M. Kate Stephenson

The applicant, a person with a developmental disability, worked as a general labourer for the respondent for over 10 years.

She was paid a 'training honorarium' of $1.00 to $1.25 per hour, while non-disabled employees performing substantially similar work were paid the statutory minimum wage.

The Tribunal found that this differential pay practice constituted discrimination on the basis of disability, as it imposed an arbitrary disadvantage on the applicant solely because of her disability, despite allowing her to maintain provincial disability support payments.

The Tribunal ordered the respondent to pay compensation for lost income and injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect, and issued compliance orders including a cease and desist order and mandatory training.

The applicant, who has a developmental disability, requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that dismissed her allegations of an ongoing discriminatory wage differential as out of time.

The Tribunal previously found that the ongoing practice of paying her less than non-disabled employees was not a continuing contravention under section 34(1) of the Human Rights Code.

On reconsideration, the Tribunal found that the ongoing wage differential constituted a series of incidents, making the allegations timely.

The Tribunal granted the request for reconsideration and directed further proceedings to determine the merits and potential remedy.

The applicant, a security guard alleging discrimination on the basis of age and creed and reprisal, sought production of seniority lists, birth dates of specific employees, and CCTV/access records.

The respondent sought production of the applicant's medical documentation and communications between the applicant's counsel and the union.

The Tribunal ordered the respondent to produce the seniority lists and birth dates, and to confirm its non-possession of the CCTV records.

The Tribunal also ordered the applicant to produce the requested communications with the union, noting that the medical documentation had already been provided.

The City of Toronto sought judicial review of two interim decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, which had rejected the City's request for early dismissal of a human rights application challenging municipal zoning by-laws regarding group homes.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that the Tribunal's decision to defer the jurisdictional challenge until a full evidentiary record was established was reasonable.

The Court also held that the application for judicial review was premature, as there were no exceptional circumstances warranting intervention in the Tribunal's interim procedural decisions.

The applicants, individuals with intellectual disabilities residing in group homes, filed human rights complaints against the respondent unions.

They alleged that legal picketing by the unions at their group homes during lawful strikes constituted discrimination with respect to services and occupancy of accommodation under the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the applications had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that the Code does not govern the relationship between a union and those using services at a place the union's members are picketing, as the union members were acting as union members rather than service providers.

The applications were dismissed.

The respondents challenged the applicant's mother's ability to continue acting as his litigation guardian in human rights proceedings, arguing that her involvement in child protection proceedings created a conflict of interest.

The Tribunal found that since the child protection proceedings had concluded and the mother had regained custody, there was no clear and demonstrated conflict of interest.

The mother was permitted to continue as litigation guardian.

The applicant, a person with intellectual disabilities living in a group home, alleged that picketing by the respondent union during a legal strike violated his Code rights.

As the applicant lacked legal capacity, his sister sought to be appointed as his litigation guardian.

The respondent union opposed the appointment, arguing that the sister had a conflict of interest due to her historical acrimony towards unions and picketing.

The Tribunal found that a family member can be a litigation guardian unless there is a clear, demonstrated conflict of interest with the incapable person.

The Tribunal concluded that the sister's strong views against the union did not establish a conflict of interest with her brother, and appointed her as litigation guardian.

The applicant, who holds an Authorization to Possess medical marijuana, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability.

He challenged a regulation under the Liquor Licence Act that prohibited him from possessing or consuming marijuana on licensed premises, seeking to smoke on uncovered patios where tobacco is permitted.

The Tribunal found that the regulation was prima facie discriminatory as it created a substantive disadvantage for the applicant.

However, the Tribunal accepted expert evidence that second-hand marijuana smoke poses a serious risk to passive inhalers, establishing a bona fide health and safety justification for prohibiting smoking on the premises.

The Tribunal found no such justification for prohibiting the mere possession of medical marijuana, and declared that the regulation should not be enforced to prevent authorized persons from holding medical marijuana on licensed premises.

The applicant, a condominium owner, alleged that the respondent condominium corporation's declaration restricting occupancy to a 'one family residence' forced him to discriminate against prospective student tenants, claiming discrimination based on family status and reprisal.

The respondent sought to dismiss the application based on a prior consent judgment and the Court of Appeal's decision in Kilfoyl, which upheld the same declaration.

The Tribunal struck the family status allegations, finding the Kilfoyl decision binding and determinative of that issue.

However, the Tribunal permitted the applicant to amend the application to explicitly plead reprisal and allowed the reprisal claim to proceed, as it was not explicitly addressed in Kilfoyl.

The applicant, who had no legal immigration status in Canada, alleged that her ineligibility for Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP) benefits constituted discrimination on the basis of citizenship under the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that even if the denial of coverage raised the ground of citizenship, the defence under s. 16(1) of the Code applied.

Section 16(1) provides that there is no discrimination where Canadian citizenship is a requirement imposed or authorized by law, which includes distinctions based on legal immigration status.

The applicant, a former firefighter whose employment was terminated due to off-duty criminal misconduct, requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision dismissing his human rights application.

He argued that the Tribunal erred by denying his late request to call his doctor as an expert witness and by failing to ask him questions to elicit missing factual details about his alcohol addiction.

The Tribunal dismissed the request for reconsideration, finding that the applicant had access to legal advice, failed to provide a credible explanation for his late expert witness request, and had a fair opportunity to present his case without the Tribunal acting as his advocate.

The applicant, who lacked legal capacity, sought to have his sister appointed as his litigation guardian for a human rights application.

The respondent union argued that previous case law suggested the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to make such an appointment.

The Tribunal held that its power to control its own process under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act and the Human Rights Code includes the jurisdiction to appoint a litigation guardian.

The Tribunal directed that a hearing be held to determine whether the proposed litigation guardian should be appointed in this specific case.

The applicant, an undocumented immigrant, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of citizenship after being denied OHIP coverage.

She requested an interim remedy ordering the Ontario government to provide her with OHIP coverage pending the determination of her application.

The respondent argued the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to grant substantive interim remedies.

The Tribunal held that s. 16.1 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act grants it the power to make substantive interim orders.

However, the Tribunal dismissed the request for an interim remedy, finding there was considerable doubt about whether the application fell within its jurisdiction under the ground of citizenship, and noting a lack of immediate urgency that would require a remedy before addressing the jurisdictional issue.

The applicant, a minor, brought human rights complaints through his mother as litigation guardian.

The Children's Aid Society obtained interim custody of the applicant and sought permanent Crown wardship.

The respondents and the Society argued the mother should not continue as litigation guardian and sought to suspend the human rights proceedings until the custody issue was resolved.

The Tribunal found that the ongoing child protection litigation and uncertainty over permanent custody were significant factors in determining the appropriate litigation guardian.

The Tribunal ordered a stay of the human rights proceedings for up to one year pending the completion of the child protection proceedings.

The respondents requested an order to consolidate or hear together two human rights applications challenging the prohibition on smoking medical marihuana in licensed premises.

The respondents proposed hearing both matters in Ottawa and offered to pay travel expenses for the Toronto-based applicant.

The Tribunal denied the request, noting the Ottawa complainant's inability to travel and the Toronto applicant's childcare responsibilities, which made a joint hearing in either location impractical.

The Tribunal indicated a willingness to consider other ways to manage the evidence efficiently.

The applicant, who has Duchenne's Muscular Dystrophy, sought judicial review of the Ontario Human Rights Commission's decision not to refer his discrimination complaint to the Human Rights Tribunal.

He alleged discrimination on the basis of age and disability because the government provided residential group homes in his community for adults with cognitive disabilities, but not for medically challenged adults without cognitive disabilities.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no breach of procedural fairness in the Commission's investigation or disclosure.

The Court held that the Commission's decision was reasonable, as the comparator group had different needs and the government is permitted to target social programs to specific disadvantaged groups.

The Tribunal considered whether an application filed under the new Part IV of the Human Rights Code and a complaint referred by the Ontario Human Rights Commission under the old Code should be heard together.

Both matters involved allegations of discrimination in services based on disability, specifically related to the smoking of medical marihuana.

After receiving written submissions where the applicant and the Commission opposed hearing the matters together, the Tribunal declined to order that the proceedings be joined.

The appellant brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence on appeal regarding the enforcement of a Singapore judgment in Ontario.

The fresh evidence consisted of affidavits from a Singapore litigant who faced criminal contempt proceedings after criticizing the Singapore judicial system.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, applying the Palmer test.

The court found that the evidence could have been obtained earlier with due diligence and, given its political context, would not have affected the outcome of the commercial dispute.

The appellant appealed a decision recognizing and enforcing a judgment granted against it by the High Court of the Republic of Singapore.

The appellant argued that the Singapore judgment should not be enforced because it was granted by a corrupt legal system with biased judges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the foreign court properly assumed jurisdiction and that the appellant failed to establish the defences of public policy, bias, or lack of natural justice.

The court held that there was no cogent evidence of bias or corruption in private commercial cases in Singapore.

The applicants sought an order in the nature of certiorari to intervene in an ongoing Ontario Human Rights Tribunal hearing regarding the implementation of remedial orders for workplace discrimination.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, reiterating that courts should not intervene in ongoing administrative proceedings absent unusual circumstances.

The court found no such circumstances, noting the applicants' interests were aligned with the Ministry, which was already a party, and emphasizing the chaotic consequences of granting party standing to every non-party whose conduct is raised in evidence.