Sarah Valair

The applicants sought an extension of time to bring a motion for leave to appeal an order of the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that while the applicants had a timely intention to appeal, their explanation for the delay was inadequate, there was continuing prejudice to the public interest due to delayed enforcement of an environmental order, and the proposed appeal lacked merit.

The court emphasized that lack of merit alone can be determinative in such motions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario partially allowed an appeal by the family of a deceased First Nations child, Brody Meekis, who died of strep throat following an allegedly flawed coronial investigation.

The family's civil claim, which included allegations of misfeasance in public office, negligent supervision, and Charter s. 15 discrimination, had been entirely struck by the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal reinstated the misfeasance in public office and Charter claims, finding that the motion judge erred in concluding they had no reasonable prospect of success.

The court clarified that discriminatory conduct, even within discretionary powers, can constitute unlawful action for misfeasance, and that adverse impact discrimination under s. 15 of the Charter can arise from the application of seemingly neutral laws that disproportionately disadvantage protected groups.

The claim for negligent supervision remained struck.

The plaintiff First Nation sued the City of Winnipeg for compensation for injurious affection caused by Winnipeg's water-taking from Shoal Lake, and sued the Province of Ontario for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to protect the plaintiff's interests and ensure compensation.

Ontario moved to strike the breach of fiduciary duty claims under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it was not plain and obvious that the plaintiff's claims based on sui generis and ad hoc fiduciary duties were doomed to fail, given the historical context, the 1913 Order in Council, and the Crown's potential discretionary control over the plaintiff's cognizable Aboriginal interests.

The defendants, Her Majesty the Queen in the Right of Ontario and the Attorney General of Canada, successfully moved to strike the plaintiffs' action as res judicata and an abuse of process.

In this costs endorsement, the plaintiffs argued for an exemption from costs as public interest litigants.

The court rejected this argument, finding the action was primarily intended to prevent regulatory charges from being heard, was substantially similar to previous actions, and therefore constituted an abuse of process not in the public interest.

The court applied the five factors from *St. James Preservation Society* and the criteria from *Incredible Electronics Inc.* to determine that the plaintiffs did not qualify as public interest litigants.

Costs were awarded to Ontario and Canada.

Ontario brought a motion to reopen Stage One of the trial to admit newly discovered evidence, specifically the Fort William Jesuit Mission Diary and a September 30, 1850 entry, along with expert opinion evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence would not probably have changed the result of the trial and could have been discovered with reasonable diligence.

The court also ruled that the expert opinion evidence was inadmissible on the motion as it was not necessary and its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The appellants appealed from an order granting the respondent's application for a warrant to remove signs placed on trailers bordering Highway 400.

The signs violated the Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act as they were within 400 metres of the highway.

The appellants challenged the application on grounds that the respondent cited incorrect subsections of the Act and that the authorization to remove the signs was deficient in not specifying which signs were subject to removal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the erroneous subsection reference was a mere irregularity that did not vitiate the authority of the direction, and that the deficiency in the authorization could be remedied by issuing a supplementary authorization.

The appellants' cross-application for a declaration that the signs were permitted was dismissed as it confused the respondent's sign policy with the general prohibition under the Act.

The Anishinaabe beneficiaries of the Robinson Huron and Robinson Superior Treaties of 1850 brought actions seeking declarations regarding the interpretation of the annuity augmentation clause in the Treaties.

The Treaties provided for a perpetual annuity that the Crown promised to increase if the ceded territory produced an amount enabling the Crown to do so without incurring loss, provided the amount paid to each individual did not exceed £1 ($4) per year, or such further sum as Her Majesty may be graciously pleased to order.

The Court held that the Crown has a mandatory obligation to increase the collective annuities when economic circumstances warrant, and that the $4 cap applies only to individual distributions, not the collective entitlement.

The Court also found that the Crown owes an ad hoc fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries to engage in the process of determining whether the economic circumstances warrant an increase.

The representative plaintiff in a class action regarding pension benefits for employees transferred to Community Care Access Centres moved for settlement approval, fee approval, and an amendment to the class definition.

The plaintiff alleged the government breached a 'no loss' commitment regarding pension benefits.

The court approved the amendment to the class definition to include certain union members.

The court also approved the settlement of $752,500, providing $2,500 per class member, finding it fair and reasonable given the significant litigation risks, including a limitation period defence.

Class counsel fees up to $75,000 were also approved.

A solicitor sought an order to discharge a mortgage and rectify the Land Titles Parcel Register following a property sale.

An earlier mortgage, inadvertently deleted from title, complicated the transaction.

The solicitor relied on the Parcel Register and a payout statement from the mortgagee, which was mistakenly applied to the deleted mortgage, leaving the intended mortgage undischarged.

The court applied the doctrine of estoppel, finding that the mortgagee's representation in the payout statement, coupled with the solicitor's reasonable reliance, warranted the discharge of the mortgage and rectification of the register.

Concurrently, the mortgagee's cross-motion for judgment against the vendor on the underlying debt was granted, as the vendor was aware of the outstanding obligation and could not reasonably claim estoppel regarding the debt itself.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Deputy Registrar of Motor Vehicles suspending his driver’s licence under the Highway Traffic Act after he failed to complete required remedial driving lessons and a reassessment following concerns about his driving record and attention-related issues.

The court first granted leave under s. 6(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act due to urgency, finding that the suspension threatened the applicant’s livelihood as a self‑employed tow truck driver and delay before the Divisional Court could cause a failure of justice.

On the merits, the court held that the statutory scheme permitted the Deputy Registrar to require remedial lessons and a further driving assessment.

Applying a reasonableness standard of review, the court found the suspension justified given the applicant’s extensive accident history, the occupational therapist’s recommendations, and his withdrawal from the remedial program.

Technical defects in the Notice of Suspension, including reference to a repealed subsection, did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The applicant sought urgent judicial review of a government decision denying funding under the Second Career program for a proposed Master’s degree in public administration.

The respondent argued the matter was not urgent and that the decision was neither reviewable nor unreasonable.

The court held that the applicant failed to demonstrate that proceeding in the Divisional Court would cause a failure of justice as required under s. 6(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The court further found that the government program was a discretionary public funding initiative not subject to judicial review absent a Charter or fundamental rights violation.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant corporation sought orders under the Securities Act and the Business Corporations Act to restrict certain shareholders from voting shares allegedly acquired in breach of early warning reporting requirements, to declare that a shareholder rights plan “flip‑in event” had occurred, and to invalidate a dissident proxy solicitation ahead of an annual general meeting.

The court declined to address the alleged early warning breach because the matter was already the subject of an ongoing Ontario Securities Commission investigation and had previously been withdrawn from related litigation.

Even if a breach had occurred, the court held that the discretionary remedy of prohibiting voting rights would not be appropriate given the circumstances and absence of harm to the market or shareholders.

The court also found no evidence that the respondents acted jointly or in concert in organizing the proxy solicitation or that the circular was misleading under applicable securities and corporate law regulations.

The application was dismissed.