A. Peter Trebuss

The appellants purchased a fan manufactured by the respondent and installed it in their home.

Thirteen years later, the fan overheated and caused a fire, resulting in agreed damages of $179,000.

The trial judge dismissed the appellants' negligence action, finding no breach of a duty to warn.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, noting the appellants led no evidence regarding the standard of care for warnings in 1985, nor did they establish they would have acted differently had a warning been provided.

The appellant appealed the decision of the motion judge dismissing his action.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting that the appellant failed to plead material facts for causes of action independent of his wrongful dismissal claim.

As the appellant had already amended his pleadings twice and did not provide a proposed statement of claim, the court upheld the refusal to grant leave to amend and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict dismissing their civil negligence action against the respondents.

The appellants alleged that the plaintiff suffered a severe asthmatic attack caused by exposure to hardeners in ink mixtures at a trade show booth operated by the respondents.

The jury found that the hardeners were not present in the booth.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's production order, the questions left to the jury, or the jury charge.

The court also held that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence and not unreasonable.

The moving parties brought a motion before the Court of Appeal.

The court issued a brief endorsement reserving the costs of the motion to the panel hearing the appeal on its merits.

The moving parties brought a motion to quash the appellants' appeal on the basis that the notice of appeal was served out of time.

The appellants argued that the 30-day appeal period did not begin until the trial judge released her costs judgment, which occurred months after the jury dismissed the action on the merits.

The Court of Appeal held that a merits judgment and a costs judgment are separate appealable judgments, and the time to appeal the merits judgment runs from its pronouncement, not from the subsequent costs decision.

Although the notice of appeal was served out of time, the Court granted an extension of time to appeal because the appellants had a bona fide intention to appeal, the delay was explained by counsel's mistaken belief regarding the appeal period, there was no prejudice to the moving parties, and the justice of the case warranted the extension.

The motion to quash was dismissed.