Victoria Boger-Mull

The applicant mother sought to terminate the respondent father's mid-week access to their child pending trial, based on recommendations in an Office of the Children's Lawyer report.

The report recommended terminating mid-week access based on the child's teacher's observations of behavioral difficulties following access with the father.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the factual basis for the recommendation was questionable and untested, contradicted by other evidence, and would represent a significant change to a status quo that had been in place for over eighteen months without incident.

The court emphasized the importance of parental communication and cooperation for the child's best interests.

This is a child protection trial under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act concerning a child born in 2012.

The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that the child was in need of protection under sections 37(2)(b) and 37(2)(g) of the Act, and sought a crown wardship order for adoption purposes.

The mother sought the return of the child to her care with or without supervision, or alternatively, access if the child was made a crown ward.

The father did not participate in the proceedings.

The court found the child was in need of protection based on the mother's failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child, and her pattern of neglect resulting in physical and emotional harm, including developmental delays.

The court made a crown wardship order without access, finding that the mother lacked the parenting capacity to meet the child's needs despite extensive supportive services, and that the relationship between mother and child was not significantly beneficial to the child.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion under Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules seeking a finding that a child was in need of protection under sections 37(2)(b)(i) and 37(2)(g) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The child had refused all contact with her father for nearly three years following a period during which the father had enforced access orders with police assistance, resulting in the child being physically forced into his vehicle on multiple occasions.

The child suffered bruising during one such incident.

The father contested the motion, arguing that parental alienation by the mother was the cause of the child's refusal and that a trial was necessary to determine the factual basis for any protection finding.

The court granted the summary judgment motion, finding that the disputed facts regarding the cause of the child's refusal were not material to the outcome, as the child's wishes and best interests would result in the same disposition regardless of whether alienation had occurred.