Haley Gaber-Katz

This decision addresses a temporary care and custody motion under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, where the applicant society sought supervision terms to protect eight children from potential sexual abuse by the paternal grandfather.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe there was a probable risk of harm due to credible allegations from two adult children of the paternal grandparents and the father's refusal to cooperate fully with the society’s investigation.

The court ordered supervision terms including prohibiting contact between the children and the paternal grandparents and permitting the society to interview the children privately, emphasizing the necessity of these measures to ensure the children's protection.

The society brought a motion for temporary care and custody, seeking to place a child with his maternal grandmother due to his sexualized behaviours towards his younger sister.

The parents sought to have all children placed in their temporary care and custody subject to supervision.

The court found that while there was a risk of harm, the society did not meet its onus to show that the children could not be adequately protected by a supervision order.

The court ordered that all children be placed in the temporary care and custody of the parents subject to strict terms of supervision, including the use of cameras, door alarms, and the requirement that the child sleep in the parents' bedroom.

A child protection application was brought concerning a young child whose mother struggled with significant mental health instability, inconsistent engagement with services, and erratic visitation while the child was in foster care.

The court found the child was in need of protection due to a risk of physical and emotional harm arising from the mother’s impaired functioning, chaotic living conditions, and inability to maintain consistent care or access.

After applying the statutory best‑interests framework under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and considering the child’s need for stability, the court concluded that the child continued to require protection.

The court ordered extended society care to permit permanency planning, emphasizing the statutory timelines for young children and the importance of stable attachments.

Limited post‑care access was granted only through the exchange of letters, cards, or photographs, with the child designated as the access holder.

The Jewish Family and Child Service of Greater Toronto (JFCS) brought a motion to appoint amicus curiae in a child protection proceeding concerning a 2-year-old child.

The respondent mother, N.D., had a history of mental health issues, inconsistent access, and had twice terminated counsel, indicating a desire to self-represent despite the society seeking permanent care and adoption.

The court considered the complex nature of child protection cases, the serious relief sought, and the mother's inability to maintain legal representation.

The motion was granted, and Tammy Law was appointed as amicus curiae to assist the court, with specific duties outlined, even if the mother later retained counsel.

The applicant filed a complaint with the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding the respondent children's aid society's handling of child protection investigations and related decisions.

The respondent argued the Board lacked jurisdiction because the applicant had filed a concurrent claim in Small Claims Court based on identical facts and issues.

The Board found that under section 120(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, it cannot review a complaint if the subject matter is before the courts.

The Board also found it lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested remedies, which included monetary damages and records retractions.

The application was dismissed in its entirety.

The appellant mother, M.H., brought a motion for state-funded counsel for her appeal of a child protection order that placed her child in extended care.

The court applied the five-part test for funding, finding that the mother's s. 7 Charter rights were engaged, she could not have a fair hearing without counsel due to the complexity of the proceedings and her limited capacity, she had exhausted all legal aid avenues, and she was unable to afford a lawyer.

Crucially, the court determined that her appeal had the requisite minimum threshold of merit, particularly concerning arguments of ineffective assistance of counsel and the significant imbalance of evidence at the original summary judgment motion.

The motion was granted, and the Attorney General of Ontario was ordered to provide state-funded counsel and reasonable disbursements for both the appeal and the present motion.

A child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act in which the applicant society sought a finding that a 15-year-old girl was in need of protection.

The society alleged physical abuse, emotional harm, and risk of ongoing harm resulting from the mother's pattern of aggressive behavior, uncontrolled anger, and unaddressed mental health issues.

The mother denied the allegations and provided sparse evidence consisting largely of bald denials.

The father and the Office of the Children's Lawyer supported the society's position.

The court found that the child had suffered physical harm through repeated hitting and was at risk of ongoing physical harm, and that the child had suffered serious emotional harm including anxiety and fear, with ongoing risk of emotional harm.

The court granted the finding in need of protection under sections 37(2)(a)(ii), 37(2)(b)(ii), 37(2)(f), and 37(2)(g) of the Act.

A child protection trial under the Child and Family Services Act involving two young children (K.P., born 2013, and A.P., born 2014) where the applicant society sought findings of need of protection and Crown wardship without access.

The respondent parents, both with significant cognitive disabilities (father with FASD and frontal lobe damage; mother with intellectual disability), opposed the application and sought various supervision orders.

The court found the children in need of protection based on actual physical harm, risk of physical harm from pattern of neglect, and failure to address developmental delays.

The court rejected all proposed supervision orders due to the parents' lack of insight, poor judgment, inability to self-regulate, and demonstrated unwillingness to cooperate with the society.

Crown wardship without access was ordered as being in the best interests of the children.

A child protection society brought a summary judgment motion in a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act.

The child had been found in need of protection due to parental substance abuse.

The society sought an order placing the child in the sole custody of the father, with access to the mother.

The mother opposed the motion and sought joint or parallel parenting arrangements, arguing she should participate in major decisions regarding the child's education and religious upbringing.

The court granted summary judgment to the society, finding no genuine issue requiring trial on the question of sole custody to the father.

The court found the father had provided stable, appropriate care, while the mother's recovery was recent and there was no history of effective co-parenting or communication between the parties.

This is a costs decision in a child protection proceeding under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act.

The court awarded costs to the child protection society against the respondent parents for two of three motions brought by the parents.

The parents' motion to vary a temporary care and custody order was dismissed, as was their motion to remove a psychiatrist's report from the court record.

The parents also brought six contempt motions (five against individual society workers and one against the agency itself), all of which were dismissed.

The court found the parents' conduct in bringing these motions, particularly the contempt motions based on flawed evidence and material misrepresentations, to be exceptional and warranting costs awards.

The court awarded costs of $4,222.83 on the variation motion and $7,008.04 on the contempt motions, but declined to award costs on the motion to remove the medical report.

The Jewish Family and Child Service of Greater Toronto brought a motion for summary judgment seeking orders that three children be found in need of protection and made crown wards without access for adoption purposes.

The parents consented to the eldest child being made a crown ward.

During the hearing, the parents also consented to the two younger children being found in need of protection.

The mother did not oppose the balance of the motion, but the father opposed it and proposed a plan for the children to be placed with him subject to supervision.

The court found no genuine issue for trial and granted the society's motion, making the two younger children crown wards without access for adoption.

A child protection society sought a summary judgment motion to determine whether it could order parents to pay support pursuant to section 60 of the Child and Family Services Act for a child made a Crown Ward.

The parents argued that section 60 only applies to temporary care and custody or society wardship, not Crown wardship, and that Crown wardship terminates parental rights.

The court rejected these arguments, finding that Crown wardship does not terminate the parent-child relationship and that section 60 applies to children placed in the care of a society, including Crown Wards.

The court granted the motion and ordered the parents to pay $3,000 per month for the child's care.

A child protection society brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that a 15-year-old child was in need of protection and an order making her a Crown ward.

The child had been in the society's care since February 2013 following a crisis involving self-harm and suicidal ideation.

The child consistently refused to return to her adoptive parents' care or permit them involvement in her treatment.

The parents opposed the motion, arguing there were genuine issues requiring trial and that the child should be returned to their care.

The court granted the society's motion, finding the child was in need of protection under multiple grounds and that Crown wardship was the appropriate disposition.

The court rejected the parents' arguments regarding procedural fairness and the admissibility of evidence, and found that the child's wishes and best interests clearly supported the society's position.

Parents in a child protection proceeding brought a motion to remove the child's legal representative, Ms. Samira Ahmed of Justice for Children and Youth.

The child, nearly sixteen years old and in the care of the child protection society since February 2013, opposed the motion.

The parents argued the child lacked capacity to instruct counsel, that the representative exceeded her role, that a litigation guardian should be appointed, and that the representative had misused confidential information.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the child had clearly expressed views separate from both parents and the society, that legal representation was desirable, and that the representative had properly discharged her duties in advocating for the child's interests.

The appellant appealed a child protection decision, arguing that the agency did not provide sufficient services to assist her and enable her to keep her child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no legal or factual errors in the lower courts' conclusions that the appellant had not availed herself of the services provided and had resisted assistance.

The appellant wife appealed an order setting aside final orders made at an uncontested trial regarding custody, access, and support.

The respondent husband's pleadings had previously been struck.

The motion judge set aside the final orders relying on Rule 15(14) of the Family Law Rules and the court's inherent jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that Rule 15(14) applies only to motions to change, not set aside, final orders.

The court further found that the stringent tests for setting aside a default judgment or invoking inherent jurisdiction were not met, and the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors regarding disclosure.