COURT FILE NO.: CV-20-83057
DATE: 20210414
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: 77 CHARLES STREET LIMITED and 2094079 ONTARIO LIMITED, Plaintiffs
AND
ASPEN RIDGE HOMES (CHARLES STREET) LTD., 77 CHARLES STREET WEST LIMITED, ARH DESIGN-BUILD PARTNERSHIP, ASPEN RIDGE (77 CHARLES STREET DESIGN BUILD) LTD., ASPEN RIDGE DESIGN-BUILD INC., 77 CHARLES ST. LP, MAREL CONTRACTORS GROUP INC., MAREL CONTRACTORS SYSTEMS INC., and CON-DRAIN CARPENTRY (1983) LIMITED, Defendants
BEFORE: Madam Justice Heather J. Williams
COUNSEL: Antonios T. Antoniou and Ian Sinke, for the Plaintiffs
Michael A. Cohen and Adam Lifshitz for the Defendants Aspen Ridge Homes (Charles Street) Ltd., 77 Charles Street West Limited, ARH Design-Build Partnership, Aspen Ridge (77 Charles Street Design Build) Ltd., Aspen Ridge Design-Build Inc. and 77 Charles St. LP
Mark Veneziano, for the Defendants Marel Contractors Group Inc. and Marel Contractors Systems Inc.
Julia E. Schatz, for the Defendant Con-Drain Carpentry (1983) Limited
HEARD: March 18, 2021
REASONS FOR DECISION
Overview
[1] The plaintiffs have brought a motion to enforce a settlement under Rule 49.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] In their notice of motion, the plaintiffs seek judgment in the amount of $200,000.00 against six of the nine defendants to the action:
Aspen Ridge Homes (Charles St.) Ltd.;
77 Charles St. West Limited;
ARH Design-Build Partnership;
Aspen Ridge (77 Charles Street Design Build) Ltd.;
Aspen Ridge Design-Build Inc.; and
77 Charles St. LP
[3] In these reasons, I will refer to these six defendants, as “the Aspen Ridge defendants.”
[4] The Aspen Ridge defendants argue that the offer the plaintiffs ostensibly accepted was not really an offer. They argue that if it was an offer, it was not open for acceptance at the time the plaintiffs ostensibly accepted it. They argue that if it was an offer open for acceptance at the time the plaintiffs ostensibly accepted it, it was not accepted unconditionally. Finally, the Aspen Ridge defendants argue that if there was a settlement, enforcement would not be in the interests of justice.
The Facts
[5] In August 2015, the plaintiffs served a notice of arbitration and started the civil action in which this motion was brought. The arbitration and the action were both in respect of a limited partnership agreement established to develop land at 77 Charles St. West in Toronto.
[6] In both the arbitration and the action, the plaintiffs claimed $17 million.
[7] Of the nine defendants to the action, the first four listed in the title of proceeding (Aspen Ridge Homes (Charles St.) Ltd., 77 Charles St. West Limited, ARH Design-Build Partnership and Aspen Ridge (77 Charles Street Design Build) Ltd.) were also named as respondents to the arbitration.
[8] On February 16, 2016, a lawyer, Ms. S., served a notice of intent to defend on behalf of all defendants to the action other than Marel Contractors Group Inc. and Marel Contractors Systems Inc. This meant that Ms. S. was lawyer of record for the six Aspen Ridge defendants and the defendant Con-Drain Carpentry (1983) Limited.
[9] On February 19, 2016, lawyer Mark Veneziano, served a notice of intent to defend on behalf of the two Marel defendants. Mr. Veneziano represented the Marel defendants at the hearing of the motion.
[10] On March 10, 2016, Ms. S. wrote a five-page letter to the Ottawa lawyer representing the plaintiffs, Mr. P. The letter was copied to Mr. G., a Toronto-based lawyer with the same law firm as Mr. P. In her letter, Ms. S. set out her clients’ position with respect to the merits of the plaintiffs’ action. The most significant portion of the letter for the purposes of this motion is its concluding paragraph:
Notwithstanding all of the above, our client is prepared to offer to resolve this matter on the basis of the payment of $200,000 in full and final settlement of any and all claims your clients may have against all of the parties named in the claim and arbitration. The parties would agree to execute a release of all such parties in a form satisfactory to the parties.
[11] In a telephone conversation on March 30, 2016, Mr. G. told Ms. S. that the amount of her offer was “an order of magnitude too small” and that a settlement at that level would never happen.
[12] The two lawyers had a further conversation in April 2016, in which they discussed moving the matter forward by arbitration or through the courts. Ms. S.’s notes of this conversation suggest that Mr. G. told her he did not know what the Marel defendants’ position would be, and that Con-Drain should not have been part of the claim.
[13] There was then no further communication between Ms. S. and Mr. G. until August 7, 2020, when Mr. G. sent a letter by email to Ms. S., informing her that he had been instructed to accept the $200,000.00 settlement offer in her March 10, 2016 letter. In his letter, Mr. G. noted that the March 10, 2016 offer had contemplated a release of all parties. He requested a draft mutual release. He proposed either a without-costs discontinuance or dismissal, and said that either would be fine with him, provided the release was both mutual and comprehensive.
[14] On September 23, 2020, Michael Cohen, the lawyer who now represents the Aspen Ridge defendants, wrote to Mr. G. and said that, because Mr. G. had rejected the offer in a conversation with Ms. S. in 2016 (Mr. Cohen said the conversation was around April 5, 2016), there was no offer open for the plaintiffs to accept.
[15] On December 23, 2020, the lawyer now acting as Mr. G.’s agent, Mr. Antoniou, wrote to Mr. Cohen to request his availability for a motion to enforce the settlement.
[16] The motion was heard on March 18, 2021.
[17] As more than five years have passed since the notice of action was issued, the plaintiffs have scheduled a status hearing for April 29, 2021.
The Positions of the Parties
[18] The plaintiffs have brought a motion to enforce a $200,000.00 settlement they say crystallized on August 7, 2020 when Mr. G. accepted Ms. S.’s offer of March 10, 2016.
[19] The Aspen Ridge defendants and the two Marel defendants responded to the motion, although the Marel defendants filed no factum and Mr. Veneziano made only brief submissions at the hearing of the motion.
[20] Con-Drain, which continues to be represented by Ms. S., took no position.
The Issues
[21] The test to be applied on a motion under Rule 49.09 is: (1) was an agreement to settle reached; and, (2) if so, should it be enforced based on all the evidence: Bank of Montreal v. Ismail, 2012 ONCA 129 at para.5, citing Milios v. Zagas (1998), 1998 7119 (ON CA), 38 O.R. (3d) 218 (C.A.)
[22] Therefore, the issues to be decided on this motion are:
Was an offer open for acceptance on August 7, 2020?
If an offer was open for acceptance on August 7, 2020, was an agreement to settle reached?
If an agreement to settle was reached, should it be enforced, based on all of the evidence?
ISSUE ONE: WAS AN OFFER OPEN FOR ACCEPTANCE ON AUGUST 7, 2020?
[23] To decide whether there was a settlement and, if so, whether it should be enforced, I must first consider the Aspen Ridge defendants’ argument that Ms. S.’s March 10, 2016 letter did not contain an offer to settle and, if it did, it was not an offer that was open for acceptance when the plaintiffs ostensibly accepted it on August 7, 2020.
[24] The Aspen Ridge defendants argue if the March 10, 2016 letter contained an offer, it was a common law offer, and not an offer under Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. They argue that, because it was, at best, a common law offer, it did not remain open for acceptance after Mr. G. rejected it in his March 30, 2016 telephone conversation with Ms. S. At common law, offers to settle, once rejected, are no longer open for acceptance. However, under Rule 49.04(1), offers to settle remain open for acceptance until they are withdrawn in writing.
Did the March 10, 2016 letter include an offer to settle?
[25] The Aspen Ridge defendants argue that the last paragraph of Ms. S.’s letter must be looked at as a “proposal” and not an offer to settle. They argue that because Ms. S. wrote “our client is prepared to offer… (Italics added)”, a proposal was being floated but an offer was not actually being made. The Aspen Ridge defendants argue that the paragraph constituted an agreement to agree but not an offer.
[26] I do not accept this argument. Ms. S. did not include any conditions precedent to her client’s preparedness to make the offer. She did not, for example, say that her client would be prepared to make an offer on some future date or if a certain event were to take place. When read in the context of the sentence, paragraph and letter in which it was written, I am satisfied that the phrase “my client is prepared to offer” should be interpreted as being synonymous with the phrase “my client offers.”
[27] The Aspen Ridge defendants also argue that there was no offer because essential terms of an offer, pertaining to costs and releases, were not mentioned. The Aspen Ridge defendants rely on Bawitko Investments Ltd. v. Kernals Popcorn Ltd., (1991) 1991 2734 (ON CA), 53 OAC 314, at pages 12 and 13, which described circumstances in which an ostensible contract may be only a contract to make a contract.
[28] I do not accept this argument either. It is true that Ms. S.’s letter did not specifically refer to costs. There is no requirement that offers to settle make reference to costs. The Rules of Civil Procedure specifically contemplate and provide for a plaintiff’s entitlement to costs when the plaintiff accepts an offer that does not refer to costs (Rule 49.07(5).) Ms. S.’s letter did refer to a release, although not to the wording of a release. An offer to settle is not required to set out the terms of a release; settlement implies a promise to furnish a release unless there is a contractual agreement to the contrary. (Huma v. Mississauga Hospital, 2020 ONCA 644 at para. 20, citing Hodaie v. RBC Dominion Securities, 2011 ONSC 6881, at para. 18, aff’d 2021 ONCA 796.)
[29] Finally, I note that in her February 2, 2021 affidavit in support of this motion, Ms. S. described the content of the last paragraph of her March 10, 2016 letter as a “proposal”. However, in his letter of September 23, 2020 to Mr. G., Mr. Cohen used the word offer several times, saying that there was no offer for Mr. G.’s clients to accept because Mr. G. had rejected the offer in conversation with Ms. S. and the rejection of the offer resulted in its termination.
[30] For these reasons, I am satisfied that the last paragraph of Ms. S.’s letter of March 10, 2016 contained an offer to settle.
Was the offer subject to the provisions of Rule 49?
[31] If the basic requirements of a Rule 49 offer are present, an offer will be presumed to be a Rule 49 offer unless expressly stated otherwise or unless the offeror can demonstrate that they did not intend the offer to be a Rule 49 offer. (Clark Agri Service Inc. v. 705680 Ontario Ltd. [1996] O.R. No. 2783 (Gen. Div.), at para. 5.)
[32] The last paragraph of Ms. S.’s letter of March 10, 2016 had the features of an offer to settle: it was made in writing; it was delivered to the opposing party; and it was a proposal that could be construed as an offer to settle, open for acceptance and binding if accepted. (Clark Agri Service Inc., at para. 4.)
[33] The Aspen Ridge defendants argue that Ms. S.’s March 10, 2016 letter was marked “without prejudice” and that this is evidence that she did not intend it to be treated as a Rule 49 offer.
[34] I do not accept this argument. Stating that a letter containing an offer to settle is “without prejudice” does not rebut the presumption that the offer is a Rule 49 offer. Stating that an offer is “without prejudice” is actually consistent with and not a departure from the Rule 49 regime; Rule 49.05 states that an offer to settle shall be deemed to be “an offer of compromise made without prejudice”. The case relied upon by the Aspen Ridge defendants in support of this argument, Roma Construction (Niagara) Ltd. v. Dykstra Bros. Roofing (1992) Limited, 2008 ONSC 34365 is distinguishable. In Roma, the plaintiff marked an offer “without prejudice” when all of the defendants’ offers had stated that they were made pursuant to the rules. The judge concluded that, in the circumstances, the plaintiff must have intended to opt out of Rule 49. Assuming that I would have come to the same conclusion, there is no similar comparison between offers to be made in this case.
[35] For these reasons, I am satisfied that the offer in the last paragraph of Ms. S.’s March 10, 2016 letter was an offer subject to the provisions of Rule 49.
Conclusion with Respect to Issue One:
[36] Ms. S.’s March 10, 2016 letter contained an offer that was subject to the provisions of Rule 49. Although it was orally rejected by Mr. G. on March 30, 2016, it remained open for acceptance when Mr. G. ostensibly accepted it on August 7, 2020, because it had not been withdrawn in writing.
[37] If I am wrong, and Ms. S.’s March 10, 2016 letter did not contain an offer to settle, there was, obviously, no offer for Mr. G. to accept on August 7, 2020. If I am right about the letter containing an offer but wrong about the offer being subject to Rule 49, the offer was not open for acceptance after Mr. G.’s orally rejected it on March 30, 2016. In either event, there would be no settlement agreement between the parties and no settlement to be enforced under Rule 49.09.
ISSUE TWO: WAS AN AGREEMENT TO SETTLE REACHED?
[38] The proper approach under the first step of the [two-part] test [under Rule 49.09] is to treat the motion like a Rule 20 motion for summary judgment. If there are material issues of fact or genuine issues of credibility in dispute regarding whether (i) the parties intended to create a legally-binding relation or (ii) there was an agreement on all essential terms, a court must refuse to grant judgment. (Capital Gains Income Streams Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Canada Inc., (2007), 2007 39604 (ON SCDC), 87 O.R. (3d) 464 (Div. Ct.) at para. 9.)
[39] Although Capital Gains was decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87, which altered the framework for granting summary judgment, the two-step approach applied to the enforcement of a Rule 49 offer remains unaltered. (Hashemi-Sabet Estate v. Oak Ridges Pharmasave Inc., 2018 ONCA 839 at para. 28.)
[40] As has been repeatedly stated in the jurisprudence, on a summary judgment motion, the motion judge is entitled to assume that the record contains all the evidence which the parties will present if there is a trial. The same is true on a motion to enforce a Rule 49 offer; a party must put its best foot forward. (Hashemi-Sabet Estate, at para. 33, with internal citations deleted.)
[41] I am unable to find, on the record before me, that on August 7, 2020, the plaintiffs and the Aspen Ridge defendants had agreed on all of the essential terms of the settlement. In his letter of August 7, 2020, Mr. G. requested terms that Ms. S. had not offered in her letter of March 10, 2016 and which required the agreement and participation of the Marel defendants, which Ms. S. did not represent. The request for these terms amounted to a counter-offer. I am also not satisfied that there was an agreement with respect to which of the Aspen Ridge defendants had made the offer to pay the $200,000.00.
(1) Mr. G.’s letter of August 7, 2020 was a counter-offer
[42] It is a fundamental principle of contract law that an offer is not accepted unless the offeree unreservedly assents to the exact terms proposed by the offeror. If, while purporting to accept the offer as a whole, the offeree introduces a new term which the offeror has not had the opportunity to examine, the offeree is making a counter-offer: see, e.g., Cheshire & Fifoot's Law of Contract, 8th ed. (1972), at p. 31. (Re Desanto et al. and Cretzman et al., (1986) 1986 2663 (ON SC), 53 O.R. (2d) 732 (Dist. Ct.)
[43] The plaintiffs argue that it is clear that the parties had reached an agreement on all essential terms of a settlement and that they intended to create a legally-binding contract. They point to Ms. S.’s letter of March 10, 2016, which said “our client is prepared to offer to resolve this matter” and Mr. G.’s letter of August 7, 2020, which said “I have been instructed by my clients to accept the Settlement Offer of $200,000 set out in your attached letter.” They argue that any matters related to completion or implementation of a settlement, which include releases, are not considered to be essential terms.
[44] The context in which the March 10, 2016 and August 7, 2020 letters were written is important.
[45] As I indicated in the fact summary at the outset of these reasons, on February 16, 2016, Ms. S. filed a notice of intent to defend on behalf of all of the defendants to the action other than the two Marel defendants.
[46] Mr. Veneziano filed a notice of intent to defend on behalf of the Marel defendants on February 19, 2016.
[47] In the opening paragraph of her March 10, 2016 letter, Ms. S. confirmed that she had been retained by the Aspen Ridge defendants. At page 4 of the letter, Ms. S. said that although Con-Drain was a company related to her clients, it had not been involved in the 77 Charles St. project. Also, at page 4, Ms. S. said the Marel defendants were not related to her clients.
[48] The last paragraph of Ms. S.’s March 10, 2016 letter included the $200,000.00 offer to resolve “this matter.” It said the $200,000.00 payment would be “in full and final settlement of any and all claims your clients may have against all of the parties named in the claim and arbitration.” It then said: “The parties would agree to execute a release of all such parties in a form satisfactory to the parties.”
[49] Ms. S.’s letter was silent about costs and did not mention a dismissal order or otherwise refer to termination of the action.
[50] In his letter of August 7, 2020, Mr. G. said that Ms. S.’s letter had contemplated a form of release of “all parties” (that is to say, not only the parties against which the plaintiffs had advanced claims but the plaintiffs as well) and asked Ms. S. to forward her proposed form of mutual release. Mr. G. also proposed a without-costs discontinuance or a dismissal of the action, saying he had no preference, provided the release was mutual and comprehensive.
[51] There was no evidence before me to suggest that Ms. S’s March 10, 2016 letter or Mr. G.’s August 7, 2020 letter were sent to Mr. Veneziano.
[52] The plaintiffs are correct when they argue there is a distinction between the essential terms of a settlement and terms relating to the completion or implementation of a settlement. For there to be a settlement, typically, it is not necessary to have reached agreement on incidental matters, such as the exchange of releases. (Atkinson v. Whaley Estate Litigation, 2019 ONSC 3708, at para. 48.) Settlement implies a promise to furnish a release unless there is a contractual agreement to the contrary. (Huma v. Mississauga Hospital, 2020 ONCA 644, at para. 19.) Further, a party which proposes an overly broad release is not repudiating a settlement unless, after discussion, the party refuses to proceed without it being signed. (Huma, at para. 21.)
[53] I am satisfied that the question of whether an action is to be formally terminated by a notice of discontinuance or a dismissal order would also fit squarely into the box of terms relating to completion or implementation, and not into the box of essential terms.
[54] In this case, however, there was a disconnect between Ms. S.’s offer and Mr. G.’s ostensible acceptance that went beyond the wording or scope of releases and the choice between a discontinuance and a dismissal order. It is apparent from Ms. S.’s letter of March 10, 2016 and Mr. G.’s of August 7, 2020 that there was no mutual understanding about which parties were taking part in the settlement discussions, about whether any or all of the defendants had agreed not to assert a claim against the plaintiffs or about whether any or all of the defendants had agreed not to seek costs.
[55] The Marel defendants had not been involved in the exchange of correspondence between Ms. S. and Mr. G. Although Ms. S. had requested releases of “all of the parties named in the claim and arbitration”, she had not represented to Mr. G. that she had authority to negotiate on the Marel defendants’ behalf. By requesting a mutual release of all parties[^1] and a without-costs discontinuance or dismissal of the action, Mr. G. was requesting terms of settlement that required the input of the Marel defendants. Mr. G. had been on notice since February 19, 2016 that Mr. Veneziano represented the Marel defendants.
[56] In an affidavit in response to the plaintiffs’ motion, Joseph De Tommaso, an authorized signing officer of the Marel defendants, said the Marel defendants are not prepared to provide a release or to consent to a without-costs discontinuance or dismissal of the action. Mr. De Tommaso said that Mr. G. had not contacted his lawyer in the past five years to discuss the settlement terms and that his lawyer had not been consulted about the March 18, 2021 hearing date for this motion.
[57] Although requests for releases and even mutual releases (Chater v. York Central Hospital, 2009 33022 (ON SC)) and documents terminating an action typically would be considered matters relating only to the completion or implementation of a settlement, the requests made by Mr. G. affected strangers to the settlement discussions and were terms Ms. S. had not offered and could not have offered and to which she could not agree.
[58] Ms. S. had offered Mr. G.’s clients $200,000.00 and had asked his clients to sign releases in favour of all of the defendants. Mr. G. had responded on August 7, 2020 by saying, effectively, my clients accept the $200,000.00 and agree to release the defendants, however, my clients also require that your clients release my clients and that you arrange for the Marel defendants both to release my clients and to agree not to seek costs from my clients.
[59] I find that Mr. G.’s August 7, 2020 letter to Ms. S. introduced new terms that were not merely incidental, because they required the agreement of Mr. Veneziano’s clients, and that Mr. G.’s letter constituted a counter-offer and not an acceptance of Ms. S.’s offer.
[60] For these reasons, the plaintiffs have failed to show that, on August 7, 2020, there was an agreement between Ms. S. and Mr. G. with respect to the essential terms of a settlement.
(2) No agreement with respect to the paying defendant
[61] In their notice of motion, the plaintiffs seek an order for a $200,000.00 judgment against all six of the Aspen Ridge defendants.
[62] In the first paragraph of her March 10, 2016 letter, Ms. S. stated that she had been retained by all six of these defendants. (As I have already noted, the notice of intent to defend served by Ms. S. indicated that she also represented a seventh defendant, Con-Drain.)
[63] Throughout the letter, Ms. S. referred to her “clients”, plural, and also, from time to time, to some of them individually.
[64] In the last paragraph of the letter, however, the paragraph containing the offer to settle, Ms. S. said that her “client”, singular, was prepared to offer to resolve the matter on the basis of a $200,000.00 payment. This client was not identified.
[65] Mr. G.’s letter of August 7, 2020 did not refer to whether a client (singular) or clients (plural) of Ms. S. had made the offer his clients had instructed him to accept. Mr. G. wrote that he had been instructed by his clients to accept “the Settlement Offer of $200,000 set out in your attached letter.” Mr. G. was effectively saying here is the offer that was made; my clients accept it.
[66] At the hearing of the motion, the plaintiffs responded to the Aspen Ridge defendants’ submissions on this point by arguing that they don’t care which of the defendants pays them the $200,000.00. They argue that the settlement should be enforced against all of the Aspen Ridge defendants who can then sort it out among themselves. The plaintiffs also argue that the Aspen Ridge defendants should not be permitted to avoid a settlement because their lawyer’s letter was unclear.
[67] I am not without some sympathy for the plaintiffs’ arguments. However, the plaintiffs bear the onus on this motion to show that there are no material issues of fact in respect of whether there was an agreement on all of the essential terms of the settlement they are seeking to enforce.
[68] It may be that when Ms. S. wrote “client”, the use of the singular form was a typographical error, and Ms. S. had actually intended to write “clients.” It may be that “client” was being used by Ms. S. as shorthand for the group of clients. It may be that the same individual is the principal of or lawyer liaison for all of the Aspen Ridge defendants and that Ms. S. was referring to this person. It may be that only one of Ms. S.’s clients was making the offer. These are all possibilities, and, consequently, based on the record before me, I cannot be sure of which of Ms. S.’s clients made the offer Mr. G.’s clients purportedly accepted.
[69] The identification of the parties to a settlement is an essential term; a court cannot enforce a settlement if the parties to the settlement are not identified. Before accepting the offer, Ms. S. could have been asked to identify the client or clients which were making the offer to settle. This was not done. Ms. S. filed an affidavit in response to the plaintiffs’ motion. In it, she did not identify the offeror or offerors. Ms. S. was not cross-examined.
[70] This is not a situation in which there is a conflict in the evidence before me which might be resolved through the enhanced powers available to me under Rule 20; it is a situation in which evidence that is required is not before me.
[71] The plaintiffs have failed to show that there was an agreement between the parties with respect to which defendant or defendants made the $200,000.00 offer the plaintiffs ostensibly accepted.
Conclusion with Respect to Issue Two:
[72] As I am not satisfied that the plaintiffs and the Aspen Ridge defendants had agreed on all essential terms of a settlement, the plaintiff have failed to show that a settlement was reached.
ISSUE THREE: IF AN AGREEMENT TO SETTLE WAS REACHED, SHOULD IT BE ENFORCED?
[73] As I have found there was no settlement, it is unnecessary for me to consider this issue.
DISPOSITION
[74] The motion is dismissed.
COSTS
[75] At my request, the parties have already filed costs outlines. I encourage the parties to settle the issue of costs. If they are unable to do so, the defendants may deliver brief written submissions supplementary to their costs outlines within three weeks of the date of this endorsement. The plaintiffs may then deliver brief submissions supplementary to their costs outlines, within two weeks of receipt of the defendants’ submissions. The defendants may deliver brief reply submissions within one week of receipt of the plaintiffs’ submissions.
Date: April 14, 2021
COURT FILE NO.: CV-20-83057
DATE: 20210414
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
RE: 77 CHARLES STREET LIMITED and 2094079 ONTARIO LIMITED, Plaintiffs
AND
ASPEN RIDGE HOMES (CHARLES STREET) LTD., 77 CHARLES STREET WEST LTD, ARH DESIGN-BUILD PARTNERSHIP, ASPEN RIDGE (77 CHARLES STREET DESIGN BUILD) LTD., ASPEN RIDGE DESIGN-BUILD INC., 77 CHARLES ST. LP, MAREL CONTRACTORS GROUP INC., MAREL CONTRACTORS SYSTEMS INC., and CON-DRAIN CARPENTRY (1983) LTD, Defendants
COUNSEL: Antonios T. Antoniou and Ian Sinke, for the Plaintiffs
Michael A. Cohen, for the Defendants Aspen Ridge Homes (Charles Street) Ltd., 77 Charles Street West Limited, ARH Design-Build Partnership, Aspen Ridge (77 Charles Street Design Build) Ltd., Aspen Ridge Design-Build Inc., and 77 Charles St. LP
Mark Veneziano, for the Defendants Marel Contractors Group Inc. and Marel Contractors Systems Inc.
Julia E. Schatz, for the Defendant Con-Drain Carpentry (1983) Limited
ENDORSEMENT
Madam Justice Heather J. Williams
Released: April 14, 2021
[^1]: Although the last sentence of Ms. S.’s March 10, 2016 letter, in which she referred to a release, might have been drafted more precisely, I do not interpret it as a proposal to release all parties, including the plaintiffs. I interpret her reference to a release of “all such parties” as a reference to the parties to which she had referred in her previous sentence, which were all of the parties named in the claim and the arbitration against which the plaintiffs had claims.