Antonios Theodosios Antoniou

The self-represented appellant sought to pursue a new action after prior proceedings and appeals concerning related allegations had concluded.

The court held the proposed appeal was a collateral attack and abuse of process and summarily dismissed it under r. 2.1.01.

The defendant law firm moved for security for costs against the self-represented plaintiff, who resides outside of Ontario and Canada.

The plaintiff claimed impecuniosity, but the court found his evidence insufficient, noting similar findings in prior family law proceedings.

The court also considered the plaintiff's low likelihood of success in his solicitors' negligence claim and the defendant's incurred and projected legal fees.

The motion for security for costs was granted, requiring the plaintiff to pay $85,000 into court, but no costs were awarded for the motion itself.

This motion by the plaintiff sought to vary a 2018 judgment regarding costs, specifically to include a corporate defendant (1779042 Ontario Ltd.) as jointly liable for a $95,000 costs award, as the other corporate defendant had gone bankrupt.

The plaintiff initially sought rectification based on a clerical error under Rule 59.06 but later amended the motion to argue there was no agreement on costs, seeking a new determination.

The defendant 1779042 Ontario Ltd. brought a cross-motion to vary the costs endorsement.

The court adjourned the motion to allow the defendant to respond to the amended motion and new affidavit, permitting cross-examinations, and reserving costs of the adjournment.

The appellants appealed the motion judge's order striking their statement of claim and amended statement of claim against the Law Society of Upper Canada as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The appellants alleged that the Law Society's practice of requiring lawyers facing negligence claims to provide client files to the professional indemnity insurer violated confidentiality, privacy, and solicitor-client privilege.

The motion judge struck the pleadings without leave to amend, finding that section 9 of the Law Society Act provides statutory immunity for actions taken in good faith in the performance of statutory duties.

The appellants did not plead bad faith, which is necessary to overcome the statutory immunity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing his motion to amend his statement of claim.

The motion judge had refused certain amendments as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and deferred other amendments pending the determination of an outstanding motion for partial summary judgment.

The motion judge also awarded costs against the appellant.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: alleged bias by the motion judge and error in refusing leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of bias and upholding the motion judge's discretionary procedural orders regarding the timing of amendments and the statute-barred nature of certain claims.

The court fixed costs following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion to amend the statement of claim.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, while the plaintiff argued for partial indemnity and proportionality.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, finding the plaintiff's conduct unnecessarily complicated the proceedings and that the principle of proportionality should not override the court's concerns about the plaintiff's conduct.

Costs were also awarded to a non-party.

The plaintiff, Sam Cosentino, brought a motion to amend his statement of claim for the fifth time to add new transactions, some of which occurred more than two years prior to the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed amendments would cause prejudice to the defendants, particularly given a pending summary judgment motion.

The court also determined that the new claims were barred by the Limitations Act, as the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice arising from the expired limitation period.

Additionally, the plaintiff's refusal to provide a blacklined pleading, as directed by the court, was noted.

The moving parties sought an order quashing an appeal from a Superior Court judgment on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction.

The lower court had declared the appellant mentally incapable and appointed the Public Guardian and Trustee as her litigation guardian.

The Court of Appeal determined that the order under appeal was interlocutory in nature, relating to a procedural matter rather than the merits of the proceeding, and therefore fell within the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court rather than the Court of Appeal.

The appeal was quashed without prejudice to the appellant's right to apply to the Divisional Court for leave to appeal.

The plaintiffs, Greenwald et al., brought a motion seeking an extension of time to set their action down for trial and leave to amend their statement of claim to add Monterey Park Inc. as a defendant.

The action concerned alleged construction deficiencies in a house purchased from Ridgevale Inc. The plaintiffs argued that Monterey Park Inc., controlled by one of the existing defendants, was an alter ego of Ridgevale Inc. and the true vendor.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs provided an adequate explanation for the delay in advancing the litigation and that the defendants would not suffer non-compensable prejudice.

Regarding the amendment, the court determined that the claim against Monterey Park Inc. was not statute-barred, as the plaintiffs only discovered sufficient information to advance the alter ego claim in June 2014.

Crucially, the Master emphasized that the underlying merits of a proposed claim are not a relevant factor to consider on a motion to amend pleadings under Rule 5.04(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Following settlement of the substantive estate dispute, the parties disagreed over the language of a release, resulting in a motion to resolve the wording and determine costs.

The court found the dispute over wording insignificant and concluded the motion was unnecessary and could have been avoided through cooperation between counsel.

The revised release ultimately satisfied both parties.

Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principles governing costs, the court held the responding party's lack of responsiveness warranted cost consequences.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the moving parties but reduced to reflect the straightforward nature of the motion.

Following a motion hearing concerning a significant advance payment request in complex estate-related litigation, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

Applying the factors in Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court considered the importance and novelty of the issues and the reasonable expectations of experienced litigants.

The plaintiff was successful and entitled to substantial costs for the motion.

The court also addressed the entitlement of the estate trustee during litigation to costs payable from the estate under a prior order.

A surviving spouse sought an advance equalization payment of $4.5 million from the estate of her deceased husband under the Family Law Act or, alternatively, partial summary judgment.

The motion was opposed by several defendants asserting potential claims against the estate and challenging their standing and the appropriateness of the advance.

The court held that the equalization entitlement between spouses is personal under the Family Law Act and that the defendants were neither proven creditors nor beneficiaries.

Applying the three-part test for advance equalization payments from Laamanen v. Laamanen, the court found a reasonable need for litigation funding, little doubt of entitlement to at least the requested amount, and that granting the advance was just in the circumstances.

Following earlier rulings on a derivative leave motion in estate litigation, the court addressed outstanding procedural directions and the issue of costs for five related motions.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $144,000 for work connected primarily to the derivative issues.

Applying Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the proportionality principles discussed in Boucher v. Public Accountants, the court held that the requested amount far exceeded the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful parties for a one‑day motion.

Substantial indemnity costs were denied.

The court fixed costs payable by the defendants jointly and severally at $55,000 inclusive of taxes and interest.