Carolyn Leach

The appellant mother brought a motion for directions regarding her appeals of two interlocutory orders made in a child protection proceeding.

The respondent children's aid society brought a counter-motion to quash the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeals because the orders were interlocutory and were made under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act at a family court branch, meaning any appeal lies to the Divisional Court.

The mother's motion was dismissed and the appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The appellant parents appealed a decision making their two children Crown wards without access.

The children had been in the care of the Children's Aid Society since 2007 due to neglect and a volatile home environment involving domestic violence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the parents could not provide a safe, stable plan and that a supervision order would not adequately protect the children.

The appeal of the Crown wardship order was dismissed.

The appellant mother appealed a decision dismissing her appeal of a summary judgment order in a child protection status review.

In a previous appeal, the Court of Appeal had directed that the status review proceed by way of a 'new trial' so the mother could adduce fresh evidence challenging a psychologist's parenting capacity assessment.

The matter was subsequently decided by summary judgment rather than a viva voce trial.

The motion judge accepted the fresh evidence and found the psychologist's assessment baseless, but still granted summary judgment maintaining the children in the father's custody based on the mother's ongoing problematic behaviour and parental alienation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the summary judgment motion constituted a 'hearing' under the Family Law Rules and that no miscarriage of justice occurred since the motion judge accepted the mother's fresh evidence and the outcome was in the best interests of the children.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer appealed an interlocutory order requiring it to pay for a mother's psychiatric assessment in a custody dispute.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motions judge lacked jurisdiction to order the disbursement of public funds for a private benefit absent specific legislative authority or a Charter breach involving an indigent litigant.

The order was set aside, and the father was ordered to pay for the assessment subject to reallocation at trial.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice regarding a child protection matter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal to a limited extent, ordering that the ongoing status review hearing proceed by way of an expedited new trial before a different judge, with the status quo remaining in the interim.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) moved for leave to appeal an interlocutory order requiring it to pay for a mother's psychiatric assessment in a custody and access dispute.

The motions judge had ordered the OCL to pay because the mother lacked funds and the judge required an assessment, despite the OCL's position that it would proceed without one if the parties could not pay.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of ordering a non-party government office to pay for a private litigant's assessment, and noting the issue is of general public importance to the administration of justice.

Addendum regarding costs following an appeal in a child protection matter.

The Divisional Court considered the submissions of the parties and the factors set out in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

The court concluded that this was an appropriate case to not require the unsuccessful party to pay costs.

No costs were ordered.

The Children's Lawyer appealed a trial judge's decision to return two children to their mother under a strict 12-month supervision order, rather than making them Crown wards without access.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to apply the paramount 'best interests of the child' test and made palpable and overriding errors in fact-finding regarding the parents' ability to protect the children from the father, who had been diagnosed with pedophilia.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was acutely sensitive to the risks, properly balanced the children's best interests with maintaining the family unit, and made no palpable or overriding errors.

The appellant mother appealed the dismissal of her appeal from a summary judgment granting Crown wardship of her three children to the Society without access.

On appeal, the mother sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding a proposed plan of care.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the lower courts' decisions but noted concerns regarding the children's current status and the deteriorating prospects for adoption.

The Court dismissed the appeal but granted the mother leave to commence a fresh status review application forthwith to assess whether re-establishing contact or placement with the mother is in the children's best interests.