James C. Morton

The applicants sought an order in the nature of certiorari to intervene in an ongoing Ontario Human Rights Tribunal hearing regarding the implementation of remedial orders for workplace discrimination.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, reiterating that courts should not intervene in ongoing administrative proceedings absent unusual circumstances.

The court found no such circumstances, noting the applicants' interests were aligned with the Ministry, which was already a party, and emphasizing the chaotic consequences of granting party standing to every non-party whose conduct is raised in evidence.

The applicants sought costs against the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario following successful applications for judicial review.

The Divisional Court awarded costs of $20,000 on a partial indemnity scale against the Tribunal.

The court noted that while costs against a statutory tribunal are rare, the Tribunal's fully adversarial stance and unsuccessful arguments on all issues justified the award.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice in a bankruptcy matter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the result followed the disposition of a companion action appeal (C43482) which had also been dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their action for delay.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge correctly stated the applicable principles and reasonably concluded that the delay was inordinate, raising a presumption of prejudice.

As the appellants provided no evidence to explain the delay, the Court of Appeal found no basis to disturb the motion judge's findings and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The applicants, an employer and its manager, settled a sexual harassment complaint with the complainant.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission then referred the complaint solely against another respondent to the Human Rights Tribunal.

Despite the applicants not being parties to the hearing, the Tribunal made adverse findings of fact and liability against them.

The Divisional Court granted judicial review, holding that the Tribunal breached natural justice and exceeded its jurisdiction by adjudicating matters not referred to it and making findings against non-parties who had settled.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal to amend its decision.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the lower court.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the lower court judge and dismissed the appeal.

In the circumstances, the court declined to order costs on the appeal.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim against a discount brokerage firm for damages based on misrepresentation and negligence.

The appellant suffered significant losses after purchasing shares on margin and facing margin calls when the share value dropped.

He argued the respondent breached a duty to warn him about the risks of margin accounts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the respondent satisfied its duty to warn through the various documents provided to the appellant before he purchased the shares.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable because the events as described by the complainant were mechanically impossible and could not have occurred without her waking up earlier.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the complainant's version of events was not implausible, especially given that she had been drinking before falling asleep.

The court concluded that the trial judge's finding of sexual assault was not unreasonable.

The accused was charged with historical sexual offences.

At the preliminary inquiry, the judge discharged the accused, finding no evidence of non-consent, despite the complainant's testimony that he did not want to engage in the activity.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari, but the Court of Appeal restored the discharge.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the evidence, specifically the direct evidence of lack of consent, and thus exceeded his jurisdiction.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's order compelling answers to discovery questions to the Divisional Court, characterizing it as a final order.

The defendants brought motions to quash the appeal, arguing the order was interlocutory and the proper appeal route was to a Superior Court Judge.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that an order compelling discovery answers does not finally dispose of the substantive rights of the parties and is therefore interlocutory.

The appeal was quashed.

The appellant, a housing co-operative resident receiving social assistance, filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination based on a rent calculation condition in the co-op's operating agreement with the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC).

The Board of Inquiry added CMHC as a respondent, but the Divisional Court quashed the order.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the condition was a valid exercise of the federal spending power under s. 91(1A) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court applied the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, concluding that the provincial Human Rights Code must be read down so as not to apply to the core of the federal spending power, thereby exempting CMHC and the impugned condition from the Code's application.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's finding that defamatory words were spoken without qualified privilege.

The trial judge had found that while the appellant's communication to the police was privileged, his communication to a co-worker was not, as there was no reciprocal interest in the communication.

The Divisional Court found no error in the trial judge's reasoning and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.

In an addendum regarding costs, the court considered whether to depart from the general rule of awarding costs to the successful party on the basis that the legal issue was novel.

The court found that while the circumstances were unique, there were guiding authorities and significant preparation was required.

The court awarded costs to the successful party in the claimed amount of $5,915.04.

The plaintiffs appealed a master's order removing their solicitors of record due to a conflict of interest.

The defendants argued that a U.S. counsel listed on the plaintiffs' law firm's letterhead had previously represented one of the defendants, creating a conflict.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the U.S. counsel was not a member of the firm, but merely had a referral arrangement.

Therefore, there was no solicitor-client relationship between the firm and the defendant, no presumption of shared confidences, and no disqualifying conflict of interest.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his defamation action against his former sister-in-law.

The motion judge had dismissed the action on the basis that the defamatory statement proved in evidence varied from the statement pleaded, and that the appellant failed to prove malice or that the listener understood the words referred to him.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred in her analysis of malice and identification, and should have granted leave to amend the statement of claim to conform with the evidence.

The summary judgment in favour of one respondent was set aside, while the appeal regarding the other respondent was dismissed as abandoned.

The plaintiff appealed a summary judgment dismissing his defamation action against his former sister-in-law.

The motion judge had dismissed the claim due to a variance between the pleaded defamatory words and the evidence, and found no genuine issue for trial regarding malice or the identification of the plaintiff.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge should have granted leave to amend the pleadings.

The Court further found that malice was properly pleaded and supported by extrinsic evidence, and that the motion judge applied the wrong legal test for identification, which requires an objective assessment of whether a reasonable person would understand the words referred to the plaintiff.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the respondents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it had no merit with respect to the first respondent based on binding precedent, and noting no basis was advanced for the appeal against the second respondent.

Solicitor and client costs were awarded to both respondents.

The appellant challenged the reasons of the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal was not persuaded that any error had been shown on the facts of the case.

The appeal was therefore dismissed with costs.