ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COURT FILE NO.: CV-10-413391 and CV-13-473332
DATE: 20130709
BETWEEN:
MANOUCHER BARADARAN
Plaintiff
– and –
TARION WARRANTY CORPORATION, ROGERS BOYD, ABBASSGHOLI NASSERI and MASTER CUSTOM HOMES INC.
Defendants
Manoucher Baradaran in person as self-represented
Howard L. Shankman, for the Defendants, Abbassgholi Nasseri and Master Custom Homes Inc.
Sophie Vlahakis, for the Defendant Tarion Warranty Corporation
AND BETWEEN:
MASTER CUSTOM HOMES INC. and ABBASSGHOLI NASSERI
Applicants
– and –
MANOUCHER BARADARAN also known as MANOUCHEHR BARADARAN
Respondent
Howard L. Shankman, for the Defendants, Abbassgholi Nasseri and Master Custom Homes Inc.
Manoucher Baradaran in person as self-represented
HEARD: May 7, 2013
t. mcewen j.
reasons for decision
[1] This hearing dealt with the following matters:
(i) a motion brought by the plaintiff, Manoucher Baradaran (“Baradaran”), to amend his pleadings in Court File No. CV-10-413391;
(ii) a motion brought by the defendants, Tarion Warranty Corporation (“Tarion”), Abbassgholi Nasseri (“Nasseri”) and Master Custom Homes Inc. (“Master”), in the same action to dismiss the action, or alternatively, to stay the action; and
(iii) an application brought by Master and Nasseri in Court File No. CV-13-473332 for an order declaring Baradaran to be a vexatious litigant and seeking ancillary relief in this regard.
background
[2] This litigation involves a home purchased by Baradaran located at 102 Church Avenue in the City of Toronto (the “home”). The home was constructed by Master, which is a corporation in which Nasseri is a principal. Baradaran took title to the home and moved into it with his wife, Fariba Baradaran (“Mrs. Baradaran”), and his daughters, Saba Baradaran (“Saba”) and Sama Baradaran (“Sama”).
[3] Subsequent to moving in, Baradaran began to make several complaints about alleged construction defects in the home. He wrote to both Master and Tarion. Tarion is a non-profit corporation that administers the mandatory warranties and compensation scheme set out in the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.31. The Act has two purposes: (1) consumer protection; and (2) the regulation of the new home building industry. The Act imposes mandatory warranties on new home vendors in Ontario and provides for the payment of compensation to the purchasers of new homes in Ontario when vendors have failed to honour the mandatory warranties.
[4] Rogers Boyd (“Boyd”), a Tarion employee, was the Senior Field Claims Representative who inspected Baradaran’s home as a result of the complaints. Boyd rendered decisions on behalf of Tarion with respect to the complaints. Of approximately 45 alleged deficiencies, Boyd found that one was actually warranted and ought to be repaired by Master. Baradaran was unhappy with this result and wrote to Tarion alleging, amongst other things, that Tarion was accepting bribes from Master. Baradaran threatened to pursue legal action that would involve punitive damages.
[5] Baradaran continued to make complaints about the construction of the home and three more decision letters were rendered by Tarion between November 2008 and May 2009. Approximately 30 additional, separate deficiency items were identified by Baradaran. Baradaran and Master tried to resolve the outstanding difficulties. At the same time, Baradaran appealed the findings set out in the Tarion decision letters to the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”). The Act provides that a homeowner, such as Baradaran, is entitled to a hearing by the Tribunal where the homeowner disagrees with Tarion’s warranty findings. The Act further provides for an automatic right of appeal of any decision made by the Tribunal to the Divisional Court.
[6] Ultimately, a number of issues were resolved between Baradaran and Master, but they were unable to come to an agreement with respect to 18 different alleged deficiencies. The matter proceeded to an oral hearing before the Tribunal. The hearing took approximately 16 days and 13 witnesses were called to provide evidence.
[7] In August 2010, the Tribunal released its written reasons. The Tribunal found that of the 18 claims, only two were warranted: (1) rust on an iron railing – the cost to rectify was found by the Tribunal to be $500; and (2) a missing backyard light – the cost to rectify was found by the Tribunal to be $300. Tarion and Nasseri were awarded costs of the hearing. The Tribunal was critical of Baradaran’s conduct at the hearing and described it as follows:
The grounds advanced for the award of costs against the Homeowner are more compelling. They include an almost total disregard of the Tribunal’s Rules and the order of a Vice-Chair of this Tribunal respecting the disclosure of documents, the issuance of summons to compel the attendance not only of his own witnesses but of witnesses for Tarion, an unsubstantiated attempt to have counsel for the Added Parties removed, threats of lawsuits against his own witness prior to him taking the stand, and very serious and unsubstantiated allegations of wrongdoing against Tarion’s Field Claim Representatives.
[8] At the end of the Second Year Warranty Period, Boyd performed another inspection of the home in November 2009 and decision letters were rendered by Tarion. Once again, Baradaran appealed the decision letters to the Tribunal. A three-day hearing was conducted by the Tribunal in May 2010. The Tribunal upheld the findings set out in the decision letters and found that none of Baradaran’s claims were warranted with respect to the Second Year Warranty Period.
[9] Baradaran then appealed this decision of the Tribunal to the Divisional Court. The appeal was dismissed. One of the grounds of appeal raised by Baradaran was that the Tribunal was biased against him. The Divisional Court found that there was no bias. Baradaran sought leave to appeal the Divisional Court’s decision to the Court of Appeal. Leave was not granted.
[10] In addition to the proceedings before the Tribunal, Baradaran commenced a Small Claims Court action against Nasseri in February of 2008, although it appears as though that action has not proceeded.
[11] Ultimately, Baradaran commenced this action against Tarion, Boyd, Nasseri and Master.
[12] Goldstein J., in his Order dated October 3, 2012, dismissed the action against Boyd. Baradaran appealed that decision to the Court of Appeal, which has not yet released its decision.
[13] In the Statement of Claim, Baradaran made the same complaints about the home that he made before the Tribunal. He alleged that he incurred the following damages as a result of defects in the home: deficiencies in the driveway damaged his car; he and his family have suffered from stress; and Sama injured her ankle on a broken slot stone located in front of the home.
[14] I will now turn to the two motions and the application that were brought before me.
defendants’ motion to dismiss or stay the action
The Defendants’ Position
[15] The defendants submitted that all of the claims advanced by Baradaran in this action have been determined in the two previous proceedings before the Tribunal, the second of which was unsuccessfully appealed to the Divisional Court and leave to appeal that decision to the Court of Appeal was not granted.
[16] Accordingly, the defendants submitted that the action is res judicata, an abuse of process and constitutes a collateral attack on the Tribunal’s decisions. They further argued that the doctrine of issue estoppel applies.
Baradaran’s Position
[17] Baradaran’s position was difficult to decipher and despite my urging, he did not outline a real, concise position. Essentially, he displayed his unhappiness with the Tribunal’s findings and expressed his desire to pursue the aforementioned claims in the Superior Court of Justice.
Analysis
[18] Even though the previous proceedings were before the Tribunal and not the Superior Court of Justice, I agree with the defendants’ submissions that the decision of a tribunal can give rise to issue estoppel: see Rasanen v. Rosemount Instruments Ltd. (1994), 1994 608 (ON CA), 17 O.R. (3d) 267 (C.A.). In my view, employing the logic in Rasanen, the Tribunal’s decisions can also give rise to findings of res judicata, abuse of process and collateral attack.
[19] The Tribunal, in both of its decisions, had to determine whether there was warranty coverage for the alleged defects.
[20] In doing so, it had regard to s. 13(1) of the Act, which provides as follows:
Warranties
13 (1) Every vendor of a home warrants to the owner,
(a) that the home,
(i) is constructed in a workmanlike manner and is free from defects in material,
(ii) is fit for habitation, and
(iii) is constructed in accordance with the Ontario Building Code;
(b) that the home is free of major structural defects as defined by the regulations; and
(c) such other warranties as are prescribed by the regulations.
[21] As a result of s. 13(1) of the Act, the issues before the Tribunal were whether the home was constructed in a workmanlike manner, free from defects in material, fit for habitation, constructed in accordance with the Ontario Building Code and free of major structural defects as defined by the regulations.
[22] In this action, Baradaran did not seek damages for the two items that the Tribunal found were warranted (the rust on an iron railing and a missing backyard light).
[23] Although the Statement of Claim was difficult to understand, a close reading disclosed that Baradaran’s complaints in this action arose solely from the complaints he made to Tarion, specifically, how they were dealt with by Tarion and adjudicated by the Tribunal. In particular, Baradaran complained that the defendants refused to pay for warranted items, which caused him damage, as well as physical and emotional injuries. There were further allegations that the defendants “breached their contracts” to Baradaran by failing to honour warranties which, again, resulted in the aforementioned losses.
[24] Any uncertainty as to whether Baradaran is seeking to relitigate the same issues in this action that were decided by the Tribunal is resolved by his own evidence given at his cross-examination on January 22, 2012. He confirmed that the construction deficiencies that he complained about in this action are the same construction deficiencies that he complained about to Tarion in 2008 and 2009. The relevant excerpt is as follows:
Q. So the construction deficiencies that you’re complaining about in this action are the same construction deficiencies that you complained about to Tarion in 2008 and 2009, aren’t they?
A. Yes.
[25] However, I note that no claims can be brought before the Tribunal for any form of personal injury or property damage, and Baradaran is pursuing these claims in this action. In order to obtain damages for these claims, he must establish that the defendants are responsible for his damages. In this regard, Baradaran is seeking to relitigate the warranty item issues in which he was unsuccessful before the Tribunal. The type of analysis that the Tribunal performed in determining whether there were any breaches of the warranties provided for in the Act is the same type of analysis that this court would have to undertake to determine whether there was any liability in either breach of contract or negligence, namely, that Baradaran did not get the home that he bargained for.
[26] Based on my findings above, I agree with the submissions of the defendants that the decisions of the Tribunal give rise to issue estoppel.
[27] Further, based on the test set out in Elguindy v. Warkworth Institution, 2011 ONSC 4670, [2011] O.J. No. 3631, at para. 27, I find that the action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata:
there were final decisions of the Tribunal, which is a court of competent jurisdiction;
the parties in this litigation have been parties to or privy with the parties that were before the Tribunal;
the causes of action in the prior actions are not separate and distinct. They arise out of the same fact situation and are based on allegations that the home was improperly constructed; and
the bases of the causes of action and the subsequent action were argued before the Tribunal.
[28] In my view, Baradaran simply reframed his case. It is predicated on the same set of facts. He is not permitted to do this: see Las Vegas Strip Ltd. v. Toronto (City) (1996), 1996 8037 (ON SC), 30 O.R. (3d) 286 (C.J.), aff’d (1997), 1997 3841 (ON CA), 32 O.R. (3d) 651 (C.A.).
[29] I am also of the view that the action constitutes a collateral attack on the correctness of the Tribunal’s decisions and the subsequent decisions of the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal with respect to the second matter. A collateral attack has been defined by the Supreme Court of Canada in Wilson v. The Queen, [1983] S.C.R. 594, at p. 599, as follows:
It has long been a fundamental rule that a court order, made by a court having jurisdiction to make it, stands and is binding and conclusive unless it is set aside on appeal or lawfully quashed. It is also well settled in the authorities that such an order may not be attacked collaterally – and a collateral attack may be described as an attack made in proceedings other than those whose specific object is the reversal, variation, or nullification of the order or judgment.
[30] Lastly, I would dismiss Baradaran’s action because it constitutes an abuse of process. An abuse of process can occur where the litigation before the court is found to be, in essence, an attempt to relitigate a claim which the court has already determined. It is a flexible doctrine that is unencumbered by the specific requirements necessary to find issue estoppel: Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, at para. 37. In the circumstances, I find that Baradaran is, in essence, attempting to relitigate a claim that has already been determined by the Tribunal.
[31] Based on the foregoing, I would dismiss the action.
Plaintiff’s motion to amend
[32] In the event that I am wrong with respect to my decision to dismiss the claim, I will deal with Baradaran’s motion to amend.
[33] This motion was complicated by the fact that no formal Notice of Motion was filed. Since Baradaran was self-represented and his motion materials contained a previous Notice of Motion dated February 15, 2012, the parties agreed that I would proceed to hear the motion using that prior Notice of Motion.
[34] Baradaran is seeking the following amendments:
(i) an amendment to para. 1 of the Statement of Claim allowing him to pursue compensatory damages against Tarion and Boyd in the sum of $500,000;
(ii) an amendment adding Mrs. Baradaran, Saba and Sama as plaintiffs;
(iii) an amendment allowing Sama to pursue a claim with respect to her injured ankle, allowing all plaintiffs to pursue claims for the depression that they have suffered and allowing Baradaran to pursue a claim for damage to the underside of his vehicle as a result of slope deficiencies in the driveway;
(iv) a host of other minor amendments, generally in support of the aforementioned amendments.
[35] I would allow Baradaran to amend his Statement of Claim to pursue compensatory damages for depression and property damage, and to make the resulting minor amendments, subject to any defences the defendants might raise, including any limitation period defences.
[36] I would not allow the amendments to add Mrs. Baradaran, Saba and Sama as plaintiffs or the amendments concerning their claims for the following reasons:
(a) Baradaran does not have the legal authority to represent Mrs. Baradaran and his children at the motion;
(b) no Notice of Motion was delivered by Mrs. Baradaran or on behalf of his children;
(c) no litigation guardian has been appointed on behalf of his children, as required by rule 7.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194; and
(d) no lawyer has been appointed to represent the interests of the children.
[37] Although Mrs. Baradaran was present at the motion, she did not make submissions. I asked her whether she wished to proceed with a claim and she indicated that she did wish to do so. The fact remains, however, that no motion materials were served by her and she cannot be represented by her husband. There are also issues as to whether any claim brought by her would be statute barred by virtue of the provisions of the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Schedule B.
[38] My order refusing to allow Baradaran to add Mrs. Baradaran, Saba and Sama as plaintiffs is made on a without prejudice basis to their right to commence their own actions or bring their own motions.
[39] I note that Tarion argued that it opposed the addition of the plaintiffs on the basis that Tarion cannot be held liable for any secondary damages, specifically personal injury damages, nor can it be held liable to any party who is not “an owner” of a home as defined in the Act. Given my ruling, since Mrs. Baradaran and the children did not have a motion before the court, it would not be appropriate for me to make findings with respect to these arguments. Any arguments in this regard ought to be deferred until they bring a motion to add themselves as plaintiffs or issue a Statement of Claim.
the application
[40] Master and Nasseri applied for an order to have Baradaran declared a vexatious litigant.
[41] Henry J. in Re Lang Michener et al. and Fabian et al. (1987), 1987 172 (ON SC), 59 O.R. (2d) 353 (H.C.), at pp. 358-359, considered a number judicial decisions and extracted the following principles to help a court determine whether a proceeding is vexatious and whether a person is a vexatious litigant:
(a) the bringing of one or more actions to determine an issue which has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction constitutes a vexatious proceeding;
(b) where it is obvious that an action cannot succeed, or if the action would lead to no possible good, or if no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief, the action is vexatious;
(c) vexatious actions include those brought for an improper purpose, including the harassment and oppression of other parties by multifarious proceedings brought for purposes other than the assertion of legitimate rights;
(d) it is a general characteristic of vexatious proceedings that grounds and issues raised tend to be rolled forward into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented, often with actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings;
(e) in determining whether proceedings are vexatious, the court must look at the whole history of the matter and not just whether there was originally a good cause of action;
(f) the failure of the person instituting the proceedings to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings is one factor to be considered in determining whether proceedings are vexatious;
(g) the respondent's conduct in persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions can be considered vexatious conduct of legal proceedings.
[42] The case law has evolved over the years so that courts may consider the behaviour of litigants both inside and outside of the courtroom: see Canada Post Corp. v. Varma (2000), 2000 15754 (FC), 192 F.T.R. 278 (T.D.), at para. 23.
[43] Baradaran has a history of commencing numerous claims against various persons. He also has a history of unruly and obstreperous behaviour while appearing before tribunals. Furthermore, Baradaran has a pattern of expanding his grievances to include lawyers who acted against him and judges who have presided over the proceedings.
[44] Baradaran’s history with our legal system was provided in the applicants’ materials:
• Since 2003, Baradaran has commenced at least 48 separate Small Claims Court actions in Toronto.
• Baradaran has commenced four Small Claims Court actions in Brampton, New Market and Richmond Hill.
• In two of the Small Claims Court actions, Baradaran has sued his own previous lawyers. Both actions were dismissed by Small Claims Court and on appeal to the Divisional Court.
• In a claim against one of his ex-solicitors, Mary Lee (“Lee”), Small Claims Court found the claim to be frivolous and vexatious and awarded the maximum costs award of $1,500.
• In a claim against another one of his ex-solicitors, William Taberner (“Taberner”), Small Claims Court dismissed Baradaran’s action and described his conduct as “neither reasonable or proper”. Baradaran appealed to the Divisional Court. Lax J. dismissed the appeal: see Baradaran v. Taberner, [2008] O.J. No. 2909 (Div. Ct.).
• Since 2007, Baradaran has commenced 11 actions in the Superior Court of Justice.
• Prior to the requirement that paralegals be licensed in Ontario, Baradaran practised as a paralegal. On a number of occasions, Baradaran was found to have engaged in misconduct and was found to be incompetent in representing his clients in cases before the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (the “Commission”).
• In 2004, in Miri-Lashkajani v. RBC General Insurance Co., [2004] O.F.S.C.D. No. 162, Arbitrator Wilson noted that Baradaran’s handling of cases before the Commission had been the subject of concern in a number of decisions. These decisions noted that he acted in bad faith and was ignorant of the law and the legal system in place in Ontario. Ultimately, Arbitrator Wilson found that Baradaran’s conduct in the proceeding before him was sufficient to bar Baradaran, pursuant to s. 23(3) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22, from appearing as agent or advisor in the matters before him.
• In the Small Claims Court matter of Baradaran v. Ghaffari, [2005] O.J. No. 3595 (Small Cl. Ct.), Baradaran was found to have misrepresented himself as a lawyer. The decision was upheld on appeal to the Divisional Court by Chapnik J.: see Baradaran v. Ghaffari, [2006] O.J. No. 2019 (Div. Ct.).
• Baradaran continues to hold himself out as a qualified paralegal, notwithstanding the fact that he is not licensed as a paralegal.
• Baradaran has threatened both counsel of record in this proceeding, Mr. Shankman and Ms. Vlahakis, with litigation or disciplinary proceedings.
• Baradaran has made a complaint about Mr. Shankman to the Law Society of Upper Canada. The complaint was found to be without merit.
• Baradaran also made complaints to the Law Society of Upper Canada against Shadi Nasseri, who represented Master and Nasseri before the Tribunal. The complaint was found to be without merit.
• In these proceedings, Baradaran has engaged in obstreperous behaviour with respect to scheduling appointments and has reported Low J. to the Canadian Judicial Council as a result of how she dealt with matters in Motion Scheduling Court.
• Baradaran has also reported Goldstein J. to the Regional Senior Justice’s office in Toronto. He made submissions before me that Goldstein J., in essence, has colluded with the other parties in this action.
• Materials were filed indicating that executions registered against him in favour of his ex-solicitors, Lee and Taberner, remain outstanding.
• Baradaran has failed to pay the costs of Master and Nasseri arising from the first Tribunal hearing in the amount of $800.
• Costs ordered by Master Glustein in this proceeding totalling $4,500 remain outstanding.
[45] Baradaran explained in his submissions that he had to bring several Small Claims Court actions to collect fees because he represented over 500 individuals when he was a paralegal. He further explained that he has suffered from health problems that have affected his ability to work as a paralegal. This may be true and I find it difficult to put all of the claims he has commenced into context given the limited evidence at the application. However, Baradaran has a habit of relitigating matters, which he has done in this action, and he has failed to pay costs awards against him. He has advanced frivolous and unsubstantiated allegations of impropriety against lawyers and judges without any proof. He has not successfully prosecuted any of these claims. He has also been found to have engaged in inappropriate behaviour. When one reviews the totality of the proceedings that have been commenced by Baradaran, many of which have been unsuccessful, and when one examines his conduct and his pattern of escalating attacks against other lawyers and members of the judiciary, a finding that he has engaged in vexatious litigation is inescapable.
[46] In view of Baradaran’s conduct, I find that he is a vexatious litigant.
[47] In their application, Master and Nasseri sought an order prohibiting Baradaran from commencing any litigation without leave. During submissions, counsel for Master and Nasseri refined the order sought to one that prohibits Baradaran from commencing any litigation specifically against Master and/or Nasseri unless he has leave of the court.
[48] Boyd and Tarion did not bring their own application for such an order. However, at the hearing of Master’s and Nasseri’s application, Boyd sought an order prohibiting Baradaran from commencing any proceedings against him without leave of the court. Tarion sought an order prohibiting Baradaran from commencing any further proceedings against it regarding the two sets of warranty claims already adjudicated by the Tribunal. Tarion did not seek an order prohibiting Baradaran from instituting proceedings against it for future warranty claims as they may be legitimate and the Act provides for such future claims. The application brought by Master and Nasseri is broad enough to allow me to prohibit Baradaran from commencing any further litigation without leave of the court. Therefore, I am prepared to grant the relief sought by Boyd and Tarion.
[49] Granting the relief requested by Boyd and Tarion also leads to the most logical result. If I refuse to grant the relief, it would be possible for Baradaran to institute further proceedings against these two parties, in which case Master and Nasseri may be dragged into such proceedings as third parties. As a result, in order to give effect to my order prohibiting Baradaran from commencing proceedings against Master and Nasseri without leave of the court, I must make the corresponding orders in favour of Boyd and Tarion. In my view, it is fair and just to do so. Further, Baradaran cannot be said to be taken by surprise given the nature of the relief sought in the Notice of Application.
[50] It is also reasonable for me to prohibit Baradaran from pursuing litigation against the defendants until he has complied with the outstanding cost orders against him: see Dyce v. Ontario [2007] O.J. No. 2142 (S.C.), at para. 28.
disposition
[51] The action is dismissed.
[52] Having found that Baradaran is a vexatious litigant, I impose the following restrictions upon him:
- No further action, originating process, proceeding, motion or appeal may be instituted or continued by Baradaran against Master, its agents, solicitors, employees or assigns, Nasseri and Boyd until both of the following conditions are met:
i) he has paid all outstanding costs orders awarded against him in the Tribunal proceeding and this action to Master and Nasseri; and
ii) he has obtained leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice sitting in the Toronto region.
- No further action, originating process, proceeding, motion or appeal may be instituted or continued by Baradaran against Tarion, its agents, solicitors, employees or assigns with respect to the two matters previously dealt with by the Tribunal in its decisions dated June 23, 2010 and August 25, 2010, unless he has obtained leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice sitting in the Toronto region.
[53] This Order will also affect Baradaran’s right to initiate any matters against Master, Nasseri, Boyd or Tarion, with respect to the above, before the Court of Appeal for Ontario and the Small Claims Court of Ontario. Prior to doing so, he must first obtain leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice sitting in the Toronto region. The sole exception, of course, is his right to appeal my Order. Lastly, the action commenced by Baradaran against Nasseri before the Small Claims Court of Ontario, referred to above, is stayed.
[54] The order concerning the vexatious litigant finding shall include Baradaran, as well as Manouchehr Baradaran, which is another name that Baradaran admits to using, or any other aliases that he may adopt.
[55] Given the difficulty that counsel for the defence have had with Baradaran, his approval of the final form of the order is dispensed with.
[56] If the parties cannot agree on the issue of costs, written submissions can be made to me, not to exceed five pages in length. The defendants shall deliver their submissions within three weeks’ time. Baradaran shall deliver his submissions within two weeks of receiving the defendants’ submissions and the defendants will have one week thereafter to reply.
T. McEwen J.
Released: July 9, 2013
COURT FILE NO.: CV-10-413391
DATE: 20130709
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
MANOUCHER BARADARAN
Plaintiff
– and –
TARION WARRANTY CORPORATION, ROGERS BOYD, ABBASSAGHOLI NASSERI and MASTER CUSTOM HOMES INC.
Defendants
AND BETWEEN:
MASTER CUSTOM HOMES INC. and ABBASSGHOLI NASSERI
Applicants
– and –
MANOUCHER BARADARAN also known as MANOUCHEHR BARADARAN
Respondent
REASONS FOR DECISION
T. McEwen J.
Released: July 9, 2013