Antonios Theodosios Antoniou

The moving party, a former paralegal, sought an extension of time to file an application for judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that dismissed his application as abandoned.

The moving party filed his notice of application nine months after the HRTO decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to establish apparent grounds for relief because he provided insufficient evidence to show the HRTO's decision was unreasonable.

The court also noted the nine-month delay was unexplained.

The self-represented plaintiff requested a reconsideration of a costs decision after her motion to reinstate an action dismissed for delay was denied.

She argued she was forced to bring the motion, the defendants contributed to the delay, and opposing counsel owed her a duty to warn her about Rule 48.14.

The court rejected these arguments, finding she chose to bring the motion, the defendants' inaction did not excuse her delay, and opposing counsel owed her no duty to assist her against their clients' interests.

The original costs awards of $50,000 and $35,000 to the defendants were reaffirmed.

Following dismissal of the plaintiff's motion to set aside the Registrar's dismissal order, the court determined costs of the motion and the entire action.

One defendant was awarded full indemnity costs of $50,000 pursuant to a contractual provision in the Standard Charge Terms of the mortgage, which entitled the mortgagee to solicitor-and-client costs in proceedings taken to realize upon the security.

The other defendant was awarded substantial indemnity costs of $35,000 on account of the plaintiff's unsubstantiated allegations of fraud, dishonesty, criminal conduct, and conspiracy, which impugned the defendant's professional reputation as a lawyer and unduly complicated what was essentially a simple mortgage enforcement action.

The plaintiff's failure to participate in costs submissions was also taken into account.

Total costs of $85,000 were ordered payable within 60 days.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing her action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The action, which alleged fraud and conspiracy against a private lender and his lawyer regarding a mortgage enforcement, had been dormant for nearly five years after the plaintiff's lawyer was removed from the record.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay, failed to prove she always intended to prosecute the action, delayed in bringing the motion to set aside, and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice to the defendants, whose witnesses had suffered memory loss.

The self-represented appellant sought to pursue a new action after prior proceedings and appeals concerning related allegations had concluded.

The court held the proposed appeal was a collateral attack and abuse of process and summarily dismissed it under r. 2.1.01.

The defendant law firm moved for security for costs against the self-represented plaintiff, who resides outside of Ontario and Canada.

The plaintiff claimed impecuniosity, but the court found his evidence insufficient, noting similar findings in prior family law proceedings.

The court also considered the plaintiff's low likelihood of success in his solicitors' negligence claim and the defendant's incurred and projected legal fees.

The motion for security for costs was granted, requiring the plaintiff to pay $85,000 into court, but no costs were awarded for the motion itself.

The defendant successfully moved to withdraw deemed admissions arising from an inadvertent failure to respond to a request to admit.

The defendant sought costs of the motion.

The plaintiff argued no costs should be awarded because the defendant was seeking an indulgence.

The court awarded costs to the defendant, finding the plaintiff acted unreasonably by engaging in 'gotcha litigation' and refusing to consent to the withdrawal when there was no prejudice.

The plaintiff served a request to admit on the defendants.

Counsel for the moving defendant inadvertently failed to respond to five requests, resulting in deemed admissions of liability and damages.

The plaintiff subsequently brought a motion for judgment based on these deemed admissions.

The defendant brought a motion for leave to withdraw the deemed admissions under Rule 51.05.

The court granted the motion, finding that the failure to respond was inadvertent, there was no non-compensable prejudice to the plaintiff, and there were triable issues on the merits.

This motion by the plaintiff sought to vary a 2018 judgment regarding costs, specifically to include a corporate defendant (1779042 Ontario Ltd.) as jointly liable for a $95,000 costs award, as the other corporate defendant had gone bankrupt.

The plaintiff initially sought rectification based on a clerical error under Rule 59.06 but later amended the motion to argue there was no agreement on costs, seeking a new determination.

The defendant 1779042 Ontario Ltd. brought a cross-motion to vary the costs endorsement.

The court adjourned the motion to allow the defendant to respond to the amended motion and new affidavit, permitting cross-examinations, and reserving costs of the adjournment.

The plaintiff, acting as Estate Trustee, brought a motion for leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against a property held by the deceased's sister.

The deceased and her sister had taken title as joint tenants following a refinancing arrangement, but the sister had not paid the agreed consideration.

After the deceased's death, the sister registered a survivorship application and further encumbered the property.

The court found that the transfer was gratuitous, raising a presumption of resulting trust, and that the Estate had met the threshold of demonstrating a triable issue regarding its interest in the property.

The motion was granted, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to enforce a $200,000 settlement under Rule 49.09, arguing they had accepted a 2016 offer from the defendants in 2020.

The court found that while the 2016 letter contained a valid Rule 49 offer that remained open for acceptance, the plaintiffs' purported acceptance in 2020 introduced new terms regarding mutual releases and costs involving parties not represented by the offeror's counsel.

Consequently, the purported acceptance was a counter-offer, and no agreement on essential terms was reached.

The motion to enforce the settlement was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the motion judge's order striking their statement of claim and amended statement of claim against the Law Society of Upper Canada as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The appellants alleged that the Law Society's practice of requiring lawyers facing negligence claims to provide client files to the professional indemnity insurer violated confidentiality, privacy, and solicitor-client privilege.

The motion judge struck the pleadings without leave to amend, finding that section 9 of the Law Society Act provides statutory immunity for actions taken in good faith in the performance of statutory duties.

The appellants did not plead bad faith, which is necessary to overcome the statutory immunity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing his motion to amend his statement of claim.

The motion judge had refused certain amendments as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and deferred other amendments pending the determination of an outstanding motion for partial summary judgment.

The motion judge also awarded costs against the appellant.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: alleged bias by the motion judge and error in refusing leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of bias and upholding the motion judge's discretionary procedural orders regarding the timing of amendments and the statute-barred nature of certain claims.

The court fixed costs following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion to amend the statement of claim.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, while the plaintiff argued for partial indemnity and proportionality.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, finding the plaintiff's conduct unnecessarily complicated the proceedings and that the principle of proportionality should not override the court's concerns about the plaintiff's conduct.

Costs were also awarded to a non-party.

The plaintiff, Sam Cosentino, brought a motion to amend his statement of claim for the fifth time to add new transactions, some of which occurred more than two years prior to the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed amendments would cause prejudice to the defendants, particularly given a pending summary judgment motion.

The court also determined that the new claims were barred by the Limitations Act, as the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice arising from the expired limitation period.

Additionally, the plaintiff's refusal to provide a blacklined pleading, as directed by the court, was noted.

The plaintiffs in a construction deficiency action brought a motion to compel the defendant Monterey Park to provide a further and better affidavit of documents, specifically seeking income tax returns, financial statements, general ledgers, and working papers for a three-year period.

The plaintiffs alleged Monterey Park was the alter ego of the defendant Ridgevale.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the requested documents were not relevant to the pleaded allegations, as existing productions already demonstrated the financial relationship between the corporate parties.

The court also held that the broad request for three years of financial records offended the principle of proportionality.

The moving parties sought an order quashing an appeal from a Superior Court judgment on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction.

The lower court had declared the appellant mentally incapable and appointed the Public Guardian and Trustee as her litigation guardian.

The Court of Appeal determined that the order under appeal was interlocutory in nature, relating to a procedural matter rather than the merits of the proceeding, and therefore fell within the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court rather than the Court of Appeal.

The appeal was quashed without prejudice to the appellant's right to apply to the Divisional Court for leave to appeal.

The plaintiffs, Greenwald et al., brought a motion seeking an extension of time to set their action down for trial and leave to amend their statement of claim to add Monterey Park Inc. as a defendant.

The action concerned alleged construction deficiencies in a house purchased from Ridgevale Inc. The plaintiffs argued that Monterey Park Inc., controlled by one of the existing defendants, was an alter ego of Ridgevale Inc. and the true vendor.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs provided an adequate explanation for the delay in advancing the litigation and that the defendants would not suffer non-compensable prejudice.

Regarding the amendment, the court determined that the claim against Monterey Park Inc. was not statute-barred, as the plaintiffs only discovered sufficient information to advance the alter ego claim in June 2014.

Crucially, the Master emphasized that the underlying merits of a proposed claim are not a relevant factor to consider on a motion to amend pleadings under Rule 5.04(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident and commenced tort and accident benefits actions.

After multiple changes in counsel and a capacity assessment confirming she was capable, the plaintiff became self-represented.

The case management judge attempted to appoint Amicus Curiae to assist the plaintiff at trial, but the relationship between the plaintiff and proposed counsel broke down.

The plaintiff insisted on representing herself and refused further assistance.

The court reluctantly discontinued efforts to appoint Amicus Curiae and scheduled the trial and outstanding motions.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application against the Law Society of Upper Canada and the Attorney General of Ontario as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by not reviewing the evidence filed in his supplementary application record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, endorsing the principle that Rule 2.1 is designed for summary dismissal based on the face of the pleadings and written submissions, and that resorting to evidence defeats the purpose of the rule.