Katherine Kavassalis

This appeal addressed habitual residence under Article 3 of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction after a parent retained children in Canada beyond a time-limited consent period.

The Court adopted a hybrid, multi-factor approach that evaluates all relevant circumstances, including but not limited to parental intent and the child's links to each state.

The Court also endorsed a non-technical approach to Article 13(2), requiring proof of sufficient maturity and a genuine objection before discretion is exercised.

Although the matter was moot, the appeal was resolved to clarify national law and emphasize expeditious handling of return proceedings.

The appellant mother appealed an order making her child a Crown ward with no access.

The Court of Appeal previously ordered a new assessment because the proposed adoptive parents had separated.

The court-appointed assessor reported that the child was thriving with the adoptive family and would suffer emotional distress if moved.

The Court of Appeal accepted the assessor's recommendation, found it was in the child's best interests to remain with the adoptive family, and dismissed the appeal regarding Crown wardship and access.

A constitutional question regarding delay was deferred.

The mother appealed a decision dismissing her status review application regarding her child, who had been made a Crown ward with no access.

On appeal, both the mother and the Children's Aid Society sought to introduce fresh evidence, including evidence that the child's prospective adoptive parents had separated.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it could impact the outcome, and ordered an assessment report to evaluate the impact of the separation on the child.

The court also requested submissions from the Attorney General of Ontario regarding the mother's claim that institutional delays violated her section 7 Charter rights.

The appeal was reserved pending receipt of the further material.

The mother appealed a trial decision that transferred sole custody of her two children to the father due to her relentless campaign of parental alienation.

The trial judge had severely restricted the mother's access, making it conditional on her engaging with a specified expert for counselling and assessment, and ordered a review of access after six months.

The mother also appealed a $160,000 costs award made against her.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had jurisdiction to order a review, did not impermissibly delegate access determination, and properly exercised her discretion in awarding costs given the mother's bad faith conduct.

In six family law cases, a Superior Court judge exercised parens patriae jurisdiction to order the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) to represent children or conduct investigations, bypassing the statutory request process.

The OCL appealed these mandatory orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, holding that the judge erred by circumventing the existing statutory structure under the Courts of Justice Act, which grants the OCL discretion to accept or decline requests for involvement based on its resources and intake criteria.

The applicant, an intervener in the court below, brought a motion to be added as a party under Rule 18(5) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada in order to seek leave to appeal.

The underlying judgment declared that a child could have three parents.

None of the original parties or the Attorney General sought to appeal the decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motion, holding that the applicant lacked a specific personal interest in the outcome of the litigation and failed to meet the test for public interest standing.

The Children's Aid Society appealed a Superior Court decision that remitted the issue of a mother's access to her children, who were made Crown Wards, back to the trial court for a rehearing.

The trial judge had made a 'silent with respect to access' order to facilitate adoption.

The appeal judge found this order impermissible but ordered a rehearing due to the passage of time.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appeal judge erred in ordering a rehearing and should have ordered no access, as the mother failed to rebut the presumption against access under s. 59(2) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The Court emphasized the need to avoid delay in child protection proceedings.

The appellant mother, a member of the Cree First Nations, appealed a decision denying her access to her six-year-old child, who had been a Crown ward in non-Indigenous foster care since she was three months old.

The mother sought access to instruct the child about her Cree culture and heritage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the mother's intentions were positive, the proposed access would disrupt the child's secure and loving foster family unit and would not be in the child's best interests.