Adam Lifshitz

The appellant, a homebuilder, appealed a summary judgment that granted the respondent relief from forfeiture of an $82,916.19 deposit for a home purchase.

The transaction did not close, and the appellant claimed the respondent breached the contract and forfeited the deposit.

The motion judge found it appropriate to relieve the respondent from forfeiture.

The appellant argued the motion judge applied the wrong legal test, asserting that relief from forfeiture is unavailable if the breach was entirely the party's fault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the correct test, as per Redstone Enterprises Ltd. v. Simple Technology Inc., focuses on whether the forfeiture is out of proportion to damages and if retention would be unconscionable, without making the applicant's fault a precondition.

The court upheld the motion judge's findings regarding the parties' sophistication, lack of loss to the vendor, and the appellant's misleading conduct.

This defamation action involved Dianne Ballam and multiple defendants, including Linda Atamanchuk, concerning a newspaper article.

Following settlement with other defendants, the plaintiff, Dianne Ballam, moved to amend her statement of claim to reduce damages to $35,000 and remove injunctive relief, and to transfer the action to the Small Claims Court.

The defendant, Linda Atamanchuk, opposed the transfer, arguing procedural prejudice.

The court granted the amendment and the transfer, finding the Small Claims Court capable of resolving the dispute and that no genuine procedural prejudice would result.

The court also awarded Ms. Atamanchuk partial indemnity costs thrown away.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to recover a $100,000 loan and interest from the defendants, evidenced by a missing promissory note.

The defendants disputed the loan's principal amount, interest rate, and whether Ms. Morrow was a party, also raising a limitations defence based on a 2012 email.

The court found the loan was $100,000 at 8% interest and that both defendants were liable.

The court dismissed the limitations defence, ruling the 2012 email was not a clear and unequivocal demand.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a certificate of pending litigation on a pre-construction corner lot, claiming inadvertent cancellation of the purchase agreement.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiff's claim to an interest in the land dubious, noting inordinate delay in bringing the motion, and concluding that the property was not unique and damages would be an adequate remedy.

The balance of convenience also favored the defendants, who had a pending sale to a third party.

The plaintiff brought an urgent motion for a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on a property she had an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) for, which the defendant was attempting to sell to a third party.

The transaction had failed to close due to disputes over extension requests.

The court considered the equitable factors for granting a CPL, including the uniqueness of the land, the plaintiff's intentions, the adequacy of damages as a remedy, and the plaintiff's diligence in prosecuting the claim.

The court found the plaintiff's evidence on uniqueness and intent vague and concluded that the plaintiff had not prosecuted the claim with reasonable diligence.

The motion for a CPL was dismissed, and the plaintiff's alternative request for payment of sale proceeds into court was also denied.

The plaintiffs, unpaid contractors on a home building project, brought a motion in two related actions for four orders: to transfer one action from Toronto to Newmarket, to amend their statements of claim to add defendants and allege fraudulent conveyances, to register certificates of pending litigation (CPLs) on the impugned properties, and for summary judgment against the corporate builder.

The court granted the venue transfer and summary judgment on consent.

The court also granted leave to amend the pleadings, finding no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants.

However, the court dismissed the motion for CPLs, concluding that the plaintiffs' evidence regarding the fair market value of the properties was methodologically flawed and failed to establish a prima facie case of intent to defeat creditors.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to enforce a $200,000 settlement under Rule 49.09, arguing they had accepted a 2016 offer from the defendants in 2020.

The court found that while the 2016 letter contained a valid Rule 49 offer that remained open for acceptance, the plaintiffs' purported acceptance in 2020 introduced new terms regarding mutual releases and costs involving parties not represented by the offeror's counsel.

Consequently, the purported acceptance was a counter-offer, and no agreement on essential terms was reached.

The motion to enforce the settlement was dismissed.