Chris Andrikakis

This is a second appeal concerning a child protection order, specifically the "no access" portion of the order.

The mother (appellant) sought a rehearing or virtual access to her child, D.R., who was found in need of protection due to serious injuries inflicted by a parent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal judge's decision to deny access, finding no palpable and overriding error in the best interests analysis under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The court emphasized the significant risk that led to the protection finding and the lack of a beneficial and meaningful relationship between the mother and child, noting the child's thriving in foster care.

The applicant society brought a 14B motion seeking final orders within an Amended Status Review Application, requesting custody of a child for the mother and fully supervised access for the father at a professional access centre.

The society sought to proceed on an uncontested basis without the father's consent, despite the father being served during a period when time limitations under Ontario legislation were suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to lift the suspension of the time limitation period applicable to the father, finding it inappropriate to proceed without the father's participation given the circumstances, including the closure of supervised access centres and the lack of information regarding the father's recent contact with the child.

The appellant appealed a mid-trial consent order that would have automatically returned the child to the parents' care following a six-month interim care order.

The child, who had legal representation and party status under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, opposed the consent order.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The court held that the trial judge erred in law by making a final order based on consent when the child opposed it, thereby disregarding the child's statutory participatory rights.

The court further held that the trial judge's failure to provide reasons for the decision constituted an independent error of law.

The mother appealed a child protection order placing her child in extended society care with no access, following a trial where the child was found to have suffered serious unexplained injuries.

She raised three grounds: ineffective counsel, the trial judge's incorrect application of the "unexplained injury principle" and the application of an outdated legal test for access.

The court dismissed the first two grounds, finding no miscarriage of justice regarding ineffective counsel and affirming the correct application of the unexplained injury principle.

However, the court allowed the third ground, agreeing that the trial judge erred in applying an outdated legal test for access under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

Despite this legal error, the appellate court exercised its jurisdiction to decide the access issue itself, concluding that it was not in the child's best interests to order access for the mother, given the history of serious unexplained injuries and the mother's acknowledged risk.

The father, R.W., appealed a summary judgment that placed his children in the extended care of the Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto.

R.W. failed to perfect his appeal by the court-ordered deadline, leading the Society to bring a motion to dismiss it.

The court dismissed R.W.'s appeal, noting that he would benefit from any order made in a companion appeal brought by the mother, O.P., effectively making his separate appeal redundant.

The mother (O.P.) appealed a summary judgment decision that placed her children in extended society care for adoption planning with discretionary access.

The motion judge had applied an incorrect summary judgment test.

The appellate court, applying the correct legal framework under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA), found no palpable and overriding errors in the factual findings regarding parental neglect, lack of insight, and failure to follow recommendations.

The court affirmed that extended society care was in the children's best interests, considering their stability with the kin caregiver and their mature understanding of their needs versus their wishes.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is a Status Review proceeding under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act concerning an 8-year-old child.

Following a trial on the issue of paternal access, the court ordered no access and directed the appointment of an assessor to determine how and when the child should be informed of her father's identity.

The motion addresses the appointment of Dr. Rex Collins as the assessor and concerns serious disclosure failures by the Society and its counsel, who failed to disclose that the mother had told the child about her father and disclosed traumatic information about the mother's past, contrary to the court's findings that the child did not know her father's identity.

This child protection trial concerns access between an eight-year-old child and her biological father.

The father was convicted of serious violent offences against the mother, including human trafficking, sexual assault, and assault causing bodily harm.

Following his release from prison, a Quebec Superior Court ordered supervised access.

However, the mother relocated to Ontario to avoid implementing that order.

The Society sought a finding that the child is in need of protection and a no-access order.

The father engaged in extensive online harassment of the mother and the child, posting videos, images, and commentary that violated non-publication provisions.

The mother suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression, and made statements about suicidal ideation if access was ordered.

The court found that access is not in the child's best interests at this time, but ordered comprehensive terms and conditions addressing the parents' online conduct and requiring expert assessment of the child's needs regarding her paternal identity.

A child protection society sought a summary judgment order denying a father access to his seven-year-old daughter following his criminal convictions for serious offences against the mother, including sexual assault and human trafficking.

The father had been ordered supervised access by the Quebec Superior Court but the mother subsequently moved to Ontario with the child.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding the father's access, including conflicting evidence about why the Quebec access order was not implemented, insufficient evidence about the impact of access on the mother's mental health and parenting capacity, and concerns about the father's lack of insight into his conduct.

The court ordered a focused trial on the access issue while placing the child in the mother's care subject to society supervision.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society sought Crown wardship with no access for two young children apprehended at birth.

The respondent parents sought return of the children with consent to a six-month supervision order.

Following a two-phase trial spanning nearly two years, the court ordered Crown wardship based on the parents' significant mental health diagnoses (father with schizophrenia, mother with a significant personality disorder), the mother's inability to regulate anger and control abusive behavior toward the children and father, the father's lack of engagement and failure to recognize safety issues, and the parents' inability to work therapeutically with child protection services.

The court found that return would be traumatizing to the children.

Access to the biological parents was denied, but access between the two sisters was granted.

A child protection agency brought a motion for summary judgment on a status review application concerning a child found to be in need of protection due to parental conflict.

The respondent father opposed the motion and sought a full trial.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring trial.

The evidence established that the child remained at risk due to ongoing conflict, the father had not had contact with the child in over three years, and the father refused to agree to basic behavioral conditions necessary for supervised access to resume.

The court ordered the child remain in the mother's care under agency supervision with access to the father at the agency's discretion.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society apprehended a two-year-old child from non-biological caregivers who had cared for the child since birth.

The biological mother, who has profound hearing loss and other impairments, had placed the child with them.

The biological father, who is also hearing impaired, was largely kept out of the child's life by the caregivers.

The Society, the father, the maternal grandmother, and the caregivers all proposed plans for temporary care and custody.

The court found that the caregivers did not have legal 'charge' of the child prior to apprehension, as they had established their status quo by extra-legal means and by taking advantage of vulnerable parents.

The court ordered that the child be placed in the temporary care and custody of the biological father, finding it in the child's best interests.

In a child protection proceeding, the mother sought the return of her three-year-old child to her care following an apprehension triggered by her mental health crisis and the father's arrest.

The child had been placed in the temporary care of the paternal grandparents.

The court determined that the hearing was an originating temporary care and custody motion, not a motion to change, and that both parents had charge of the child prior to apprehension.

Applying the test under section 51(3) of the Child and Family Services Act, the court found that the mother presented a better plan of care and ordered the child returned to her custody subject to society supervision.

In a child protection matter under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act, the court determined temporary care and custody of two children following a mental health crisis involving the mother and subsequent placement with the father.

The mother sought to regain custody after demonstrating significant mental health improvements and completing treatment programs.

The father opposed the motion, relying on the status quo of the children's placement with him for over seven months.

The court found that both parents had "charge" of the children at the time of intervention and applied the two-part test under subsection 51(3) of the Act.

The court determined that supervision terms would be adequate to protect the children in the mother's care but inadequate in the father's care due to documented neglect of the children's academic needs, concerns about physical discipline, and inadequate housing and provisions.

The children were placed in the temporary care and custody of the mother subject to society supervision, with generous overnight access for the father.

This is a status review application concerning a child apprehended at birth due to parental concerns including domestic violence, substance abuse, intellectual and developmental delays, and allegations of sexual assault by the father.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society sought Crown wardship for adoption purposes.

The mother sought the child's return under a supervision order.

The court found that the mother's extremely low intelligence (IQ 57), poor judgment, inability to work cooperatively with the Society, and pattern of dishonesty made her unsuitable as a primary caregiver.

The court rejected the mother's proposed plan with her fiancé as inadequate.

Crown wardship for adoption was ordered without access.

A motion to transfer child protection proceedings from the Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto to the York Region Children's Aid Society.

The children had been in the father's care for nearly four years in York Region following a 2008 trial finding that the mother had engaged in extreme parental alienation.

The court granted the motion to transfer, finding that the preponderance of convenience favoured transfer to York Region where the children resided, attended school, and where the Unified Family Court could coordinate both child protection and Divorce Act custody proceedings.

The appellant mother appealed a decision dismissing her appeal of a summary judgment order in a child protection status review.

In a previous appeal, the Court of Appeal had directed that the status review proceed by way of a 'new trial' so the mother could adduce fresh evidence challenging a psychologist's parenting capacity assessment.

The matter was subsequently decided by summary judgment rather than a viva voce trial.

The motion judge accepted the fresh evidence and found the psychologist's assessment baseless, but still granted summary judgment maintaining the children in the father's custody based on the mother's ongoing problematic behaviour and parental alienation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the summary judgment motion constituted a 'hearing' under the Family Law Rules and that no miscarriage of justice occurred since the motion judge accepted the mother's fresh evidence and the outcome was in the best interests of the children.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice regarding a child protection matter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal to a limited extent, ordering that the ongoing status review hearing proceed by way of an expedited new trial before a different judge, with the status quo remaining in the interim.