Darryl T. Mann

The plaintiffs brought a motion to hold the defendant in contempt of court for repeatedly refusing to attend examinations for discovery in breach of multiple court orders.

The court found the defendant in civil contempt, noting his deliberate manipulation of the process and failure to comply despite prior indulgences.

The defendant was sentenced to 60 days of incarceration, a $10,000 fine, and ordered to pay $170,000 in costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the Superior Court of Justice dated November 13, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties in the fixed amount of $5,000.

The defendant brought a successful motion to stay a 2019 action as an abuse of process and to consolidate it with a 2017 action.

The defendant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, citing a Rule 49 offer, the plaintiff's lack of good faith, and uncooperative conduct.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding it appropriate to clear the costs slate and apply normal principles.

Costs were awarded to the defendant on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $70,000.

The minority shareholder of a family company commenced an action for an oppression remedy and asserted a derivative claim without obtaining leave.

The minority shareholder's holding company later commenced an action in debt against the family company.

The defendant in the first action moved to stay the second action as an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the motion to stay, instead ordering the two actions consolidated.

However, the court struck the derivative claim without leave to amend, finding it misconceived, ill-advised, and not brought in good faith.

The applicants sought oppression relief arising from a 2005 plan of arrangement converting a corporation into an income trust structure and a 2009 restructuring of participating notes that later impeded redemption of preference shares.

The respondents raised a preliminary limitations defence under ss. 4 and 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the alleged damage occurred when the impugned corporate steps were taken, and that the applicants knew or ought to have known the material facts underlying the oppression claim well before the two-year period preceding commencement of the application.

The application was therefore dismissed as statute-barred.

In ongoing litigation concerning a family marina business under receivership, the court considered a motion by the court‑appointed receiver seeking approval of its interim reports, payment of interim receiver’s fees, and approval of legal fees incurred by its counsel.

The defendants opposed the motion, alleging bias by the receiver and arguing that the original receivership order permitted payment only from the proceeds of a future sale of the marina.

The court found no evidence of bias or improper conduct by the receiver and held that a material change in circumstances—specifically opposition to the marina’s sale—permitted variation of the prior order to allow interim payment.

The court approved the receiver’s interim reports and authorized payment of the receiver’s fees and legal fees as fair and reasonable, but declined to grant the receiver a first charge over the marina property.

The court also ordered that $17,000 be released to the estate once a properly appointed estate trustee or administrator complied with Rule 9 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant, a target of a Canadian criminal investigation into chocolate price-fixing, appealed an order enforcing a US Letter of Request compelling him to testify in a US class action.

He argued that compelling his testimony would violate his right to silence under section 7 of the Charter and provide the Competition Bureau with an unfair advantage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's rights were adequately protected by use immunity under section 13 of the Charter and the Evidence Acts.

The Court added three conditions to the order to further restrict the Competition Bureau's access to the compelled testimony.

Following a motion, the court determined the appropriate costs award between the parties.

The successful party sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis and relied on an earlier offer to settle under Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court rejected the argument that the motion had little chance of success and declined to award substantial indemnity costs.

It also found that the offer to settle related to the entire action rather than the summary judgment motion and therefore did not trigger Rule 49 cost consequences.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment seeking payment of approximately $2.53 million under a promissory note issued as part of a share sale transaction.

The defendant argued that payment obligations under the note were conditional upon its compliance with financial covenants contained in a specific 2007 banking facility letter with its lender.

The court interpreted the promissory note and held that the relevant covenants were those contained in the specifically referenced 2007 facility letter, not later amendments.

Because the defendant could not make payment without breaching those original covenants, the condition precedent to payment had not been satisfied.

The motion for summary judgment was therefore denied.

Addendum reasons addressing the applicable evidentiary protections for the examination of a witness pursuant to a letter of request issued in connection with foreign antitrust litigation in the United States.

The applicant argued that the Canada Evidence Act should govern the examination because the foreign order contemplated evidence taken in accordance with Canadian law.

The respondent submitted that protections under the Ontario Evidence Act should also apply.

The court held that both the Canada Evidence Act and the Ontario Evidence Act, together with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, apply, ensuring the witness benefits from all available statutory protections against self-incrimination.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing a Letter of Request (LOR) from a US District Court seeking document production and examination of representatives in relation to a US antitrust class action.

The appellant argued the application judge failed to exercise independent discretion and merely accepted the LOR at face value.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge properly applied the Friction Division Products criteria, sought clarification from the US judge, and correctly concluded that the requested information was relevant, necessary, and not otherwise obtainable.

The respondent paid $222,500 to purchase shares but never received them.

The motion judge granted partial summary judgment for $202,500, accounting for a $20,000 counterclaim.

The appellants appealed, arguing an alleged oral agreement regarding profit sharing created a genuine issue for trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial as the individual appellant admitted to personally guaranteeing the subscription price and failing to pay.

The appellant, SimEx Inc., acquired rights to certain films from IMAX Corporation under a Transfer Agreement.

A dispute arose when a third party, Robots of Mars, Inc., commenced arbitration in California claiming unpaid royalties under a prior Production Agreement with IMAX.

IMAX cross-claimed against SimEx, arguing SimEx assumed all liabilities under the Production Agreement.

SimEx applied for a declaration in Ontario that it was not bound by the Production Agreement's arbitration and royalty clauses.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the assignment conveyed both benefits and burdens.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the unambiguous terms of the Transfer Agreement only transferred ownership rights to the films, not the contractual obligations of the Production Agreement.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Securities Commission that set aside a decision of the IDA District Council and substituted a harsher penalty for his involvement in facilitating a market manipulation scheme.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Commission applied the correct standard of review, properly concluded that the District Council misapprehended material evidence, and reasonably substituted its view of the public interest in imposing a severe penalty including a fine and suspension.

The Staff of the Investment Dealers Association of Canada applied for a hearing and review of a District Council decision regarding a registered representative who traded for a client attempting to manipulate the market price of a security.

The District Council had dismissed the allegation that the respondent facilitated the business of an unregistered entity and imposed a penalty without a fine or disgorgement.

The Ontario Securities Commission found that the District Council misapprehended the evidence of facilitation and the public interest in strong sanctions for willful market manipulation.

The Commission set aside the dismissal, imposed a fine of $128,504.55 (including disgorgement of commissions), and suspended the respondent's approval for seven years.