Peter Istvan Waldmann

The Receiver brought a motion seeking a declaration that certain transfers made by the debtor to third-party creditors were transfers at undervalue under section 96 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and an order for repayment.

The debtor's principal had breached a preservation order by using a tax refund to pay personal and corporate debts owed to the third parties, who received the funds in good faith without knowledge of the receivership or the court order.

The court found that while the transfers met the criteria for transfers at undervalue, the exceptional circumstances of the case warranted exercising discretion to not require the third parties to repay the funds.

The Receiver's reports and fees were approved.

The defendant in a proposed class action moved under s. 29.1 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 to dismiss the action for delay, on the basis that the plaintiff failed to file a final and complete certification motion record within one year of commencing the action.

The plaintiff filed a certification record three days after the one-year deadline and, in any event, the record was incomplete as it contained no litigation plan — an indispensable requirement under s. 5(1)(e)(ii) of the CPA.

The plaintiff also moved to amend the Statement of Claim and substitute two new representative plaintiffs, but both proposed plaintiffs demonstrated no meaningful understanding of or engagement with the litigation plan requirement, effectively leaving counsel to litigate on his own.

The Court of Appeal had definitively eliminated any judicial discretion to relieve parties of the strict requirements of s. 29.1.

The motion to dismiss was granted; the motion to amend and substitute was denied.

On panel review under s. 7(5) CJA, the appellant challenged dismissal of a motion to extend time to perfect an appeal.

The panel found justice required an extension because perfection materials had been tendered before dismissal notice and defects were largely technical with no demonstrated prejudice.

The review motion was granted and timelines reset.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The action arose from a social media post by the respondent about Halal mortgages, which the appellant claimed referred to him and his former company.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the post related to a matter of public interest and that the appellant failed to show the defamation claim had substantial merit, as the impugned words did not identify him.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded on a partial indemnity basis.

This endorsement addresses the awarding of full indemnity costs to the Defendants following the dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that several indicia of anti-SLAPP litigation were present, including a history of litigation against critics, a punitive purpose, and minimal damages.

The Plaintiffs did not provide costs submissions or arguments against the statutory presumption of full indemnity costs.

The court found the quantum of costs sought to be reasonable and noted that the Plaintiffs’ conduct increased litigation costs.

The Defendants were awarded $64,359.30 in costs, payable within 30 days.

Following an appeal in a class proceeding, the parties and the Law Foundation of Ontario made a joint submission regarding costs.

The Court of Appeal ordered the appellants to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal fixed at $30,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

This decision concerns the interpretation and distribution of proceeds from a Legal Expense Insurance (LEI) policy following the unsuccessful outcome of a personal injury trial.

The court considered whether the applicant (Spencer and Elite Insurance Company) or the respondent (Belton) was entitled to the policy funds, and whether the funds should be shared pro rata between costs and disbursements.

The court held that the policy funds were to be paid to the applicants to offset their costs, as the law firm (MHA) had abandoned its claim for disbursements, and that Belton was not a beneficiary entitled to direct the use of the funds.

The court dismissed a defamation action brought by UM Financial Inc., Omar Kalair, and Yusuf Panchbhaya against Ronald Butler and Butler Mortgage Inc. The plaintiffs alleged that a social media post by Mr. Butler defamed them by referencing a halal mortgage organization that "ripped off its clients years ago & embezzled people’s money." The court found that UM Financial lacked standing as an undischarged bankrupt, and that the impugned words did not refer to the plaintiffs specifically.

The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to show substantial merit to their claim, failed to show the defendants had no valid defences, and failed to demonstrate that the public interest in allowing the action to proceed outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The action was dismissed under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their class proceeding for delay under s. 29.1(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The motion judge found that the appellants failed to file a certification motion record or establish a timetable for steps required to advance the proceeding within one year of commencement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that while a contextual approach applies to determining whether a timetable for required steps was established, the one-year deadline is mandatory and no such timetable existed here.

The court also rejected arguments regarding waiver, the availability of a Phoenix order, and the effect of adding a new plaintiff.

The appellant builder appealed an arbitrator's final award on damages and costs following a failed real estate transaction.

Previously, a Superior Court judge had set aside the arbitrator's initial liability award, finding the respondent buyers liable for anticipatory breach, and remitted the matter for damages assessment.

On remand, the arbitrator ignored the court's binding findings, created a legal fiction of 'contributory breach of contract,' and limited the builder's damages to the forfeited deposits without hearing evidence.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that arbitrators are bound by the law and appellate court directions.

The award was set aside and remitted to a new arbitrator to properly assess damages based on the difference between the contract and resale prices.

The appellant, a formerly licensed lawyer, appealed the dismissal of his $15 million action against his former counsel for negligent legal advice and ineffective assistance during contempt proceedings.

The motion judge had dismissed the action under Rule 21.01(3)(d) as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the action constituted an impermissible collateral attack on previous contempt findings.

The court also upheld the motion judge's finding regarding the limited scope of the retainer, which did not obligate counsel to adduce the additional evidence the appellant claimed was missing, and concluded that such evidence would not have altered the original contempt finding based on the appellant's collusion with his former client.

The applicants sought an order compelling Martin & Hillyer Associates to produce an unredacted adverse costs insurance policy.

Martin & Hillyer had provided a partially redacted copy, claiming privilege and confidentiality over certain portions.

The court found that the redacted portions were neither privileged nor confidential, as the policy contained generic wording common to such contracts and did not include solicitor-client communications or litigation strategy.

The court emphasized that the entire policy was relevant for proper contractual interpretation.

The application for production was granted.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' application for an assessment of the respondent law firm's accounts, the respondent sought costs on a composite partial, substantial, and full indemnity basis.

The court found that the applicants' persistence in making unfounded and scurrilous allegations against the integrity of the late Edward Greenspan and his firm justified an award of full indemnity costs.

The court reduced the claimed amount by disallowing fees for work performed by the represented clients themselves and for a settled security for costs motion, ultimately awarding the respondent $150,262.92 all-inclusive, plus $1,500 for costs submissions.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The action, assigned from a bankrupt estate, alleged negligence and breach of fiduciary duty by the former bankruptcy trustee and its representative.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by reversing the onus of proof regarding discoverability and by failing to consider s. 12 of the Limitations Act, which applies to assigned claims in bankruptcy.

The court held that the limitation period analysis must account for the dual roles of the creditor as an inspector and the need to obtain court orders (s. 38 and s. 215 BIA) before commencing action against a trustee.

The appeal was allowed, the dismissal set aside, and the limitation period issue was directed to proceed to trial.

The applicants sought an assessment of the legal accounts rendered by the respondent criminal defence law firm, alleging overcharging and breach of fixed-price and maximum-price retainer agreements.

The court found no fixed-price agreement existed for the preliminary inquiry and that the firm did not overcharge under the maximum-price contract for the trial phase.

The court also held that allegations of deficient legal services were barred by issue estoppel, having been dismissed in prior criminal proceedings.

Finding no special circumstances to justify an assessment outside the statutory limitation period, the application was dismissed.

This is a motion for certification for settlement purposes in a proposed privacy law class action concerning a data breach affecting 8.6 million customers of LifeLabs.

The parties reached a settlement agreement, and the plaintiffs sought court approval for certifying the action for settlement, approving the settlement notices (Short and Long Form), and a plan for their dissemination.

The court granted the motion, finding that all criteria for certification were met, albeit less rigorously applied in the settlement context.

The settlement involves a guaranteed fund of $4.9 million and a contingent fund of $4.9 million, with claimants receiving a minimum of $50.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's professional negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 21.01(3)(d).

The plaintiff, a suspended lawyer, alleged negligent legal advice and breach of professional obligations by the defendants in defending him against a civil contempt application, which resulted in a jail sentence.

The court found that the plaintiff's action constituted an impermissible collateral attack on prior court orders that had already established his contempt.

The court accepted the defendants' evidence regarding the limited scope of their retainer and dismissed the plaintiff's claims, including a claim for recovery of legal fees, which the court suggested should be pursued under the Solicitors Act.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Morgan J. dated April 13, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $4,874.14.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent $17,918.66 for unsold jewelry under a consignment agreement.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, argued the trial was unfair due to the handling of her adjournment request and the trial judge's failure to assist her with procedural steps.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge failed to provide necessary assistance to the self-represented litigant regarding the adjournment and the tendering of documentary evidence.

The court also found the trial judge erred in applying an arbitrary 20% discount to the damages calculation.

A new trial was ordered.

The plaintiff successfully defended summary judgment motions brought by multiple defendants across several actions.

While costs were resolved with most defendants, the plaintiff sought costs against the defendants Helden and 131 Ontario for their involvement in the dismissed motions in the s. 38 BIA Action and the Copyright Action.

The court declined to award costs for the Copyright Action due to the defendants' limited involvement.

For the s. 38 BIA Action, the court found the defendants were passive participants who 'tagged along' with the primary moving parties.

The court apportioned 25% of the plaintiff's costs for that motion to these defendants, fixing the amount at $9,500 on a partial indemnity scale.