Doug Smith

The plaintiff successfully defended summary judgment motions brought by multiple defendants across several actions.

While costs were resolved with most defendants, the plaintiff sought costs against the defendants Helden and 131 Ontario for their involvement in the dismissed motions in the s. 38 BIA Action and the Copyright Action.

The court declined to award costs for the Copyright Action due to the defendants' limited involvement.

For the s. 38 BIA Action, the court found the defendants were passive participants who 'tagged along' with the primary moving parties.

The court apportioned 25% of the plaintiff's costs for that motion to these defendants, fixing the amount at $9,500 on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiff commenced four separate actions arising out of the bankruptcy and subsequent death of a lawyer.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the actions, primarily arguing they were barred by the applicable limitation periods.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the Bankruptcy Trustee Action and the Client Assigned Claims Action (with one minor exception), finding they were commenced after the expiry of the two-year limitation period and there was no genuine issue for trial regarding discoverability.

However, the court denied summary judgment for the s. 38 BIA Action and the Copyright Action, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding when the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of the injuries and whether the copyrighted materials were used during the relevant period.

The applicant, Vale Canada Limited and related entities, brought a motion before the Court of Appeal for Ontario to expedite the hearing of their appeals.

These appeals stem from a lower court decision regarding jurisdiction and forum non conveniens in a complex insurance dispute with parallel proceedings in New York.

The motion judge dismissed the request for expedition, emphasizing that judicial comity requires avoiding an "unseemly race" between jurisdictions and that the issue of forum non conveniens should be determined on its merits by the respective appeal courts, not by the speed of litigation.

Following a successful motion by the defendant Nelson to permanently stay the action and crossclaim against him, the parties could not agree on costs.

Nelson sought costs for both the stay motion and a moot summary judgment motion brought by the co-defendant Halton.

The court declined to award costs for the moot summary judgment motion.

However, the court awarded Nelson his costs for the successful stay motion on a partial indemnity basis, rejecting Halton's argument that Nelson's criminal conduct should preclude a costs award.

Halton was ordered to pay Nelson $19,000 in costs.

The defendant Tad Nelson moved to permanently stay the action against him due to the plaintiff and co-defendant Regional Municipality of Halton's failure to immediately disclose a settlement agreement.

This agreement included an assignment of the plaintiff's claim against Nelson to Halton.

The court found that the settlement significantly altered the litigation landscape and the adversarial relationship between the parties, requiring immediate and full disclosure.

The delayed and partial disclosure constituted an abuse of process.

The court rejected arguments of no prejudice and delay in bringing the motion.

The action and Halton's crossclaim against Nelson were permanently stayed.

The plaintiffs, former co-owners of a property, sued the defendants, real estate appraisers, for negligence and breach of contract arising from an appraisal report prepared for a prior arbitration.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the claims based on expert witness immunity.

The court granted the defendants' motions, finding that the appraiser acted as an expert witness in the arbitration and is therefore absolutely immune from civil suit by both the adverse party and his own client for his report and testimony.

The court also held that issue estoppel did not apply to bind the defendants to the arbitrator's findings, as they were not privies to the arbitration.

The plaintiff alleged sexual assault by the defendant Nelson while employed by Halton.

Halton settled with the plaintiff and moved for summary judgment on its crossclaim against Nelson.

Nelson sought to amend the motion timetable to adduce late expert evidence from a personal injury lawyer regarding the reasonableness of the settlement, which would require a six-month adjournment.

The court dismissed the request, emphasizing the importance of adhering to court-ordered schedules, proportionality, and timeliness, and noting doubts about the admissibility of such expert evidence.

The Regional Municipality of Halton sought default judgment against Tad Nelson, who had been noted in default.

Nelson subsequently retained counsel and sought to set aside the noting in default.

The court convened a case conference to schedule both motions.

The judge decided that both motions should be heard orally and together by a judge, rather than Nelson's motion to set aside default being heard by a Master first.

The decision emphasized efficiency, affordability, and proportionality over tactical considerations regarding appeal routes.

The Third Party, a municipality, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss a Third Party Claim brought by the Defendant general contractor.

The claim arose from a municipal infrastructure project where a provisional item was deleted from the contract.

The parties had previously entered into a Global Settlement Agreement to resolve all outstanding claims.

The court found that the summary judgment process was appropriate as there were no credibility issues requiring a trial.

The court interpreted the Global Settlement Agreement and concluded that the specific claim was subsumed within the settlement, barring the Defendant from asserting further claims.

The motion for summary judgment was granted.

The appellant sought a review of a chambers judge's decision dismissing his motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, which he had missed by two weeks.

The chambers judge found that while the appellant had formed the requisite intention to appeal and provided an adequate explanation for the delay with no prejudice to the respondent, he failed to demonstrate that there was merit to the proposed appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the chambers judge's decision, finding that the conclusory statements in the appellant's affidavit did not support an error and that the core findings on the summary judgment motion regarding the expiration of the limitations period and the appellant's lack of standing were unassailable.

A judgment creditor brought a motion under s. 50.4(11) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to terminate the automatic 30‑day stay following the debtor’s notice of intention to make a proposal.

The debtor sought an extension of the stay under s. 50.4(9).

The court found the debtor failed to establish good faith, due diligence, or a likelihood of presenting a viable proposal, providing only vague assertions of possible negotiations while having no active business, revenue, or meaningful assets.

Given the absence of evidence of any realistic restructuring plan and the veto power of the principal creditor, the statutory requirements for an extension were not met.

The court dismissed the debtor’s motion for an extension and granted the creditor’s motion to terminate the stay.

Following an eight‑day civil trial in which the defendants were wholly successful, the court addressed costs.

The plaintiffs argued that costs should not follow the event because the litigation was pursued in the public interest and they were allegedly impecunious.

The court considered Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including proportionality, the circumstances of the dispute, the parties’ reasonable expectations, and the existence of settlement offers.

While acknowledging potential financial hardship and the plaintiffs’ stated public interest motivations, the court found that the defendants were entitled to recover costs.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded in a reduced amount, payable jointly by the unsuccessful plaintiffs.

Prisoner passengers injured in a rear-end collision while being transported in a police prisoner transport vehicle sought punitive damages against the police service and related defendants after settling compensatory claims with other parties.

The plaintiffs alleged that the design of the transport vehicle—lacking seat belts, padding, visibility, and communication systems—demonstrated reckless disregard for prisoner safety.

The defendants argued the design reflected industry standards and balanced passenger safety with the need to prevent prisoner-on-prisoner and prisoner-on-officer violence.

The court held that punitive damages require malicious, high‑handed, or reprehensible conduct warranting denunciation.

Because the vehicle design reflected a rational policing approach supported by industry practice and reasonable debate over competing safety concerns, the conduct did not meet the threshold for punitive damages.

The applicant filed a police misconduct complaint arising from a stop and search during the G20 summit.

The OIPRD investigated and directed the Chief of Police to hold a disciplinary hearing.

Because more than six months had passed, the Chief applied to the Police Services Board for an extension of time.

The Board denied the extension without notifying the applicant, allowing him to make submissions, or providing reasons for its decision.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court quashed the Board's decision, holding that the Board breached its duty of procedural fairness by failing to provide the applicant with notice, an opportunity to be heard, and reasons for its decision.

The plaintiff and defendant were participating in a charity bicycle ride on a closed highway.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant suddenly swerved into his path, causing a collision and injuries.

The court found that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff and that the appropriate standard of care was negligence, not recklessness.

The court concluded that the defendant breached this standard by making a sudden, unpredictable movement contrary to the rules of group cycling.

The court also held that the waiver signed by the plaintiff did not release other participants from liability for negligence.

Liability was found against the defendant.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the defendant’s jury notice in a negligence action arising from a bicycle collision during a charity ride.

The defendant amended the statement of defence to plead the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria and reliance on a signed waiver releasing liability.

The court held that the waiver and the volenti defence would necessarily require evidence and argument concerning the interpretation and legal effect of the waiver, raising issues of law intertwined with the liability determination.

The court concluded that a jury could be confused by the waiver and might improperly interpret it as barring the lawsuit altogether.

Justice was better served by striking the jury notice and proceeding with a judge-alone trial.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that despite not having the benefit of the Combined Air decision, the motion judge developed a full appreciation of the case.

The motion judge was entitled to engage in a limited weighing of the evidence and correctly concluded there was no evidence of over service of alcohol by the respondent.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants, residents of a social housing complex, were arrested by security guards for trespass after refusing to answer questions and acting belligerently.

At trial, the jury returned inconsistent answers, and the trial judge dismissed the action, finding the guards had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by engaging in fact-finding to fill gaps in the jury's answers.

The Court found that the guards lacked reasonable and probable grounds to believe the appellants were trespassing, as residents have no legal obligation to answer security guards' questions.

Judgment was entered for the appellants for false arrest and assault.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict dismissing her action for malicious prosecution and negligent investigation against the police.

She argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the exact words spoken, the police's duty to get her version of events, and the assessment of reasonable and probable grounds.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the charge, noting it fairly focused the jury on whether the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charge.

The respondents cross-appealed the trial judge's decision to deny them costs based solely on the appellant's impecuniosity.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, holding that impecuniosity cannot be the only factor considered, and awarded the respondents $40,000 in trial costs and $7,500 for the appeal.