal grandparents, with supervised access for the mother.

In complex environmental remediation and construction lien litigation, the moving party sought production of numerous documents withheld on claims of solicitor‑client privilege, litigation privilege, and relevance.

The court reviewed over 1,600 documents including materials from a consulting engineer, internal environmental steering committee meetings, and documents produced in related environmental contamination litigation.

The court held that the party asserting privilege bears the burden of proving it on a balance of probabilities and rejected broad claims that entire meetings or communications involving counsel were privileged merely because legal issues might arise.

Applying the functional approach to third‑party communications and the dominant purpose test for litigation privilege, the court determined that many communications primarily concerned business or factual remediation matters and were not privileged.

Documents relating to the related environmental action were found relevant to the counterclaim and ordered produced, subject to further submissions regarding specific documents identified in a schedule.

In a complex construction lien and environmental remediation dispute, the parties brought cross-motions to compel answers to questions refused during examinations for discovery.

The owner sought answers from the remediation contractor regarding its prior experience and sampling protocols.

The contractor sought information and documents from the owner regarding the historical environmental condition of the property and its 1981 purchase agreement.

Applying the relevance test informed by proportionality, the court ordered the contractor to answer questions about its experience and subcontractor control, and ordered the owner to produce historical environmental information and the 1981 purchase documents, as they were relevant to the allegations of negligence and failure to mitigate.

Following dismissal of a child protection motion brought by a child welfare agency seeking emergency supervision and assessment orders under the Child and Family Services Act, the respondents sought costs.

The court found the agency’s investigation and litigation position fell far below the required standard of fairness and reasonableness expected of a statutory child protection authority.

The application was characterized as a fishing expedition driven by concerns raised by school authorities rather than legitimate child protection issues.

Applying rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court concluded that a substantial costs award was warranted.

Costs of $12,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST were ordered against the agency.

In a child protection status review involving eight children, the court considered whether the children should remain in the care of the Children’s Aid Society pending trial and whether certain children required independent legal representation.

Applying the Child and Family Services Act, the court determined that three of the older children should receive legal representation under s. 38, while younger children were too young to meaningfully instruct counsel.

The court found that the Society established ongoing protection concerns including inadequate supervision, poor school attendance, domestic violence exposure, and the caregiver’s inability to manage the children’s needs.

Proposed placements with family members and the return of several children to the mother’s care were rejected due to insufficient information and unresolved risk factors.

All children were ordered to remain in the Society’s care on an interim basis with access arrangements for family members.

Temporary care hearing under the Child and Family Services Act concerning two children previously found in need of protection.

The children had been apprehended after allegations of sexual impropriety against the father and a breach of a supervision order prohibiting his contact with the children.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children were at risk of harm but concluded the risk could be adequately managed through a supervision order.

Given the father’s relocation and the availability of supervision by the society, the court ordered that the children be returned to the mother’s care under society supervision with discretionary supervision of the father’s access.