James C. Morton

The applicant sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision dismissing her appeal of a municipal by-law regarding proposed hospital lands.

The OMB found she lacked standing because she did not make oral or written submissions to City Council when the by-law was considered, as required by s. 34(19) 2 of the Planning Act.

The Divisional Court held that the OMB's interpretation of the standing requirement was reasonable and dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Following dismissal of a negligence action against a lawyer, the successful defendant sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $74,000.

The plaintiffs challenged the quantum, arguing that certain hours were excessive, that some work should have been done by junior counsel, and that an expert report not used at trial should not be compensable.

The court applied the discretionary factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing fairness and reasonableness in light of the issues and expectations of the parties.

While the hourly rates and expert report were found reasonable, some time entries and disbursements were reduced.

The court awarded reduced costs inclusive of disbursements and tax.

The appellants appealed a trial decision fixing the fair value of the respondents' shares in a hotel business following the exercise of dissent rights under the Business Corporations Act.

The respondents cross-appealed the trial judge's valuation of the hotel itself.

The Divisional Court dismissed the cross-appeal, finding no error in the hotel valuation.

However, the Court allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by rejecting the only expert evidence on share valuation and substituting her own unsupported asset-based calculation.

The Court varied the judgment to impose the en bloc share value of $1,240,500 established by the appellants' expert.

The plaintiffs alleged negligence against a lawyer who discharged their mortgages without authorization, claiming they had never met the lawyer or signed discharge authorizations.

The lawyer maintained that the plaintiffs attended his office, produced identification, and executed written authorizations.

The court evaluated conflicting testimony, contemporaneous documentation, and the lawyer’s standard practice for client identification.

Finding the lawyer’s evidence more credible and supported by photocopies of the plaintiffs’ identification and witnessed signatures, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had likely attended and authorized the discharges or, alternatively, that the lawyer had exercised reasonable care consistent with the applicable standard.

The plaintiffs also failed to prove the alleged outstanding mortgage advances.

The negligence claim was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to five counts of counselling misrepresentation and admitted the remaining allegations arising from a lengthy scheme arranging sham marriages to obtain permanent residence for foreign nationals.

The court held that the offences were grave, commercially motivated, and struck at the integrity of the Canadian immigration system, making denunciation and general deterrence the paramount sentencing objectives.

After weighing early guilty pleas, genuine remorse, extensive voluntary community service, and personal health circumstances, the court fixed a sentence of two years less one day.

Applying the conditional sentence principles, the court concluded that a community-based custodial sentence with punitive house arrest conditions would still meet the requirements of denunciation and deterrence.

The individual defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim against him personally for negligent misrepresentation regarding a home theatre installation.

The court found no evidence that the individual defendant made representations in his personal capacity or that any representations were knowingly false.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the claim against the individual defendant was dismissed, with costs fixed at $10,000.

The defendants moved to transfer a civil action from Toronto to London arising from alleged wrongful arrests, unlawful detention, Charter breaches, negligent investigation, malicious prosecution, and assault and battery by London police.

Applying Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that the claim arose in London, the local community had a strong interest in the subject matter, and the convenience of parties and numerous witnesses substantially favoured London.

Although the plaintiff relied on medical evidence suggesting that a London trial would exacerbate anxiety and related symptoms, the court was not persuaded that this outweighed the other factors, particularly given the plaintiff's ongoing participation in family proceedings in London.

The motion was granted and the file was ordered transferred to London.

Neighbouring property owners brought an application seeking an injunction preventing interference with their access to a laneway used as the sole vehicular access to several residential properties.

The respondents owned the servient property containing the laneway and argued that any historical right-of-way had been extinguished under the 40‑year search rule in the Registry Act because the servient easement was absent from title.

The court found the applicants openly used the laneway and relied on it for access, and held that proprietary estoppel applied because the respondents had allowed such use and later attempted to deny it in an unconscionable manner.

The court also interpreted s. 113(5)(a)(iv) of the Registry Act as preserving openly used unregistered easements, including rights-of-way that were historically registered but later omitted from title.

An injunction was granted prohibiting the respondents from interfering with the applicants’ use of the laneway.

The Association of Justices of the Peace of Ontario sought judicial review of the provincial government's decision to reject the recommendation of the Justice of the Peace Remuneration Commission regarding the appropriate Industrial Aggregate Index rate for a 2008 salary increase.

The Commission's majority had recommended a compromise rate of 3.3%, which the government rejected in favour of the minority's 2.7% recommendation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the government met the standard of simple rationality by providing legitimate reasons for its decision, including that the majority failed to answer the specific question referred to it and failed to properly weigh the required statutory criteria.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a Registrar’s order dismissing a civil action for delay arising from alleged workplace sexual assault and related constructive dismissal claims.

The court applied the contextual analysis described in Reid v Dow Corning Corp, considering explanation for litigation delay, inadvertence in missing the deadline to set the action down for trial, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

Although the action progressed slowly and counsel cited workload pressures, the court found there was no intentional delay and that the plaintiff had taken steps toward advancing the litigation.

The motion to set aside the dismissal was brought promptly and the defendants failed to demonstrate significant prejudice.

The court set aside the dismissal order and permitted the action and a related crossclaim to proceed.

The applicants sought an order enforcing their deeded right-of-way over a shared laneway and prohibiting the respondents from blocking it.

The responding neighbour argued that the applicants had abandoned their right-of-way through historical non-use and the erection of fences.

The court held that mere non-use is insufficient to prove abandonment and found no evidence of a deliberate act to abandon the easement.

The court granted the application, enjoining the respondents from blocking the laneway, and awarded partial indemnity costs to the applicants.

An association representing justices of the peace brought an application seeking a declaration that existing pension arrangements—under which justices of the peace participate in the provincial public servants’ pension plan—violate the constitutional principle of judicial independence.

The respondent argued that the application should not proceed because the issue was currently before the Justice of the Peace Remuneration Commission.

The court held that although it possessed inherent jurisdiction to determine constitutional questions, courts should ordinarily refrain from intervening before specialized administrative processes are completed.

Given that the Commission was actively considering the same issue and could provide an informed report, the court found the application premature.

The application was therefore adjourned pending the Commission’s report.

The appellant challenged a summary judgment dismissing its claim for alleged breaches of non-competition and non-solicitation obligations by former employees and a competing entity.

The Court of Appeal held that the evidentiary record advanced by the appellant consisted of bald allegations and a small number of suspicious incidents that were fully explained by the respondents.

Because the appellant did not cross-examine or otherwise meaningfully challenge those explanations, there were no genuine issues requiring a trial.

The court held the full appreciation test was satisfied without a trial and dismissed the appeal, with fixed costs to the respondents.

The appellant appealed two orders dismissing and adjourning its application for an interpretation of an Ontario Regulation regarding the 2008 remuneration of Justices of the Peace.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the proper mechanism to challenge the government's response to a remuneration commission's recommendation is through judicial review on a standard of rationality, not by seeking an interpretation of the implementing Regulation.

The applicant sought a declaration that a judgment debt arising from the respondent’s misappropriation of corporate funds while acting in a fiduciary capacity would survive bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The respondent conceded the debt fell within the statutory category but argued that the application was hypothetical because no bankruptcy had yet occurred.

The court rejected that argument, holding that a declaration could properly be issued in advance of a bankruptcy where the debtor’s financial circumstances and the existence of an unsatisfied judgment made the issue practical and not merely theoretical.

Following earlier reasoning on the same factual background, the court declared that the debt would survive bankruptcy and awarded substantial indemnity costs.

The Association of Justices of the Peace of Ontario brought an application seeking a declaration regarding the appropriate salary indexing adjustment for the 2008-2009 salary year.

The court had previously adjourned the application to allow the government time to respond to the Remuneration Commission's recommendation.

After the government provided its response, the court dismissed the application, holding that the appropriate remedy was now judicial review of the government's decision based on the standard of simple rationality.

Following dismissal of the plaintiff’s action and success of the defendants’ counterclaim, the court addressed costs.

The plaintiff had engaged in a prolonged campaign of harassment against neighbouring defendants and pursued unfounded allegations during the litigation.

The court held that the conduct before and during the proceeding constituted reprehensible conduct justifying an award of substantial indemnity costs.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court fixed substantial indemnity costs in favour of the defendants, with a small reduction in relation to a withdrawn counterclaim.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that implied a term into a commercial agreement requiring the appellant to enter into a contract with QVC UK to provide the respondent's products for broadcast on the Shopping Channel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to imply the term because the agreement made no practical sense without it, and the entire agreement clause did not preclude this implication.

The court noted the same result could have been reached through standard contractual interpretation.

The accused was charged with theft over $5,000 arising from a series of cheques written to herself from a corporate account while employed as a manager and later shareholder.

The Crown alleged the accused lacked authority and concealed the payments.

The defence maintained the cheques were authorized and properly recorded as shareholder loans in the company’s books.

After applying the W.(D.) credibility framework, the court accepted the accused’s evidence, supported by a forensic accounting report showing the payments were transparently recorded and not concealed.

The court held the dispute was essentially civil in nature between shareholders and that the Crown failed to prove theft beyond a reasonable doubt.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to recognize and enforce a $99,925 Maryland judgment obtained against the defendant in 2004.

The defendant opposed the motion, arguing the action was time-barred under the Limitations Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the issue of discoverability—specifically when the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the defendant resided in Ontario—raised genuine issues of material fact and credibility that required a trial.