James C. Morton

The appellant appealed an order of a Master requiring the appellant to post security for costs.

The Master had found that impecuniosity had not been established, that the appellant’s case did not demonstrate a high likelihood of success, and that no hardship would result even if impecuniosity could not be shown.

Applying the standard of review for appeals from a Master, the court found no palpable or overriding error and no error of law in the Master’s reasoning.

The appeal was dismissed and the security for costs order remained in effect.

The respondents sought costs for two appeals following the release of the court's reasons.

For the first appeal, the court declined to award costs, agreeing with the appellants that their partial success on appeal warranted an offset against the significant unadjusted costs awarded in the court below.

For the second appeal, where the respondents were entirely successful, the court awarded costs fixed at $7,500, noting the appeal was straightforward and took little time.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for fraud, conspiracy, and breach of fiduciary duty in several real estate transactions with the Ontario Realty Corporation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on most transactions, including orders for disgorgement of profits based on knowing receipt and conspiracy with a fiduciary.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the King's Highway 2A property, finding no basis for disgorgement where no fiduciary breach or damages were proven.

The respondents' cross-appeal was allowed in part, holding a former employee jointly and severally liable for a $300,000 improper price abatement.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing a motion to quash an Assessment Order to the Divisional Court.

The respondent argued the order was final and outside the Divisional Court's jurisdiction under s. 19 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Divisional Court agreed the order was final as it disposed of a substantive right.

The court exercised its discretion under s. 110 of the Courts of Justice Act to transfer the appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action.

The Court of Appeal found that while there was enough evidence to raise a genuine issue for trial regarding the standard of care, the appellants failed to put forward sufficient evidence on causation to raise a genuine issue for trial.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The moving parties, two individual defendants, brought a motion to strike a notice of cross-appeal delivered by the respondents.

The moving parties argued that because they had not appealed the trial judgment and the cross-appeal raised issues unrelated to the main appeal brought by other defendants, the respondents were required to commence a fresh appeal rather than a cross-appeal.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, holding that Rule 61.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is broad enough to permit a cross-appeal even where the issues and parties differ from those in the main appeal.

The moving party sought an extension of time to perfect an appeal.

The court applied the test from Duca Community Credit Union Ltd. v. Giovannoli, finding that there was a firm intention to appeal immediately, no uncompensable prejudice to the respondent, the appeal was not frivolous, and the delay was not long.

The motion was granted, with costs awarded to the respondent due to the moving party's fault in necessitating the motion.

Following the appellant's substantial success on appeal and at trial in a family law matter, the Court of Appeal fixed costs for both proceedings.

The court noted the respondent's unreasonable conduct in prolonging the trial and failing to make or accept reasonable offers to settle.

Applying the factors under Rule 24(11) of the Family Law Rules, the court awarded the appellant $275,000 for the trial and $25,000 for the appeal, allowing the award to be offset against the appellant's spousal support arrears.

The respondent paid $222,500 to purchase shares but never received them.

The motion judge granted partial summary judgment for $202,500, accounting for a $20,000 counterclaim.

The appellants appealed, arguing an alleged oral agreement regarding profit sharing created a genuine issue for trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial as the individual appellant admitted to personally guaranteeing the subscription price and failing to pay.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's refusal to stay an Ontario action in favour of arbitration and forum selection clauses contained in an Additional Rights Agreement.

The dispute arose over the termination of the respondents' management rights following the sale of certain theatre assets.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, applying the competence-competence principle.

The Court held that where it is arguable that a dispute falls within the terms of an arbitration agreement, the court should grant a stay and leave the determination of the arbitrator's jurisdiction to the arbitrator.

The action was stayed pending the resolution of the arbitration proceedings in California.

The parties separated after a 24-year marriage.

At separation, the husband's textile business was valued at up to $11.25 million.

By trial, market forces had reduced its value by $8-9 million.

The trial judge ordered an equalization payment of over $4 million based on the separation-date value, finding that a market-driven decline could not be considered under s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a post-separation market-driven decline in value can be considered under s. 5(6)(h).

Given the dramatic decline, the wife's trust claims, and the preservation order, equalizing the properties based on the separation date was unconscionable.

The equalization payment was reduced to $900,000.

The appellant church appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board denying a property tax exemption for a warehouse property adjacent to the church.

The church argued the property was exempt under s. 3(1)3(i) of the Assessment Act as 'land used in connection with' a place of worship, as it was used for storage and youth programs.

The Divisional Court granted the appeal, finding the Board erred in law by asking whether the property was a 'place of worship' rather than whether it was 'land used in connection with' a place of worship.

The matter was remitted to a different Board member for rehearing.

The plaintiff sued a corporate tenant for breach of a commercial lease and its sole shareholder personally for inducing the breach.

The plaintiff also sued a subsequent purchaser of the tenant's assets for unjust enrichment and fraudulent conveyance.

The trial judge found the tenant and shareholder liable but dismissed the claims against the purchaser.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the finding of personal liability against the shareholder, holding that entering into two leases was not a tortious act outside the scope of his authority and did not justify piercing the corporate veil.

The plaintiff's cross-appeal regarding the purchaser was dismissed.

The plaintiff appealed an order of a Master dismissing his wrongful arrest action for delay at a status hearing under Rule 48.14(8).

The dismissal was based on the plaintiff's failure to provide particulars for a Charter claim and lack of a plan to move the litigation forward.

The Divisional Court applied a contextual approach, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Master's discretionary decision, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant solicitor appealed an order directing the assessment of his accounts, arguing the application was barred by the two-year limitation period in the Limitations Act, 2002.

The respondent client had brought the application almost three years after paying the final account, citing poor health and an inability to manage her affairs as special circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 20 of the Limitations Act preserves the 'special circumstances' exception set out in section 4 of the Solicitors Act, meaning there is no absolute time bar against applications for the assessment of lawyers' accounts.

Alternatively, the transitional provisions of the Limitations Act applied to preserve the former limitation period.

The respondent in a family law appeal brought a motion to stay the appeal, arguing that the appellant had failed to pay the full amount of support ordered by the trial judge.

The appellant argued that a single judge lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion and that he was unable to afford the full payments.

The single judge of the Court of Appeal held that he lacked jurisdiction, as a stay would effectively dispose of the appeal and thus required a panel of three judges under Rule 61.16(2.2) and s. 140(5) of the Courts of Justice Act.

In any event, the judge would have dismissed the motion on the merits, as the appellant had provided an uncontradicted explanation for his inability to pay the full amount and was not simply refusing to comply.

The motion was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to set aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to interfere with the motion judge's decision.

The appellants failed to satisfy the conventional test for setting aside a default judgment, particularly failing to explain an eight-and-a-half-year delay, and had already acknowledged the judgment's validity by unconditionally satisfying it.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that fees paid to the respondent bank were non-refundable valuation and processing fees, rather than refundable commitment fees.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's interpretation of the commitment letters, noting the appellants accepted the terms and paid the fees without reservation before refusing to proceed with the financing.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicants sought urgent judicial review of an interim order by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario that required them to call ten specific witnesses and produce will-say statements for them.

The Tribunal had amended the complaint mid-hearing and ordered the applicants to call these witnesses to bridge the evidentiary gap.

The Divisional Court granted the application and quashed the order, holding that the Tribunal's inquisitorial approach breached natural justice and procedural fairness by depriving the applicants of their right to control their own defence in an adversarial proceeding.

The appellants appealed an order striking their statements of defence for failing to comply with a peremptory order to produce documents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's decision to enforce the strict terms of the prior peremptory order after the appellants failed to meet their production obligations.