Maurice William Pilon

The plaintiffs, vulnerable seniors, alleged predatory lending practices, misrepresentations, and inadequate legal representation led to a large, unconscionable mortgage on their debt-free home.

Several defendants, including Canada Choice Investments Inc. (CCI), Anas Ayyoub, Blossom Rabinowitz, and Edmond Ohayon, brought motions to strike the plaintiffs' claims against them, arguing no reasonable cause of action was disclosed or that claims were scandalous/irrelevant.

The court dismissed all motions, finding that the plaintiffs' claims were adequately pleaded, met the high threshold for surviving a motion to strike, and that the interests of justice strongly supported allowing the action to proceed to trial.

The applicant father sought to change a temporary, without prejudice, consent parenting order to a graduated 2-2-3 schedule for the child (TRL).

The respondent mother opposed the motion, arguing the proposed schedule would be too disruptive given the child's young age and existing routine.

The court, noting the "without prejudice" nature of the prior order, determined that a material change in circumstances was not required.

After considering the child's best interests, including her age, development, routine, and relationship with her maternal great-grandmother, the court granted a more gradual increase in the father's parenting time, ordering one midweek overnight on alternating Tuesdays and Thursdays, in addition to the existing alternate weekend schedule.

An appeal concerning whether a daughter exerted undue influence over her elderly parents, resulting in an inter vivos gift of substantially all their capital assets.

The parents transferred their equity in a property to the respondent daughter, who had lived with them and provided care.

The trial judge found no presumption of undue influence arose and dismissed the action.

On appeal, the court upheld the trial decision, finding that while the relationship had the capacity to create undue influence, the trial judge properly concluded the presumption did not arise based on the dominant personality and financial acumen of the father, and that any presumption would have been rebutted.

The applicant, acting as litigation guardian and power of attorney for her 95-year-old mother, Elizabeth, sought an order for possession of Elizabeth's property and leave to issue a writ of possession.

The mother's health had significantly deteriorated, requiring her to reside in an assisted living facility, and the sale of her home was necessary to cover her long-term care costs.

The respondent, Elizabeth's daughter, had been living in the property since 2014 and refused to vacate, despite a previous adjournment to obtain counsel and a court-ordered timetable for materials, which she failed to comply with.

The court granted the applicant possession of the property and leave to issue a writ of possession, effective after August 20, and awarded costs of $7,000 to the applicant, noting the application should not have been necessary.

The plaintiff, Giustina Morreale, sued her sister, Elisabeth Romanino, alleging undue influence over their parents regarding an inter vivos gift of property.

The parents had transferred the equity from their home (Beck Drive) to the defendant and her husband for the purchase of a new home (Russell Stover Court), where they continued to live.

This transfer was contrary to the parents' mirror wills, which intended a more equal division of the Beck property between the sisters.

The court examined whether a presumption of undue influence applied and, if so, whether it was rebutted.

The court found no specific act of coercion or domination and concluded that the strong-willed father made his own financial decisions.

The plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's finding that there was no oral agreement displacing the effect of title documents and no resulting trust.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed an order setting aside a previous over-the-counter order that had rectified a settlement agreement.

The appellant claimed she made a unilateral mistake in her offer to settle, which the respondent had accepted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to conclude that the respondent knew or ought to have known about the unilateral mistake, and therefore no grounds existed to set aside the settlement order.