James C. Morton

The plaintiffs, successful in their wrongful dismissal and breach of contract action, sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The defendant opposed, arguing the amounts were excessive and duplicative.

The court, considering the complexity of the case, the number of witnesses, and the defendant's unfounded allegations of dishonesty and fraud, found the plaintiffs' requested costs of $131,701.95 to be fair and reasonable and awarded them on a substantial indemnity basis, inclusive of disbursements and HST, plus pre- and post-judgment interest.

The defendants moved to transfer an action from Hamilton to Newmarket and to consolidate it with an application in Toronto.

The action arose from a failed residential property sale in Vaughan.

The court granted the transfer of the action to Newmarket, finding that the events, property, and parties were all located in York Region, making Newmarket a significantly better venue than Hamilton, which had no factual connection.

The motion to transfer and consolidate the application was dismissed as premature, requiring the application to first be converted to an action in Toronto.

The plaintiff, Sam Cosentino, brought a motion to amend his statement of claim for the fifth time to add new transactions, some of which occurred more than two years prior to the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed amendments would cause prejudice to the defendants, particularly given a pending summary judgment motion.

The court also determined that the new claims were barred by the Limitations Act, as the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice arising from the expired limitation period.

Additionally, the plaintiff's refusal to provide a blacklined pleading, as directed by the court, was noted.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a claim for adverse possession against the respondent property owner.

The appellant argued that the application judge erred by departing from agreed facts in concluding that adverse possession had not been established, particularly regarding whether the respondent had been excluded from the disputed property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the application judge's findings were fully supported by the agreed facts, affidavits, and cross-examination evidence.

The court distinguished between exclusion of uninvited persons and exclusion from the owner's intended use of the property.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment, the defendants sought costs on a full indemnity basis, citing the plaintiff's unreasonable conduct and late withdrawal of serious allegations.

The plaintiff argued that full indemnity costs were not justified and challenged the time spent by the defendants.

The court found that the defendants' offer to settle, which proposed dismissing the action without costs, was a valid compromise.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a partial indemnity basis up to the date of the offer and on a substantial indemnity basis thereafter.

The plaintiff, former President of the defendant company, brought an action for wrongful dismissal after being terminated without cause following six years and eight months of employment.

The defendant subsequently alleged after-acquired cause, claiming the plaintiff failed to reimburse the company for personal insurance premiums and made an unauthorized $6.8 million corporate write-off.

The court found the defendant's principals were aware of or willfully blind to the financial arrangements and write-offs, which were regularly disclosed in financial statements.

The court dismissed the allegations of cause and the defendant's counterclaim, awarding the plaintiff 18 months' reasonable notice and the transfer of the disputed life insurance policy.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for negligence, breach of Charter rights, and defamation arising from his suspension from practice.

The plaintiff argued that the defendants exceeded their statutory authority by demanding client files without reasonable suspicion on a file-by-file basis.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiff's claims constituted an impermissible collateral attack on unappealed Law Society Tribunal proceedings, and that the defendants were protected by statutory immunity under s. 9 of the Law Society Act as there was no evidence of bad faith.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal.

The appellant appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice dated March 24, 2016.

The Court of Appeal, in accordance with the agreement of counsel, awarded costs to the respondents in the amount of $10,000, all inclusive.

A lawyer was found by the Hearing Division to have knowingly participated in mortgage fraud in seven real estate transactions, resulting in approximately $625,000 in losses.

The Hearing Division imposed the presumptive penalty of licence revocation.

The Appeal Division, by a 3-2 majority, reversed the penalty and substituted a two-year suspension, citing the Law Society's inordinate investigative and procedural delay as an exceptional mitigating circumstance.

The Divisional Court dismissed the Law Society's appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Law Society's appeal, set aside the Appeal Division's decision on penalty, and reinstated licence revocation.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her civil action against the Toronto Police Services Board and Detective Constable Andrew MacPhail for wrongful arrest and negligent investigation.

The appellant had been charged with threatening death and intimidation in connection with threatening letters and harassing phone calls made to a school, but was ultimately acquitted at trial and required to enter into a Peace Bond.

The motion judge found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and charge the appellant, and therefore granted summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the motion judge properly applied the summary judgment test and that ample evidence supported the finding of reasonable and probable grounds.

The appellant university appealed an interlocutory order dismissing its motion to strike the respondent student's claim for breach of contract.

The student alleged the university breached a contract by failing to return graded assignments with comments and explain a grade received in 2006-2007.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the claim lacked necessary particulars to establish the university went beyond its academic discretion.

Furthermore, the court held it was plain and obvious the claim was statute-barred, as the alleged breach occurred well over two years before the claim was commenced in 2015, and repeated internal complaints did not extend the limitation period.

The individual defendants sought costs for two successful motions to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim and amended claim.

The plaintiff argued success was divided because leave to amend was granted, and that the costs claimed were excessive.

The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments, finding the defendants were substantially successful.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding no egregious misconduct by the plaintiff.

Applying the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality, the court awarded the individual defendants $18,052.30 in costs on a partial indemnity basis.

This endorsement addresses costs following the successful dismissal of three separate actions against the Toronto Police Services Board and other defendants.

The defendants, having succeeded in their motions to dismiss, sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court considered the principle of proportionality and the fact that two plaintiffs were self-represented, while one was represented by counsel who focused on relevant issues.

The court awarded a uniform amount of $10,000 in costs against each plaintiff, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, payable within 120 days.

A solicitor sought an order to discharge a mortgage and rectify the Land Titles Parcel Register following a property sale.

An earlier mortgage, inadvertently deleted from title, complicated the transaction.

The solicitor relied on the Parcel Register and a payout statement from the mortgagee, which was mistakenly applied to the deleted mortgage, leaving the intended mortgage undischarged.

The court applied the doctrine of estoppel, finding that the mortgagee's representation in the payout statement, coupled with the solicitor's reasonable reliance, warranted the discharge of the mortgage and rectification of the register.

Concurrently, the mortgagee's cross-motion for judgment against the vendor on the underlying debt was granted, as the vendor was aware of the outstanding obligation and could not reasonably claim estoppel regarding the debt itself.

York University sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion to strike a former student's breach of contract claim.

The student alleged a breach of contract related to a course grade from 2006-2007, specifically the failure to return assignments and explain the grade.

The motion to strike was based on the claim being statute-barred and failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action within academic discretion.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision on both the limitation period, particularly whether repeated requests for redress could perpetually extend it, and the sufficiency of the contractual pleadings to demonstrate the university acted beyond its academic discretion.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel that dismissed his appeal of a penalty requiring him to surrender his licence for participating in mortgage frauds.

On appeal to the Divisional Court, the appellant argued the Appeal Panel should have adjudicated a human rights issue concerning his alleged disability, which was raised for the first time before the Appeal Panel.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Appeal Panel's decision not to permit the new issue on appeal was reasonable and its reasons were adequate.

The plaintiffs brought actions against the police defendants for negligent investigation, malicious prosecution, and defamation arising from their arrests for criminal harassment and threatening death related to a series of threatening letters and phone calls directed at a school.

The police defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the actions.

The court granted the motions, finding that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the plaintiffs, there was no evidence of malice, and the defamation claims were improperly pleaded and subject to qualified privilege.

Additionally, one plaintiff's action was barred by the limitation period.

The appellant lawyer was found by the Law Society Hearing Division to have knowingly assisted in mortgage fraud and his licence was revoked.

The Appeal Division upheld the misconduct finding and the dismissal of a stay motion based on delay, but substituted a two-year suspension for the revocation due to the Law Society's inordinate delay.

The appellant appealed the misconduct and stay decisions, and the Law Society cross-appealed the penalty decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding that the Appeal Division correctly interpreted the law on delay and reasonably concluded that a two-year suspension was appropriate.

The appellant estate trustee appealed a Master's order dismissing a motion to withdraw admissions regarding property ownership and to consolidate three related proceedings.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's decision, finding no reasonable explanation for the appellant's attempt to withdraw a clear admission made over a year after a consent order for the sale of the property.

The court also agreed that consolidating the proceedings would contradict the prior consent order and increase complexity.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants blocked a laneway on their property that the respondents used to access their homes.

The right-of-way had been registered on the appellants' title until 1960 but was not renewed within the 40-year expiry period under Part III of the Registry Act.

The application judge granted an injunction protecting the respondents' use of the laneway, relying on s. 113(5)(a)(iv) of the Registry Act, which exempts unregistered rights-of-way that are openly enjoyed and used.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 113(5)(a)(iv) is not restricted to prescriptive easements and protects once-registered rights-of-way that are no longer validly registered, provided the dominant tenement owners continuously and openly enjoy and use the right-of-way from the expiration of the 40-year period.