3 total
Application for secure treatment dismissed for lack of standing and failure to meet statutory criteria.
The child brought a motion to vacate a temporary order placing him in a secure treatment program.
The applicant conceded she did not meet the statutory definition of a parent, resulting in the application being dismissed for lack of standing.
The court further noted that even if standing existed, the temporary order would be vacated because the strict criteria for secure treatment, including evidence of serious bodily harm and the unavailability of less restrictive treatment methods, were not met.
Child remained in Society care; assessment ordered only in principle.
In a child protection motion, the mother sought temporary care and custody of two very young children, alternatively increased access, and a parenting capacity assessment under s. 54 of the Child and Family Services Act.
The court applied the temporary protection risk analysis for the younger child and the material change in circumstances/status quo principles for the older child in status review proceedings.
On the evidence of longstanding neglect, supervision concerns, poor housekeeping, domestic instability, and recent serious incidents in the home, the court held the mother had not shown a material change for the older child and that returning the younger child would create a probable risk of harm not manageable by supervision.
The motion was dismissed except that a parenting capacity assessment was ordered in principle, subject to further particulars.
Child support varied from effective notice date; limited contribution ordered for competitive sports expenses.
Both parties brought competing motions to change the child support provisions of a 2001 divorce order.
The applicant sought increased and retroactive child support based on the respondent’s increased income and requested contribution toward special expenses including orthodontics and competitive soccer.
The respondent sought termination or reduction of support due to unemployment.
The court found material changes in circumstances, attributed income reflecting severance and employment insurance, and varied support prospectively from the date of effective notice rather than the earlier period sought.
The court also determined that competitive soccer constituted a s.7 special expense and ordered a limited contribution.