Rebecca Louise Bush

The plaintiffs sought an order for relief from the deemed undertaking rule to use a "Show Cause Brief" (a document obtained through discovery and a freedom of information request) in an existing complaint to the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) and a contemplated private criminal prosecution against two police officers not named as defendants in the civil action.

The defendants opposed, arguing a breach of the rule and potential prejudice.

The court found that the plaintiffs had breached the deemed undertaking rule but granted leave to use the Show Cause Brief, determining that the public interest in police accountability outweighed the diminished prejudice to the defendants, particularly given the public nature of the document and its availability through other means.

The defendants requested an urgent case management conference because the self-represented plaintiffs failed to comply with a previously ordered timetable for Master's motions and sought broader relief than initially identified.

The court accepted the plaintiffs' explanation for the delay, which was due to an internet issue.

To ensure all motions could be heard together, the court vacated the previously scheduled dates, granted the plaintiffs time to seek legal advice, and established a revised timetable for the pending Master's motions.

At the sixth case management conference, the court addressed the scheduling of various motions proposed by the parties, including motions for summary judgment, undertakings, and further examinations.

The court granted a motion on consent to allow a plaintiff who had reached the age of majority to continue the action in her own capacity.

The court directed that the motions regarding undertakings and refusals be heard by the Case Management Master before any summary judgment motions are scheduled, emphasizing the need for effective case management.

The appellant City of Toronto appealed a trial judgment finding it liable under the Occupiers' Liability Act for injuries sustained by the respondent when a glass door shattered at a community centre.

The trial judge found the City breached its duty of care because the door was made of annealed glass rather than the safety glass required by the Ontario Building Code.

On appeal, the City argued the trial judge improperly applied a strict liability standard rather than assessing whether the City took reasonable care to install the correct glass.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge correctly decided the case based on the theories and issues expressly advanced by the parties at trial.

The plaintiff moved for an extension of the deadline to set the action down for trial, while the defendants brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action for delay.

The action, stemming from a 1998 arrest, had been stayed due to related criminal proceedings until 2017.

The court applied a contextual approach, considering the preference for merits-based decisions and timely resolution.

It found the plaintiff provided an adequate explanation for the delay, including the criminal proceedings and subsequent steps taken to gather evidence.

The court was not satisfied that the defendants demonstrated actual prejudice.

Consequently, the plaintiff's motion was granted, extending the deadline, and the defendants' cross-motion to dismiss for delay was dismissed.

At a fourth case management conference, the court addressed ongoing procedural issues in an action involving self-represented plaintiffs.

The court directed that future examinations for discovery proceed orally rather than by written interrogatory due to complications.

The court declined to waive mandatory mediation and deferred the plaintiffs' request to schedule a summary judgment motion until they could properly frame it in accordance with the principles of partial summary judgment.

Various other procedural directions were made, including delegating certain discovery motions to a Case Management Master.

Stephanie Becker, a 14-year-old, was severely injured by shattering glass at a community centre.

She sued the City of Toronto for negligence under the Occupiers’ Liability Act, alleging the glass in an office door was annealed glass, not the required tempered safety glass.

The court found the City breached its duty of care by installing annealed glass, which did not meet minimum building code standards.

The injury was found to be caused by this breach and was reasonably foreseeable given the public nature of the centre and minimal supervision.

Damages were settled, and the case proceeded on liability.

The defendants brought a joint motion to strike the plaintiff's Statement of Claim for failing to plead material facts to support the alleged causes of action, including breach of contract, negligence, public malfeasance, and intentional interference with economic relations.

The plaintiff, who was self-represented, also brought a cross-motion for an injunction.

The court found the Statement of Claim fundamentally deficient, lacking essential factual details.

Despite the deficiencies and prior warnings, the court struck the Statement of Claim but granted the plaintiff leave to amend within 30 days, acknowledging the plaintiff's self-represented status.

The plaintiff's motion for an injunction was dismissed as it failed to meet the requirements for injunctive relief.

Nominal costs were awarded against the plaintiff to two leading defendants.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, or to strike the statement of claim.

The plaintiff, who was self-represented, had commenced the action against the defendant, a YMCA employee, based on an internal incident report disclosed during a related Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario proceeding.

The court found that the plaintiff issued the claim to manipulate and threaten the defendant into retracting evidence.

The court dismissed the action as an abuse of process and struck the statement of claim without leave to amend for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action and violating pleading rules.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing their claims against the Toronto Police Services Board.

The appellants argued that criminal proceedings were a nullity because the information was not properly vetted by the Justice of the Peace.

The Court of Appeal found this issue was irrelevant to the summary judgment motion.

The appellants failed to file evidence supporting their claim that police lacked reasonable and probable grounds and did not cross-examine the respondents' extensive material.

The motion judge correctly found the respondents met their onus.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal.

The appellant appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice dated March 24, 2016.

The Court of Appeal, in accordance with the agreement of counsel, awarded costs to the respondents in the amount of $10,000, all inclusive.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her civil action against the Toronto Police Services Board and Detective Constable Andrew MacPhail for wrongful arrest and negligent investigation.

The appellant had been charged with threatening death and intimidation in connection with threatening letters and harassing phone calls made to a school, but was ultimately acquitted at trial and required to enter into a Peace Bond.

The motion judge found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and charge the appellant, and therefore granted summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the motion judge properly applied the summary judgment test and that ample evidence supported the finding of reasonable and probable grounds.

The plaintiff's action against police defendants, alleging Charter breaches, negligent investigation, falsified evidence, and assault, was dismissed after a lengthy trial where the plaintiff failed to prove any allegations and was found to be an incredible witness.

The defendants, as the successful parties, sought partial indemnity costs.

The court, applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considered the seriousness of the plaintiff's unsubstantiated allegations and his conduct in forcing a lengthy trial.

The court awarded the defendants partial indemnity costs in the amount of $367,704.87, finding the request fair and reasonable.

The Toronto Police Services Board appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding damages to Moses and Princess Water for injuries and trauma sustained during the execution of a search warrant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal regarding Moses, finding the trial judge did not err in concluding police used excessive force.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding Princess, setting aside her damages award because the trial judge failed to find the police liable for any cause of action against her.

The cross-appeals by Moses and Princess alleging unlawful detention and arrest were dismissed, as the police actions were deemed necessary to secure the premises during the search.

The plaintiff sued the police for negligent investigation, assault and battery, misfeasance of public office, and conversion of property following his arrest on drug trafficking charges that were later stayed.

The plaintiff alleged the police relied on fabricated information to obtain wiretap authorizations and used excessive force during his arrest, causing severe injuries including deep vein thrombosis.

The court dismissed the action in its entirety, finding the wiretap authorizations were validly issued based on reasonable grounds and the police did not breach their duty of care.

The court also rejected the plaintiff's claims of excessive force, finding his injuries were minor, his testimony lacked credibility, and his severe medical issues were pre-existing.

This endorsement addresses costs following the successful dismissal of three separate actions against the Toronto Police Services Board and other defendants.

The defendants, having succeeded in their motions to dismiss, sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court considered the principle of proportionality and the fact that two plaintiffs were self-represented, while one was represented by counsel who focused on relevant issues.

The court awarded a uniform amount of $10,000 in costs against each plaintiff, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, payable within 120 days.

The plaintiffs brought actions against the police defendants for negligent investigation, malicious prosecution, and defamation arising from their arrests for criminal harassment and threatening death related to a series of threatening letters and phone calls directed at a school.

The police defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the actions.

The court granted the motions, finding that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the plaintiffs, there was no evidence of malice, and the defamation claims were improperly pleaded and subject to qualified privilege.

Additionally, one plaintiff's action was barred by the limitation period.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the constitutional issues had already been decided.

The Court held that under the current Limitations Act, fiduciary claims are subject to limitation periods as they fall under 'claims pursued in court' pursuant to section 2(1).

However, the Court noted the appellant could still pursue a claim solely for declaratory relief, which is not subject to limitations under the Act.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict dismissing her action for malicious prosecution and negligent investigation against the police.

She argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the exact words spoken, the police's duty to get her version of events, and the assessment of reasonable and probable grounds.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the charge, noting it fairly focused the jury on whether the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charge.

The respondents cross-appealed the trial judge's decision to deny them costs based solely on the appellant's impecuniosity.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, holding that impecuniosity cannot be the only factor considered, and awarded the respondents $40,000 in trial costs and $7,500 for the appeal.

The appellant employee suffered a mental breakdown and sued her employer for negligent infliction of mental suffering and negligent supervision, following a period of workplace restructuring, denial of a promotion, and disciplinary actions for absenteeism.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the employer's actions were reasonable responses to declining performance and that the employer was unaware of the employee's mental illness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if a free-standing tort of negligent infliction of mental suffering exists in the employment context, the trial judge's factual findings precluded liability.