Shelley M. Kierstead

The appellant appealed an order relating to two children.

The Court of Appeal found that the order did not finally resolve the issues between the parties and was therefore not a final order.

As the order was interlocutory, jurisdiction lay with the Divisional Court.

The appeal was quashed.

The Supreme Court of Canada considered whether a person can be a party to the offence of conspiracy under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant, a youth convicted of conspiracy to commit murder for assisting two sisters in planning to kill their mother, argued that party liability should not apply to conspiracy.

The Court held unanimously that party liability to conspiracy is an offence known to Canadian law, but adopted the narrower Trieu model, limiting such liability to aiding or abetting the formation of the agreement or assisting new members to join a pre-existing agreement, and rejecting the broader McNamara approach extending liability to furthering the conspiracy's unlawful object.

Although the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on party liability, the curative proviso applied because the evidence of the appellant's membership in the conspiracy was overwhelming.

The appellant mother appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing her appeal from an Ontario Court of Justice order making her two children Crown wards with no access.

The children, diagnosed with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder, were apprehended at birth.

The mother argued the trial judge erred in overemphasizing the risk of ongoing litigation and the need for finality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences were reasonable and there was no error in the weight assigned to the children's need for finality.

Fresh evidence regarding a failed foster placement did not alter the conclusion that Crown wardship without access remained in the children's best interests.

The appellant father appealed a decision ordering ongoing and retroactive child support for an adult child with severe disabilities.

The appellate court upheld the finding that the child qualified for support under s. 31 of the Family Law Act because her participation in an adapted educational program constituted full-time education in light of her medical limitations.

The court also upheld the retroactive support award based on the father’s blameworthy conduct in failing to disclose income increases, consistent with the principles in DBS v. SRG.

However, the court held that the impact of the adult child’s Ontario Disability Support Program benefits on the quantum of support had not been properly analyzed and required further evidentiary consideration.

That issue was remitted to the Ontario Court of Justice for determination while the remainder of the appeal was dismissed.