Marvin Kurz

Following an appeal decision that recalculated child and spousal support, the parties made further written submissions on calculation corrections and costs.

The Court of Appeal accepted both parties' submissions to correct the child support calculations based on clarified living arrangements and section 7 expenses.

On the issue of costs, the court affirmed the trial judge's costs award of $22,000 to the respondent, finding that the respondent's pre-trial offer remained considerably more generous than the final result obtained by the appellant.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order terminating child and spousal support and requiring her to reimburse the respondent for overpayments.

The Court of Appeal upheld the termination of spousal support, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellant had achieved self-sufficiency following an inheritance.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred by failing to increase spousal support for the period after child support ended, and made several calculation errors regarding child support overpayments.

The appeal was allowed in part, adjusting the amounts owed between the parties.

Two subcontractors sued a prime contractor for breach of oral contracts relating to a municipal winter road maintenance contract.

The plaintiffs alleged their arrangements to supply trucks and operators were for the same five‑season duration as the contractor’s agreement with the municipality, while the defendant argued the arrangements were terminable at will.

The court held that the parties’ conduct, including deposits corresponding to the five‑year municipal contract and payment structures flowing from that contract, objectively demonstrated fixed‑term agreements.

The defendant’s termination after one season constituted breach of contract.

Damages representing lost profits for the remaining four seasons, subject to mitigation, were awarded.

The respondent brought a motion for contempt of court against the applicant, alleging breaches of a consent order dated September 17, 2012.

The applicant opposed the contempt motion and brought a cross-motion to strike portions of the respondent's materials.

The court struck two of three paragraphs of the contempt motion as improper and struck portions of the applicant's affidavit containing inadmissible evidence.

The contempt motion proceeded only regarding an alleged breach of paragraph 3 of the order.

The court dismissed the contempt motion, finding the order ambiguous regarding the interaction between paragraphs 3 and 4.

However, the court found the respondent's conduct unreasonable in that he engaged in the same behavior he had criticized the applicant for—discussing major parenting changes with the child without consulting the other parent.

Consequently, despite being the successful party, the respondent was denied costs.

The respondent brought a motion to vary prior support orders seeking termination of spousal support, reduction of child support, and elimination of certain section 7 expenses based on an alleged reduction in income.

The applicant conceded termination of spousal support but sought a later termination date, an increase in child support, and additional section 7 expenses including private school tuition and tutoring.

The court found the evidence insufficient to establish a material change in the respondent’s income and maintained the previously determined income for child support purposes.

The court terminated spousal support effective April 30, 2012, removed the respondent’s obligation to contribute to nanny expenses, and declined to order contributions for private school tuition or tutoring as necessary section 7 expenses.

The court also reduced the life insurance security amount following termination of spousal support.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order making her infant child a Crown Ward with no access for the purposes of adoption.

The motion judge had relied heavily on a past parenting capacity assessment and historical child protection involvement, while dismissing the mother's new evidence, which included a recent psychological assessment and a plan of care with her new partner.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in granting summary judgment because the mother had presented sufficient conflicting evidence that required a trial.

The court ordered an expedited trial to determine the child's disposition.

The applicant sought temporary spousal support in a family law application.

The respondent brought a motion to transfer the proceedings to the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that property issues required adjudication.

The Ontario Court of Justice granted the applicant temporary spousal support of $559 per month and transferred the matter to Superior Court.

The applicant sought costs of the motion.

The court awarded nominal costs of $2,500 to the applicant, payable by the respondent forthwith and enforceable as support, considering the significant income disparity between the parties and the applicant's success on the motion.

Following dismissal of a motion to vary and a finding of contempt for failure to comply with a prior order regarding sale of the matrimonial home, the court addressed costs.

The successful party sought substantial indemnity costs based on alleged bad faith and unreasonable conduct.

The court held that although substantial indemnity costs had been awarded on an earlier related motion, no offer to settle had been served in relation to the present motion.

Considering the circumstances, including substantial success and the duplication of issues previously litigated, the court fixed costs on a reduced basis.

Costs were ordered in a lump sum of $15,000 all inclusive.

The moving party sought to vary a prior interim order requiring monthly payments of $10,000 to the responding party, requesting a reduction and other financial relief including imputation of income and disclosure orders.

The responding party brought a cross‑motion seeking to strike the moving party’s pleadings for repeated breaches of court orders and to have him found in contempt.

The court found the moving party had failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances and had not provided sufficient financial disclosure to justify a variation.

The court also found beyond a reasonable doubt that the moving party wilfully failed to comply with an order requiring the matrimonial home to be listed for sale and made a finding of contempt.

The variation motion was dismissed, the payments were characterized as child and spousal support based on an imputed income of $350,000, and arrears were fixed and payable from the sale proceeds of the matrimonial home.

The Children's Aid Society applied for a prohibition or stay of a hearing before the Child and Family Services Board regarding the removal of a special needs Crown ward from his foster parents.

The Society argued the foster parents were not entitled to notice because the child had not lived with them continuously for two years due to a temporary treatment placement.

The court found the temporary placement did not interrupt the continuous care period and that the foster parents were entitled to notice.

The court dismissed the Society's application for judicial review as premature and ordered the child to remain with the foster parents pending the Board's hearing.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to vary his spousal and child support obligations and rescind arrears.

The respondent requested the court refuse to hear the appeal due to the appellant's willful refusal to pay support, but the court proceeded on the merits.

The appellant argued for a reduced standard of review because the motion judge's findings were based on a written record.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, applying the palpable and overriding error standard from Housen v. Nikolaisen, and found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's factual and credibility findings.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants, a 14-year-old Jehovah's Witness and her parents, fled British Columbia to Ontario to avoid a court order authorizing blood transfusions without consent.

The BC Director obtained an ex parte interim custody order in BC and successfully enforced it in Ontario, resulting in the child's return to BC.

Although the underlying medical dispute was subsequently resolved and the BC orders vacated, the appellants appealed the Ontario enforcement orders.

The Court of Appeal held the appeal was moot but exercised its discretion to hear the procedural issues.

The Court allowed the appeal, finding the Ontario courts erred in enforcing the BC ex parte custody order under s. 41(1) of the Children's Law Reform Act because the appellants were denied an opportunity to be heard, and the motion judge erred in refusing to hear viva voce evidence.

The applicants, foster parents of a child since birth, sought judicial review of a Director's decision confirming the Halton Children's Aid Society's decision to place the child for adoption with another family.

The applicants argued the process was procedurally unfair due to excessive delay and the admission of late expert evidence, and that the removal of the child violated their section 7 Charter rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the delay was necessary to determine the child's best interests, the applicants had no section 7 rights as foster parents, and the Director's decision was reasonable based on the evidence of the child's attachment to the adoptive family.

The applicants, former foster parents, brought a motion to admit several affidavits on their judicial review application.

The respondents filed responding and reply affidavits.

The Divisional Court noted that the indiscriminate filing of affidavits likely offended the rule in Keeprite, but concluded it was not feasible to parse the inextricably woven evidence paragraph by paragraph.

The court admitted all affidavits, except for a portion of one affidavit that the applicants agreed to strike, noting it would separate the wheat from the chaff during the hearing.

Four applicants brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality and interpretation of war crimes provisions in the Criminal Code.

Three public interest groups sought to intervene on issues of international law and Canada's obligations regarding war crimes.

A private individual also sought to intervene based on his expertise.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to the three public interest groups, finding they had a direct interest and could provide useful and novel submissions.

The Court denied leave to the private individual, concluding he lacked a direct stake in the outcome of the appeal.