June A. Maresca

The accused was charged with three offences related to child pornography: possession, accessing, and making available.

The Crown sought to admit evidence obtained from searches of hard drives seized from the accused's residence.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained in breach of section 8 rights.

The court found that the initial search was conducted in breach of section 8 rights following the Supreme Court's decision in R v Spencer, which established that Law Enforcement Requests to internet service providers for subscriber information require prior judicial authorization.

The court also found that a second search conducted after the Spencer decision was unconstitutional.

The court excluded all evidence obtained from both searches, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the egregious nature of the state conduct and the cumulative effect of the Charter breaches.

A youth, aged 17 at the time of the offences, pleaded guilty to procuring under section 212 of the Criminal Code, making child pornography under section 163.1, making available child pornography under section 163.1(3), and attempting to procure a person to become a prostitute under section 212(1)(d).

The youth recruited three young women aged 16 to work as prostitutes, took suggestive photographs, posted them on the internet, fixed prices for sexual acts, and collected money from the women.

The court imposed a 24-month probation sentence with conditions rather than custody, considering the youth's strong family support, genuine remorse, guilty pleas, counselling efforts, community involvement, and rehabilitation potential against the serious nature of the exploitation offences.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood and driving with an open container of liquor.

The Crown's case rested on ASD test results and Intoxilyzer readings showing BAC levels of 181 and 177.

The defence raised three issues: whether the initial demand was vitiated by re-administration of the ASD test, whether the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated by failure to re-read rights to counsel before the second ASD test, and whether the initial stop violated s. 9 Charter rights.

The court found that the stop was unconstitutional as it was based solely on the officer's suspicion without objective grounds, resulting in a breach of the accused's s. 9 rights.

Applying the R. v. Grant analysis, the court excluded the BAC evidence and entered acquittals on both charges.

The applicant mother brought a motion for summary judgment seeking sole custody of Daniel Pedersen and supervised access for the respondent father.

The respondent father opposed the motion, arguing that custody and access issues were triable matters.

The court found that after more than four years of acrimonious litigation, the outcome was a foregone conclusion based on clinical assessments and the children's best interests.

The court granted summary judgment, awarding sole custody of Daniel to the mother with supervised access to the father, and sole custody of Erika to the father with access to the mother as agreed.

The applicant sought temporary spousal support in a family law application.

The respondent brought a motion to transfer the proceedings to the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that property issues required adjudication.

The Ontario Court of Justice granted the applicant temporary spousal support of $559 per month and transferred the matter to Superior Court.

The applicant sought costs of the motion.

The court awarded nominal costs of $2,500 to the applicant, payable by the respondent forthwith and enforceable as support, considering the significant income disparity between the parties and the applicant's success on the motion.