Cristina Siviero

This is a child protection case under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act involving a child with complex medical needs (short bowel syndrome requiring G-tube feeding and intravenous nutrition).

The child was apprehended in July 2015 after the mother, a permanent resident from Niger, faced housing instability, expired work permit, and loss of income in Alberta.

The Society sought Crown wardship for adoption.

The court found the child was in need of protection due to the mother's failure to adequately care for the child given the circumstances at the time of apprehension.

However, after hearing extensive evidence regarding the mother's demonstrated ability to care for the child in Alberta, her improved cooperation with the Society, and the child's strong bond with his mother, the court ordered the child be placed in the mother's care subject to Society supervision for six months rather than granting Crown wardship.

The decision emphasizes the importance of continuity of care, cultural and linguistic considerations, and the least disruptive course of action.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion seeking a final order of crown wardship without access for the purposes of adoption of a child born in 2013 to parents with significant histories of drug addiction.

The parents opposed the motion, arguing there was a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court found that while the parents had struggled with addiction and the mother had only recently made progress in treatment and recovery, the question of whether the mother had genuinely turned the corner on her addiction was a material fact requiring further evidence.

The court declined to grant summary judgment and instead ordered a mini-trial under the amended Rule 16 to determine whether there was a genuine issue requiring a full trial.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion under Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules seeking a finding that a child was in need of protection under sections 37(2)(b)(i) and 37(2)(g) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The child had refused all contact with her father for nearly three years following a period during which the father had enforced access orders with police assistance, resulting in the child being physically forced into his vehicle on multiple occasions.

The child suffered bruising during one such incident.

The father contested the motion, arguing that parental alienation by the mother was the cause of the child's refusal and that a trial was necessary to determine the factual basis for any protection finding.

The court granted the summary judgment motion, finding that the disputed facts regarding the cause of the child's refusal were not material to the outcome, as the child's wishes and best interests would result in the same disposition regardless of whether alienation had occurred.