McRae J.

The appellants appealed a judgment granting oppression remedies to the respondents, arguing there was no factual basis for the finding of oppression.

The Divisional Court upheld the findings of oppression, which included refusing to provide audited financial statements, calling shareholder meetings on short notice, and withholding monies for snowmobiles.

However, the court varied the judgment to remove the individual appellant's joint and several liability for the snowmobile payment, as no such relief was sought against him personally.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed, including challenges to the 12% interest rate and the costs award.

The applicant sought judicial review of a 1997 Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing his complaints against his union under sections 74 and 76 of the Labour Relations Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the four-and-a-half-year delay in bringing the application was undue and inadequately explained.

Furthermore, applying the patent unreasonableness standard of review, the court held that the Board's conclusion that the union had not acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith was not patently unreasonable.

The applicant also failed to exhaust alternative remedies regarding the section 76 claim.

The applicant sought judicial review to quash an order of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario that granted intervenor status to the Liquor Control Board of Ontario in two stay motions.

The stay motions were based on allegations of witness tampering by an LCBO employee and the improper distribution of transcripts.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was correctness and found that the Board erred in granting intervenor status.

The Court concluded that the LCBO had no interest in the stay motions and its intervention would introduce a distortion into the adversarial process.

The order granting standing to the LCBO was quashed.

The applicant brought an application to quash an order of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario that granted intervenor status to the Liquor Control Board of Ontario in two stay motions.

The stay motions were based on allegations of witness tampering by an LCBO employee.

The Divisional Court held that the Board's decision to grant intervenor status was incorrect, as the LCBO had no interest in the stay motions and its intervention would distort the adversarial process.

The order granting standing to the LCBO was quashed.

The applicants sought judicial review of orders made by the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario directing that a hearing proceed in camera and restricting the attendance of counsel for interested persons.

The Divisional Court quashed the orders, emphasizing that the Statutory Powers Procedure Act and the common law strongly favour open hearings.

The Court found that the Board failed to consider less restrictive measures to address its concerns regarding the presence of counsel while witnesses were excluded.

The applicant sought judicial review of three orders made by a panel of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario that directed a hearing to proceed in camera and excluded counsel for interested persons.

The Divisional Court quashed the orders, emphasizing that section 9(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act and the common law strongly favour open hearings.

The Court found that the Board failed to consider less restrictive measures to address its concerns regarding the presence of counsel while witnesses were excluded.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's finding that defamatory words were spoken without qualified privilege.

The trial judge had found that while the appellant's communication to the police was privileged, his communication to a co-worker was not, as there was no reciprocal interest in the communication.

The Divisional Court found no error in the trial judge's reasoning and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding that the respondent employee was constructively dismissed and awarding her damages.

The respondent, a director, had refused to accept a corporate restructuring that required her to report to a newly appointed assistant vice-president rather than the senior vice-president.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in construing the altered reporting obligation as a transfer of responsibility.

Applying an objective test, the court found that the structural change did not constitute a fundamental breach of the employment contract, and therefore, there was no constructive dismissal.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario revoking his licence for sexual abuse.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, noting that judicial review is rarely permitted when a right of appeal exists and was waived.

Furthermore, on the merits, the court found that the applicant and his counsel had clearly admitted before the Committee to conduct constituting sexual abuse that mandated revocation.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment awarding a wrongfully dismissed employee three months' notice, an additional two months' notice for bad faith (Wallace damages), and substantial indemnity costs.

The employee, a 47-year-old single mother, was given two weeks' working notice and required to train her replacement, who had already started working before she was notified of her termination.

When she objected, the employer threatened to report her as having resigned to deny her employment insurance.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the notice period reasonable and upholding the bad faith damages due to the employer's insensitive and misleading conduct.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motions to certify their actions as class proceedings against life insurance companies regarding the sale of 'premium offset' or 'vanishing premium' policies.

The Divisional Court upheld the motions judges' decisions, finding that the claims were intrinsically individualistic, based on individual representations by agents, and lacked common issues necessary for class certification.

The appeals were dismissed.