Ian Ross

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order committing a youth to a secure treatment program for 180 days under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The trial judge found that the youth had attempted to cause serious bodily harm within the preceding 45 days based on a threat to jump off a bridge, ingestion of an unidentified quantity of methamphetamine, and an involuntary hospital admission for suicidal ideation.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law because the incidents amounted to mere threats or lacked evidence of actual harm or risk of serious bodily harm.

The secure treatment order was set aside.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated September 23, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs on consent.

The appellant appealed a mid-trial consent order that would have automatically returned the child to the parents' care following a six-month interim care order.

The child, who had legal representation and party status under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, opposed the consent order.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The court held that the trial judge erred in law by making a final order based on consent when the child opposed it, thereby disregarding the child's statutory participatory rights.

The court further held that the trial judge's failure to provide reasons for the decision constituted an independent error of law.

The appellant mother appealed the decision of the Ontario Superior Court, which had upheld a motion judge's order making three young children Crown wards (now called extended society care) without access to the mother under the Child and Family Services Act.

The appeal judge applied the wrong legislation (CFSA instead of CYFSA) and the wrong summary judgment principles.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, confirming the extended society care order but granting the mother access to the children.

The court found that the motion judge's factual findings regarding the mother's inability to adequately care for the children were sound, but the denial of access was based on improper judicial notice and unsupported assumptions about adoption prospects.

The nature and extent of access were remanded to the Ontario Court of Justice.

This appeal concerns a mother's request for access to three of her six children in extended care following their apprehension by the Children's Aid Society in 2015.

The motion judge granted Crown wardship without access.

The Divisional Court affirmed the decision but applied the old Child and Family Services Act rather than the new Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the transitional provisions of the new Act applied, the record was insufficient to satisfy the expanded access test, the children's Indigenous heritage was not properly considered, and the approach to summary judgment in child protection matters was misapplied.

The matter was remitted to Superior Court for determination under the new legislation.

The appellant father appealed a summary judgment decision finding his child in need of protection and placing her in the custody of the respondent mother.

The child had threatened suicide during access visits, which the motions judge found was proximately caused by the father's inappropriate conduct and obsession with proving parental alienation syndrome.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge made no palpable and overriding error in relying on the available evidence.

The court also noted that the significant delay in perfecting the appeal rendered the requested remedy of a new trial impractical given the child's age and consistent refusal to see the father.

In a child protection appeal, the Office of the Children's Lawyer sought to admit fresh evidence regarding the views and preferences of the nearly 16-year-old child.

The appellant requested an adjournment to file responding evidence and cross-examine the affiant.

The Divisional Court admitted the fresh evidence and denied the adjournment, finding that the appellant had the evidence for two weeks, which was sufficient time to respond with reasonable diligence, and that child protection cases must take priority.

The Children's Lawyer for Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an Information and Privacy Commissioner's order that the Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG) had custody or control of the Children's Lawyer's litigation records relating to child clients, and therefore such records were subject to freedom of information access requests under FIPPA.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Children's Lawyer operates independently from MAG with respect to her core functions of representing children, and therefore MAG does not have custody or control of child client records.

The court emphasized the importance of confidentiality in the Children's Lawyer-child relationship to the proper functioning of the legal system and the best interests of children.

The mother appealed a summary judgment order denying her access to her four eldest children after they were made Crown wards.

The Divisional Court found that the motion judge erred in law by applying the pre-Hryniak test for summary judgment and failing to provide adequate reasons.

However, exercising its appellate powers, the Court reviewed the record and concluded that summary judgment was appropriate.

The Court held that the mother failed to establish a beneficial and meaningful relationship with the children that would justify an access order under the Child and Family Services Act.

The appeal was dismissed.

The child brought a motion to vacate a temporary order placing him in a secure treatment program.

The applicant conceded she did not meet the statutory definition of a parent, resulting in the application being dismissed for lack of standing.

The court further noted that even if standing existed, the temporary order would be vacated because the strict criteria for secure treatment, including evidence of serious bodily harm and the unavailability of less restrictive treatment methods, were not met.

The requester sought access under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) to records held by the Children's Lawyer relating to a custody and access dispute involving his children.

The Children's Lawyer refused, arguing the records were not in the custody or control of the Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG) when acting as counsel for a child.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) ordered MAG to issue an access decision, finding the records were under MAG's control.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held the standard of review was reasonableness, not correctness, as interpreting s. 10(1) of FIPPA is not a true question of jurisdiction.

The Court dismissed the application, finding the IPC's decision reasonable and noting that solicitor-client privilege concerns could be addressed through FIPPA exemptions.