Sara Westreich

This decision addresses motions for leave to intervene on an appeal from a summary judgment in a child protection case.

The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) and Renatta Austin, a lawyer who previously represented the appellant E.K.B. when she was a special party, sought leave to intervene.

The appeal raised significant issues regarding the role of special parties, their representatives, counsel's duties, procedural fairness, and Charter values.

The court found that these issues had a significant public interest element and that both proposed intervenors had an interest in the subject matter and could be adversely affected by the judgment.

Leave to intervene was granted to both the PGT and Ms. Austin, with terms restricting their intervention to specific issues related to their roles and conduct.

A child protection society brought a summary judgment motion seeking an order for extended society care of two children, with no access to their mother, and access to their maternal uncle.

The mother opposed the motion and sought return of the children to her care.

The court found that the mother suffered from serious untreated mental health issues, including amphetamine-induced psychosis, and had engaged in concerning behaviour including violating court orders, posting confidential information on social media, and attempting to undermine the children's foster placement.

The court granted the society's motion for extended care, denied the mother's request for access, and granted access to the maternal uncle at the society's discretion.

This is a costs decision arising from two motions in a child protection application.

The Jewish Family and Child Service of Greater Toronto sought orders preventing children from attending court and receiving a psychological report.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer opposed both motions.

The court granted the agency's motions.

In the costs decision, the court addressed claims by the mother and the agency.

The mother's costs claims were dismissed.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer was ordered to pay costs to the agency in the amount of $3,850 due to their failure to meet agreed-upon filing deadlines, which caused additional work for the agency.

This motion arose from a child protection proceeding concerning two children, H. (15) and C. (12).

The children and their father sought a stay of two orders made by a lower court judge: one prohibiting the children from attending the protection hearing, and another restricting their access to a prepared report.

The moving parties argued that the refusal to accept late materials from the Children's Lawyer violated procedural fairness and that the children had a presumptive right to participate.

The court applied the R.J.R.-MacDonald test for a stay, considering it through the prism of the children's best interests.

It found no irreparable harm in denying the stays and that the balance of convenience favored dismissal, citing overwhelming evidence of emotional harm to the children from involvement in the high-conflict litigation.

The motion to stay the orders was dismissed.

The applicant child protection agency brought two motions in a protection proceeding involving two children (ages 15 and 12) arising from parental conflict following the death of a sibling and the parents' separation.

The first motion sought an order preventing the children from attending court proceedings.

The second motion sought to prevent the children from receiving a clinical assessment report prepared by a family therapist.

The court granted both motions, finding that attendance at court and access to the report would cause emotional harm to the vulnerable children who were already deeply immersed in the parental conflict and litigation.

A child protection trial under the Child and Family Services Act involving two young children (K.P., born 2013, and A.P., born 2014) where the applicant society sought findings of need of protection and Crown wardship without access.

The respondent parents, both with significant cognitive disabilities (father with FASD and frontal lobe damage; mother with intellectual disability), opposed the application and sought various supervision orders.

The court found the children in need of protection based on actual physical harm, risk of physical harm from pattern of neglect, and failure to address developmental delays.

The court rejected all proposed supervision orders due to the parents' lack of insight, poor judgment, inability to self-regulate, and demonstrated unwillingness to cooperate with the society.

Crown wardship without access was ordered as being in the best interests of the children.

The applicant society brought a motion to dispense with service of protection application documents on the biological father of two children.

The court declined to dispense with service but instead granted an order for substituted service through the biological father's active Facebook account.

The court found that substituted service via Facebook was a reasonable and preferable method that would give the biological father the best opportunity to participate in the child protection proceedings while respecting privacy protections under the Child and Family Services Act.

The father brought a motion seeking recusal of the trial judge and a declaration of mistrial on two grounds: (1) late disclosure and non-disclosure of notes from Jennifer Shneer, the mother's therapist employed by the child protection society, which the father claimed prejudiced his ability to conduct his case; and (2) an alleged apprehension of bias arising from a distant familial relationship between the judge and the proposed witness.

The court dismissed the motion in its entirety, finding no prejudicial disclosure, no basis for declaring a mistrial, and no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The father brought a Notice of Constitutional Question challenging the court's scheduling of a child protection trial, arguing that adjournments exceeding 30 days and the failure to schedule consecutive trial dates violated his Charter rights under sections 7 and 15.

The father sought various remedies including dismissal of the application, placement of children in his care, or modified access arrangements.

The court dismissed the constitutional motion in its entirety, finding that the scheduling decisions were within the court's jurisdiction and discretion, that no Charter rights were violated, and that the sought remedies were neither appropriate nor just in the circumstances.

A motion brought by counsel for the mother seeking to be removed as solicitor of record in a child protection proceeding scheduled for trial.

The mother's counsel sought removal due to financial hardship, as the mother had no capacity to pay further legal fees and did not qualify for legal aid.

The court dismissed the motion, balancing the hardship to counsel against the potential prejudice to the mother and the administration of justice.

The court found that the mother would be at a considerable disadvantage if forced to represent herself, particularly given the complexity of the case, the mother's limited English proficiency, and the fact that she would be facing experienced counsel for both the society and the father.

A child protection society sought an order placing two children in the temporary care and custody of their mother subject to society supervision, with the father to have access at the society's discretion.

The father opposed the motion and sought the children be returned to both parents on a week-on, week-off basis.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children faced risk of sexual and emotional harm based on evidence of sexually inappropriate behaviour by both parents, the father's history of sexual violence convictions in Utah, allegations of domestic violence, and the father's lack of insight into protection concerns.

The court granted the society's motion, placing the children with the mother under supervision and ordering the father's access remain discretionary pending full disclosure of his criminal and therapeutic records.