Ian R. Mang

Two subcontractors sued a prime contractor for breach of oral contracts relating to a municipal winter road maintenance contract.

The plaintiffs alleged their arrangements to supply trucks and operators were for the same five‑season duration as the contractor’s agreement with the municipality, while the defendant argued the arrangements were terminable at will.

The court held that the parties’ conduct, including deposits corresponding to the five‑year municipal contract and payment structures flowing from that contract, objectively demonstrated fixed‑term agreements.

The defendant’s termination after one season constituted breach of contract.

Damages representing lost profits for the remaining four seasons, subject to mitigation, were awarded.

This is a ruling on a preliminary jurisdictional issue concerning whether a motion to change a custody order should be heard in the Ontario Court of Justice or the Superior Court of Justice.

The original order was made by the Superior Court of Justice, Family Court Branch in Hamilton pursuant to section 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act, granting custody to the applicants with access to the respondent mother at their discretion.

The respondent mother sought to vary the order.

The court determined that since a section 57.1 order is deemed to be a custody order under the Children's Law Reform Act, and the original order was made in the Superior Court of Justice, any variation of that order must proceed in the Superior Court of Justice.

The motion was transferred to the Superior Court of Justice in Milton.

Two plaintiffs brought motions for summary judgment in related actions alleging breach of oral contracts for the provision of equipment and personnel for municipal snow removal services.

The plaintiffs asserted that the agreements were fixed‑term contracts for five years that were prematurely terminated, while the defendants argued the arrangements were terminable at will.

The court found the evidentiary record contained significant conflicts regarding the formation and terms of the alleged oral agreements, the circumstances of termination, and issues of damages and mitigation.

Questions of credibility and potential personal liability of corporate principals also required factual assessment.

The court held that these genuine issues for trial made the actions unsuitable for summary judgment.

The appellant appealed an order relating to two children.

The Court of Appeal found that the order did not finally resolve the issues between the parties and was therefore not a final order.

As the order was interlocutory, jurisdiction lay with the Divisional Court.

The appeal was quashed.

The Supreme Court of Canada considered whether a person can be a party to the offence of conspiracy under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant, a youth convicted of conspiracy to commit murder for assisting two sisters in planning to kill their mother, argued that party liability should not apply to conspiracy.

The Court held unanimously that party liability to conspiracy is an offence known to Canadian law, but adopted the narrower Trieu model, limiting such liability to aiding or abetting the formation of the agreement or assisting new members to join a pre-existing agreement, and rejecting the broader McNamara approach extending liability to furthering the conspiracy's unlawful object.

Although the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on party liability, the curative proviso applied because the evidence of the appellant's membership in the conspiracy was overwhelming.

The appellant mother appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing her appeal from an Ontario Court of Justice order making her two children Crown wards with no access.

The children, diagnosed with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder, were apprehended at birth.

The mother argued the trial judge erred in overemphasizing the risk of ongoing litigation and the need for finality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences were reasonable and there was no error in the weight assigned to the children's need for finality.

Fresh evidence regarding a failed foster placement did not alter the conclusion that Crown wardship without access remained in the children's best interests.

The appellant father appealed a decision ordering ongoing and retroactive child support for an adult child with severe disabilities.

The appellate court upheld the finding that the child qualified for support under s. 31 of the Family Law Act because her participation in an adapted educational program constituted full-time education in light of her medical limitations.

The court also upheld the retroactive support award based on the father’s blameworthy conduct in failing to disclose income increases, consistent with the principles in DBS v. SRG.

However, the court held that the impact of the adult child’s Ontario Disability Support Program benefits on the quantum of support had not been properly analyzed and required further evidentiary consideration.

That issue was remitted to the Ontario Court of Justice for determination while the remainder of the appeal was dismissed.

The moving party sought an order under Rules 15.03(4) and (5) of the Rules of Civil Procedure declaring that his former lawyers had no right to assert a lawyer’s possessory lien over documents belonging to him.

The law firm had represented the moving party in two civil actions and claimed unpaid legal fees exceeding $150,000, asserting a lien over litigation documents after being discharged without cause.

The court held that the law firm was entitled to assert the lien given the material unpaid balance and the circumstances of discharge.

However, the court noted that a substantial portion of the accounts may be statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and reduced the potential exposure accordingly.

The motion was conditionally resolved by permitting release of the documents if the moving party granted a collateral mortgage as security for up to $75,000; otherwise the motion would be dismissed.

A temporary care and custody motion under the Child and Family Services Act concerning two children, J.B. (age 14) and S.B. (age 12), whose parents have a lengthy history of conflict spanning approximately eight to nine years.

The children's emotional distress, particularly J.B.'s suicidal ideation and hospitalization, was directly linked to parental conflict over school choice and ongoing litigation.

The court determined that J.B. was at risk of emotional harm if returned to his father's care, as the father continued to involve the child in parental disputes despite court proceedings being ongoing.

The court ordered J.B. to remain in the temporary care of the society with supervised access to both parents, and S.B. to remain with his mother under society supervision.

In a child protection proceeding involving two children, the applicant society and the respondent father sought the appointment of independent legal counsel for the children.

The respondent mother opposed the appointment, arguing it would increase the children's stress and draw them further into the high-conflict litigation.

The court held that the children, aged 12 and 14, had a right to be heard and that independent counsel would provide an objective evaluation of their interests.

The court ordered the Office of the Children's Lawyer to provide separate representation for each child.

Following a successful appeal under the Hague Convention ordering the return of a child to England, the appellant father sought costs of $15,000 for the appeal and $15,000 for the application hearing.

The respondent mother argued for no costs or $5,000.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellant costs for both proceedings, fixed in the aggregate amount of $5,000 on a partial indemnity scale, balancing the need for deterrence with the relative financial situations of the parties.

The mother brought the child from England to Canada for a vacation and subsequently refused to return.

The father applied under the Hague Convention for the child's return.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the child was habitually resident in Ontario and that returning her to England would create an intolerable situation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the application judge erred in determining habitual residence by focusing on the mother's intentions and post-retention facts.

The Court also found the application judge set the threshold for an 'intolerable situation' too low.

The appeal was allowed and the child was ordered returned to England.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for the respondent's investment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility were supported by the record and revealed no error.

The appellant bank appealed a summary judgment requiring it to pay the respondent $299,419.82 from his bank account.

The appellant argued there was an agreement to freeze the funds pending the outcome of related litigation, supported by consideration in the form of continued cheque cashing facilities.

The Court of Appeal found genuine issues for trial regarding the existence of the agreement and mutual consideration, allowed the appeal, and set aside the summary judgment.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision regarding the care of his child, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on a doctor's findings about emotional harm and placed undue weight on his economic circumstances.

The Divisional Court admitted fresh evidence of the appellant's improved employment and housing but dismissed the appeal.

The court found the trial judge properly assessed the risk of emotional harm based on the appellant's history of inappropriate disciplinary measures and dysfunctional parenting.

The court also held that the trial judge appropriately considered the appellant's financial ability to provide a secure home as part of the mandated best interests analysis under the Child and Family Services Act.

The parents appealed an order making their two children permanent wards of the Crown without access.

The trial judge had granted summary judgment against the mother based on a prior agreement to be bound by a parental assessment, effectively delegating the disposition decision and depriving her of a hearing on the merits.

The Court of Appeal found this process fundamentally flawed, as the burden was on the Children's Aid Society to show no triable issue regarding the best interests of the children.

The Court also admitted fresh evidence regarding the mother's mental health progress and the parents' support network.

The appeal was allowed and a new hearing ordered.

The appellant mother appealed the dismissal of her appeal from a summary judgment granting Crown wardship of her three children to the Society without access.

On appeal, the mother sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding a proposed plan of care.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the lower courts' decisions but noted concerns regarding the children's current status and the deteriorating prospects for adoption.

The Court dismissed the appeal but granted the mother leave to commence a fresh status review application forthwith to assess whether re-establishing contact or placement with the mother is in the children's best interests.

The applicants, former foster parents of the child, sought judicial review of a Director's decision confirming the Society's rejection of their application to adopt the child.

The Society had rejected the applicants due to misrepresentations during the home study, undisclosed mental health issues, and a history of abuse in the family.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Director's decision was reasonable and that he had properly weighed the evidence, including the child's attachment to the applicants against the risks posed by their misrepresentations and family history.

The applicants, foster parents of an Aboriginal Crown ward, sought an urgent judicial review and interim injunction to prevent the children's aid society from removing the child from their care and transferring her to a First Nation in British Columbia.

The society planned to move the child just weeks before she would have been in the applicants' care for two years, at which point they would acquire additional statutory rights.

The court found that the society's haste was motivated by a desire to avoid the applicants gaining these rights, rather than the child's best interests.

The court granted an interim order prohibiting the removal of the child pending the completion of the administrative and judicial reviews.

The applicant Children's Aid Society sought leave to appeal a motion judge's refusal to strike portions of an affidavit filed by the respondent foster parents.

The affidavit disclosed a mid-trial offer to settle.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, holding that an evidentiary ruling cannot be the subject of an isolated appeal when the ultimate decision on the stay motion was not appealed.

Furthermore, the applicant failed to establish conflicting decisions regarding the confidentiality of offers to settle under the Family Law Rules.