Richard A. Levin

The appellant, injured in a prisoner transport van, sued for negligence alleging design deficiencies.

After settling with the Province, the appellant pursued the driver and the City of Toronto, primarily seeking punitive damages for alleged callous disregard for prisoner safety.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding no conduct warranting punitive damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the assessment of the punitive damages claim or the factual findings, and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against him arising from a three-way motor vehicle accident.

The defendant brought the motion before submitting to discovery and relied solely on a lawyer's double-hearsay affidavit rather than providing his own direct evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the record was insufficiently developed to permit a fair and just determination of the issues on the merits, and drew an adverse inference from the defendant's failure to provide his own evidence.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a decision by the Director's Delegate of the Financial Services Commission of Ontario regarding the respondent insured's entitlement to income replacement benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The Director's Delegate had upheld the arbitrator's award of income replacement benefits but remitted other issues for re-hearing due to inadequate reasons.

The insurer argued the Director's Delegate breached procedural fairness and provided inadequate reasons by not remitting all issues.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no breach of procedural fairness and concluding that the Director's Delegate's reasons were adequate and reasonable.

Following an appeal and cross-appeal regarding statutory accident benefits where both parties enjoyed mixed success, both parties sought their legal expenses of the appeal.

The Director's Delegate found that neither party enjoyed a significantly greater degree of success that would warrant an award of expenses.

The parties were ordered to bear their own expenses of the appeal and cross-appeal.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a summary judgment motion where the plaintiffs were wholly successful.

The court awarded the plaintiffs partial indemnity costs of $7,166.78, all-inclusive, payable forthwith by the moving party defendants, Subramaniam Jeyakumar and Financialinx Corporation.

The decision considered the reasonableness and proportionality of the costs, as well as the factors set forth in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The moving defendants, Subramaniam Jeyakumar and Financialinx Corporation, sought summary judgment to dismiss the action and crossclaims against them, arguing no genuine issue for trial existed regarding their liability in a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiffs opposed, citing conflicting evidence on liability and damages, and the co-defendant Jamie Marston's admission of only 1% liability.

The court also addressed whether leave was required to bring the motion under Rule 48.04.

The motion judge found that no consent was given to place the action on a trial list, thus no leave was required.

Alternatively, if leave was required, it was granted due to a substantial and unexpected change in circumstances (Marston's 1% liability admission).

Ultimately, the court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly regarding the allocation of liability between the co-defendants, and that summary judgment would not be a proportionate, expeditious, or less expensive means to achieve a just result.

Both parties appealed an Arbitrator's decision regarding statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The Director's Delegate found that the Arbitrator breached procedural fairness by failing to provide adequate reasons for awarding attendant care, housekeeping, medical/rehabilitation benefits, and the cost of assessments.

The Delegate upheld the Arbitrator's finding that the accident caused the insured's shoulder injury and the award of income replacement benefits, but found no evidentiary basis for limiting the benefits to a three-month post-surgery period.

The Delegate also found the Arbitrator's dismissal of a special award to be self-contradictory given the finding that the insurer unreasonably withheld benefits.

The unsupported and unreasoned portions of the decision were rescinded and remitted for rehearing.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for accident benefits.

She elected to receive caregiver benefits instead of income replacement benefits.

The insurer sent contradictory Explanations of Benefits regarding her eligibility for income replacement benefits.

More than two years later, she applied for mediation for income replacement benefits.

The Arbitrator dismissed the application as time-barred.

On appeal, the Director's Delegate found that the insurer's denial was not clear and unequivocal due to the contradictory notices, meaning the two-year limitation period was not triggered.

Furthermore, because the initial election was invalid, the 30-day time limit to re-elect was negated.

The appeal was allowed, permitting the appellant to pursue her claim for income replacement benefits.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and elected to receive caregiver benefits instead of income replacement benefits.

The insurer terminated the caregiver benefits in December 2008.

In 2011, the applicant sought income replacement benefits, arguing her initial election was invalid because the insurer failed to provide required information under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The arbitrator found that while the initial election was invalid, the insurer's 2008 refusal of income replacement benefits was clear and unequivocal, triggering the two-year limitation period.

As the applicant did not seek mediation until 2013, the application for arbitration was dismissed as time-barred.

Following an eight‑day civil trial in which the defendants were wholly successful, the court addressed costs.

The plaintiffs argued that costs should not follow the event because the litigation was pursued in the public interest and they were allegedly impecunious.

The court considered Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including proportionality, the circumstances of the dispute, the parties’ reasonable expectations, and the existence of settlement offers.

While acknowledging potential financial hardship and the plaintiffs’ stated public interest motivations, the court found that the defendants were entitled to recover costs.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded in a reduced amount, payable jointly by the unsuccessful plaintiffs.

Prisoner passengers injured in a rear-end collision while being transported in a police prisoner transport vehicle sought punitive damages against the police service and related defendants after settling compensatory claims with other parties.

The plaintiffs alleged that the design of the transport vehicle—lacking seat belts, padding, visibility, and communication systems—demonstrated reckless disregard for prisoner safety.

The defendants argued the design reflected industry standards and balanced passenger safety with the need to prevent prisoner-on-prisoner and prisoner-on-officer violence.

The court held that punitive damages require malicious, high‑handed, or reprehensible conduct warranting denunciation.

Because the vehicle design reflected a rational policing approach supported by industry practice and reasonable debate over competing safety concerns, the conduct did not meet the threshold for punitive damages.

The appellant municipality appealed from the dismissal of its application for an injunction enforcing a by-law prohibiting the feeding of bears and from the granting of a counter-application quashing that by-law.

The court held that municipal by-laws are presumed valid and enacted in good faith, and that the onus on a challenger to prove bad faith is high.

The respondent's evidence, focused on the absence of investigation, research, or analysis supporting the by-law, did not establish bad faith and instead improperly invited judicial review of the wisdom of the by-law.

The appeal was allowed, the order quashing the by-law was set aside, a permanent injunction issued, and appeal costs were awarded to the municipality.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 19.03(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a registrar’s noting of default entered at the plaintiff’s request in a motor vehicle personal injury action.

The court applied the factors set out in Bardmore, including the parties’ conduct, length and reasons for delay, complexity and value of the claim, and potential prejudice.

Although the defendants’ insurer delayed retaining counsel and delivering a defence, the court found the three‑month delay was not excessive and there was no evidence of non‑compensable prejudice to the plaintiff.

The court therefore exercised its discretion to set aside the noting in default on terms requiring prompt litigation steps.

Despite their success, the defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiff’s motion costs as the relief constituted an indulgence.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and claimed non-earner benefits.

At the time of the accident, he was receiving an Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) benefit.

The insurer argued it was entitled to deduct the ODSP benefit from the non-earner benefit as a collateral benefit under section 60 of the Schedule.

The arbitrator held that section 58 of the Schedule requires insurers to pay benefits despite the receipt of ODSP benefits, and that ODSP regulations require the inclusion of non-earner benefits in income, thereby avoiding double compensation.

The insurer was ordered to pay the full non-earner benefit without deduction.

Following settlement negotiations in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident, the parties sought a judicial determination of whether an earlier Rule 49 offer to settle remained open for acceptance after the defendants delivered a subsequent “revised” offer.

The plaintiffs purported to accept the original offer after the revised offer clarified the allocation of damages and limited prejudgment interest to certain heads of damages.

The court held that the revised offer constituted a new offer that implicitly withdrew the earlier offer.

Even if the original offer had remained open, the plaintiffs could not reasonably rely on its literal wording because they knew the revised terms limited the interest calculation.

The court concluded that the original offer was not open for acceptance when the plaintiffs attempted to accept it.

The parties requested a late adjournment of a scheduled summary hearing on consent to allow for ongoing settlement discussions.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's recent retention of counsel and health concerns constituted exceptional circumstances justifying the late request under the Tribunal's Practice Direction.

The adjournment was granted, with directions to advise the Tribunal within 30 days if the matter settled or needed to be rescheduled.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that awarded him damages for constructive dismissal but dismissed his claims for aggravated damages, punitive damages, and intentional infliction of mental distress arising from workplace verbal abuse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the employer's conduct, while creating a poisoned work environment, did not rise to the level required for additional damages.

The respondent's cross-appeal regarding the trial judge's costs award was also dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's finding that they did not suffer a serious and permanent impairment under s. 35(5) of the Insurance Act following a motor vehicle accident.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings, including the finding that any impairment contributing to the breakdown of the appellant's marriage was not proven to be serious and permanent.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The Applicant was previously granted an adjournment of the arbitration hearing, with an order to pay the Insurer's costs thrown away.

A dispute arose regarding whether the costs should be assessed and paid immediately or after the conclusion of the arbitration.

The Arbitrator clarified the previous order pursuant to Rule 65.6 of the Dispute Resolution Practice Code, substituting the term 'expenses' for 'costs' and ordering that the expenses thrown away are payable by the Applicant regardless of the arbitration's outcome, but are to be assessed and paid after the conclusion of the arbitration hearing.

The Applicant, injured in a 2004 motor vehicle accident, sought an adjournment of his statutory accident benefits arbitration hearing on the eve of the hearing to obtain a medical report from his treating pain specialist.

The Insurer opposed the adjournment, noting it was the Applicant's third request and the Insurer was ready to proceed.

The Arbitrator granted the adjournment, finding that the Applicant had not appreciated the implications of his treatment and had not informed his counsel, and that the evidence was likely critical.

The adjournment was granted peremptory to the Applicant, who was ordered to pay costs thrown away.