Sophie Vlahakis

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his action under Rules 57.03(2) and 60.12 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for failing to pay outstanding costs awards.

The appellant argued that some costs were discharged by a previous order, raised historical grievances, and alleged bias against the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in these arguments, noting the motion judge applied the correct test and appropriately exercised his discretion given the appellant offered no reason for non-payment.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed an order staying his action pending the payment of outstanding costs orders.

The respondents argued the order was interlocutory and the appeal route was to the Divisional Court with leave.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the order did not determine any substantive matter in the action.

The appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant challenged orders dismissing his civil action arising from alleged new home construction defects and declaring him a vexatious litigant.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge misconstrued both the pleading and the statutory scheme under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act by treating the action as a prohibited relitigation of matters already determined by the Tribunal.

Relying on the distinction between Tarion decisions, Tribunal determinations, and surviving civil warranty claims, the court concluded that the pleaded claims related to defects found warranted and were not fully barred by issue estoppel, res judicata, or abuse of process.

The vexatious litigant order was also set aside because it was premised on the erroneous view that the Superior Court action itself was vexatious.

Leave to amend was granted only to the extent previously contemplated for the appellant's own claims, and no costs of the appeal were ordered.

The appellant challenged an order striking his statement of claim against an employee of the statutory home warranty administrator on the basis that no reasonable cause of action was disclosed.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion was properly heard as a Rule 21 motion and that the pleading contained no material facts capable of grounding personal liability against the employee acting within the scope of employment.

The proposed amendments did not cure the deficiencies, including the absence of proper particulars for allegations such as fraud, misrepresentation, breach of trust, malice, or intent.

The court also accepted that the claim was an impermissible attempt to re-litigate issues already canvassed before the Licence Appeal Tribunal.

The appeal and the challenge to costs were dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss or stay an action concerning alleged construction deficiencies in a new home.

The plaintiff had previously pursued warranty claims through the statutory regime under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act and unsuccessfully litigated the issues before the Licence Appeal Tribunal and on appeal.

The court held that the action attempted to relitigate the same warranty issues and was barred by issue estoppel, res judicata, abuse of process, and collateral attack on tribunal decisions.

In addition, the defendants applied for an order declaring the plaintiff a vexatious litigant based on a long history of repetitive and abusive litigation conduct.

The court granted the application and imposed restrictions requiring leave of the court before the plaintiff could commence further proceedings against the defendants.

The appellant builder appealed a License Appeal Tribunal decision awarding the respondent homeowners $11,234 to replace ceramic tiles that did not comply with the Ontario Building Code.

The parties consented to an order setting aside the Tribunal's decision and substituting an award of $4,000 plus costs.

The Divisional Court approved the settlement, noting that the Tribunal erred in effectively ordering specific performance rather than assessing damages based on the floor's useful life or the cost of stiffening it, as required by prior jurisprudence.

The respondent was seriously injured when his motorcycle struck a freight train at a rural railway crossing at night.

The crossing had only a passive warning system.

The trial judge found the appellant railway company 75% negligent for failing to conduct nighttime inspections and failing to implement additional safety measures, and the respondent 25% contributorily negligent due to excessive speed and impairment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the railway company's appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on standard of care, causation, and contributory negligence.

The applicant sought to set aside or vary an order of a single judge of the Divisional Court, which had quashed its application for judicial review of an arbitration award administered by a voluntary dispute resolution corporation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, agreeing with the single judge that jurisdiction to set aside the arbitration award lies exclusively with the Superior Court of Justice under the International Commercial Arbitration Act.

Furthermore, the court noted the motion was out of time under Rule 61.16(6) with no grounds justifying an extension.

The appellant, a housing co-operative resident receiving social assistance, filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination based on a rent calculation condition in the co-op's operating agreement with the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC).

The Board of Inquiry added CMHC as a respondent, but the Divisional Court quashed the order.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the condition was a valid exercise of the federal spending power under s. 91(1A) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court applied the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, concluding that the provincial Human Rights Code must be read down so as not to apply to the core of the federal spending power, thereby exempting CMHC and the impugned condition from the Code's application.

The respondent, an Ontario insurer, paid statutory accident benefits to Ontario residents injured in a motor vehicle accident in British Columbia.

The respondent sought indemnification from the appellant, a British Columbia insurer, under section 275 of the Ontario Insurance Act.

The appellant argued the Ontario legislation could not constitutionally apply to it.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the superior court, not an arbitrator, should determine the constitutional applicability of the statute.

The Court further held that the Ontario Insurance Act was constitutionally inapplicable to the out-of-province appellant because there was an insufficient connection between Ontario and the appellant to justify the extraterritorial application of the provincial regulatory scheme.

The responding party sought leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision regarding a human rights complaint against a housing co-operative and a federal crown corporation.

In support of her leave application, she filed affidavits to demonstrate the public importance of the legal issues.

The moving party brought a motion to strike the affidavits.

The Court of Appeal held that while affidavit evidence on public importance cannot be filed as of right, the court may grant leave to file such evidence if it is factual and relevant.

The court struck out specific paragraphs containing legal opinions but allowed the remainder of the affidavits to be filed.

The applicant, a federal Crown corporation, sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Board of Inquiry adding it as a respondent to a human rights complaint.

The complainant alleged that the rent calculation formula for social assistance recipients in her co-operative housing, mandated by the applicant's funding agreement, was discriminatory.

The Divisional Court quashed the Board's order, holding that the applicant's imposition of funding conditions was a valid exercise of the federal spending power under s. 91(1A) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court applied the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, finding that provincial human rights legislation must be read down so as not to impair the essential powers of a federal agency carrying out its core functions.

The appellant appealed an order granting an injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's decision and noting that the impact of the decision is a matter for the arbitrator, not the court.

The appellant insurer sought indemnification from the respondent insurer for statutory accident benefits paid to its insured following a motor vehicle accident in British Columbia.

When the respondent disputed the application of the Ontario Insurance Act, the appellant applied to appoint an arbitrator.

The application judge stayed the application, finding that the British Columbia court was the proper forum to decide the choice of law issue.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under the Arbitration Act, an arbitrator must make the initial determination of any questions of jurisdiction and applicable law, and the application judge erred by deciding the forum non conveniens issue instead of appointing the arbitrator.