Allyson Fox

The Bank of Montreal brought an action to collect moneys due under a line of credit agreement.

The only issue was whether the defendant, Joseph Ieradi, entered into the agreement personally or on behalf of his corporations.

The court found that the agreement was personal, not corporate, and that the defendant was personally liable for the debt, despite the absence of the original written agreement.

The court relied on secondary evidence and the parties' conduct to reach its conclusion.

This decision addresses two issues in the context of a long-running guardianship and estate dispute: (1) the standing of Indu and Meenu Shewa to participate in the passing of accounts of Sundri Shewa’s property, and (2) the disclosure of medical information regarding Sundri Shewa’s capacity.

The court grants standing to Indu and Meenu, finding their rights and interests may be directly affected by the outcome, and sets out a careful process for the disclosure of sensitive medical records, balancing the need for evidence with privacy concerns.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granting the respondent bank's claim for amounts due on a credit card and two lines of credit.

The appellant argued the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the bank discovered the claim when she first missed minimum monthly payments.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the credit agreements created demand obligations, meaning the limitation period only began to run when the bank cancelled the accounts and demanded full repayment.

As the action was commenced within two years of the earliest cancellation date, the appeal was dismissed.

The Bank of Montreal, a creditor, sought to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real property by Roufat Iskenderov to Elena Lazareva.

The motion judge applied a ten-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The appellants appealed, arguing the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 applied.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal, holding that the two-year limitation period from the date of discovery under the Limitations Act, 2002 applies to fraudulent conveyance actions, not the ten-year period under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The court found its previous decision in Anisman (ONCA) was wrongly decided due to a lack of historical context.

The discoverability issue was ordered to be tried together with the fraudulent conveyance claim.

This costs endorsement followed the dismissal of the plaintiff's action and a subsequent motion to restore it to the trial list.

The defendants sought fees and disbursements.

The court applied Rule 57 criteria, noting the serious allegations made by the plaintiff, numerous delays caused by the plaintiff's handling of the case, and the plaintiff's rejection of multiple settlement offers.

The court found the defendants' requested costs reasonable and ordered the plaintiff to pay specific amounts to the Bank of Montreal and York Regional Police, in addition to previously awarded motion costs.

The Bank of Montreal (BMO) brought a motion for judgment against Volodymyr Garasymovych for credit card and personal line of credit debts, following his default.

BMO also sought a declaration that these debts arose from fraudulent misrepresentations and would therefore survive bankruptcy under section 178 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court granted BMO the monetary judgment for the outstanding debts, finding the facts deemed admitted by default sufficient for this claim.

However, the court dismissed BMO's claim for a declaration of fraud, ruling that BMO failed to provide clear and conclusive evidence to prove the elements of civil fraud.

The evidence presented, primarily BMO's proprietary software screenshots, was deemed inadmissible as business records due to lack of proper proof and also suffered from issues related to the best evidence rule and ambiguity.

The applicant title insurance company sought an order to rectify title due to an error in a 2016 mortgage where the wrong institution was named as mortgagee.

The borrower had subsequently transferred the property to himself and his spouse, and later passed away.

The court found a compelling case for an equitable mortgage but declined to order rectification without hearing from others who may have acquired an interest in the land.

The court authorized the registration of a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL).

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff bank's fraudulent conveyance action as statute-barred, and alternatively to discharge a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) for delay.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to extend the time to set the action down for trial.

The court held that the applicable limitation period for an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real property is the ten-year period under section 4 of the Real Property Limitations Act, not the two-year period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

As the action was commenced within ten years, the summary judgment motion was dismissed.

The court also declined to discharge the CPL or dismiss the action for delay, finding that both parties contributed to the delay and the plaintiff would suffer prejudice if the action were dismissed.

The plaintiff's motion to extend time was granted.

The Bank of Montreal sought to set aside a property transfer from Samira Bibi to her mother, Hanifan Bibi, as a fraudulent conveyance and unlawful preference under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act and the Assignments and Preferences Act.

The court found that the transfer was made with intent to defeat creditors, that the mother was complicit, and that the consideration was inadequate.

The transfer was set aside.

The plaintiffs, Tony’s Touch Plumbing Ltd. and Level V Design & Build Inc., brought construction lien claims against the defendant, Hatcho Nersesian, for unpaid plumbing, HVAC, and project management services and materials supplied for a new home construction.

Mr. Nersesian disputed the claims, alleging overcharging, deficient work, and incomplete work, and brought counterclaims for backcharges and exaggerated lien claims under section 35 of the Construction Lien Act.

The court found that Mr. Nersesian breached his contracts with Tony’s by imposing unreasonable deadlines and terminating the contract without allowing an opportunity to complete work or rectify deficiencies.

The court also found that Level V was entitled to a project management fee for the initial "weather tight" stage and a commission on trades it introduced thereafter, but not a full project management fee for the entire project due to lack of evidence of services.

Mr. Nersesian's counterclaims for backcharges and section 35 damages against both plaintiffs were dismissed due to failure to mitigate and lack of evidence of damages.

The moving parties sought a stay of a Divisional Court order dismissing their appeals from Landlord and Tenant Board decisions that terminated their tenancies.

The moving parties were tenants in a rental property subject to demolition and redevelopment.

The responding party provided them with temporary relocation units at reduced rent pending completion of replacement units, with the understanding they would vacate once the replacement building was ready.

The moving parties refused to vacate and sought relief.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the stay motion, finding no serious question to be tried, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favored the respondent.

The court also applied the clean hands doctrine, noting the moving parties had acted in bad faith by refusing to honor their relocation agreement.

The plaintiff, Amanda Valentine, obtained a jury verdict in a motor vehicle action, exceeding her Rule 49 offers.

The defendant, Sebastian Rodriguez-Elizalde, admitted liability but made no monetary settlement offers, forcing a trial.

The court determined the plaintiff was entitled to partial indemnity costs to the date of her second Rule 49 offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, as the judgment was more favorable than her offer.

The court rejected the plaintiff's request for a remedial costs penalty under the Insurance Act, finding the insurer did not breach its duty to settle expeditiously or participate in mediation, despite its "hardball" approach.

The court fixed total costs, including reduced disbursements, at $172,000.

A solicitor sought an order to discharge a mortgage and rectify the Land Titles Parcel Register following a property sale.

An earlier mortgage, inadvertently deleted from title, complicated the transaction.

The solicitor relied on the Parcel Register and a payout statement from the mortgagee, which was mistakenly applied to the deleted mortgage, leaving the intended mortgage undischarged.

The court applied the doctrine of estoppel, finding that the mortgagee's representation in the payout statement, coupled with the solicitor's reasonable reliance, warranted the discharge of the mortgage and rectification of the register.

Concurrently, the mortgagee's cross-motion for judgment against the vendor on the underlying debt was granted, as the vendor was aware of the outstanding obligation and could not reasonably claim estoppel regarding the debt itself.

Following a jury verdict awarding damages for a motor vehicle collision, the trial judge determined collateral benefits, the statutory threshold for non-pecuniary loss, and the applicable deductible.

The plaintiff's award for future housekeeping was reduced to nil due to collateral benefits.

The defendant's threshold motion, brought after the jury verdict, was considered by the trial judge as required by statute.

The court found that while the plaintiff's impairments were permanent and important, they did not meet the "serious impairment" criterion under the Insurance Act and O. Reg. 461/96, particularly regarding substantial interference with employment or daily living activities, and lack of evidence on accommodation efforts.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claim for non-pecuniary loss was barred, and the $30,000 general damages award was reduced to nil.

The court also clarified that the indexed deductible amount in place at the time of the threshold determination applies, not the amount at the time of the accident.

The plaintiffs sued the Bank of Montreal for $211,999.62 arising from unauthorized debits from a corporate account and moved for summary judgment.

The Bank of Montreal also moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the claims based on a limitations period and an account verification agreement.

The court found genuine issues requiring a trial regarding the start date of the limitation period due to conflicting evidence on when the plaintiff discovered the loss and when BMO provided account documentation.

The court also identified an ambiguity in the account verification clause regarding written versus oral notice, suggesting the `contra proferentem` rule might apply.

Both motions for summary judgment were dismissed, and no costs were awarded due to divided success.

The plaintiff alleged that his former spouse knowingly infected him with HIV and sued multiple defendants, including the federal Crown, an immigration medical examiner, and the employer of the spouse.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment dismissing the claims.

The court held that the action was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 because the plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of material facts when he was diagnosed as HIV‑positive in March 2004 but commenced the action in 2008.

The court further held that neither the federal government nor the immigration physician owed a private law duty of care to the plaintiff under the Anns/Cooper framework, and there was no evidentiary basis for negligence or vicarious liability against the nightclub employer.

The claims against all moving defendants were dismissed.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion seeking leave to amend three consolidated statements of claim to add allegations of fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation against a lawyer and a property appraiser involved in mortgage transactions, and to assert that the claims survived bankruptcy under s. 178 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing the amendments introduced a new cause of action after the expiry of the applicable limitation period.

The court held that the original pleadings alleged negligence only and did not contain the material facts necessary to support allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation, including knowledge of falsity or intention to deceive.

Because the proposed amendments introduced a fundamentally different cause of action, the limitation period created a presumption of non‑compensable prejudice.

The motion to amend was therefore dismissed.

The plaintiff and defendant, who are siblings, were involved in estate litigation.

The plaintiff alleged that he, the defendant, and another sister entered into an oral agreement to each contribute $10,000 towards a legal retainer, and in return, share equally in any settlement proceeds.

The defendant denied the agreement, arguing she never verbally promised to share the proceeds.

The court found that by paying her $10,000 share of the retainer, the defendant objectively assented to the terms of the oral agreement.

The court also held that the oral agreement was not collateral to the written Minutes of Settlement, and even if it was, it did not conflict with them.

The plaintiff was awarded his one-third share of the settlement proceeds.

The plaintiff, Bank of Montreal, brought a motion under Rule 37.14 to set aside a registrar's dismissal order.

The action, which involved allegations of a complex mortgage fraud, had been dismissed for delay after the plaintiff missed a court-ordered deadline to set the action down for trial.

Applying the Reid factors contextually, the Master found that the plaintiff had adequately explained the delay, demonstrated inadvertence in missing the deadline, moved promptly to set aside the order, and rebutted the presumption of prejudice.

The motion was granted and the dismissal order was set aside without costs.