Natalie Marconi

The moving party sought a stay pending appeal of orders striking her trespass action as an abuse of process and granting the responding party vacant possession of a mortgaged property.

The moving party had previously been evicted following a default judgment but illegally re-entered the property.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found no serious issue to be tried, as the moving party's action was a clear collateral attack on the default judgment.

The balance of convenience favoured the responding party due to mounting arrears and the moving party's illegal occupation.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The plaintiff bank moved for summary judgment on two loans advanced to the corporate defendant restaurant and against the individual defendant on a personal guarantee and collateral mortgage.

The court granted summary judgment in full.

The corporate defendant had no genuine issue for trial regarding two loans (a line of credit and a $100,000 loan) and a security agreement.

The individual defendant failed to raise triable issues regarding the guarantee and mortgage, including claims of undue influence, non est factum, accommodation surety status, and material alteration of the guarantee.

The court awarded judgment against the corporate defendant for the full amounts outstanding and against the individual defendant for the maximum guaranteed amount of $30,000, along with an order for possession of the mortgaged property.

The court awarded costs following a summary judgment decision in favour of the plaintiff bank on three unpaid loans totalling $274,311.33 plus interest, and dismissal of the defendant's counterclaim.

The plaintiff sought costs on a solicitor and own client scale based on contractual terms in the loan agreements.

The court awarded enhanced costs at $15,000, finding the plaintiff entitled to such costs based on the contractual relationship, the defendant's multiple adjournment requests, and the lack of merit in the defendant's arguments.

The plaintiff, Royal Bank of Canada, sought summary judgment against Precision Markings Inc. and Isabell Helene Sickinger for a liquidated debt under a 2018 loan agreement.

Precision admitted liability, but Ms. Sickinger disputed personal liability, raising the defence of non est factum.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, holding that Ms. Sickinger was not misled and was not entitled to rely on non est factum, given her experience and the clarity of the agreement.

Judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for $212,421.80 plus interest.

The Toronto-Dominion Bank sought summary judgment against the defendants for loan and credit card defaults.

The defendants opposed, arguing the London venue was inappropriate due to lack of local connection and that the motion was premature given potential government guarantees.

The court, noting concerns about "forum shopping" by financial institutions, adjourned the plaintiff's summary judgment motion to allow the defendants to bring a formal motion to transfer the proceeding to Toronto, and also acknowledged the prematurity argument.

The Toronto-Dominion Bank sought summary judgment against Helen Marie MacNeill, the guarantor of a corporate loan to Cellular Transport Inc., which was in default.

MacNeill argued she had no knowledge of the guarantee, signed under undue influence, and was indemnified by a separation agreement with her former spouse.

The court found no material facts in dispute, noting MacNeill was an equal shareholder and direct beneficiary of the loan.

Her claims of undue influence and *non est factum* were dismissed as her evidence did not meet the legal threshold, and her actions amounted to carelessness.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the bank for the full amount of the debt.

The Royal Bank of Canada ("RBC") sought a judicial sale of the defendant's jointly owned property to satisfy a default judgment for unpaid credit card bills.

RBC moved for a reference under Rule 54.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as a prerequisite to an order for sale under Rule 55.06, arguing it would yield a better price than a sheriff's sale.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no "special circumstances" to justify deviating from the statutory sheriff's sale process under the Execution Act.

The court also noted the cumbersome and expensive nature of judicial sales and the strain on court resources, and rejected the attempt to indirectly sever a joint tenancy to facilitate the sale of jointly owned property where the co-owner was not a debtor.

The Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) sought a judicial sale of the defendant's property to satisfy a default judgment for unpaid credit card bills.

RBC moved for the appointment of a referee under Rule 54.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing this process would yield a better price than a sheriff's sale.

The defendant did not appear.

The court dismissed RBC's motion, finding that a judicial sale is a cumbersome and expensive process that should only be ordered in "special circumstances" where there is an impediment to a sheriff's sale and a clear benefit to an equitable receiver.

The court concluded that such special circumstances, particularly regarding PIPEDA issues, no longer exist following the Supreme Court's decision in Royal Bank of Canada v. Trang.

The court emphasized that the Execution Act provides the primary statutory vehicle for enforcing writs of seizure and sale against real property, and the judicial sale process is an inefficient use of court resources given current backlogs.

No order as to costs was made.

The appellants, S-Cosmetics Clinic Inc. and Kuilin Wang, appealed a portion of a summary judgment that required Mr. Wang to deliver corporate assets to the Royal Bank of Canada.

They argued that the bank had not pleaded personal liability for Mr. Wang regarding the corporate assets.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's determination that Mr. Wang, as the sole officer, director, and directing mind of the Corporation, and admitting possession and the bank's entitlement to the assets, must deliver them.

The appellants, Home & Us Corporation and its director Asma Parveen, appealed a summary judgment granted to The Toronto-Dominion Bank concerning two loan agreements and a personal guarantee.

The appellants argued that a demand for payment on the first loan was invalid due to Mrs. Parveen being out of the country, and that a CEBA loan was not yet due and the bank lacked authority to demand payment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings, agreeing that a prior valid demand existed for the first loan and that the CEBA loan agreement terms allowed for default if other loans were in default or if business activities ceased, which they had.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a judgment creditor, brought a motion for an order for a judicial reference sale of the defendant's property, arguing it was more advantageous than a sheriff's sale.

The defendant did not respond or appear.

The court considered conflicting judicial decisions on the availability of judicial reference sales and adopted the view that the court has inherent jurisdiction to order such a sale when it is more likely to achieve fair market value and is beneficial to all parties, including the debtor.

The motion was granted.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant guarantor for a corporate debt.

The defendant denied signing the guarantee and alternatively pleaded undue influence by her husband.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the bank failed to provide a proper evidential foundation.

The bank relied on affidavits from an employee with no personal knowledge, appending hearsay documents without establishing their admissibility.

The court held there were genuine issues for trial regarding the authenticity of the guarantee and whether the bank took reasonable steps to rebut the presumption of undue influence.

The Royal Bank of Canada sought summary judgment against a corporation and its principals for defaulted loans and a credit card.

The court granted summary judgment for the undisputed corporate debts and the credit card debt.

However, the motion for summary judgment against the principals as personal guarantors was dismissed due to significant conflicting evidence regarding the signing of personal guarantees and alleged misrepresentation by RBC representatives.

The court found that the credibility and reliability of witnesses could not be assessed without cross-examination, which is prohibited in simplified procedure actions, thus requiring a summary trial for the guarantee claims.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted by the Superior Court of Justice ordering him to repay $337,653.67 to the respondent bank.

The claim arose from a forged cheque that the appellant had deposited to his bank account.

The appellant's primary complaint was that the motion judge erred in refusing to grant an adjournment of the summary judgment motion.

The appellant's counsel requested an adjournment the day before the hearing, citing recent retention and scheduling conflicts.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to proceed with the motion, finding no error in the exercise of discretion and noting that the appellant had ample notice of the hearing date and that waiting until the last minute to request an adjournment was contrary to the principles and directives governing summary judgment motions.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted by the Superior Court in favor of the respondent bank.

The appellants had fallen into arrears on property taxes, and the bank paid those arrears as permitted under the mortgage terms and added the amount to the mortgage debt.

This caused the appellants to exceed their authorized credit limit, constituting a default under the mortgage.

The appellants filed fresh evidence on appeal that could have been presented at the motion stage.

The court found no basis for the defences raised and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order granted in favor of the Royal Bank of Canada and dismissing the appellant's counterclaim.

The appellant argued that the motion judge erred in refusing to accept late-filed materials for the summary judgment motion.

The appellant also brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence, including an affidavit from his lawyer explaining that he had misdiarized the filing date.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no basis to interfere with the discretionary refusal to accept late materials and denying the motion for leave to adduce fresh evidence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants for outstanding loan and credit card debts.

The defendant Guy Sanders sought leave to file responding materials on the day of the hearing, which the court denied due to his failure to comply with previous timetable orders and lack of valid explanation.

The court found the plaintiff's affidavit evidence sufficient to establish the debts, noting the defendants' pleadings contained only bald denials without particulars.

The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff and dismissed the defendants' counterclaim.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment seeking recovery of $46,784.11 after it mistakenly credited mortgage payments drawn from a frozen bank account and later discharged the mortgage based on an incorrect payout statement.

The court held that the discharge of the mortgage did not extinguish the underlying debt, and allowing the defendants to retain the benefit of the bank’s mistake would constitute unjust enrichment.

The defendants’ argument based on the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio was rejected, as the bank’s breach of the freeze order was inadvertent and did not bar enforcement of the debt.

However, the court declined to rectify the land titles register to reinstate the mortgage because the parties could not be restored to their original position and the requested third mortgage would prejudice other mortgagees who were not parties to the proceeding.

Judgment was granted for the debt, and the defendants’ counterclaim was dismissed.

The bank brought summary judgment motions to enforce two small business loans and related personal guarantees arising from franchise purchases.

The borrowers admitted receiving the funds and failing to repay but attempted to amend their pleadings to assert misrepresentation and unconscionability based on allegedly fraudulent financial information provided by third parties.

The court held that the proposed defenses were not viable, emphasizing that borrowers cannot rely on a lender to inform them of their own financial circumstances and that lack of independent legal advice is not a standalone defence where guarantors understood the agreements.

The relationship between lender and borrower was a normal commercial one with no vulnerability triggering unconscionability.

Summary judgment was granted for the bank for the outstanding loan, guarantee, and credit account amounts.

Following the granting of summary judgment for a lender enforcing personal guarantees, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The moving party sought substantial indemnity costs relying on contractual terms in the guarantee requiring payment of legal costs on a solicitor-and-own-client basis.

The court also found that the responding party attempted to mislead the court by manufacturing evidence regarding the circumstances of the guarantee.

Considering Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principles governing fair and reasonable cost awards, the court granted substantial indemnity costs in the amount sought.