Joyce Dittrich

The Family & Children’s Services of St. Thomas and Elgin brought a motion to continue an interim order placing a child in temporary care, while the respondent mother cross-moved for the child's return.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe a risk of harm existed due to the mother's mental health challenges but determined the child could be adequately protected by a supervision order.

The court dismissed the Society's motion to continue the placement and granted the mother's cross-motion, ordering the child's return to her care under specific supervision conditions.

This temporary care and custody hearing involved three Indigenous children affiliated with Caldwell First Nations.

The Family & Children’s Services of St. Thomas and Elgin sought to place the eldest child (L.A.) with the father and the two younger children (M.W. and H.W.) with the mother, subject to supervision.

The father opposed, seeking custody of all three.

The court, applying the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and the paramount An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, found that L.A. could remain with the father under terms.

However, M.W. and H.W. were at risk of physical and emotional harm with the father due to ongoing verbal and physical abuse, neglect, and the father's non-compliance with previous court orders.

The court ordered M.W. and H.W. into the temporary care of the mother, with terms to ensure their safety and cultural connection.

The Family and Children Services of St. Thomas and Elgin brought a summary judgment motion to terminate an existing supervision order for the child, T., arguing she was no longer in need of protection.

Both parents, B.M. and D.O., opposed the termination, each seeking primary decision-making authority for T. The court dismissed the Society's motion, finding that a genuine issue for trial existed regarding T.'s continued need for protection due to the parents' ongoing high conflict and its negative emotional impact on the child, as evidenced by T.'s distress and withdrawal during parental arguments.

The court emphasized that the Society's withdrawal would likely exacerbate parental conflict over major decisions, such as T.'s schooling and medication, which would not be in the child's best interests.

A motion by the maternal grandfather (R.W.) to vary an interim order placing two young children in the temporary care and control of the Children's Aid Society.

The grandfather sought placement of the children in his home.

The court applied the test under subsection 51(6) of the Child and Family Services Act, finding a material change in circumstances but ultimately dismissing the motion.

The court found that while the grandfather's application merited consideration, insufficient evidence regarding the children's needs, the grandfather's ability to manage the older child's special medical needs (spina bifida), and unresolved concerns about the grandfather's marijuana use and financial obligations created too much uncertainty to warrant moving the children prior to trial.

The court emphasized the importance of continuity for very young children and the risk of multiple placements.

The Children's Aid Society apprehended a child from her father's care following allegations of risk.

The father moved for the return of the child and was successful.

The child was returned to the father's care subject to existing supervision order terms.

Subsequently, the father sought costs of the motion.

The court dismissed the father's costs claim, finding that while the applicant's assessment of risk was speculative or premature, the father's conduct in attempting to deny the mother her consented access through intimidation and alleged drug planting constituted bad faith that made the litigation necessary.

A status review application sought to grant custody of two children to their paternal grandparents pursuant to section 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The children had been in the grandparents' care since 2008.

The applicant initially sought consent orders with agreed findings of ongoing risk, but the agreed statement of facts was insufficient.

Subsequently, a summary judgment motion was filed combining consent provisions with summary judgment procedures.

The court refused to endorse the orders, finding that the procedural combination was improper and that certain pre-conditions in the affidavit required formal adoption by the biological parents through their signatures.

The matter was adjourned for a proper consent hearing.

This is a ruling on a voir dire in a child protection application brought by the Society seeking a finding that four children are in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act due to physical abuse and risk of physical and emotional abuse, and seeking an order of Crown wardship without access.

The court considered the admissibility of numerous statements made by the children to third parties, applying both the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and the principled exception for hearsay evidence.

The court admitted certain statements meeting the threshold reliability test while rejecting others that failed to meet the required criteria.

A child protection application brought by the Family & Children's Services of St. Thomas and Elgin concerning four children.

The Society sought a finding that the children were in need of protection under clauses 37(2)(a), (b), and (g) of the Child and Family Services Act due to physical and emotional abuse and risk of physical abuse, with a disposition of Crown wardship without access.

The respondent mother sought dismissal of the application or, alternatively, return of the children to her care subject to supervision.

The court found the children were in need of protection under clauses 37(2)(b) and (g) based on exposure to domestic violence, inadequate supervision, and alcohol consumption issues.

However, the court determined it was in the best interests of the children to be returned to the mother's care subject to a 12-month supervision order with specific terms and conditions, rather than making them Crown wards.