James C. Morton

The plaintiffs, successful in their wrongful dismissal and breach of contract action, sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The defendant opposed, arguing the amounts were excessive and duplicative.

The court, considering the complexity of the case, the number of witnesses, and the defendant's unfounded allegations of dishonesty and fraud, found the plaintiffs' requested costs of $131,701.95 to be fair and reasonable and awarded them on a substantial indemnity basis, inclusive of disbursements and HST, plus pre- and post-judgment interest.

The defendants moved to transfer an action from Hamilton to Newmarket and to consolidate it with an application in Toronto.

The action arose from a failed residential property sale in Vaughan.

The court granted the transfer of the action to Newmarket, finding that the events, property, and parties were all located in York Region, making Newmarket a significantly better venue than Hamilton, which had no factual connection.

The motion to transfer and consolidate the application was dismissed as premature, requiring the application to first be converted to an action in Toronto.

The plaintiff, Sam Cosentino, brought a motion to amend his statement of claim for the fifth time to add new transactions, some of which occurred more than two years prior to the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed amendments would cause prejudice to the defendants, particularly given a pending summary judgment motion.

The court also determined that the new claims were barred by the Limitations Act, as the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice arising from the expired limitation period.

Additionally, the plaintiff's refusal to provide a blacklined pleading, as directed by the court, was noted.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a claim for adverse possession against the respondent property owner.

The appellant argued that the application judge erred by departing from agreed facts in concluding that adverse possession had not been established, particularly regarding whether the respondent had been excluded from the disputed property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the application judge's findings were fully supported by the agreed facts, affidavits, and cross-examination evidence.

The court distinguished between exclusion of uninvited persons and exclusion from the owner's intended use of the property.

The plaintiff, former President of the defendant company, brought an action for wrongful dismissal after being terminated without cause following six years and eight months of employment.

The defendant subsequently alleged after-acquired cause, claiming the plaintiff failed to reimburse the company for personal insurance premiums and made an unauthorized $6.8 million corporate write-off.

The court found the defendant's principals were aware of or willfully blind to the financial arrangements and write-offs, which were regularly disclosed in financial statements.

The court dismissed the allegations of cause and the defendant's counterclaim, awarding the plaintiff 18 months' reasonable notice and the transfer of the disputed life insurance policy.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal.

The appellant appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice dated March 24, 2016.

The Court of Appeal, in accordance with the agreement of counsel, awarded costs to the respondents in the amount of $10,000, all inclusive.

A lawyer was found by the Hearing Division to have knowingly participated in mortgage fraud in seven real estate transactions, resulting in approximately $625,000 in losses.

The Hearing Division imposed the presumptive penalty of licence revocation.

The Appeal Division, by a 3-2 majority, reversed the penalty and substituted a two-year suspension, citing the Law Society's inordinate investigative and procedural delay as an exceptional mitigating circumstance.

The Divisional Court dismissed the Law Society's appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Law Society's appeal, set aside the Appeal Division's decision on penalty, and reinstated licence revocation.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her civil action against the Toronto Police Services Board and Detective Constable Andrew MacPhail for wrongful arrest and negligent investigation.

The appellant had been charged with threatening death and intimidation in connection with threatening letters and harassing phone calls made to a school, but was ultimately acquitted at trial and required to enter into a Peace Bond.

The motion judge found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and charge the appellant, and therefore granted summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the motion judge properly applied the summary judgment test and that ample evidence supported the finding of reasonable and probable grounds.

The individual defendants sought costs for two successful motions to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim and amended claim.

The plaintiff argued success was divided because leave to amend was granted, and that the costs claimed were excessive.

The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments, finding the defendants were substantially successful.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding no egregious misconduct by the plaintiff.

Applying the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality, the court awarded the individual defendants $18,052.30 in costs on a partial indemnity basis.

This endorsement addresses costs following the successful dismissal of three separate actions against the Toronto Police Services Board and other defendants.

The defendants, having succeeded in their motions to dismiss, sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court considered the principle of proportionality and the fact that two plaintiffs were self-represented, while one was represented by counsel who focused on relevant issues.

The court awarded a uniform amount of $10,000 in costs against each plaintiff, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, payable within 120 days.

A solicitor sought an order to discharge a mortgage and rectify the Land Titles Parcel Register following a property sale.

An earlier mortgage, inadvertently deleted from title, complicated the transaction.

The solicitor relied on the Parcel Register and a payout statement from the mortgagee, which was mistakenly applied to the deleted mortgage, leaving the intended mortgage undischarged.

The court applied the doctrine of estoppel, finding that the mortgagee's representation in the payout statement, coupled with the solicitor's reasonable reliance, warranted the discharge of the mortgage and rectification of the register.

Concurrently, the mortgagee's cross-motion for judgment against the vendor on the underlying debt was granted, as the vendor was aware of the outstanding obligation and could not reasonably claim estoppel regarding the debt itself.

York University sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion to strike a former student's breach of contract claim.

The student alleged a breach of contract related to a course grade from 2006-2007, specifically the failure to return assignments and explain the grade.

The motion to strike was based on the claim being statute-barred and failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action within academic discretion.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision on both the limitation period, particularly whether repeated requests for redress could perpetually extend it, and the sufficiency of the contractual pleadings to demonstrate the university acted beyond its academic discretion.

The plaintiffs brought actions against the police defendants for negligent investigation, malicious prosecution, and defamation arising from their arrests for criminal harassment and threatening death related to a series of threatening letters and phone calls directed at a school.

The police defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the actions.

The court granted the motions, finding that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the plaintiffs, there was no evidence of malice, and the defamation claims were improperly pleaded and subject to qualified privilege.

Additionally, one plaintiff's action was barred by the limitation period.

Neighbouring property owners brought an application seeking an injunction preventing interference with their access to a laneway used as the sole vehicular access to several residential properties.

The respondents owned the servient property containing the laneway and argued that any historical right-of-way had been extinguished under the 40‑year search rule in the Registry Act because the servient easement was absent from title.

The court found the applicants openly used the laneway and relied on it for access, and held that proprietary estoppel applied because the respondents had allowed such use and later attempted to deny it in an unconscionable manner.

The court also interpreted s. 113(5)(a)(iv) of the Registry Act as preserving openly used unregistered easements, including rights-of-way that were historically registered but later omitted from title.

An injunction was granted prohibiting the respondents from interfering with the applicants’ use of the laneway.

The applicants sought an order enforcing their deeded right-of-way over a shared laneway and prohibiting the respondents from blocking it.

The responding neighbour argued that the applicants had abandoned their right-of-way through historical non-use and the erection of fences.

The court held that mere non-use is insufficient to prove abandonment and found no evidence of a deliberate act to abandon the easement.

The court granted the application, enjoining the respondents from blocking the laneway, and awarded partial indemnity costs to the applicants.

An association representing justices of the peace brought an application seeking a declaration that existing pension arrangements—under which justices of the peace participate in the provincial public servants’ pension plan—violate the constitutional principle of judicial independence.

The respondent argued that the application should not proceed because the issue was currently before the Justice of the Peace Remuneration Commission.

The court held that although it possessed inherent jurisdiction to determine constitutional questions, courts should ordinarily refrain from intervening before specialized administrative processes are completed.

Given that the Commission was actively considering the same issue and could provide an informed report, the court found the application premature.

The application was therefore adjourned pending the Commission’s report.

The applicant sought a declaration that a judgment debt arising from the respondent’s misappropriation of corporate funds while acting in a fiduciary capacity would survive bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The respondent conceded the debt fell within the statutory category but argued that the application was hypothetical because no bankruptcy had yet occurred.

The court rejected that argument, holding that a declaration could properly be issued in advance of a bankruptcy where the debtor’s financial circumstances and the existence of an unsatisfied judgment made the issue practical and not merely theoretical.

Following earlier reasoning on the same factual background, the court declared that the debt would survive bankruptcy and awarded substantial indemnity costs.

Following dismissal of the plaintiff’s action and success of the defendants’ counterclaim, the court addressed costs.

The plaintiff had engaged in a prolonged campaign of harassment against neighbouring defendants and pursued unfounded allegations during the litigation.

The court held that the conduct before and during the proceeding constituted reprehensible conduct justifying an award of substantial indemnity costs.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court fixed substantial indemnity costs in favour of the defendants, with a small reduction in relation to a withdrawn counterclaim.

The accused was charged with theft over $5,000 arising from a series of cheques written to herself from a corporate account while employed as a manager and later shareholder.

The Crown alleged the accused lacked authority and concealed the payments.

The defence maintained the cheques were authorized and properly recorded as shareholder loans in the company’s books.

After applying the W.(D.) credibility framework, the court accepted the accused’s evidence, supported by a forensic accounting report showing the payments were transparently recorded and not concealed.

The court held the dispute was essentially civil in nature between shareholders and that the Crown failed to prove theft beyond a reasonable doubt.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to recognize and enforce a $99,925 Maryland judgment obtained against the defendant in 2004.

The defendant opposed the motion, arguing the action was time-barred under the Limitations Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the issue of discoverability—specifically when the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the defendant resided in Ontario—raised genuine issues of material fact and credibility that required a trial.