Lorne Vincent Glass

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for a temporary order to place two children in the care of their mother, with supervised access for the father, due to concerns of physical and emotional harm arising from severe post-separation conflict.

The court found that both parents had pre-intervention charge of the children under a shared parenting schedule.

However, the court concluded there were reasonable grounds to believe the children would suffer harm if returned to joint care, citing the father's use of physical discipline, coercive control, and family violence.

Finding that supervision terms would be inadequate to protect the children in joint care, the court placed the children in the temporary care and custody of the mother and ordered supervised access for the father.

The Jewish Family and Child Services of Greater Toronto brought a motion for temporary care and custody of a 9-year-old child, D.S., due to concerns about the mother, Z.Y.'s, deteriorating mental health, which manifested as paranoid delusions impacting the child's safety, well-being, and academic/medical needs.

The mother denied mental health issues and sought the child's return without supervision.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the child was at risk of harm if returned to the mother's care, and that supervision terms would be inadequate.

The motion was granted, placing the child in the society's temporary care, with access to the mother at the society's discretion, considering the child's needs and the mother's mental health.

The father sought costs against the child's privately retained counsel, Lorne Glass, following the dismissal of a child protection application brought by the 13-year-old applicant.

The father claimed that Mr. Glass acted improperly by bringing an abuse of process proceeding devoid of merit, wasting court time, and failing to seek proper court authorization for his representation of the child.

The court found that Mr. Glass's conduct caused costs to be incurred unnecessarily by commencing a collateral proceeding for an improper purpose—to stay the father's pending custody trial—rather than seeking appointment as counsel under the Family Law Rules.

Despite finding unnecessary costs were incurred, the court applied the "extreme caution" test and awarded only $5,000 in costs against counsel, recognizing the importance of protecting resolute advocacy in child protection matters.

A 13-year-old child commenced a child welfare proceeding against her parents and the local children's aid society, seeking a finding that she and her siblings were in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act.

The father moved to dismiss the application as an abuse of process and for failure to raise a genuine issue for trial.

The court found that the child had commenced the proceeding under the influence of her mother as a tactical measure to interfere with concurrent Superior Court custody proceedings.

The court dismissed the application, finding it was an abuse of process and raised no genuine issue for trial.

The mother appealed a Crown wardship order, arguing that institutional delays in the appeal process, specifically regarding transcript preparation, breached her s. 7 Charter rights by allowing the child to bond with a prospective adoptive family over four years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Charter application, finding that the delay did not cause the substantive prejudice alleged, as the passage of time also allowed the mother to improve her situation, but it remained in the child's best interests to stay with the adoptive family.

The mother was awarded costs for the Charter application payable by the Attorney General.

A child protection application brought by a child welfare society seeking temporary care and custody of two children (ages 12 and 9) from their parents.

The father opposed the motion and sought custody with society supervision, while the mother supported the society's position.

The court found that both children had suffered significant emotional harm due to high-conflict parenting, with evidence of parental alienation, emotional abuse, and the father's controlling behavior toward the children and mother.

The court determined that the children could not be adequately protected in either parent's care and ordered temporary placement with the society, with access discretionary to the society.

A payment order was imposed on both parents proportionate to their incomes.

The appellant mother appealed an order making her child a Crown ward with no access.

The Court of Appeal previously ordered a new assessment because the proposed adoptive parents had separated.

The court-appointed assessor reported that the child was thriving with the adoptive family and would suffer emotional distress if moved.

The Court of Appeal accepted the assessor's recommendation, found it was in the child's best interests to remain with the adoptive family, and dismissed the appeal regarding Crown wardship and access.

A constitutional question regarding delay was deferred.

The mother appealed a decision dismissing her status review application regarding her child, who had been made a Crown ward with no access.

On appeal, both the mother and the Children's Aid Society sought to introduce fresh evidence, including evidence that the child's prospective adoptive parents had separated.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it could impact the outcome, and ordered an assessment report to evaluate the impact of the separation on the child.

The court also requested submissions from the Attorney General of Ontario regarding the mother's claim that institutional delays violated her section 7 Charter rights.

The appeal was reserved pending receipt of the further material.

In a child protection matter under the Child and Family Services Act, the father sought costs related to two appeals to the Superior Court of Justice arising from procedural orders made by an Ontario Court of Justice judge during settlement conferences.

The first appeal had been allowed on procedural fairness grounds after the settlement conference judge extended trial timelines without notice or consent.

A second appeal later became moot after the underlying protection application was dismissed and interim orders were varied.

The court held that, given the narrow basis of the earlier appeal decision and the ultimate dismissal of the protection application by another judge who had a full evidentiary record, it was inappropriate to assess the parties’ conduct for costs purposes.

Exercising its discretion, the court declined to award costs on either appeal.

The appellant grandmother appealed a summary judgment order finding her grandson to be a child in need of protection and making him a Crown ward with no access.

The grandmother argued the motions judge erred in applying the summary judgment test and assessing credibility.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge correctly applied the test and did not improperly weigh evidence or assess credibility, as the material issue was the undisputed lack of a relationship between the grandmother and the child.

Appeal from an Ontario Court of Justice order made at a settlement conference in a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act.

The settlement conference judge removed the matter from trial assignment court and extended the timeline under Rule 33 of the Family Law Rules without notice, relying on settlement conference materials and discussions.

The appellate court held that settlement conference briefs and discussions are protected by Rules 17(23) and 17(24) and cannot form the basis for adjudicative orders absent consent or proper notice.

The judge erred in extending the statutory timeline based on settlement conference materials and without procedural fairness.

The appeal was allowed and any future request to extend timelines was directed to be heard by a different judge.

A status review application for crown wardship of a three-year-old child.

The applicant child protection agency sought crown wardship without access for purposes of adoption.

The respondent mother opposed the application and sought return of the child to her care.

The court found the child continued to be in need of protection due to the mother's paranoid personality disorder, which was pervasive and enduring, contributing to her inability to provide adequate care and stability.

The mother's parenting was significantly impaired, characterized by inability to respond appropriately to the child's cues, inconsistent attendance at access visits, and failure to accept responsibility for her circumstances.

The court made an order for crown wardship with no access.

A temporary care and custody motion under the Child and Family Services Act concerning two children, J.B. (age 14) and S.B. (age 12), whose parents have a lengthy history of conflict spanning approximately eight to nine years.

The children's emotional distress, particularly J.B.'s suicidal ideation and hospitalization, was directly linked to parental conflict over school choice and ongoing litigation.

The court determined that J.B. was at risk of emotional harm if returned to his father's care, as the father continued to involve the child in parental disputes despite court proceedings being ongoing.

The court ordered J.B. to remain in the temporary care of the society with supervised access to both parents, and S.B. to remain with his mother under society supervision.

The appellant father appealed an order making his two children Crown wards without access.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the children were at risk, failing to consider prior agency assistance under s. 57(2) of the CFSA, and failing to consider less disruptive alternatives under s. 57(3).

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence of ongoing risk due to the father's substance abuse and instability, and concluding the trial judge properly considered both prior assistance and the lack of viable less disruptive alternatives.

The appellant appealed a child protection decision, arguing that the agency did not provide sufficient services to assist her and enable her to keep her child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no legal or factual errors in the lower courts' conclusions that the appellant had not availed herself of the services provided and had resisted assistance.

The appellant appealed an order regarding the care of her children, arguing that her trial counsel was incompetent for conceding that her son was in need of protection.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's finding that counsel was not incompetent given the substantial medical evidence, and that no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The court also found no error in the decision not to place the other child in the appellant's care.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Children's Aid Society applied for a prohibition or stay of a hearing before the Child and Family Services Board regarding the removal of a special needs Crown ward from his foster parents.

The Society argued the foster parents were not entitled to notice because the child had not lived with them continuously for two years due to a temporary treatment placement.

The court found the temporary placement did not interrupt the continuous care period and that the foster parents were entitled to notice.

The court dismissed the Society's application for judicial review as premature and ordered the child to remain with the foster parents pending the Board's hearing.

The Children's Aid Society appealed a Superior Court decision that remitted the issue of a mother's access to her children, who were made Crown Wards, back to the trial court for a rehearing.

The trial judge had made a 'silent with respect to access' order to facilitate adoption.

The appeal judge found this order impermissible but ordered a rehearing due to the passage of time.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appeal judge erred in ordering a rehearing and should have ordered no access, as the mother failed to rebut the presumption against access under s. 59(2) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The Court emphasized the need to avoid delay in child protection proceedings.