Eliezer Karp

The plaintiff brought a motion on consent for leave to commence a secondary market misrepresentation action under the Securities Act against KPMG and for certification as a class proceeding for settlement purposes.

The court found the statutory criteria satisfied and granted the order, approving the class definition, representative plaintiff, common issue, and the form and dissemination of the notices to class members regarding the settlement hearing and opt-out process.

The appellant appealed a summary trial judgment finding him jointly and severally liable for a corporate loan he personally guaranteed.

The appellant argued there was a failure of consideration because the guarantee was signed after the initial loan agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that consideration existed because the bank retained the ability to change the terms of the demand loan, the appellant understood he was signing a guarantee to obtain credit, and funds were only advanced after the guarantee was signed.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the decision of Koehnen J. dated October 6, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded all-inclusive costs of $5,000 to the responding parties.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside a 2013 consent dismissal and settlement agreement, as well as the dismissal of a new 2023 action claiming the same relief.

The motion judge found the appellant's motion and the new action were transparent attempts to relitigate issues that had been settled over a decade prior.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, confirming that the doctrine of abuse of process prevents the relitigation of settled issues and that the interests of finality prevail absent contractual problems like fraud or duress.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The proposed intervenor sought leave to intervene as an added party in the defendant's motion for leave to appeal a Mareva injunction.

The proposed intervenor argued he had an interest in the proceeding because the motion judge made significant adverse findings about his integrity and conduct, including allegations of operating a Ponzi scheme.

While the Divisional Court found the proposed intervenor had an interest in the subject matter, it declined to exercise its discretion to permit intervention.

The court noted that the defendant would likely advance the same arguments and the proposed intervenor would have other opportunities to defend his reputation in related ongoing litigation.

The motion to intervene was dismissed.

The court heard competing motions by a court-appointed receiver and a third-party purchaser (BJC) regarding the sale of a commercial property.

The property was subject to a mortgage that fell into default, prompting the mortgagee to exercise its statutory power of sale and enter into an agreement with BJC.

Subsequently, a receiver was appointed over the mortgagor corporation in an oppression action and sought to sell the same property en bloc with another property to a different purchaser.

The court held that the receivership order under the Business Corporations Act and Courts of Justice Act did not suspend or supersede the mortgagee's pre-existing statutory power of sale under the Mortgages Act.

The receiver's motion to approve its sale was dismissed, and the mortgagee was permitted to complete its sale to BJC.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for specific performance of a failed commercial real estate agreement of purchase and sale, the denial of his post-trial motion to amend his pleadings to claim damages, and the trial judge's finding that a 12% mortgage interest rate offended s. 8 of the Interest Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the refusal to grant specific performance, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the property was not unique and damages would be adequate.

The Court also upheld the refusal to allow a post-trial amendment to claim damages, noting the prejudice to the respondent.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the mortgage, holding that the 12% interest rate commenced prior to default and therefore did not violate s. 8 of the Interest Act.

Two class action proceedings—one against TELUS Communications Company and related entities, and one against Bell Mobility Inc.—were brought by plaintiffs alleging that the defendants engaged in similar practices of rounding up seconds to minutes on cell phone bills.

The defendants moved to consolidate the two actions for trial or summary judgment.

The court granted the motion to hear the two summary judgment motions consecutively in a single three-week block of hearing time, finding that the common issues were identical and that separate proceedings would create an unnecessary multiplicity of litigation and risk inconsistent findings.

However, the court determined that the case management judge would not preside over the summary judgment motions, as the principles underlying Rules 37.15(1) and 77.06(2)—which prohibit a case management judge from presiding at trial without consent—apply equally to summary judgment motions.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a Mareva injunction to freeze approximately $6.1 million in settlement funds held in the defendant's solicitor's trust account.

The funds were allegedly derived from a fraudulent investment scheme involving the defendant corporation, which was controlled by individuals connected to a Ponzi scheme operated by Arash Missaghi.

The plaintiffs alleged they were induced to invest substantial sums through misrepresentation and fraud.

The court granted the Mareva injunction, finding the plaintiffs established a strong prima facie case of fraud, that assets were in the jurisdiction, that there was a risk of dissipation, and that irreparable harm would result if the funds were distributed.

The court also allowed the defendant to withdraw $250,000 from the frozen funds for legal expenses.

This decision resolves a carriage motion between three proposed class actions seeking damages for investors in The Toronto-Dominion Bank, arising from alleged misrepresentations and failures to disclose anti-money laundering (AML) deficiencies.

The court concludes that the Parkin action is best suited to advance the class members’ claims efficiently and cost-effectively, considering the statutory criteria under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The decision addresses the impact of late registration of a class proceeding, the legal framework for carriage motions, the comparative strengths and weaknesses of each action, and issues of funding and counsel experience.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion to reconsider its earlier decision denying specific performance of a land sale agreement, and refused to allow the plaintiff to amend his pleading to claim damages after trial.

The court found that the uniqueness of the property to a third party in a related case was irrelevant to the plaintiff's claim, and that the plaintiff's strategic choice to seek only specific performance precluded a late amendment.

Costs were awarded to the defendant.

On a mortgage enforcement motion, the moving party sought leave to amend her defence and counterclaim to add multiple proposed defendants by counterclaim, validate service, convert the action from foreclosure to sale, and obtain consolidation with a separate related action.

The court held there was no non-compensable prejudice and that the proposed joinder satisfied the Rules of Civil Procedure because the pleaded facts alleged an interconnected series of transactions, common factual issues, uncertainty about liability, and a strong interest in avoiding inconsistent findings.

The court further held that the proposed unlawful act conspiracy pleading was legally sufficient at the pleadings stage and need not prove the merits on the motion.

Leave to amend, conversion to a sale action, and validation of service were granted; consolidation was left unnecessary in light of the expected discontinuance of the separate action.

The decision addresses motions by Stephen Moranis to set aside a 2013 settlement and to pursue a new, nearly identical action against the Toronto Real Estate Board and others.

The court finds that Moranis’s attempts to re-litigate settled and dismissed claims constitute an abuse of process.

The court dismisses both the motion to set aside the settlement and the new action, emphasizing the importance of finality in litigation and compliance with court-ordered timetables.

The plaintiff, MM Fund, sought to dismiss its proposed securities class action against Excelsior Mining Corp. and its directors with prejudice and without costs.

The action, initially filed in British Columbia and then Ontario to preserve limitation periods, alleged misrepresentation in Excelsior's prospectus.

Citing prolonged procedural disputes, increased costs, and the absence of a substitute plaintiff, the plaintiff deemed the action no longer economically justified.

The court approved the dismissal, finding it warranted given the circumstances and the plaintiff's desire to cease pursuit.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of the lower court judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

No costs were ordered as no costs outline was uploaded to Case Center.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order setting aside a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) and an interlocutory injunction regarding a $37 million real estate transaction.

The moving party requested a stay of the order to keep the CPL in place pending the leave motion.

To avoid the time and expense of a contested stay motion, the court used its case management powers to expedite the motion for leave to appeal and granted an interim stay, conditional upon the moving party providing a $5 million undertaking in damages.

The plaintiffs, vulnerable seniors, alleged predatory lending practices, misrepresentations, and inadequate legal representation led to a large, unconscionable mortgage on their debt-free home.

Several defendants, including Canada Choice Investments Inc. (CCI), Anas Ayyoub, Blossom Rabinowitz, and Edmond Ohayon, brought motions to strike the plaintiffs' claims against them, arguing no reasonable cause of action was disclosed or that claims were scandalous/irrelevant.

The court dismissed all motions, finding that the plaintiffs' claims were adequately pleaded, met the high threshold for surviving a motion to strike, and that the interests of justice strongly supported allowing the action to proceed to trial.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted to TD Bank on a loan and guarantees.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred by allowing a non-party to testify in a mini-trial, making findings of fact relevant to a third-party claim, and granting summary judgment before the third-party claim was determined.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's exercise of enhanced powers under Rule 20.04(2.2) or in granting summary judgment, as the third-party claim was separate and the appellants had opportunities to join it.

The appellant, Money Gate Corporation, appealed the dismissal of its motion seeking distribution of proceeds from a property sale, asserting an unregistered assignment of a second mortgage.

The motion judge found the appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence regarding the source of funds for the alleged assignment, concluding no enforceable assignment was acquired.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision to dismiss the motion or in the discretionary costs order, noting the appellant's failure to file a cost outline.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The plaintiff sought specific performance of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) for a property, arguing the defendant vendor repudiated the agreement.

The defendant denied a valid agreement and specific performance, and counterclaimed for a forfeited deposit.

The plaintiff also brought a separate action for repayment of a mortgage provided to the defendant.

The court found a valid APS existed and that the defendant anticipatorily breached it.

However, specific performance was denied because the property was not unique, the transaction circumstances were not unique, damages were deemed an adequate remedy, and the parties' conduct did not favour equitable relief.

The plaintiff's claim for specific performance and the defendant's counterclaim were both dismissed.

The plaintiff's mortgage claim was granted for the principal amount of $600,000, but the 12% interest rate provision was found invalid under section 8 of the Interest Act.