Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. T.S., 2026 ONCJ 274

Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. T.S., 2026 ONCJ 274

WARNING

The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice should be attached to the file:

This is a case under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, (being Schedule 1 to the Supporting Children, Youth and Families Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14), and is subject to subsections 87(7), 87(8) and 87(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:

87.—(7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication.— Where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding, the court may make an order,

(c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing.

(8) Prohibition re identifying child.— No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.

(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged.— The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.

142.—(3) Offences re publication.— A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.

CITATION: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. T.S., 2026 ONCJ 274

DATE: May 12, 2026

COURT FILE No.: Toronto DFO-25-46057-00

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY OF TORONTO Applicant

— AND —

T.S., I.S., H.S., and M.S. Respondents

Before Justice Jennifer S. Daudlin

Heard on April 7, 2026.

Reasons for Judgement released on May 12, 2026

Counsel: Julia O’Byrne......................................................................................... counsel for the applicant Katharina Janczaruk................................................... counsel for the respondent mother, T.S. Paul Cooper..................................................................... counsel for the respondent father, I.S. Loralee Messenger...................... duty counsel for the respondent paternal grandfather, H.S. Ashley Arrobas......................... duty counsel for the respondent paternal grandmother, M.S. Marlo Shaw............................................................................ counsel for the children, E. and R.

DAUDLIN J.:

Part One: Introduction

1.1 Nature of the Case

1This is a child protection proceeding concerning four children: E. (age 9), R. (age 8), G. (age 4), and T. (age 1) (collectively, “the children”).

2The Children’s Aid Society of Toronto (the “Society”) brings a motion to change the existing temporary care and access arrangements. Specifically, the Society seeks to vary this court’s temporary care and access order dated October 30, 2025 (the “current order”).¹

3The current order established a divided placement for the children.

(1) E. and R. (the “older children”) were placed in the temporary care of the mother under Society supervision in the Niagara region, where the mother relocated following the commencement of the child protection application, on the condition that her partner, J.H. (the “partner”) not reside in the home or have contact with the children. ²

(2) G. and T. (the “younger children”) were placed in the temporary care of the paternal grandmother, M.S. (the “paternal grandmother”) under Society supervision, in Toronto.

4The order also provided for access between the children and their parents, as well as ongoing sibling contact, such that the children’s access to any parent or paternal grandparent with whom they were not residing was supervised, with visits structured to occur in both Toronto and the Niagara region in alternating weeks.

5On February 20, 2026, the older children were brought to a place of safety by Family and Children’s Services of Niagara.

6On February 25, 2026, Justice Standryk of the Superior Court of Justice (Family Branch) made a temporary without prejudice order placing the older children in the care and custody of the Society pending further determination. That order provided for supervised access between the mother and the children to occur in Toronto, pending the hearing of this motion. She also transferred the protection application to this court.

7On March 12, 2026, this court made a further temporary without prejudice order providing that all access between the four children and their parents, paternal grandparents, and sibling contact occur in Toronto, pending the hearing of this motion.

1.2 Relief Sought

8The Society seeks an order that the child E. be placed in the care of the paternal grandmother, subject to supervision, and that the child R. remain in the care of the Society. It also seeks to vary the existing access arrangements, including that all access between the parties with the children, and among the siblings, take place in Toronto rather than alternating between Toronto and the Niagara region.

9The mother opposes the motion. She seeks the return of the older children to her care or, in the alternative, their placement with her mother (“the maternal grandmother”). She requests that access in the Niagara region be reinstated.

10The paternal grandmother opposes the Society’s motion in part. She seeks an order that both older children be placed in her care with the younger children who are presently in her care. She consents to the Society’s motion with respect to the location and terms of access between the children and the mother.

11H.S. (“the paternal grandfather”) supports the paternal grandmother’s position on the motion.

12I.S. (“the father”) filed no responding materials. Nevertheless, he was permitted to make submissions. He supports a placement of the older children with the paternal grandmother and consents to the Society’s requested relief regarding access by the children to the mother. Generally, he seeks an expansion of his own access, but filed no materials to this effect.

13Counsel for the older children reports that both wish to return to the mother’s care, though their views differ with respect to alternative placements, with E. indicating a preference for placement with the paternal grandmother if she cannot return to the mother’s care, and R. expressing a preference to remain in Society care rather than be placed with the paternal grandmother.

1.3 Current Circumstances

14At the time the motion was argued, the older children were in the temporary care of the Society in a foster placement, while the younger children remained in the care of the paternal grandmother.

15Access between the children and their parents, their siblings, and extended family was taking place in Toronto, a minimum of once per week, with all aspects of access – including frequency, duration, location, and level of supervision – determined by the Society, and, in the case of the paternal grandfather, subject to his criminal release conditions.

16The mother’s partner is to have no contact with any of the children, including in-person, virtual, electronic or telephone access.

1.4 The Issues to be Determined

17The issues to be determined on this motion are:

(1) Whether there has been a material change in circumstances since the October 30, 2025 order that warrants changing the placement orders for the older children.

(2) If so, where should each of the older children be placed on a temporary basis?

(3) Whether there has been a change in circumstances since the October 30, 2025 order sufficient to justify a variation of the existing access order.

(4) If so, what terms of access should apply and, in particular, where should the mother have access with the children?

Part Two: Background Facts

2.1 Family History and Dynamics

18The mother and father began their relationship in or around 2015. They married in November 2018 and separated for the final time in late 2024. They are the parents of the four children before the court.

19The mother gave birth to a new baby, L., in February 2026, with her partner. L. is not a subject of these proceedings. L. resides with the mother.

20The family system has been marked by longstanding involvement with child protection authorities and the police, arising from concerns relating to intimate partner violence, adult conflict, and broader issues affecting parenting capacity. These concerns have been compounded by ongoing instability in the parents’ relationship and in the children’s living arrangements.

21Following the parents’ separation, the mother remained in the family home, while the father moved into the residence of the paternal grandparents and his sister. The children resided primarily with the mother during the week and with the father on weekends pursuant to an informal parenting arrangement. The paternal grandparents played a significant role in facilitating exchanges and supporting the father’s care.

22A central feature of the family dynamics has been the mother’s relationship with her partner. He entered the children’s lives in late 2024 and moved into the home in early 2025. His presence became a source of ongoing concern given his involvement in discipline of the children and his role in incidents of adult conflict.

23The children have been exposed to persistent and, at times, escalating conflict involving not only the parents, but also members of the paternal family and the mother’s partner. This conflict has included verbal disputes, intimidation, and physical altercations, some of which occurred in the presence of the children.

2.2 Escalation of Concerns in Early 2025

24In early 2025, the level of concern escalated significantly. Allegations were raised that the mother’s partner had physically disciplined the children, and that the older children were fearful of him. At the same time, there were ongoing reports of adult conflict between the parents and between the maternal and paternal households.

25The evidence also reflects incidents of heightened conflict involving the paternal grandfather and other members of the paternal family attending at the mother’s residence in a manner that resulted in police involvement and exposed the children to further instability.

26The children’s functioning was affected by these dynamics, including concerns regarding school attendance and emotional well-being.

27A critical event occurred in late April 2025 involving the youngest child, T. That child was brought to hospital with multiple bruises and an oral injury. The medical evidence was that the injuries were non-accidental and not consistent with the child’s developmental abilities. This event gave rise to serious concerns regarding physical safety in the caregiving environment.

28During this same period, further incidents of adult conflict escalated into physical violence, including an altercation at the mother’s home involving the paternal grandfather and the mother’s partner that was witnessed by at least one of the children and resulted in police involvement.

2.3 Litigation History Through Fall 2025

29The Society commenced a child protection application in early 2025 following escalating concerns arising in March and April 2025.

30On May 2, 2025, Justice Paulseth made a without prejudice temporary supervision order. The older children were placed in the mother’s care subject to terms of Society supervision, and the younger children were placed in the father’s care subject to supervision, with terms governing school attendance, adult conflict, and restrictions on the mother’s partner’s involvement with the children, pending the temporary care hearing.

31On May 29, 2025, the Society filed an urgent motion to vary Justice Paulseth’s order.

32On May 30, 2025, on consent, that arrangement was varied. The younger children were placed in the care of the paternal grandparents under terms of Society supervision.

33Throughout the spring and summer of 2025, the litigation was marked by ongoing concerns regarding adult conflict, disclosures requiring investigation, and issues with compliance with court-ordered arrangements.

34On July 30, 2025, a further incident occurred at a Society office involving a physical altercation between the father, the paternal grandfather, and the mother’s partner, in the presence of the children. This resulted in criminal charges and heightened concern regarding the children’s exposure to violence. In response, the Society brought another urgent motion to seek a variation of the temporary without prejudice order.

35On August 5, 2025, the matter came before Justice Sherr. The motions were adjourned and access between the children and both the father and paternal grandfather was suspended.

36On August 7, 2025, Justice Sherr ordered that the younger children be placed in the temporary care of the paternal grandmother, with the support of the paternal aunt, subject to Society supervision pending the full hearing of the temporary care and custody motion. The older children remained in the mother’s care, also under supervision. The temporary care motion for all four children was rescheduled to October 1, 2025.

37The matter proceeded through further attendances and was argued on October 1 and October 23, 2025.

2.4 The Temporary Care Motion

38On October 30, 2025, this court made findings that the children were at risk of physical and emotional harm in their respective caregiving environments. Those findings arose in the context of the children’s exposure to adult conflict, including incidents of physical violence, concerns relating to the non-accidental injury sustained by the youngest child, and concerns regarding the ability of the adults involved to comply with court orders and Society direction.

39The evidence established that the children had been present for, or affected by, multiple incidents of adult conflict involving the parents, the paternal family, and the mother’s partner. The children’s care arrangements had also changed over the course of the proceedings, including placements with each parent and with extended family members under Society supervision.

40The court found that, at that time, neither parent was able to adequately protect the children without Society intervention. Concerns were identified regarding each parent’s ability to comply with court orders and Society direction, to exercise judgement in relation to the children’s safety, and to shield the children from ongoing adult conflict. The involvement of the mother’s partner in incidents of conflict and in the children’s living environment gave rise to ongoing protection concerns.

41In response to those findings, the court made a temporary order placing the older children, E. and R., in the care of the mother, in Welland, Ontario, subject to terms of Society supervision, and placing the younger children, G. and T., in the care of the paternal grandmother, in Toronto, Ontario, also subject to terms of Society supervision.

42A central tenet of that order was the condition that the mother’s partner not reside in the home and not have contact with the children unless approved by the Society. The supervision framework put in place by the court depended, in a material way, on adherence to that condition. The condition reflected concerns arising from the partner’s involvement in prior incidents of adult conflict and the impact of his presence on the stability of the caregiving environment. At the time of the order, incidents involving the mother’s partner had occurred in the children’s presence and formed part of the court’s assessment of risk. The restriction was intended to address that source of instability within the children’s environment and to support the effectiveness of the supervision terms.

43The order also established a structured access regime between the children, their parents, and extended family. Access was to occur on a regular and ongoing basis, with minimum weekly contact between the children and each parent, and between the siblings. All access was to be supervised and arranged at the direction of the Society, which was given discretion over the timing, duration, location, and level of supervision.

44The order further provided that access would occur across both Toronto and the Niagara region, on an alternating basis.³

2.5 Developments Following the October 30, 2025 Order

45On January 7, 2026, the matter returned before the court. Ongoing concerns were identified regarding possible contact between the mother and her partner, notwithstanding the condition that he not reside in the home or have contact with the children. Disclosures made by E. indicated that the partner had been seen at the home and had set up surveillance equipment within the residence. The Society investigated those disclosures, cautioned the mother regarding the importance of compliance, and continued to monitor the situation, although it was not in a position to verify his presence at that time. The court directed that strict compliance with its order was expected.

46At that same attendance, the court addressed the absence of recent direct contact between counsel for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer and the older children, noting that counsel had not met with them since October 2025. The court directed that ongoing and regular contact occur, and that counsel seek the appointment of a clinical assist in preparation for trial.

47In or about February 2026, the mother gave birth to a new child with the partner.

48On February 13, 2026, further to a request for directions, the court scheduled an attendance on February 24, 2026, to address reports that the mother’s partner had been present in the home. By the time of that attendance, the court was advised that E. and R. had been brought to a place of safety on February 20, 2026 by Family and Children’s Services of Niagara. This followed reports, including disclosures from E., that the partner had been attending at the home contrary to the order, that he had access to or had installed surveillance equipment within the residence, and subsequent information indicating that he was residing in the home. Concerns were also raised that the older children were aware of his presence and of the restriction in the order, and that they had been directed not to disclose that information to others – in particular, the Society – giving rise to further concern regarding compliance and supervision.

49At that same attendance, the court was advised that the Society was conducting an ongoing investigation in relation to the younger children, who remained in the care of the paternal grandmother. The paternal grandfather was no longer residing in the home in accordance with his conditions of release, following the laying of new criminal charges of sexual assault and sexual interference in relation to R.

50Despite the court’s earlier direction on January 7, 2026, counsel for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer had not yet spoken to the older children.

51In addition, counsel for the mother was now acting on a limited scope retainer, and only to facilitate the transition to new counsel.

52On February 25, 2026, Justice Standryk made a temporary, without prejudice order varying the October 30, 2025 order with respect to the older children. It provided that:

(1) The older children be placed in the temporary care and custody of the Family and Children’s Services of Niagara.

(2) Access between the older children and their parents, their siblings, and paternal grandparents, a minimum of once weekly.

(3) Access was to take place in Toronto, with the Society determining the frequency, duration, and level of supervision.

(4) The partner was to have no contact with any of the children, including in-person, virtual, electronic or telephone access.

(5) The matter was transferred to the Ontario Court of Justice in Toronto for further proceedings.

53On March 12, 2026, the matter returned before this court.

54On the basis of a Statement of Agreed Facts executed by all parties, the court made the following findings in need of protection:

(1) T. had suffered physical harm inflicted by a person having charge of the child or caused by that person’s pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising, or protecting the child (s. 74(2)(a)(ii)).

(2) The children were at risk of physical harm inflicted by a person having charge of them or caused by that person’s pattern of neglect in caring for, providing for, supervising, or protecting them (s. 74(2)(b)(ii)).

(3) The children were at risk of emotional harm, demonstrated by serious anxiety, depression, withdrawal, self‑destructive or aggressive behaviour, or delayed development arising from the actions, failure to act, or pattern of neglect of their parent or the person having charge (s. 74(2)(h)).

55Counsel for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer advised that she had met with the older children on March 4, 2026, which was her first contact with them since October 2025. At the time, the older children understood that they had been brought into care because the condition prohibiting the partner’s presence in the home had not been followed. They reported that they had been directed by their mother and the partner to conceal his presence. They expressed a clear wish to return to the mother’s care, while also making clear that they did not want the partner to reside in the home if they were returned.

56While counsel for the older children had now met with them after a gap of nearly five-months, the earlier direction of the court to seek the appointment of a clinician had not been followed, and the court renewed that direction.

57At the same attendance, the court granted, on a temporary and without prejudice basis pending the return of the motion, the Society’s request to vary the access arrangements so that access take place in Toronto.

58Counsel for the mother remained in transition, and the paternal grandparents were now self‑represented. A motion date for the temporary care and access motions was set, and timelines for the service and filing of materials were established.

59By the return date on March 24, 2026, the mother had retained new counsel, and the Office of the Children’s Lawyer had arranged for the involvement of a clinician. The paternal grandparents had not retained new counsel.

60In light of the changes in representation and the clinician’s involvement, extensions of time for the filing of materials were requested and granted, and the motion was rescheduled on a peremptory basis. The matter was adjourned to April 7, 2026 for the hearing of the Society’s motions.

Part Three: Legal Considerations on Variation of Placement and Access on Protection Applications

61The power to vary or terminate an order made under subsection 94(2) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (the Act) is set out at subsection 94(9) of the Act, and reads as follows:

94 (9) The court may at any time vary or terminate an order made under subsection (2).

62In Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.M.,⁴ the court articulated distinct analytical frameworks for varying placement orders and access orders during the adjournment of a protection application under s. 94(9) of the Act.

63With respect to the variation of a placement order, the following principles apply:

(1) The moving party bears the onus of establishing a material change in circumstances since the making of the last order.

(2) The determination of what constitutes a material change is flexible and context‑specific.

(3) Where a material change is established, the court must undertake a contextual analysis to determine whether the placement should be varied, with the purposes of the Act remaining central. Relevant, non‑exhaustive considerations include:

(a) The nature and extent of the variation sought, and whether the proposed change is proportionate to the change in circumstances, including the extent to which the passage of time has provided a fuller picture of the child and the family.

(b) The degree to which the change in circumstances reduces or increases the risk of harm to the child.

(c) The extent to which the proposed placement advances the statutory objectives set out in s. 1 of the Act and the CYFSA.

(d) The tiered framework for temporary care orders set out in section 94 of the Act, which reflects the principle that the level of intervention is to be proportionate to the child’s need for protection.

(e) The best interests factors set out in subsection 74(3) of the Act.

(f) The timing of the proceeding, including whether a trial is imminent. Where trial is approaching, the court must consider whether the evidence of change justifies an interim change in placement, given the risk of multiple changes in a short period and the resulting disruption to the child.

64With respect to the variation of an access order, the following principles apply:

(1) The moving party must establish that there has been a sufficient change in circumstances since the last order, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case.

(2) The court must then determine, through a contextual best interests analysis, whether the access order should be varied and on what terms. The purposes of the Act remain central. Relevant, non‑exhaustive considerations include:

(a) The nature and extent of the variation sought, and whether the proposed change is proportionate to the change in circumstances, including the extent to which the passage of time has provided a fuller picture of the child and the family.

(b) The degree to which the change in circumstances reduces or increases the risk of harm to the child.

(c) The extent to which the proposed placement advances the statutory objectives set out in s. 1 of the Act and the CYFSA.

(d) The tiered framework for temporary care orders set out in section 94 of the Act, which reflects the principle that the level of intervention is to be proportionate to the child’s need for protection.

(e) The best interests factors set out in subsection 74(3) of the Act.

(f) The importance of:

(i) Ensuring that access does not remain static unless required for the child’s safety.

(ii) Supporting the gradual and safe expansion of parent‑child contact where appropriate.

(iii) Providing a basis to assess a parent’s long‑term parenting potential.

(g) The stage of the proceeding, including whether a trial is imminent. Where trial is approaching, the court must consider whether it is preferable for the issue to be determined by the trial judge.

65The court considered also the views and wishes of the older children, giving them due weight having regard to their ages and levels of maturity, in accordance with subsection 94(11) of the Act. The views and wishes of the younger children could not reasonably be ascertained given their ages.

Part Four: Analysis and Conclusion - Placement

4.1 Material Change Analysis

66With respect to the older children, the Society bears the onus of establishing a material change in circumstances since the October 30, 2025 order.

67The evidence meets that onus.

68The older children’s placement in the mother’s care was maintained under a supervision framework that depended, in a material way, on strict compliance with the condition that the mother’s partner not reside in the home or have contact with the children. The evidence before the court establishes that this foundational condition was not adhered to. There were repeated reports, including disclosures from E. (later confirmed by R.), that the partner was attending at the home and ultimately residing there, contrary to the order. The older children were aware of his presence and of the restriction, and reported that they were directed by the mother, under threat of punishment, not to disclose that information to third parties, including the Society.

69While the mother disputes that the partner was residing in the home and characterizes any contact as limited and supportive in nature—particularly in connection with her pregnancy and post‑natal period—the court does not accept that position, having regard to the consistency of the children’s reports, the timing of the disclosures, and the corroborative aspects of the Society’s evidence.

70The court accepts the evidence of the older children and the reporting of the Society as sufficiently reliable with respect to the partner’s presence in the home and the circumstances in which the older children were expected to withhold that information. These developments constitute a material change in circumstances: they go to the core premise on which the supervision‑based placement depended and materially undermine the reliability and enforceability of the supervision framework.

71Having found a material change, the court must undertake a contextual analysis to determine whether the older children’s placement should be varied, with the purposes of the Act remaining central.

72The nature and extent of the requested change is significant because it would remove the older children from the mother’s care; that magnitude requires the court to consider proportionality, risk, the tiered framework in s. 94(2) of the Act, and whether continued reliance on the existing supervision‑based placement remains consistent with adequate protection.

73Here, the material change is directly risk‑relevant. The concern is not solely the partner’s physical presence. It is the demonstrated inability to maintain and enforce the boundaries required by the supervision order, coupled with the older children’s reporting that they were directed to conceal non‑compliance. That combination undermines confidence that the existing placement can continue to operate safely and predictably pending trial.

74The court’s concern is reinforced by the evidence that the mother’s plan has been to continue co‑parenting L. with the partner as a central support, a plan that risks inviting him into the home and increasing the likelihood of contact with the older children notwithstanding an express prohibition. The mother was not able to provide clear particulars of how that plan could operate in practice within the boundaries of the existing order. In these circumstances, the court is not satisfied that the existing supervision‑based placement in the mother’s care remains a workable, enforceable, and proportionate response to the children’s need for protection.

75The timing of the proceeding is also relevant. A trial is not imminent. The court must therefore avoid repeated interim disruptions, but must also ensure that the temporary placement is consistent with adequate protection and the statutory purposes, including proportionality and the least disruptive intervention that remains protective.

76Taking these considerations together, the court is satisfied that the older children’s placement should be varied from the mother’s care on a temporary basis. The court therefore turns to the next question: if the placement is to be changed, what temporary placement is in the older children’s best interests?

4.2 Where should each of the older children be placed on a temporary basis?

a) Views and Wishes of the Older Children

77The evidence establishes that both older children have expressed clear, detailed, and, at times, strongly felt views regarding their circumstances, their mother, the partner, and the placement options available.

78Both older children consistently expressed a strong primary wish to return to the mother’s care. They continue to identify the mother’s residence as “home,” describe a close attachment to her, and report missing her significantly since their removal. They have been emotionally affected by the separation and have, at times, demonstrated distress, including sadness, anxiety, and upset in relation to their current placement.

79At the same time, both older children have demonstrated a clear understanding of the reason for their removal. They each articulated that the partner was not supposed to be in the home and that the order had been breached.

80E. expressed this in particularly direct terms, stating that the older children were in care because the mother had allowed the partner to remain in the home contrary to the court order. She also expressed anger and disappointment toward the mother, describing a loss of trust and stating that she had repeatedly told the mother that the partner should not be in the home. E. further described feeling upset, anxious, and emotionally triggered when exposed to conflict involving the partner.

81Both older children also reported that they had been asked to conceal the partner’s presence. E. described being instructed to keep this information secret and reported that she was punished for disclosing it. R. similarly reported that he had been asked to lie to the Society about the partner being in the home. These experiences affected both older children, with R. describing feeling sad and worried as a result, and expressing concern about being asked to lie.

82In terms of alternative placements, the older children’s views diverge.

83E. has identified, as a second preference, a wish to live with family if she cannot return to the mother’s care, and specifically supports placement with the paternal grandmother.

84R.’s position is materially different. While he continues to express a wish to return to the mother’s care, he has indicated that, if that is not possible at this time, he would prefer to remain in Society care rather than be placed with the grandmother. His position is grounded in specific safety concerns arising from his disclosure that his paternal grandfather engaged in inappropriate touching when he was younger, which he believes his paternal grandmother may have been aware of. R. expressed ongoing unease about the possibility of being in the paternal grandmother’s home, including concern that his paternal grandfather might attend there or confront him, and uncertainty as to whether the boundaries restricting the paternal grandfather’s presence would be reliably maintained. Although R. was able to participate in visits at the paternal grandmother’s home, he distinguished between visits and residence, stating clearly and emphatically that he does not want to live there.

b) Mother’s Plan to Place with Her with Stricter Terms

85The court is not satisfied that the older children can be safely returned to the mother’s care under stricter terms of supervision at this time.

86The issue is not the absence of adequate terms; it is whether those terms would be effective in practice. The existing order already imposed a clear and specific boundary that was central to the children’s safety. That boundary was not maintained. In those circumstances, adding further or more detailed conditions does not address the court’s core concern: the reliability of compliance.

87A supervision order depends on the caregiver’s ability and willingness to adhere to its terms on a day‑to‑day basis.⁵ On this record, the court cannot be confident that a revised supervision regime would operate as intended. Accordingly, a return of the older children to the mother’s care under enhanced supervision is not a viable interim option.

c) Mother’s Alternate Plan to Place with the Maternal Grandmother

88The court has also considered the mother’s alternative proposal that the older children be placed with the maternal grandmother.

89The evidence establishes that the maternal grandmother has been cleared by the Society as an emergency caregiver and that no concerns have been identified regarding her ability to provide care. This supports that she is, in principle, a viable kinship option. However, the evidentiary record is limited with respect to the structure of that proposed placement and how it would operate in practice.

90In particular, there is little detail before the court as to how the placement would address the risks that led to the material change, including the need for clear, consistent, and enforceable boundaries in relation to the partner. The mother’s broader plan contemplates ongoing reliance on the partner as a support, and the court is not satisfied that sufficient safeguards have been identified to ensure that the older children would not be exposed, directly or indirectly, to those dynamics in a maternal family placement. In the absence of a fully developed and demonstrably protective plan, the court is not satisfied that placement with the maternal grandmother can be relied upon to meet the older children’s safety needs at this stage.

d) No Plan for Placement with the Father

91The father has not proposed a plan for the older children to be placed in his care. Instead, he supports the placement of the older children with the paternal grandmother under Society supervision.

92In the absence of a plan from the father, the court turns to the mother’s alternative proposal, as she was the other pre-intervention caregiver.

e) Plan to Place with the Paternal Grandmother

93The court next considers the proposed placement of the older children with the paternal grandmother.

94This is the placement advanced by the paternal grandmother, with the support of the father and paternal grandfather, who seeks an order that both older children be placed in her care.

95The Society and Office of the Children’s Lawyer support placement of E. with the paternal grandmother (with the involvement of the paternal aunt), subject to supervision, but not R.

96The mother opposes the paternal grandmother’s plan for placement.

i. The plan for E.

97With respect to E., the court is satisfied that placement with the paternal grandmother is appropriate on a temporary basis.

98E. has clearly expressed a preference to live with family if she cannot return to the mother’s care and specifically supports placement with the paternal grandmother. Her views have been consistent and strongly held. They reflect both her attachment to her family and her desire to be with her younger siblings. The court accepts that these views are meaningful and should be given significant weight, particularly as they are grounded in her lived experience. The evidence also supports that E. has had positive interactions in the grandmother’s home and has demonstrated comfort in that environment.

99The proposed placement is supported by the Society, which has assessed the paternal grandmother as a caregiver and reports no concerns with the care she has provided to the younger children currently in her home. This placement would allow E. to remain within her extended family network, maintain her relationship with her youngest siblings on a daily basis, and avoid the disruption associated with continued foster placement. In this respect, it aligns with the principle of least disruptive intervention, while continuing to provide protection.

100The court has considered the concerns raised by the mother regarding conflict within the paternal family and the children’s past exposure to that conflict, including allegations relating to the father and both paternal grandparents. Those concerns are serious and cannot be minimized. However, the evidence establishes that the father and paternal grandfather are no longer residing in the home and that the proposed placement would be subject to structured supervision, including clear and enforceable restrictions on his presence, which the paternal grandmother has not historically breached. The court is satisfied that, with those safeguards in place and with ongoing Society oversight, the risks can be appropriately managed in the context of this interim arrangement.

101Taking these considerations together, the court concludes that placement with the paternal grandmother is a stable, child‑focused, and sufficiently protective interim arrangement for E. It is therefore in her best interests to be placed with the paternal grandmother on a temporary basis, subject to the terms of supervision set out below.

102The court does not accept the paternal grandmother’s proposal that the father be permitted to assist with the daily caregiving of the children within the home, even subject to supervision.

103While the court recognizes the potential benefit of the father playing a meaningful role in the children’s lives and accepts that some form of structured, supervised access within the home may be appropriate, the proposal advanced goes significantly further and is a gross departure from the Society-supervised access the father currently enjoys. In substance, it would permit the father to be present in the home on a sustained and ongoing basis, effectively participating in day‑to‑day caregiving in a manner that approaches de facto residence. On this record, the court is not satisfied that such an arrangement would provide the clear structure, boundaries, and predictability required for the children’s safety and emotional stability pending trial.

104A plan that blurs the distinction between supervised access and primary caregiving risks reintroducing complexity and potential conflict into the home environment, and is not proportionate to what is required at this interim stage. A more limited and clearly defined framework—providing for time‑limited, supervised access in the home—may be appropriate, but the broader proposal for ongoing caregiving involvement is not.

ii. The Plan for R.

105R. has consistently expressed that, if he cannot return to the mother’s care, he does not want to be placed with the paternal grandmother. He has stated clearly and emphatically that he does not wish to live in her home and would prefer to remain in his current foster placement. His views on this issue have been persistent, strongly held, and expressed without prompting. They must be given meaningful weight.

106R.’s position is grounded in concerns arising from his disclosure that he experienced inappropriate contact with his paternal grandfather when he was younger. The paternal grandfather denies any wrongdoing and the allegations are the subject of ongoing criminal proceedings. In addition, there is evidence before the court raising concern that the mother has, at times, involved the children in adult issues, including directing them to conceal information. These are serious and competing considerations that the court must approach with caution. The court cannot, on this interim record, make findings of fact in respect of those allegations.

107That said, the court must assess R.’s views as they relate to his sense of safety. R. has expressed ongoing unease about residing in the paternal grandmother’s home, including concern about the possibility of contact with his paternal grandfather notwithstanding restrictions on his presence, and uncertainty about whether those restrictions would be consistently maintained. He has also raised concern about whether the paternal grandmother was aware of the alleged inappropriate touching, and whether she would be able to ensure his protection in that environment. These concerns are subjective, but they are grounded in R.’s own experience and are central to his perception of safety.

108The court accepts that R. has been able to participate in visits at the paternal grandmother’s home and, at times, enjoy those interactions. However, he has drawn a clear distinction between participation in visits and residing in that home. He has stated that, while he can tolerate visits, he does not feel comfortable living there. That distinction is an important one and reflects a measured and thoughtful expression of his views.

109The court has considered the submission that any risk associated with the paternal grandfather can be managed through supervision and clear restrictions on his presence, and the evidence that neither the father nor the paternal grandfather currently resides in the home. While those safeguards are relevant, they do not fully address R.’s expressed lack of confidence in the reliability of those boundaries in practice. In assessing best interests, a child’s emotional security and sense of safety are critical. A placement cannot be said to meet a child’s needs if, from that child’s perspective, it is not experienced as safe.

110There is also a real risk, given the strength and consistency of R.’s views, that placing him in the paternal grandmother’s care against his clearly expressed wishes would result in further emotional harm.

111Taking these considerations together, the court is not satisfied that placement with the paternal grandmother is in R.’s best interests at this time.

f) Plan to Place R. in Temporary Society Care

112Having considered and ruled out the other proposed placements, the court turns to the remaining option: whether R. should remain in the temporary care and custody of the Society. In doing so, the court has regard to the purposes set out in s. 1 of the Act, the factors in s. 94(2), and the best interests considerations in s. 74(3), including R.’s safety, emotional wellbeing, views and wishes, and the importance of stability, together with the requirement to adopt the least disruptive course consistent with adequate protection. For the reasons set out above, the court is not satisfied that any of the proposed family placements—whether with the mother, the father, the maternal grandmother, or the paternal grandmother—provide a sufficiently safe and workable plan for R. at this time.

113In these circumstances, R.’s views and his current stability assume particular importance. He has consistently maintained that he does not wish to reside in the paternal grandmother’s home, while remaining open to maintaining contact. His concerns, although not determinative of disputed allegations, are directly relevant to his sense of safety. The evidence further establishes that he experiences his current placement as stable and secure. On a temporary basis, requiring him to move to a placement he does not trust risks undermining that stability.

114Balancing the statutory factors, the court is satisfied that the least disruptive placement consistent with adequate protection is for R. to remain in the temporary care and custody of the Society at this time.

Part Five: Analysis and Conclusion – Access

115With respect to the proposed variation of the access arrangement, the court is satisfied that a sufficient change in circumstances has been established since the current order. The existing structure was developed in a materially different factual context. The children are now in separate placements in the Toronto area, with three residing with the paternal grandmother and one in Society care pursuant to this order. The court also has the benefit of a fuller evidentiary record regarding their needs and the practical realities of access, including the demands of travel on caregivers.

116Under the October 30, 2025 order, access between the children and their parents, as well as sibling contact, was structured to occur on a scheduled basis in both Toronto and the Niagara region. That order contemplated regular in‑person contact across both locations, reflecting the children’s divided placements at that time.

117The subsequent without prejudice orders altered that arrangement. The February 25, 2026 order, and the March 12, 2026 order, both provided that all access occur in Toronto, including access for the mother and sibling contact, pending further determination.

118The Society seeks to continue that arrangement, so that all access occurs in Toronto, a position supported by the father and the paternal grandparents. The mother opposes that request and seeks the continuation of access alternating weeks in the Niagara region.

119The court accepts that there are significant practical challenges on both sides. The paternal grandmother does not drive and faces limitations in transporting multiple children over longer distances. The mother also does not drive and must travel with a newborn child, making frequent travel to Toronto difficult and burdensome. These realities must be taken into account in assessing whether any proposed access structure is workable and sustainable.

120At the same time, the children’s relationships and emotional needs remain central. The older children continue to identify the mother’s residence in Niagara as “home” and have expressed a strong attachment to her and to their sibling relationships. In these circumstances, access exclusively in Toronto risks diminishing the quality and meaningfulness of that contact, particularly given the practical barriers to the mother’s attendance. It would also limit the court’s ability to meaningfully assess the mother’s longer‑term parenting plan in the environment in which she proposes to care for the children, an assessment that is relevant given the stage of the proceeding.

121The court is not satisfied, however, that a full resumption of Niagara-based access on alternating weekends is appropriate. More frequent travel would introduce repeated disruption to the children’s routines, including missed school time and instability in their weekly schedule. A balanced approach is required.

122Permitting one access visit per month to occur in the Niagara region – such that every fourth visit takes place there – strikes an appropriate balance and is in the best interests of the children. It takes into account the logistical constraints on both sides, while preserving the children’s connection to the mother in the setting they identify as home and allowing all four children to spend time together in that environment. It also provides a meaningful opportunity to observe and assess the functioning of the mother’s contact with the children in that setting. The primary structure of access remains in Toronto, thereby supporting stability and minimizing disruption to the children’s routines.

123The court is satisfied that it is also appropriate to grant the Society discretion with respect to access involving the father and the paternal grandfather (subject to any applicable criminal conditions for the latter). Given the evolving circumstances and the need for a flexible, child‑focused approach, the Society is best positioned to determine the timing, frequency, and modality of such access. Any access shall be supervised by the Society or by a third party approved by the Society, and must be structured in a manner that ensures the children’s safety and emotional wellbeing.

Part Six: Next Steps

124As this court wrote in Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. T.S., one of the functions of a case management judge is to provide the parties with a clear and candid understanding of what must change—not only in their conduct, but in their insight into the impact of that conduct on the children, and what is realistically required before the court will consider any change in placement or expansion of access.⁶ The court addressed these issues for each party in its prior decision. While there has been some progress by individual parties since that time, the core concerns identified by the court on October 30, 2025, remain.

125The difficult truth is this:

(1) The children have been exposed to ongoing risk arising from adult conflict, instability in caregiving, and repeated failures to comply with court orders and Society direction.

(2) Those risks have not been resolved. They are being managed on a temporary basis through the current placements and supervision arrangements.

(3) The court’s findings on this motion turn, in a significant way, on issues of governability, reliability, and trust. Despite some initial steps taken by the parties, the evidence does not demonstrate sustained and consistent change in these areas. Until that occurs, the court will not consider returning the children to a parent or significantly expanding access.

126This is not about isolated missteps. It reflects a pattern of decision‑making that has, over time, placed the children in the middle of adult issues and required ongoing intervention by the court and the Society. That pattern must change.

127The court expects all parties to:

(1) Strictly comply with all court orders and Society direction.

(2) Shield the children from all adult conflict and from any discussion of these proceedings.

(3) Consistently prioritize the children’s emotional safety and stability over any personal or family dispute.

Part Seven: The Role and Expectations of the Office of the Children's Lawyer

128The court must address the role of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer in this proceeding, and the seriousness of its failure to meet that role in the period between October 2025 and March 4, 2026.

129In a child protection case, the Office of the Children’s Lawyer is a central protective feature of the process. Its function is to ensure that the children’s voices are heard independently, their interests are advanced in a timely way, and the court is provided with current, reliable information about the children’s views, circumstances, and well-being. That requires regular, direct engagement with the children, particularly where placements are changing, risk concerns are evolving, and the children’s evidence is central to temporary and long-term decision-making. It is not sufficient to rely on the Society’s account of what the children may have said to others or to obtain information only indirectly through adults involved in the litigation. The children are entitled to active representation.

130On January 7, 2026, the court recorded that counsel for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer had not met with the older children since October 2025 and emphasized that this absence was unacceptable. The court directed regular, ongoing contact and directed that a clinician be sought given the complexity of the proceeding and the centrality of the children’s evidence. Despite that direction, by February 24, 2026, the Office of the Children’s Lawyer had still not spoken to the older children. The court again directed that contact occur without delay and ensured that the relevant endorsements, including the January 7 endorsement, were provided to the Office of the Children’s Lawyer’s head office. It was only after that that steps were taken. By March 4, 2026, a clinician had been assigned and met with the older children, which was their first contact through the Office of the Children’s Lawyer since October 2025 and since their removal from their mother’s care.

131The consequences of this gap are not merely procedural. Without timely and independent contact, the children’s voices risk being filtered through other parties’ narratives; emerging safety concerns may not be identified or escalated; and the court is deprived of a key evidentiary and protective safeguard. In a high-conflict case involving significant decisions about placement and access, these failures undermine the integrity of the process and can compromise the court’s ability to make decisions based on reliable, child-focused information.

132From the children’s perspective, the impact is more acute still.

133The older children were not simply waiting for a procedural step to occur; they were living through rapid, destabilizing change, including removal from their mother’s care, separation from siblings, and the emotional consequences of disclosures they had made. In that context, the absence of timely, independent engagement from the Office of the Children’s Lawyer left them without the consistent adult advocate the process is meant to provide – someone who meets with them privately, helps them understand what is happening, ensures they are not carrying adult burdens, and brings forward their current experiences in a child‑centred way. It also risks sending an unintended message to children in crisis: that speaking up leads to upheaval, but not to reliable support. In a case where the children reported feeling pressured to conceal information, timely, independent contact with the Office of the Children’s Lawyer is not optional; it is a protective necessity.

134That said, the court notes that it appears the Office of the Children’s Lawyer has begun to take corrective steps. Since the clinician’s involvement, the older children have had frequent, structured contact through the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, including multiple meetings within a short period. This improved engagement is welcome and better reflects the active, child-centred representation the court expects.

135Going forward, the court expects strict compliance by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer with its directions, including sustained, regular engagement with the older children and timely steps to ensure that their evidence and perspectives are independently obtained and properly placed before the court as this matter proceeds.

Part Eight: Order

136The temporary order dated October 30, 2025, is changed and a new temporary order shall issue on the terms set out below. Any term of the October 30, 2025 order not changed below shall continue in full force and effect.

(1) The child E. and the younger children shall be placed in the temporary care and custody of the paternal grandmother, subject to the supervision of the Society, on the following terms and conditions:

(a) The paternal grandmother shall permit the Society to conduct announced and unannounced home visits and to meet the younger children privately at home, school, daycare, or in the community.

(b) The father and paternal grandfather shall not reside in the home.

(c) The paternal grandmother and the paternal aunt shall refrain from negative commentary about one another and shall ensure the children are not exposed to adult conflict.

(d) The paternal grandmother will facilitate or otherwise support access arrangements with the respective parties as arranged by the Society.

(e) The paternal grandmother and the paternal aunt shall not audio- or video-record the children in relation to adult disputes or litigation issues.

(f) The paternal grandmother and the paternal aunt shall not audio- or video-record the children or another party during access exchanges, court appearances, or in relation to adult disputes or litigation issues.

(g) The paternal grandmother and the paternal aunt shall keep communications with the children child-focused, age-appropriate, and limited to ordinary daily matters.

(h) The paternal grandmother and the paternal aunt shall not use physical discipline, threats, or intimidation with the children.

(i) The paternal grandmother shall notify the Society within 48 hours of any change to address, contact information, household composition, or caregiving arrangements.

(j) The paternal grandmother shall ensure regular daycare or school attendance and maintain consistent daily routines for the children; any significant absences shall be documented and explained to the Society on request.

(k) The paternal grandmother shall immediately notify the Society of any police attendance at the home, any alleged or actual breach of criminal or bail conditions by the paternal grandfather, and any injury beyond ordinary childhood scrapes or any hospital or urgent-care attendance, and shall provide discharge instructions and reports upon request.

(l) The paternal grandmother shall execute information releases permitting the Society to speak with daycare or school, health-care providers, public health or infant-nurse services, and identified community supports for the children.

(m) The children shall not be left with any unapproved substitute caregiver; any proposed caregiver must receive prior written approval from the Society.

(2) R. shall be placed in the temporary care and custody of the Society.

(3) Access between the children and their parents and paternal grandparents, and sibling contact, shall occur a minimum of once per week, at the discretion of the Society as to frequency, location, duration, and level of supervision, on the terms set out below.

(a) The mother’s access to the children shall occur in the Niagara region every fourth access visit, with all other access visits occurring in Toronto. The week shall be determined by the Society.

(b) The parties will refrain from talking negatively about the father, the paternal grandparents or other members of the paternal family in the presence of the children.

(c) The parties will ensure the children are not exposed to adult conflict.

(d) The parties will not record the older children in relation to any dispute or conflict with another parent or caregiver.

(e) The parties will facilitate or otherwise support access arrangements with the respective parties as arranged by the Society.

(f) The mother will refrain from using physical discipline or intimidation tactics with the children.

(g) The mother’s partner shall have no contact or communication with any of the children, whether virtual, telephone, e-mail or other electronic, social/gaming media, or in person.

(h) Communication with the children by the mother, the father, and the paternal grandparents, shall be age-appropriate and child-centred.

(i) The mother, the father, and the paternal grandparents shall refrain from making disparaging comments about other parents or caregivers or discussing adult conflict or litigation in the presence of the children.

(j) The mother, father, and paternal grandparents shall not video- or audio- record the children or coach them to make statements about other caregivers.

(k) The paternal grandfather shall strictly comply with all criminal or release conditions currently in force, shall provide copies to the Society, and shall promptly inform the Society of any modification.

137The matter is adjourned to June 11, 2026, at 2:45 p.m.

138The Society shall prepare the draft order for issuing.

Footnotes

1. 1Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. T.S., 2025 ONCJ 566.
2. 2The mother’s relationship with her partner remains in flux. While it is reported that the relationship has ended, he continues to form part of the mother’s support plan, particularly in relation to their child together, with a possible avenue for reconciliation. For ease of reference, he continues to be referred to in these reasons as the mother’s partner.
3. 3The background and procedural history are set out in greater detail in Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. T.S., 2025 ONCJ 566, beginning at para. 21.
4. 42017 ONCJ 784, at paras. 84-85.
5. 5Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v. R.(A), 2011 ONSC 7248; Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. P. W. and M. T., 2022 ONSC 4340.
6. 62025 ONCJ 566, at para. 158.