Martha Heder

The appellant mother appealed the decision of the Ontario Superior Court, which had upheld a motion judge's order making three young children Crown wards (now called extended society care) without access to the mother under the Child and Family Services Act.

The appeal judge applied the wrong legislation (CFSA instead of CYFSA) and the wrong summary judgment principles.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, confirming the extended society care order but granting the mother access to the children.

The court found that the motion judge's factual findings regarding the mother's inability to adequately care for the children were sound, but the denial of access was based on improper judicial notice and unsupported assumptions about adoption prospects.

The nature and extent of access were remanded to the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant sought to challenge an order requiring her to pay security for costs, failing which her appeal was stayed.

She failed to bring a motion to set aside or vary the order within the required time.

The Divisional Court refused to grant an extension of time, finding no apparent merit to the proposed motion or the underlying appeal, and noting substantial prejudice to the respondent due to the appellant's abusive litigation conduct.

The motion was dismissed and the stay of the appeal continued.

The Children's Lawyer appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

Following the precedent set in A.C.B. v. R.B., the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the lower court's order, and substituted a standard form order to the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The appellant appealed a parens patriae order made by the Superior Court of Justice.

Following the precedent set in A.C.B. v. R.B., the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the parens patriae order, and confirmed the standard form order.

In six family law cases, a Superior Court judge exercised parens patriae jurisdiction to order the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) to represent children or conduct investigations, bypassing the statutory request process.

The OCL appealed these mandatory orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, holding that the judge erred by circumventing the existing statutory structure under the Courts of Justice Act, which grants the OCL discretion to accept or decline requests for involvement based on its resources and intake criteria.

Justice for Children and Youth brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in a series of appeals brought by the Children's Lawyer.

The appeals concerned a Superior Court judge's order, made under parens patriae jurisdiction, requiring the Children's Lawyer to represent children in matrimonial litigation due to exigent circumstances.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to intervene, finding that the proposed intervener could provide useful assistance on the impact of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the court's parens patriae jurisdiction, especially since no party was responding to the appeals.

The appellant appealed the decision of the motion judge, who ordered that claims involving the parents should not be joined in the Family Law action.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge properly exercised her discretion and dismissed the appeal without costs.

Following the dismissal of an appeal regarding a child protection application, the court considered written submissions on costs.

The court set aside the application judge's costs order against the foster parents, finding they were motivated by the children's best interests rather than self-interest.

The court noted it is not the norm to award costs against unsuccessful applicants in child protection cases.

Each party was ordered to bear their own costs for both the application and the appeal.

The appellants, foster parents of three young siblings, appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing their application for an order granting them residence of the children pending the final determination of child protection proceedings.

The children had been apprehended over two years prior, but no protection finding had yet been made.

The foster parents argued that the inordinate delay created a gap in the Child and Family Services Act, justifying the Superior Court's exercise of its parens patriae jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the delay did not bring the matter outside the ambit of the legislation, and that the Ontario Court of Justice retained jurisdiction to determine the children's best interests, including the impact of the delay and their attachments to the foster parents.