Randolph Claire Hammond

At an unopposed trial arising from deficient residential renovation work, the court considered the effect of unanswered requests to admit and struck the statement of defence.

The court accepted deemed admissions to establish liability for breach of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent misrepresentation, while declining to decide oppression-remedy standing because it was unnecessary to the monetary result.

The court held the defendants jointly and severally liable for proven damages of $1,046,438.14.

The court rejected the request for contractual 12% compound pre- and post-judgment interest and applied Courts of Justice Act interest rates.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal in a child protection case.

The appellant, T.M., sought partial indemnity costs against the individual respondents (parents and aunt) and the Oneida Nation of the Thames.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario, guided by the Family Law Rules, declined to award costs against the individual respondents but found it appropriate to order costs against the Oneida Nation.

The court noted that the Oneida Nation's costs submissions contained unsworn, unproven, and disrespectful statements attacking the appellant's character, and that the appellant had to bring a contested motion for continued access pending appeal.

The court ordered the Oneida Nation to pay $10,000 in costs to the appellant.

The defendants, Walsh Construction Company Canada and WCC Construction Canada, ULC o/a Walsh Canada, brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiff, Gowing Contractors Ltd., under Rule 56.01(1)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing Gowing lacked sufficient assets in Ontario.

Gowing opposed, asserting that significant unpaid holdback funds from completed subcontract work constituted sufficient assets.

The court dismissed Walsh's motion, finding that Walsh failed to meet the threshold onus of demonstrating Gowing's lack of assets.

The Associate Justice held that the holdback funds, even subject to Walsh's set-off claims, were properly considered an asset of Gowing, especially since Walsh had not sufficiently particularized or quantified their alleged set-offs beyond a certain amount, leaving an excess holdback amount that exceeded the requested security for costs.

The applicant child, J.N.-L., brought an openness application seeking an order for continued contact with her four siblings, who were respondents along with the Children's Aid Society.

The primary issue addressed was the procedural requirement of notice to a biological parent (Ms. N.) who had not signed a consent to the openness order, particularly concerning a child in her primary care.

The court determined that while statutory notice provisions for openness applications do not explicitly extend to such parents, the court retains discretion under the Family Law Rules to add parties or require service.

Given Ms. N.'s engagement in the process and subsequent consent to one of the openness orders, the court found it unnecessary to add her as a party or serve her with the application.

The court granted two separate openness orders, one for J.N.-L. with three siblings and another for J.N.-L. with J.N., finding them to be in the best interests of the applicant.

The Children's Aid Society of London and Middlesex brought an application concerning the child V., who was found in need of protection.

The dispositional hearing considered three options: return to the mother (D.P.), placement with the father (T.M.), or custody to the non-parent caregiver (M.B.), who had cared for the child since six weeks old.

The court dismissed the mother's claim due to her non-participation and risk of harm.

It also dismissed the father's claim, finding his parental connection did not grant him a special advantage over the child's best interests, and noted his inconsistent access efforts.

Custody was awarded to M.B., emphasizing the child's psychological bond and the importance of continuity of care.

The mother was granted supervised access, and the father was granted reasonable access, including alternate weekends and summer weeks.

Following dismissal of a child protection motion brought by a child welfare agency seeking emergency supervision and assessment orders under the Child and Family Services Act, the respondents sought costs.

The court found the agency’s investigation and litigation position fell far below the required standard of fairness and reasonableness expected of a statutory child protection authority.

The application was characterized as a fishing expedition driven by concerns raised by school authorities rather than legitimate child protection issues.

Applying rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court concluded that a substantial costs award was warranted.

Costs of $12,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST were ordered against the agency.

In a child protection status review involving eight children, the court considered whether the children should remain in the care of the Children’s Aid Society pending trial and whether certain children required independent legal representation.

Applying the Child and Family Services Act, the court determined that three of the older children should receive legal representation under s. 38, while younger children were too young to meaningfully instruct counsel.

The court found that the Society established ongoing protection concerns including inadequate supervision, poor school attendance, domestic violence exposure, and the caregiver’s inability to manage the children’s needs.

Proposed placements with family members and the return of several children to the mother’s care were rejected due to insufficient information and unresolved risk factors.

All children were ordered to remain in the Society’s care on an interim basis with access arrangements for family members.

Temporary care hearing under the Child and Family Services Act concerning two children previously found in need of protection.

The children had been apprehended after allegations of sexual impropriety against the father and a breach of a supervision order prohibiting his contact with the children.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children were at risk of harm but concluded the risk could be adequately managed through a supervision order.

Given the father’s relocation and the availability of supervision by the society, the court ordered that the children be returned to the mother’s care under society supervision with discretionary supervision of the father’s access.