Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Court File Nos.: CV-23-00001573-0000; CV-24-00004685-0000
Date: 2025-02-26

Between:

Indu Rakesh Shewa (Applicant)
(Self-Represented, assisted by Dave Shewa)
Bonnie Franklin (for the Applicant Indu Shewa, on the sale of property only)

and

Sundri Rakesh Shewa, Jagdish Shewa (a.k.a. Sean Aman), Meenu Shewa, Public Guardian and Trustee (Respondents)
Aman S. Patel (for Sundri Rakesh Shewa)
Benjamin D. Arkin and Daniel W. Boucher (for Jagdish Shewa)
Peter D. Woloshyn (for Meenu Shewa)
Michelle Choi (for Public Guardian and Trustee, Sundri Shewa)
Allyson Fox (for BMO)
Irving Wolkowicz (for Adrianna Molder)

and

Sean Aman (Applicant)
Benjamin D. Arkin and Daniel W. Boucher (for the Applicant, Sean Aman)

and

Sundri Rakesh Shewa, Meenu Shewa, Public Guardian and Trustee, Indu Shewa (Respondents)
Michelle Choi and Aman S. Patel (for the Respondents)

Heard: February 3, 2025 and in writing.

Reasons for Judgment

Lemay J.

Introduction

[1] I have been case-managing this action since late 2023. The Respondent, Sundri Rakesh Shewa, is in her early eighties. Unfortunately, she suffers from dementia and has for some time. Even more unfortunately, there have been issues in the administration of her affairs for some time.

[2] Sundri has three children, Indira (“Indu”), Jagdish (a.k.a. Sean Amani) and Meenu. Jagdish has advised that he now uses the name Sean Amani and I will refer to him by that name throughout these reasons.

[3] All three children have been involved in Sundri’s medical care as well as her legal affairs for some considerable time. Both Meenu and Mr. Amani had a power of attorney for property that was signed back in 2017. However, in 2024 I found that none of Sundri’s children were suitable as guardian for property. As a result, I appointed the Public Guardian and Trustee (“PGT”) as Sundri’s guardian.

[4] As part of the various processes that have been before the Court, I also directed that Mr. Amani was to pass his accounts for the time period in which he was managing Sundri’s property. As part of that exercise in passing of accounts, there are two issues that this decision addresses: standing to participate in the passing of accounts and the disclosure of medical information in respect of Sundri. I will set out some background to put this decision in context and then set out my conclusions on each issue in turn.

Background

a) The Parties

[5] Given that most of the parties share a last name, I will use first names throughout this judgment except for Mr. Amani. As I have indicated in previous decisions, no disrespect is intended by this.

[6] Sundri Shewa is in her early 80’s. She immigrated from India many years ago and raised her family in Canada with her husband. I understand that her husband has been deceased for more than twenty years. She has, until a couple of weeks ago, lived on Bell Harbour Drive in Brampton. That property has been sold, and the proceeds from the property are being addressed as part of the case management activities.

[7] Sundri has three children, two daughters and a son. Up until a couple of weeks ago, Sundri was living with her eldest daughter, Indu, and her grandson Dev in the Bell Harbour Drive property. Since the sale of the property, Sundri has moved to live with her second eldest daughter, Meenu and her husband.

[8] Sundri’s son is the youngest child. His original name was Jagdish Shewa. Jagdish has a series of aliases that he has used over the past number of years. As noted above, he has indicated that he wishes to be referred to as Sean Amani.

[9] Sundri’s physical and mental health has been deteriorating over the past fifteen to twenty years. She has had her family managing her property. This has led to litigation, and to the appointment of the Public Guardian and Trustee (“PGT”) to manage Sundri’s affairs.

b) The Issues Prior to My Involvement

[10] There has been litigation in this matter for nearly ten years. I do not intend to review the whole history of that litigation. Instead, I will review the key points that are necessary to understand the disposition of the two issues before me. My summary of the facts is based on the information that I have and is not binding on the judge hearing the passing of accounts or any other judge who is required to find facts in this matter.

[11] As a result of some issues that it is not necessary to review, Indu became the owner of seventy-one (71) percent of the Bell Harbour property in 2017. Sundri retained title to twenty-nine (29) percent of that property as well as a life interest that allowed her to continue living at that property until she died. Sundri continued to live at the property with Indu. Indu also had the right to borrow against her interest in the property.

[12] On or about April 29, 2017, Sundri signed a Power of Attorney for Property and a Power of Attorney for personal care, giving those powers to Meenu and to Mr. Amani.

[13] There is also a second Power of Attorney for Property and Personal Care that names Mr. Amani as the sole attorney. There are allegations that this document was forged. I am not addressing those allegations in this endorsement.

[14] Mr. Amani and Meenu managed Sundri’s property until the spring of 2023, when Indu brought an application seeking to have herself appointed as Sundri’s guardian for property and personal care. She was also seeking an order terminating the Powers of Attorney held by Meenu and Mr. Amani.

c) The Current Status of the Matter

[15] The matter first came before me in the fall of 2023. I informally case-managed it for some period of time and then Ricchetti R.S.J. appointed me as case-management judge.

[16] By way of an order of October 11, 2023, I terminated the powers of attorney and appointed Indu as the temporary guardian for personal care. I also appointed Mr. Patel as section 3 counsel. Although no challenge was made to the interim guardian appointment at that time, submissions received from Mr. Amani in the last few weeks state that I did not have the jurisdiction to make that appointment and arguing that Indu has never been legally responsible for Sundri’s care. I will return to that argument below.

[17] In the fall of 2023, as I was case-managing this matter, it came to my attention that the mortgage that Indu had placed on the property on Bell Harbour Drive was in arrears, and that the mortgagee had begun power of sale proceedings. It also came to my attention that Indu had not paid the property taxes for some time, which was her responsibility under the ownership agreement with Sundri.

[18] As a result, considerable time has been spent in this matter addressing the issue of the Bell Harbour Drive property. I case managed those issues, and efforts were made to try and secure a reverse mortgage so that Sundri could remain in the property. Those efforts were unsuccessful and ended in August of last year.

[19] In the meantime, the PGT was appointed as Sundri’s guardian for property. Based on the litigation in this matter and the alleged conduct of Sundri’s three children, I determined that none of them were suitable as her guardian for property.

[20] The PGT has appointed Mr. Patel, who was section 3 counsel, as counsel for all matters except the passing of accounts. For the passing of accounts, the PGT has appointed Ms. Choi and her firm, Walker Head. Two counsels have been appointed, in part, because Mr. Amani’s counsel has indicated that they would object to Mr. Patel conducting the passing of accounts because he was section 3 counsel.

[21] While we have been managing the sale of the property, I have also been moving the passing of accounts towards a hearing. Timetables for that matter have been set and I am anticipating that the hearing will be concluded before the summer of this year.

[22] I had originally ordered the passing of accounts to take place last year, with Mr. Amani to deliver his materials by the beginning of April of 2024. Those materials were not delivered in a timely way, and there have been considerable delays in the passing of accounts.

[23] In order to continue to move the matter forward, there are two issues that must be addressed. First, Indu and Meenu are both seeking standing to participate in the passing of accounts. In addition, Mr. Patel is seeking to participate in the passing of accounts as counsel.

[24] Second, Mr. Amani has asked for medical documentation to be produced. Mr. Patel has obtained the clinical notes and records from the family physician and, in accordance with the process we discussed at our last case management conference, I have reviewed those documents and have provided some of them to the parties who have standing.

[25] I will now set out detailed reasons for my disposition of each issue.

Issue #1 – Standing

a) The Positions of the Parties

[26] Indu seeks standing on several grounds, as follows:

a) That she has filed a notice of objection to Mr. Amani’s accounts and is entitled to participate in the hearing.

b) That she is a residual beneficiary of Sundri’s estate.

c) That she has relevant evidence on various of Mr. Amani’s claims for expenses that will demonstrate that his claims are without merit.

[27] Meenu also seeks standing on similar grounds. In addition, Meenu points out the following:

a) Part of the allegations that Mr. Amani is making include the fact that the allegedly forged Power of Attorney was provided by Meenu and that one of her sons had drafted it.

b) Mr. Amani is seeking repayment for the use of an HSBC credit card flowing from the administration of Sundri’s property.

c) Meenu received funds from Mr. Amani as an ‘advance on inheritance’ and was required to return those funds to Sundri.

[28] Mr. Amani argues that the passing of accounts is essentially a court supervised audit of a fiduciary’s management of the principal’s property. As a result, the only necessary and proper parties are Mr. Amani and the PGT. While there is provision at law for the Court to exercise its discretion and grant leave to participate to other parties, in this case Mr. Amani argues that there are no other proper parties.

[29] He also argues that I should not exercise my discretion to grant standing to anyone else because the case-law does not support that request, the involvement of Meenu and Indu “seems to be motivated by their personal grievance with their brother” and that no orders are sought as against either Meenu or Indu and, as a result, they will not be prejudiced if they are not added as parties.

[30] Given the need to move this matter along, as the case management judge, I determined that the issue of standing should be addressed by way of written submissions. I invited submissions from the parties seeking standing, which were due in mid-January. Any party opposing a request for standing was to provide their submissions by February 4, 2025.

[31] Once I received and reviewed the submissions, it came to my attention that there was one issue in respect of who the Power of Attorney for Personal care was that needed to be addressed. I invited the parties to provide submissions on that specific issue by February 10, 2025.

[32] I received submissions from Mr. Amani’s counsel and Mr. Patel in accordance with my deadline. I was also advised that Mr. Woloshyn was travelling out of the country until February 18, 2025. I extended the deadlines until the end of the day on February 19, 2025. I received additional submissions on this issue from Mr. Woloshyn and Mr. Patel.

[33] I now turn to the analysis of the issues.

b) The Legal Principles and Analysis

[34] The starting point for the analysis in this case is section 42 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, SO 1992, c 30 (“SDA”). That section states, in part:

42 (1) The court may, on application, order that all or a specified part of the accounts of an attorney or guardian of property be passed. 1992, c. 30, s. 42 (1).

Attorney’s accounts

(2) An attorney, the grantor or any of the persons listed in subsection (4) may apply to pass the attorney’s accounts. 1992, c. 30, s. 42 (2).

Guardian’s accounts

(3) A guardian of property, the incapable person or any of the persons listed in subsection (4) may apply to pass the accounts of the guardian of property. 1992, c. 30, s. 42 (3).

Others entitled to apply

(4) The following persons may also apply:

1. The grantor’s or incapable person’s guardian of the person or attorney for personal care.
2. A dependant of the grantor or incapable person.
3. The Public Guardian and Trustee.
4. The Children’s Lawyer.
5. A judgment creditor of the grantor or incapable person.
6. Any other person, with leave of the court.

[35] The analysis begins with the observation that Indu has been involved in Sundri’s care for a long period of time, and that Meenu has taken over that care. As a result, there is a question of whether one or the other of them is Sundri’s attorney for personal care. That person appears to have the right to apply for a passing of accounts. Having identified this issue, I requested submissions from the parties as described above.

[36] I start with an analysis of the authorities referred to by Mr. Amani’s counsel. Chief among them is BMO Trust Company v. Childs, 2019 ONSC 2637. In that decision, the Court was faced with very contentious family litigation involving an incapable person and her four children. Two of the children had previously challenged both the conduct of one of the children, who was the litigation guardian, and BMO Trust, who was the guardian for property. Those appeals had previously been dismissed as being meritless.

[37] The motions judge dismissed the request of one of the children to participate in the passing of accounts, stating (at para. 12):

[12] I would also observe that Peter Childs and Caroline Childs have no standing as of right to participate in this passing of accounts. Mrs. Childs’ interests are represented by her litigation guardian Michael Childs. While the four Childs siblings are residuary beneficiaries under Mrs. Childs’ will and her will is unlikely to be changed given her status as an incapable person, a will speaks from the time of death and as of the present time Mrs. Childs’ children have an expectation interest only. I would acknowledge that in many cases it will be in the interests of the incapable person that one or more of her children be accorded standing in a passing of accounts. I can see no such interest when the child and future beneficiary of the incapable person wishes to put forward vexatious arguments that can only cause family strife, further delay and expense and which will dissipate Mrs. Childs’ assets, which she may well need for her health care and well-being over the balance of her life.

[38] In BMO Trust, the Court went on to grant standing on the passing of accounts to the one applicant who was the incapable person’s attorney for personal care. In that case, the Court stated (at para. 16) that it would be important for the attorney for personal care to have standing. It does not appear to me that the argument of whether the attorney for personal care had standing as of right.

[39] However, counsel for Mr. Amani acknowledges, properly in my view, that the list that appears in section 42(4) of the SDA allows those persons to participate as of right. As a result, given that Meenu was one of the guardians of both property and personal care from 2017 to 2023, I am of the view that she has the right to participate in this proceeding as a party.

[40] This brings me to the question of whether Indu is entitled to participate in this proceeding as of right. In his submissions, counsel for Mr. Amani argues that the SDA does not permit the appointment of a non-PGT person as a temporary guardian of personal care (see sections 62(2)-(3.1)). Counsel goes on to state:

This demonstrates that Indu’s appointment was borne out of expediency rather than the application of the statutory requirements. Indu therefore cannot be considered to be a “guardian of the person” within the meaning the legislature intended in section 42(4). She should not be afforded standing in [Mr. Amani’s] application to pass accounts.

[41] Having reviewed the provisions, I am not sure that counsel’s submission is legally supported for two reasons. First, section 62(3.1) requires the PGT to investigate any allegation that a person is incapable of personal care and that “serious adverse effects” are occurring as a result. In short, the section requires the PGT to take certain steps. It does not, on its face, prohibit the Court from appointing a temporary guardian in an emergent situation. Second, the Court has its parens patriae jurisdiction. It would probably require express language to oust the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and I do not see such language in this section.

[42] However, I was unable to find any cases that were directly on point, and this issue has not been fully argued. Therefore, given my view that I should exercise my discretion to permit Indu to participate in the passing of accounts, it is not necessary for me to finally decide this issue and I leave it for another day.

[43] However, even if I am wrong in my conclusion that Meenu is entitled to participate in this proceeding as of right, there are other reasons why I am of the view that both Meenu and Indu should be given standing in this matter. I acknowledge that some of the points raised by both Meenu and Indu can be addressed through their testimony and the submissions of the PGT. For example, the cost of renovations to the Bell Harbour property raised by Indu is a point that can be addressed by the PGT through evidence, including the evidence of Meenu.

[44] Counsel for Mr. Amani makes the point that there have been no other cases where a party not listed in section 42 has been added to a passing of accounts. Other than Childs, I have not been able to find a case directly on this point either. It is a discretionary decision. In exercising that discretion, I am of the view that a number of factors may be relevant. Those factors could include:

a) Whether any orders may be made that might prejudice the rights or interests of a party seeking standing.

b) Whether a party seeking standing has a close and ongoing connection to the incapable person beyond merely a familial relationship.

c) Whether a party seeking standing has been involved, on an informal basis, with the management of the affairs of the incapable person, either while the incapable person was still capable or once they became incapable.

d) Whether the involvement of the party seeking standing would serve to unduly complicate or lengthen the proceeding.

e) Whether the party seeking standing is doing so on a good faith basis.

[45] I now turn to the facts before me. In this case, there are issues that will be determined that affect the interests and rights of Meenu and Indu more directly. In that respect, I note the following points:

a) Mr. Amani alleges that he was not aware that the allegedly forged power of attorney was forged. He claims (at paragraphs 26 and 27 of his submissions) that Meenu gave it to him, which means that he appears to be suggesting that Meenu forged this POA. A court may have to make a finding on that point, which may adversely affect Meenu’s rights.

b) Mr. Amani alleges that a credit card with HSBC was actually Meenu’s credit card and that the allegations that Mr. Amani fraudulently took out this credit card are false. Adjudicating this claim will very possibly result in one or the other of Mr. Amani or Meenu being liable for this debt. As a result, a Court may have to make a finding on that point, which may adversely affect Meenu’s rights.

c) Mr. Amani alleges that he paid significant expenses on behalf of Sundri. However, Indu was responsible for managing the pension monies that were coming into Sundri’s account. As a result, the adjudication of who was paying which expenses may result in the Court making findings that adversely affect Indu’s rights and interests.

[46] Mr. Amani directs my attention to Ontario Federation of Anglers and Hunters v. Ontario (Minister of Natural Resources and Forestry), 2015 ONSC 7969, (2015) 128 O.R. (3d) 501 for the proposition (at para. 10) that a party is necessary to a proceeding if they are likely to be affected or prejudiced by the order being made.

[47] In this case, I have noted in paragraph 45 the bases on which findings may be made against each of Indu and Meenu. On that basis alone, I am of the view that I should exercise my discretion and allow them to participate in this passing of accounts. To put it another way, in his September 16, 2024 Affidavit, Mr. Amani states that his record keeping is “far from exemplary” and that it was “largely due to my reliance on our family’s informal arrangements with money and the ownership of property.” These informal arrangements mean that all three siblings were involved in the management of Sundri’s affairs and that, on the passing of accounts the Court may make findings that adversely affect all three of them.

[48] Put another way, Mr. Amani states in his own submissions that “both Meenu and Indu have been accused of inappropriate dealings with [Sundri’s] property.” Findings in respect of those allegations may be made against Meenu and Indu in the passing of accounts.

[49] Having concluded that the record keeping was informal, that the parties seeking standing have significant knowledge of the events, and that they may have adverse findings made against them, both Indu and Meenu’s requests for standing should be granted.

[50] There is one further reason why I am of the view that Indu should be given standing. In BMO, the daughter who was power of attorney for personal care was given standing. In that decision, the Court noted (at para. 16) that it would be “very important” to have the child with the power of attorney for personal care involved in the passing of accounts, given “the nature and closeness of the relationship.” In this case, although Indu and Sundri are no longer living together, they lived together for more than twenty years. In those circumstances, I am of the view that it would be important for the Court to have Indu as a party.

[51] Mr. Amani also argues that the objections filed by Meenu and Indu are sweeping generalizations and should not be allowed. I acknowledge that the objections need to be particularized: Vano (Re), 2012 ONSC 262. However, that claim is not a basis to deny someone standing to participate in a proceeding. The question is not whether their complaints are sufficiently particularized. It is a question of whether, inter alia, their rights are affected.

[52] Finally, I should address Mr. Amani’s argument that both Indu and Meenu are seeking standing because of their personal grievance against Mr. Amani. While that may be true, Mr. Amani’s Affidavit in support of his passing of accounts seems to suggest that he will be blaming them for certain events as well. They are entitled to defend themselves against those allegations as parties.

[53] For all of these reasons, Indu and Meenu are granted standing to participate in the passing of accounts.

c) The Issues in Respect of Mr. Patel

[54] Mr. Patel’s submissions raise separate issues. Mr. Patel points out that the PGT is entitled to fully participate in the passing of accounts. Mr. Patel argues that it will be in Sundri’s best interests for him, as one of the PGT’s counsel, to participate in the passing of accounts. He points out that the passing of accounts should not be a hermetically sealed process.

[55] Counsel for Mr. Amani argues that Mr. Patel is not the PGT’s solicitor of record for the passing of accounts. He argues that the PGT could have appointed Mr. Patel as counsel and chose not to. Counsel acknowledges that the PGT likely made that decision because Mr. Amani would have objected to Mr. Patel’s appointment.

[56] In the circumstances, I am not persuaded to make any changes to the orders that have previously been made. Those orders appear to me to provide Mr. Patel with sufficient entitlement to participate in the hearing of the case to ensure that Sundri’s interests are protected. Further having more than one counsel in a speaking role at a hearing can be difficult for the Court to manage. I note that this order can be varied by the judge hearing the passing of accounts.

[57] For those reasons, Mr. Patel’s request is denied.

Issue #2 – Medical Documents

[58] The issue of Sundri’s capacity is likely to be raised during the course of the passing of accounts. At some point, Sundri became incapable of managing her affairs. The question will be when. To that end, Mr. Amani has sought various medical documents.

[59] During the course of the case-management conference on February 3, 2025, I heard argument about the appropriate procedure for addressing medical documents. In my endorsement of the same date, I explained the procedure that I adopted and why I adopted it. I will briefly summarize my conclusions.

[60] The approach I am using is to have Mr. Patel submit the medical documents to me. I will then review those documents and determine whether there are documents that should be disclosed to the other parties. I will then provide those documents to the other parties. I will also provide a general description of the materials that I have received.

[61] Once the parties have reviewed the documentation, they may seek to have me disclose additional documentation. That will require either an expert report explaining what additional documents are relevant or an evidentiary basis to disclose the documentation. Those requests can be made at the next case conference, and the issue of medical disclosure will be added to the issue agenda.

[62] In the meantime, I will note that I did not adopt Mr. Amani’s approach to medical disclosure. That approach was either to produce everything or to have each side retain an expert and have the experts review everything and determine what should be produced. In deciding what medical information should be produced, I am cognizant of the fact that the parties need disclosure to address the issue of when Sundri became incapacitated. However, I am also cognizant of the fact that what is sought is medical information, which is some of the most private and personal information that exists about a person. Given Sundri’s vulnerabilities, I must balance the need for disclosure with the need to protect her privacy and dignity. Those principles are the overriding points that are guiding my decisions in respect of production.

[63] At this point, I confirm that I have received a bundle of 234 pages of medical records from Sundri’s family doctor, Dr. Graham. I have had an opportunity to review that bundle of records and can confirm that it contains the following general types of items:

a) Clinical notes of visits from 2014 to the present.

b) Blood work and other laboratory tests ordered over a period of time.

c) Referrals to various specialists

d) Treatment records for various visits to Trillium Health.

e) Reports from various other health professionals.

f) Informational reports from various home visits.

[64] In reviewing this documentation, I determined that some general points should apply to the disclosure, as follows:

a) Where an entry in the clinical notes and records mentions either dementia or the ongoing family disputes in this matter, I have disclosed the entire entry. I have done that for completeness.

b) I have generally disclosed the bloodwork that was done on Sundri, except where it appeared clear to me that the bloodwork was for a condition (or conditions) unrelated to her underlying mental health and dementia.

c) It appears that Sundri suffered a stroke in 2009. This is a medical event that could cause deterioration in her cognitive functioning. I have ordered the documents on this issue to be disclosed.

d) Sundri has a number of prescriptions. I have generally not disclosed the information on Sundri’s prescriptions.

e) The one exception to the point in subparagraph (e) is the fact that I have disclosed one clinical entry from 2024 that lists a significant series of pieces of information. I had originally intended to disclose a list of diagnoses of other conditions. However, it is clear from the records that have been filed that Sundri’s children are all well aware of her various health challenges. This document is being disclosed as it provides a more complete picture of Sundri’s clinical circumstances so that the parties have a more complete understanding of what factors may be impinging on Sundri’s cognitive functioning.

f) Other than these documents, I am not disclosing anything. However, I have put page numbers on the documentation. Those page numbers run from 1 to 234. I have numbered the pages to provide the parties with a sense of the quantity of records that exist and to indicate where in the bundle of records the extracts were pulled from.

[65] The documents that are being disclosed are the ones that have been provided to Indu and to counsel for Meenu and Mr. Amani with the e-mailed version of these reasons. They are being provided to these parties because they all have standing on the passing of accounts. Until, and unless, those documents are produced in open court during the passing of accounts, they remain confidential. They cannot be disclosed to anyone who is not counsel, a party or a retained expert without further Order of the Court.

[66] Finally, while I am adding the issue of medical documentation to the list of issues for our next case conference on March 4, 2025, I do not expect the parties to wait until then to address the issue. In that respect, if Mr. Patel needs assistance in obtaining documentation from Trillium Health Care, he is to advise me and I will provide the necessary orders. I understand that he requested that information, paid the fees in December, and was told that it would be provided within thirty (30) days and it has yet to be received.

[67] Similarly, if Mr. Amani’s counsel wishes to have me consider producing additional documentation on the basis of either the documents I have produced or on the basis of expert reports that they are willing to produce, I am prepared to consider those requests. I do not want this issue lingering and/or causing the hearing into the passing of accounts to be delayed. As a result, if a party does not assert their position on this issue in a timely way, I may determine that they have lost the right to assert their position.

Conclusion and Costs

[68] For the foregoing reasons, I am ordering as follows:

a) Indu and Meenu shall have standing to participate in the passing of accounts.

b) Mr. Patel’s participation in the passing of accounts shall be as described in paragraph 15 of my January 13, 2025 endorsement.

c) Certain medical documentation from Sundri’s family doctor is to be produced. However, the distribution and use of that documentation is limited as described in paragraph 65.

d) The issue of medical documentation is added to the list of outstanding issues for the case conference on March 4, 2025.

[69] In terms of costs, both Meenu and Indu have been successful in their request for standing at the passing of accounts. Similarly, the PGT was unsuccessful in having me expand Mr. Patel’s role in this matter beyond what was previously ordered. Costs normally follow the event and should normally be fixed at the first opportunity.

[70] However, I am of the view that the costs of this portion of the Application for Passing of Accounts should be determined by the judge conducting the hearing. That judge will be in a better position to determine whether the involvement of Indu and Meenu was of value to the process. Similarly, that judge will be in a better position to determine whether the limits that have been placed on Mr. Patel resulted in the proceeding being longer and/or more cumbersome.

[71] In addition, the medical documentation is being addressed in a cooperative manner. It is also difficult to know whether the costs associated with the production of those documents are justified. As a result, any costs in respect of the medical documentation are deferred to the passing of accounts.

[72] As a final reminder, counsel (and Indu) are reminded to ensure that all of the materials that were served and provided to me in this matter are filed with the Court office and uploaded to CaseLines.

[73] I remain seized of this matter as the case management judge.

Released: February 26, 2025

Justice Sylvia C. Lemay