Marlo K. Shaw

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion to vary a temporary care and access order regarding four children.

Previously, the two older children were placed with the mother under supervision, and the two younger children with the paternal grandmother.

The Society sought to vary the placement of the older children after the mother breached a condition prohibiting her partner from residing in the home or having contact with the children.

The court found a material change in circumstances.

One older child was placed with the paternal grandmother, while the other older child, who expressed strong views against living with the paternal grandmother due to past disclosures, was placed in the temporary care of the Society.

Access arrangements were also varied to occur primarily in Toronto, with one visit per month in the Niagara region.

The court also criticized the Office of the Children's Lawyer for failing to meet with the older children for several months during a critical period.

The appellant appealed a mid-trial consent order that would have automatically returned the child to the parents' care following a six-month interim care order.

The child, who had legal representation and party status under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, opposed the consent order.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The court held that the trial judge erred in law by making a final order based on consent when the child opposed it, thereby disregarding the child's statutory participatory rights.

The court further held that the trial judge's failure to provide reasons for the decision constituted an independent error of law.

The respondent mother brought a motion to transfer a child protection application from the Ontario Court of Justice in Toronto to the Unified Family Court in Cayuga, Haldimand County.

The respondent father opposed the transfer, requesting instead that the case be transferred to Windsor or remain in Toronto.

The court considered the test for territorial jurisdiction transfer under section 91 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, applying the "preponderance of convenience" standard with the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration.

The court granted the mother's motion and ordered the transfer to Cayuga.

The Children and Family Services for York Region ("the Society") brought a motion seeking three orders: placing a child (A.G.) in the Society's care, appointing independent legal counsel for the children (A.G. and M.G.), and requiring the father (J.G.) to undergo a sexual behaviours assessment, including phallometric testing.

The motion to place A.G. in care was adjourned by consent for kin assessments.

The court dismissed the request for independent legal counsel, finding it unnecessary and potentially detrimental in a case marked by parental alienation, where the children's views were already known and potentially influenced by the mother.

The court also dismissed the request for a sexual behaviours assessment, ruling it was not "necessary" under section 98(2) of the Child Youth and Family Services Act, given the inconclusive nature of the allegations, the intrusive nature of the testing, and the existence of other grounds for protection related to parental conflict and alienation.

A status review application under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act concerning two children in the care of the Children's Aid Society of Toronto.

The respondent mother brought a motion to extend timelines to permit late filing of her Answer/Plan of Care.

The court denied the extension with respect to the mother's primary plan to have the children returned to her care, finding no air of reality to that plan given unaddressed protection concerns including unsuitable housing, toxic relationships with brothers living in the home, and lack of insight into the risk factors.

However, the court granted an extension limited to the mother's alternate plan to place the children with her adult son and to her claim for access, finding genuine issues requiring trial on these issues.

The respondent mother, who was substantially successful on all issues in a three-day custody and access trial, sought costs on a full recovery basis totaling $36,103.

The applicant father argued that costs should be limited to $10,000-$12,000 based on his financial constraints and the importance of custody matters.

The court awarded costs of $31,674, finding that the mother was entitled to full recovery costs under Rule 18(14) of the Family Law Rules.

The court disallowed the paralegal fees entirely due to lack of detail in the bill of costs, excessive hourly rates, and the nature of work performed.

The court emphasized that the costs rules are designed to discourage family law litigation and that parties cannot escape costs consequences by arguing the importance of custody cases or their honest beliefs about the child's best interests.

A custody and access trial involving a nine-year-old child whose parents have been in litigation for four years.

Both parents initially sought joint custody but ultimately both sought sole custody.

The father sought week-on, week-off parenting (50-50), while the mother sought primary residence with specified holiday access.

The court found the mother to be the more credible and child-focused parent.

The father was found to have engaged in verbal and physical abuse toward the mother, demonstrated aggressive and hostile behavior toward professionals, and lacked insight into his conduct.

The mother was found to be proactive in addressing the child's developmental and emotional needs.

The court awarded sole custody to the mother with specified parenting time to the father.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion under Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules seeking a finding that a child was in need of protection under sections 37(2)(b)(i) and 37(2)(g) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The child had refused all contact with her father for nearly three years following a period during which the father had enforced access orders with police assistance, resulting in the child being physically forced into his vehicle on multiple occasions.

The child suffered bruising during one such incident.

The father contested the motion, arguing that parental alienation by the mother was the cause of the child's refusal and that a trial was necessary to determine the factual basis for any protection finding.

The court granted the summary judgment motion, finding that the disputed facts regarding the cause of the child's refusal were not material to the outcome, as the child's wishes and best interests would result in the same disposition regardless of whether alienation had occurred.

The mother brought a motion seeking temporary sole custody of a 13‑year‑old child and an order requiring the child to return to live with her after the child had begun residing with the father.

The father sought continuation of an earlier temporary custody order granting him sole custody and primary residence of the child.

The court considered the child’s clearly expressed preference to live with the father, concerns regarding potential parental alienation, and the impact of family conflict and difficulties involving a sibling.

Balancing the child’s best interests, the court held that the child should continue living primarily with the father with temporary sole custody remaining with him, subject to structured access with the mother and siblings.

The court also ordered school arrangements, access schedules, and ongoing monitoring by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer and child welfare authorities.

The mother brought a motion to terminate an ex parte restraining order and vary a temporary custody order granted to the father after she was charged with assaulting one of the children.

The court considered whether the outstanding criminal charge and related allegations justified maintaining the father’s temporary custody.

After reviewing the evidence, including the Office of the Children’s Lawyer investigation and the historical caregiving status quo, the court found no evidence that the mother could not provide a safe environment for the children.

The restraining order was terminated and temporary custody of two children was returned to the mother, restoring the pre‑incident status quo.

The issue of temporary custody of the third child was adjourned for further evidence and submissions.

The mother brought a motion to terminate a restraining order and vary a temporary custody order that had granted the father temporary custody after the mother was charged with assaulting one of the children.

The court considered the urgency of restoring the status quo where the children had historically resided with the mother and the recommendations of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

The court found that the mother provided a safe environment and terminated the restraining order to permit renewed contact between the children and their mother.

Temporary sole custody of two of the children was granted to the mother, while the issue of the third child’s residence and custody was adjourned for further evidence and submissions.

The appellants appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice, which dismissed their appeal from an order of the lower court.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the appeal judge's decision and dismissed the appeal with no order as to costs.

Following an appeal where the appellant achieved partial success against multiple respondents, the Court of Appeal determined the appropriate costs awards.

Recognizing the divided success at both the motions and appellate levels, the court ordered the appellant to pay costs for the motions below, while ordering certain respondents to pay costs for the appeal.

The court accounted for the multiplicity of counsel and the novelty of the appellant's arguments in fixing the amounts.

The appellant, former Commissioner of the Canadian Football League, appealed an order striking out his statement of claim against the CFL, its member clubs, and various individuals.

The claim alleged breach of confidence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, defamation, injurious falsehood, and interference with contractual relations arising from his hiring and subsequent dismissal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that while the statement of claim was prolix and contained evidence rather than material facts, certain causes of action for negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and defamation were viable.

The Court struck the entire pleading but granted the appellant leave to deliver a fresh amended statement of claim for the surviving causes of action.

The appellant, former Commissioner of the Canadian Football League, sued the League's member clubs and various individuals for almost $19 million following his dismissal.

The defendants successfully moved to strike out most of the statement of claim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the claims for breach of confidence, injurious falsehood, and intentional interference with contractual relations.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, permitting certain claims for negligent misrepresentation and defamation to proceed against specific defendants, subject to the delivery of a fresh amended statement of claim to cure pleading deficiencies.