Katherine Orkin

The Society sought an order placing the child in extended society care with no access by the parents.

The court previously placed the child in extended society care but adjourned the issue of access to trial.

The court found that despite the parents' inconsistencies and personal struggles, the child had a positive and meaningful relationship with both parents.

The court ordered a minimum of three supervised direct access visits per year for each parent, along with email updates, finding that this would maintain the child's connection to her birth parents and indigenous heritage without unduly impairing her future opportunities for adoption.

On a motion to change under the Family Law Act, the applicant sought a retroactive variation of child support arising from a prior split-custody order after one child moved into her household.

The court held that the applicant was not jurisdictionally barred from pursuing a variation merely because, when the motion was commenced, neither child was then a dependent child within the meaning of the statute.

The court found entitlement to support for one child from September 2009 to February 2011, rejected a later period that had not been pleaded, and applied the D.B.S. framework to grant retroactive child support.

A retroactive award of $10,518.90, less amounts since paid, was ordered payable at $500 per month.

In this family costs endorsement following a successful appeal in a grandparent access dispute, the court held that the respondent grandmother's failure to disclose an existing final parenting order in the Ontario Court of Justice was patently unreasonable conduct under the Family Law Rules.

Although the successful appellant was presumptively entitled to costs, the court rejected submission that automatic offer-to-settle consequences under r. 18(14) applied because the offers sought relief outside the scope of the appeal.

Applying rr. 24(1), 24(4), 24(5), 24(10), and 24(11), the court found the bill of costs excessive, excluded time unrelated to the appeal, and fixed reasonable appeal costs at $7,500 inclusive.

The court then reduced that amount by $1,500 because the successful appellant had also acted unreasonably by failing to attend in the lower court, and ordered payment of $6,000 inclusive.

The Children's Aid Society apprehended a child from her father's care following allegations of risk.

The father moved for the return of the child and was successful.

The child was returned to the father's care subject to existing supervision order terms.

Subsequently, the father sought costs of the motion.

The court dismissed the father's costs claim, finding that while the applicant's assessment of risk was speculative or premature, the father's conduct in attempting to deny the mother her consented access through intimidation and alleged drug planting constituted bad faith that made the litigation necessary.

A status review application sought to grant custody of two children to their paternal grandparents pursuant to section 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The children had been in the grandparents' care since 2008.

The applicant initially sought consent orders with agreed findings of ongoing risk, but the agreed statement of facts was insufficient.

Subsequently, a summary judgment motion was filed combining consent provisions with summary judgment procedures.

The court refused to endorse the orders, finding that the procedural combination was improper and that certain pre-conditions in the affidavit required formal adoption by the biological parents through their signatures.

The matter was adjourned for a proper consent hearing.

A child protection application brought by the Family & Children's Services of St. Thomas and Elgin concerning four children.

The Society sought a finding that the children were in need of protection under clauses 37(2)(a), (b), and (g) of the Child and Family Services Act due to physical and emotional abuse and risk of physical abuse, with a disposition of Crown wardship without access.

The respondent mother sought dismissal of the application or, alternatively, return of the children to her care subject to supervision.

The court found the children were in need of protection under clauses 37(2)(b) and (g) based on exposure to domestic violence, inadequate supervision, and alcohol consumption issues.

However, the court determined it was in the best interests of the children to be returned to the mother's care subject to a 12-month supervision order with specific terms and conditions, rather than making them Crown wards.

This is a ruling on a voir dire in a child protection application brought by the Society seeking a finding that four children are in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act due to physical abuse and risk of physical and emotional abuse, and seeking an order of Crown wardship without access.

The court considered the admissibility of numerous statements made by the children to third parties, applying both the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and the principled exception for hearsay evidence.

The court admitted certain statements meeting the threshold reliability test while rejecting others that failed to meet the required criteria.