M. Kate Stephenson

The Ontario Human Rights Commission brought a motion seeking an order that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to find that section 2(9) of the respondent's Operating Agreement violates the Human Rights Code, based on a prior Court of Appeal decision regarding interjurisdictional immunity.

The complainant opposed the motion, arguing that all evidence should be heard before determining jurisdiction.

The Tribunal dismissed the motion as premature, finding that it must fully understand the Operating Agreement and hear from all witnesses before deciding whether the Code applies and should be read down.

The tenant appealed a decision of the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal which found her claim for damages against the landlords was res judicata.

The tenant had previously sought damages for missing stored possessions, but the Tribunal initially ruled it lacked jurisdiction under the former wording of the Tenant Protection Act.

Following a legislative amendment clarifying jurisdiction, the tenant brought a fresh application, which the Tribunal dismissed on the basis of res judicata.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Tribunal erred in law in applying res judicata and that its rigorous application would be unfair given the uncertainty in the law at the material time.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal to be heard on the merits.

The plaintiff sought costs on a solicitor and client basis following the dismissal of the defendants' motion for leave to appeal a summary judgment decision.

Applying the test from Smyth v. Waterfall, the court found the defendants failed to show that bringing the motion for leave to appeal was reasonable.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs on a solicitor and client basis, fixed at $4,742.00.

The Ontario Court of Appeal heard two appeals concerning the definition of 'spouse' under Ontario's social assistance legislation.

In the Falkiner appeal, the court held that the 1995 'spouse in the house' rule, which presumed a spousal relationship based on co-residency and financial arrangements, violated s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The court recognized 'receipt of social assistance' as an analogous ground of discrimination and found the definition discriminated on the basis of sex, marital status, and receipt of social assistance.

The violation was not justified under s. 1.

In the Thomas appeal, the court found the Board erred in classifying a disabled man and his caregiver as spouses without considering if the relationship was marriage-like or accounting for his disability.

The government's appeal in Falkiner was dismissed, and Thomas's appeal was allowed.

The applicant sought a review of an Employment Standards Officer's refusal to issue an order to pay $40,000 in wages against his former employer and its directors.

The employer was bankrupt.

The Board held that under section 68(2) of the Employment Standards Act, it lacked jurisdiction to review a refusal to issue an order against directors.

Furthermore, the Board could not issue an order against the bankrupt employer due to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and because the applicant had already settled his claim with the Trustee in Bankruptcy.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the motions judge's refusal to approve his proposal in bankruptcy.

The respondent, who became a creditor through the appellant's misappropriation of funds, opposed the proposal.

The other creditors were related to the appellant and assigned their debts to third parties after the Notice of Intention was filed, specifically to circumvent the voting restrictions in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge reasonably concluded the assignments were made to circumvent the Act.

The moving parties sought to vacate a stay pending appeal after the Divisional Court held that the regulatory definition of "spouse" under social assistance legislation violated s. 15 of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1.

The Court of Appeal held that the governing test for a stay required the party seeking the stay to establish irreparable harm if relief was refused.

Because the prior motion judge had found, on evidence reasonably supporting that conclusion, that the Crown would not suffer irreparable harm, the Crown was not entitled to a stay pending appeal.

The motion to vary was granted, the stay was set aside, and costs were awarded to the moving parties.

In a winding-up of a charitable corporation facing extensive institutional abuse claims, the liquidator sought appellate clarification on whether assets allegedly held on special purpose charitable trusts were shielded from tort creditors whose claims arose elsewhere within the charity’s operations.

The court held that Canadian law recognizes no charitable immunity from tort liability and rejects any trust-fund theory that would immunize charitable assets from execution.

In the winding-up context, all assets of the charitable corporation, whether beneficially owned or held on trust for charitable purposes, were available to satisfy legitimate tort claims.

The court also struck out a paragraph of the order suggesting it was not intended to affect related British Columbia proceedings, while confirming that the British Columbia court remained free to make its own factual findings on ownership issues.

The applicant hospital, a successor hospital following an amalgamation, applied to the Ontario Labour Relations Board under the Public Sector Labour Relations Transition Act, 1997 for a determination of the number and descriptions of bargaining units.

The Board determined that there should be seven bargaining units spanning all three hospital sites.

The Board maintained separate units for stationary engineers, McLean House employees, office and clerical employees, and service employees, but combined part-time and full-time employees into single units for each category.

The applicant union referred a grievance to the Ontario Labour Relations Board under section 133 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, arguing that work performed by the responding party on a blast furnace was construction work and should have been performed under the ICI provincial agreement.

The responding party and intervenors argued the work was maintenance and properly performed under the General President's Maintenance Agreement.

The Board reviewed the scope of work, which involved extensive replacements and redesigns to bring a decommissioned furnace back into service.

The Board concluded that the totality of the work constituted repair and alteration, making it construction work subject to the ICI agreement.

The matter of damages was remitted to the parties.